VIRTUAL REALITIES AND REAL VIRTUALITIES

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by
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I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my option it is
fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree
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Abstract

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This study endeavors to explicate different conceptions of virtuality in relation to the concept of technology. Departing from the popular conceptions of virtuality discussed within the framework of digital technologies, the study aims to elaborate on the subject within different contexts where the nature of virtuality is not confined to a specific definition but expanded within all different considerations. The nature of relation between virtuality and reality is discussed under the influence of a number of complimentary conceptions introduced by G. Deleuze and H. Bergson.

Key Words: Virtuality, Reality, Actuality, Technology, Natural, Artificial

Özet

SANAL GERÇEKLİKLER VE GERÇEK SANALLIKLAR

Orkan Telhan

Grafik Tasarım Bölümü

Yüksek Lisans

Bu çalışma, sanallık kavramı ile ilgili farklı anlayışları teknoloji kavramı ile ilişkilendirek bir araya getirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Araştırmada, günümüzde sanallığı sadece sayısal (dijital) teknolojilerde çerçevesinde tartışan populer anlayışlardan yola çıkarak, belirli bir tanıma ve kavrama bağlı kalmaksızın, konu hakkındaki anlayışların daha da farklı bağlamlarda geliştirilmesi düşünülmüştür. Bu amaçla gerçeklik ve sanallık arasındaki ilişki
G. Deleuze ve H. Bergson'un kavramlarının da yardımıyla incelenmeye çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Sanal, Gerçek, Gerçekleşme, Teknoloji, Doğal, Yapay

Acknowledgements

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Virtual Realities and Real Virtualities

1. INTRODUCTION

Virtuality is a concept about peculiarities. It mostly
announces perhaps something other than itself every time,
within all different considerations, and hesitates to settle a
meaning, a definite conception that naturally corresponds to a
particular subject. Many different interpretations,
associations and considerations of virtuality actually do not
agree upon one actual 'state' or 'condition' of virtuality,
but to a great number of different articulations within
different trajectories. Correspondingly, each consideration
for virtuality thus reflects different conceptions,
systematics, and parameters that continuously defer any
locality for its meaning. As each conception of virtuality is
handled differently, the virtual subject is generally
experienced in relation to other conceptions where other
meanings are mostly postulated as 'opposite' states,
conditioned 'other' than virtuality.

It is possible to observe one of the most frequent uses of the word 'virtual' as a suffix to the word 'reality,' in which virtuality is determined with what is presumed as real, and projected onto something 'other' than what was assured as real at particular context. Virtuality is posited as something other than the reality, but the 'otherness' is nevertheless a 'vague' otherness, that does not correspond to something particular, but only a difference, proclaiming the reality itself as the determinant of the meaning, to present both itself and conditions its very other at the very moment. The meaning of virtuality is immanently imbued with a separation, with a difference. However, the way this explicit separation is handled, will be the core of this study.

This is just the sense in which the words 'virtual' and 'virtuality' are used here. There is a multitude of different relations presented to grasp the nature of virtuality, and the sole purpose ceases to embrace a potentially more significant or more influential conception among other considerations, in fact the intention is to follow the subject traversing different relations with other conceptions and concentrate on it as a becoming of a reality by itself.

Today, virtuality is mostly associated with computer technologies, cognitive thinking models, artificial environments and is often figured as a task to achieve, merely

an activity of presenting something intangible, fictitious, and unreal, that is something 'unnatural' and absent from the so-called 'real' world. Indeed, different levels of virtuality are discussed under different circumstances, and a conception of progress, a history of improvement is often posed on to the virtual subject when one medium's capability of representing the quality of virtuality is put in relation to another's. For instance, computer environments are recurrently perceived as more virtual environments than lets say books or images, when compared in terms of the level of presenting artificiality, often by the claim of their ability to provoke multi sensory experiences.

There is a genealogy of the different trajectories of technology that confront with the conception of virtuality and introduce different instrumentation of thought that are more or less successful in emphasizing the experience of sensing the difference between reality and virtuality. This, indeed, is what is most commonly maintained by all conceptions. The nature of difference is experienced as a reality, but the difference itself is not handled as virtuality, as a different nature for constructing relations.

Likewise, throughout the research, it is desired to advance the conception virtuality without particularly concentrating on a definite domain of technology or focus on a certain

medium, such as computational environments, virtual reality installations, or particular visual and verbal media. This study is not aimed to provide any answers to the question 'What is real, or what is virtual?' and it should not be regarded as a ground of discussion that means to acquire a definite method, an order of knowledge for any exact conception of virtuality. Instead, by trying to avoid any preconceptions that correspond to the claim of a certain particular virtuality, it is favored to approach any conception in its own exactitude, in its own awareness in relation to virtuality, without positing a legislative attitude.

As this study is not intended to accomplish a complete extensive analysis of different virtualities presented among disparate modals of thinking, it tries to emphasize mostly the involvement with the activity of thinking about virtuality in relation to other conceptions introduced by different philosophers. These different conceptions and different models of thought do not point further possible representations for virtuality, but in fact articulate on a series of bifurcations, unforseen directions in which virtuality can be less and less appropriated as a definite subject, and grasped each time as a more intensified concept. It would be contingent to state that this study does not mean to advance one particular conception as an opposition to the other. The

relation among them can be contemplated as a relation postulated preceeding the introduction of any oppositional modal of thinking and merely correspond to an exercise, to the movement of thinking along other conceptions, other relations for unforseen ends. As a definite figuration for virtuality would necessarily attain only to a deduced and limited consideration addressed to a particular point of view or to a particular kind of disclosure; the subject will be preferred to be handled with all of its divergence, without any privileging or negation of thought, that may obstruct the very thinking itself. Like every thought operating in relation to former considerations, this study will inevitably be in association with some suppositions, however this quality of relations are intended to present the focus on the nature of the 'relations' unlike privileging one with respect to another.

The first chapter of the research discusses merely the technological connotations of virtuality within the particular framework of digital technologies. As the popular vocabulary which discusses that virtuality is oriented towards the contemporary technological framework, it is considered deliberate to start with the existing conceptions of virtuality and the critique posed onto them. This contemplation aims to discuss how these articulations, these ways of setting relations project themselves onto inadequate

presuppositions that do not discuss the nature of relations, but only a limited idea of virtuality which is intrinsically restrained by its confined conceptions bound to particular perspectives.

The conception of technology is often associated with a diversity of definitions based on different models of thinking, which are continuously changing parameters, mechanisms referring to historicist standpoints. As these definitions do not follow a consistent path, and usually focus only to singular planes of activity, different meanings are usually appropriated to signify particular kind of relations ordered between human beings and their needs. Different trajectories of technology are depicted separately from the nature of beings and approached with a distinguishing attitude that grounds the opposition between the nature of beings and the culture that built upon with those particular kind of activities shaped throughout the flow of time.

The conception of technology, in this text, will not be handled by focusing onto a particular activity, or privileging a particular medium that instrumentalize a specific order of knowledge ascertaining certain kind of relations configured with reference points in time. Instead, technology will be considered as the sum total, the immanent cartography of the intrinsic and extrinsic relations among singularities, bodies,

and differential elements that are not figured according to a particular perspective such as a being naturally identified with a definite embodiment such as a human-being, animal or a thing… etc. As each figuration of thought, once addressed to a discrete conception of the subject, would necessarily be inferior in presenting the multitude of relations; these critiques are only presented with their own arguments that implement their own modal of thinking, their singular way of contemplation on the fabrication of thought.

In the second chapter, there are a number of concepts introduced from philosophies of Spinoza, H. Bergson, D. Deleuze and J. Rajchman. These conceptions are therefore presented to foreground Bergson and Deleuze's conception of virtuality that introduces a different conception for the nature of difference and that provides further articulations on virtuality based on a different way of acquiring relations. These different conceptions are considered in a mutual and discursive relation with each other and along each other, so that, different influences on virtuality are observed not in controversially, but in fact in virtuality that structures an unsettlement and indetermination for their figures of thought. These conceptions do also correspond to the vocabulary of meaning that discusses virtuality within the technological framework. However, this locality is not aimed to present somehow a legitimizing conception, an alternative thought, a

truth that may promise to reflect better or preferred understandings of virtuality within the same framework. In fact, this locality can be understood as a neighboring for concepts that shall provide an opening for the discussion of virtuality that is once obstructed within the very same vocabulary.

There is the presentation of a series of possible remarks within this study that discuss the nature of the relations within a number "differenciated"[1] concepts. In this respect, the aim is to present different experiences, different trajectories for discussing virtuality, and yet strive to elaborate on both with the intrinsic and the extrinsic qualities and quantities of the relations. Once this text is exposed on thinking on virtuality, it may only reflect experiences with thought that are expressed when impinged with a multiplicity of relations, and eludes attaining a certain argument about a 'knowable' conception of virtuality. The lore of virtuality is not immanently deferred, but perpetually intensified within itself by every reconsideration. This study, therefore does not aim to suggest a confrontation with a dissolution for any existing conception of virtuality, but would rather prefer to point an unsettled character, indicate an inability to represent the infinity of relations that occur for each conception at the same moment. Virtuality abruptly dismisses to dismiss any former understanding, any formed

figuration of thought about itself and instead considers each of them with their singular histories, as assemblages of complexities, intensities and extensities.

If a conception is considered with an opposition to an other, it often infers a form of thinking emphasizing particular figurations of thought or determined beings for meanings, and therefore become subjected to a claim of presenting definite exteriorities between conceptions. Throughout this study, the conception of virtuality would be discussed more or less at an a priori state in which both its inside and the outside, and the character of relations that constitute one in relation to other are not fixed yet. Thus each attempt for uttering a meaning for virtuality would only be an increment in appreciating an awareness for comprehending the complexity of its singular conception that is on its own way of becoming.

The reality of virtuality can be conceived as the very experience of the force of thinking along each and every conception that accumulates within the geography of this text. Thereupon, it would only be the finitude of this very text that will configure the ground, this confined plane for discussion for the nature of thought investing on its very virtuality.

2. ON VIRTUALITY

2.1. Virtuality as a Technological Metaphor

In popular vocabulary, virtuality is usually considered as a subject that is articulated only in a context where the form of virtuality becomes the constituent of the meaning. Virtual becomes part of a language where there is always the desire to construct a virtual world, a virtual house, a virtual space, that is a virtual 'thing' which actually is not present in the reality, but needed to be presumed 'as if' real only as a metaphor, a simulation or as a prosthesis for the real. Virtuality as a suffix to reality is considered as a modal of representation, a technical reproduction for the perceived reality. The condition of virtuality is always reserved for an application, a construct, a modal that is subsumed in the technological framework providing a mechanism that structures virtual in relation to an existence, whose absence is reserved prior to any presence.

Attending both to a cultural and technological nomenclature, virtuality is 'mediated' as a digital representational method within the dynamics of the contemporary visual culture. Virtuality is considered mostly as the technological concept in which one might expect both the object and the subject of virtuality provided within the medium in which it is presented. For example: Virtuality is considered as an attenuated existence in a computer-generated world, or

discussed as an immersive experience in a simulation environment provided with a range of different access devices. The user of a particular kind of apparatus is registered as an agent introduced from an 'outside' real world to the 'inside' of a virtual world. The agent is transformed from a 'reality' into a symbolic value, a metaphor, a 'virtuality,' an artifice that can navigate, interact and become engaged in an affective experience. An immersion, a willing suspension in the disbelief of its former condition provides the agent a temporary visit to the realm of virtuality. Its consciousness has been 'extended' through this immerse exercise so that the agent becomes part of a vocabulary of presence in which its internal circuitry has been excessively stimulated to be left open to an outside. Now the natural being is transformed into an artifice, a habitant of an anthropic space.

Virtuality is often presented as an actualization for humans to visualize, manipulate and interact with computers. Computers generate visual, auditory or other sensual outputs to the user either within the computer or at a display screen presenting an environment that can either be a model, a simulation, an augmented reality or conceived as a tele-presence that corresponds to a nature of becoming subjected to a displacement with the perception of an imaginary distance outside the actual one. Either the whole world is transformed into a computer interface (ubiquitous computing) or the

interface is totally erased, in order to provide either an appealing interactive television monitoring and rearranging the physical world or a virtual reality that is refashioning the immersive qualities of Hollywood films. If asked a popular definition can be traced as follows:

> "Virtual Reality is an interface that immerses participants in a 3-dimensional Real-time synthetic environment generated by one (or several) computer(s). Input to the system can be done simultaneously with body movement tracking and verbal commands, and devices such as 'wands,' 'data gloves,' etc. The result is simultaneous stimulation of participants' senses (Mainly vision and hearing, and occasionally touch) that gives a vivid impression of being immersed in a synthetic environment with which one interacts" (Boyer).

The users can interact with the world and directly manipulate objects within the world. Those can be physical simulations or simple animation scripts that run with the interaction of the user accordingly. Hardware such as image generators, controlling devices, position trackers, head mounted displays are used to gather information about the user, and used to react upon with a simulation based on the interpretation of the information provided. They can be either presented as realistic simulations or 'simulacra' that bear no necessary

resemblance to anything existing in the physical world. The immaterial one transcends the material environment.

This environment is considered as an immersive space in which the user is embodied and disembodied at the same time. The user is presented both within the environment as an actual being providing the information necessary for the representation and at the same time, a being that is always presented at a critical distance within the externality of the mediating environment. As the opposition between the reality and virtuality is at the locus of this technology, the immersion into the environment is always kept in a duality of being inside and outside to the environment secured by the binary opposition.

> "Wearing a VR helmet, you can visit the world of the dinosaur, then become a tyrannosaurus. Not only you can see a DNA molecule; you can experience what it's like to become a molecule" (Davies).

Both the experience of being a Dinosaur and the artificial Dinosaur is based on the level of human knowledge that is capable of representing the reality of the information of what we understood as being a Dinosaur. As Char Davies argues

> "If we create a model of a bird to fly around in virtual space, the most this bird can ever be, even with millions of polygons and ultra-sophisticated

programming, is the sum of our (very limited) knowledge about birds: it has no otherness, no mysterious being, no autonomous life. What concerns me is that one dry out culture may consider the simulated bird (that obeys our command) to be enough and perhaps even superior to the real entity. In doing so we will be impoverishing ourselves, trading mystery for certainty and living beings for symbols...a world in 'man's' own image" (Davies *Natural Artifice*).

In those articulations the outside reality is considered 'unmediated' and 'natural,' while virtuality, conceived either transparent as if in VR installation or opaque in hypermediated computer interface, is always 'mediated,' 'artificial' and subjective. Consequently, virtuality is often presented as the experience lived in between the relation of the unforeseen means with the foreseen capabilities of thought.

Virtuality is never thought as 'real virtuality,' but always contemplated as a 'virtual reality' that is associated with an inauthenticity, unreality, falsity and an 'electronic irrealism' while contemplating a presence, it is an a priori condition to an absence. When the conditions that postulate virtuality disappears, virtuality is also forced to disappear. An absence of its presence is always reserved for the virtual

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subject. Thus, virtuality becomes the interplay within the media where it is both mediated and actualized however never expressed as a reality in.

2.2. Critical Approaches to Virtuality

The conception of virtuality, when rendered both as an object and a subject within the logecentric technological framework, becomes subjected to Cartesian recuperations. Once being presented as the opposite condition of reality, virtuality is discussed only within the dualistic modal of thinking based on the semantic interface of binary oppositions. The condition of virtuality is grounded in a dualism between absence/presence, inside/outside, material/immaterial, natural/artifice, which are postulated as one state of actualization in relation/opposition to the other.

As discussed only as a technological reproduction modal, and foregrounded as an ontological existence in opposition to a reality in the logocentric framework, virtuality is often postulated as a problematic subject to be discussed within various media studies[2]. It would be possible to state some of the contemporary critiques addressed to virtual reality's technological, social and cultural implications. After all the purpose is to present how these criticisms are mostly working within the same mechanisms of thought which they intend to criticize. It can be implored how these criticisms extensively

utilize the dialectical logic and therefore are subjected to fall into the same consequences they intend to criticize. It is important to note that, these criticisms are only addressing virtuality in the evolution of communication and computer technologies. Virtuality, when considered as ontology of representation within the framework of technology, is positioned as a medium that necessarily follows a progressive, and evolutionary logic in a historical trajectory.

These criticisms can be summarized under three aspects that can be examined as critical concomitant pervasive readings of the varios characters of technology. Yet, it is important here to note that there is the limited conception of technology only as praxis, as prosthesis, an instrument, or a medium with its promises and anticipated effects. Technology as 'prosthesis' approach can be considered as a translation of the social and cultural desire for mediation. A mediation is foregrounded with its precursive character, entailing an organization of meaning that is trapped within the predetermination of a modal or theory. Accordingly, technology is projected as the maternal desire to construct or locate an essence for virtuality and virtuality is argued as a subject that is embodied within the communication technologies, partakes the logic of being a conduit, a metaphor that is critically functioning within the mechanism as an utopian disclosure posed on this conception of technology.

These categories can be summarized as follows:

1. Once prescribed as a new path of an escape route from the constrains of the embodied reality, virtuality is thought as a hallmark of a romanticism that is a flight from the oppressive character of social, political and cultural restrictions. Therefore it is presented as an old dream for establishing rational social control over space, information and identity (Hillis).

Virtuality is considered as a search for an ideal existence, for a better being other than human, an even better copy of real within a closed system, based on mathematical modals and engineering methods. There is the desire for immaterialization that gives birth to virtuality.

2. Virtuality is often thought as an extension of Western metaphysics, a transcendental identity politics that is always after facilitating new signification systems for transgression. The Cartesian split of being and having based on the famous mind/body separation is therefore thought as a nostalgia for 'leaving the body behind,' for the sake of becoming pure information. This desire is articulated as a desire for becoming the author of your own ontological ground. An attempt for erasing the question of origin, but just in reverse ending up with extensively multiplying it (Kirby).

While an epistemological position is reserved for the 'self,' the desire for creating the emphatical displacement is hypermediated. The self becoming a series of other possible points of view is encapsulated in the identity politics that is grounded onto an incompleteness based on a conception of lack, an ontological projection for being other, but repressed within a Cartesian dissolution referring to an omnipresent transcendental ego. Cartesian duality and the dichotomous logic are presented as multiplying each other through different systems of mediation within technology.

3. Virtuality is considered as a new medium operating within the same ideological nature of former media. As David Bolter has noted, there is the sense of "presentness"-not exactly a conviction of the world's presence to us, but of our presence to it, in which the desire to express one's self through media (language) predates long before the development of digital media (*Remediation* 234-235). There is always the mechanism of a dialectics that remediated the self to itself with the aid of a certain level of technology. The subjectivity becoming what is presented to the self during this mediation opens "the route to conviction in reality through the acknowledgement of the endless presence of the self" (*Remediation* 234). The world registered as object (of mimesis) and the user as subject (of expression) then point to a transcendental identity politics

that is based on the (represented) distance between subject-object dichotomy. A critical distance is both secured and transcendent. There is the presentation of an environment where a user can either pass through a window 'enter' into the immersion of the represented world, or the subjects and objects of representation can come up through the window and incorporate the viewer. A dialectics of an exercise that is merely a (re)mediation since illusionist painting, realistic photography, cinema, television and virtual reality installations. A conception of language that is based on technology of the medium is after all continuously presenting the self to itself (Bolter).

After all the intention in this thesis is to open the discussion of virtuality into a broader perspective. While trying to avoid the immutable, limited and fixed characteristics of the concepts that partake in the discussion of technology, it would be possible to articulate on virtuality not only as a subject or object conceived within digital technologies. Virtuality can be accepted merely as an "image of thought"[3], a concept which is not bound to any taxonomical vocabulary exercising a dichotomous mechanism for producing meanings. Therefore it should not be accepted as an incarnation of certain praxis within the dynamics of the medium where it is represented. After all the technological framework that postulates virtuality should not be approached

in its inferiority that is addressing a distinct natural difference between speaking through digital technologies and speaking through the very technology of the body. Therefore when we speak of technology of virtuality, it would be an inadequate response to immediately consider the only conception of virtuality within the digital technologies, and dismiss the very nature of the intrinsic relations that involve within each other. Languages, mathematical orders, and all visual and verbal signification systems are indistinguishably intertwined within each other and subjected to a differentiation from one another with their capability of addressing the complexity of the relations that each can represent within their system. As each language will conceive a different conception of virtuality within its own conformity, virtuality becomes a mysterious conception that corresponds to the very nature of the undefined, unforseen relations as well.

3. THE VIRTUALITY OF THE VIRTUAL

The technological conception of virtuality as a theory or praxis should not be a discussion about the essence of virtuality. In fact in these conceptions the essence of virtuality is not even virtual, but instead correspond to a realization of a possibility in the name of virtuality. The sole purpose in this study is not to trace the ontological constitution of the virtual subject, or to reappropriate a

position for the virtual object in a philosophical context and neither is to deconstitute the technological conception of virtuality in relation to other figures of thought. Virtuality, as discussed before, can be accepted as a social, historical and cultural investment in which virtuality is always positioned at an imaginary distance, to be rendered as an unreality, a fictive state. However a variety of conceptions of virtuality can be grasped while thinking along different vocabularies which can construct a multitude of other relations under the influence of the concepts introduced by philosophies of Spinoza, H. Bergson, G. Deleuze, and J. Rajchman.

Deleuzian concept of virtuality suggests a motif of his philosophical thinking modal which has different traces in different texts written by him. It is a mode of engagement with virtuality in order not to discuss it only as a vocabulary of an application of a virtual 'thing,' but to acquire it as an underlying figure that constructs new concepts and releases further meanings from existing articulations. An application of virtuality, an actualization is thus not a method or a modal of a logic like the Cartesian thinking or Hegelian *Aufhebung* that produces concepts in order to transcend them. Concepts in the dichotomous modal, become subjects at stake, as they are always kept at their finitude in order to secure a position for their essence. After all

virtuality unsettles the distinction between concepts and therefore provides a plurality while multiplying their relations with each other.

Virtuality introduces a new conception for concepts. Concepts do become intertwined disparities operating in an informal plan of thought. Virtuality projects concepts as 'meta-stable' constructs (Gilbert Simondon) that change themselves along with the definition of their individual components (Rajchman, *Deleuze Connections* 58). They do not embody relativism, but instead compose an incomplete and indefinite structure in order not to fall into a conventional way of subjectification. Each of them continuously invents new meanings within its architecture and therefore posits a potentiality through differentiation. Concepts do territoralize, deterritoralize and reterritoralize at the same time within an immanent topography of thought in relation to each other.

As J. Rachman traces, this is a logic of "complication" based on an infinite neighboring of the differences of concepts in a continuous differentiation yielding certain vagueness (*Deleuze Connections* 61). This vagueness always provide them a structure in continuous experimentation, "a freshness of what has not been made definite by habit or law" within its existing structure (*Deleuze Connections* 55). Concepts do occupy certain coexistence and preexistence with each other,

and as their conceptions start to get away from subjectifications with fixed discursive regularities, the relation in between them become a "nondialectizable" one which suggest an opening to the dichotomous logic (*Deleuze Connections* 50). Virtuality becomes an unforseen force for extending the relation happening in between the concepts, and to open a path to perceive what was not foreseen, and to sense what was indiscernible at the moment of thinking.

Therefore the conception of virtuality should not be abridged only as a confrontation with the existing vocabulary of reality, and neither should be presented as an attempt to become both its critique and advocate, to either diagnose or celebrate. Virtuality is considered as a concept providing an opening out from itself, from its technological connotations to the point where it becomes beside itself. While articulating within these concepts, it will be possible to confront with the vocabulary used in the technological conception of virtual. As these concepts will inevitably recall the technocentric articulations of virtuality, these are not going to be accepted as rival opinions or extensional conditions that necessarily embody limitations. On the contrary they will be translated from the virtual character of virtuality that is in a continuous state of becoming a conception in different trajectories. Here, virtuality is not going to be thought only with certain figures, methods and

concepts, but also by, for, and along with concepts that differenciate along their way of becoming themselves.

These concepts can be suggested as follows:

Virtual-Actual, Real-Possible

Difference-Differenciation

Concept, The Plane of Immanence

Multiplicity

Duration (Time-Space)

Body

Event

Natural-Artificial and Technology

Given these concepts, it is possible to articulate on how these concepts can be thought under the influence of the conception of virtuality. As each conception can only be experienced in relation to other figurations, and as each thought can only be grasped always in correlation to former thought in the flux of thinking, this study aims to consider these different concepts as openings to the discussion of virtuality. Virtuality, here, can be observed in its singular conception that is always in a line of becoming in relation to other components of thought. The nature of differenciation, and bifurcation through other conceptions, other images of thought does not privilege a singular appearance, a unique

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conception and force the others to a disappearance. Instead, within different texts of Deleuze and Bergson it is possible to observe how the nature of concepts ascribes an incompleteness and uncertainty.

Therefore, in this study, these concepts are not introduced to locate different traces within auxiliary meanings, rather they aim to present the topography of thought in how differentiation itself becomes subjected to virtuality. As Deleuzian concepts may show different confrontations within different contexts, this should not be regarded as an attempt to prescribe a certain understanding for virtuality, but only find a reservoir for the aggregate of meanings under different orientations. The becoming of a concept secures a fluidity of a continuous flow, which rejects certain temporalizations that determine the state of meaning of a concept. Concepts always increase their linkages and populate further connections. Therefore, it is not aimed to interfere with this continuous accumulation of thought to suppose a particular conception of virtuality. Besides, it is not intended to limit virtuality only to a concept or only to a vague assemblage of thought that is concerned with the limits of other conceptions. As virtuality signifies both an irregular heterogeneity and a precise consistency in different texts, there is the intention to witness different confrontations of virtuality during its

infinite movement, at its infinite speed within this different layers of thought.

It is possible to state that Deleuze starts with an articulation of virtuality, which he borrows from Bergson and then let it becoming a concept through different actualizations of thought. Virtuality ceases to become while passing through its components marks new territories and simultaneously becomes inseparable from its constructs. When Deleuze states "In its production and reproduction, the concept has the reality of the virtual" the virtual becomes a necessary state of the affairs that conceptualize the concept (*What is Philosophy* 159). Besides virtuality becomes the 'meanwhile,' the time of the 'event' in its passes, the composite becoming character of the event. It becomes the relation, the variable and the function, at the same time, the simultaneously intersecting virtual character with itself, inseparable yet independent encountering effectuation beside itself.

The virtual character reserved for virtuality in Deleuzian conception releases a multitude of characters in which none of them are left definite and complete enough to suggest a delimition for the virtual concept in a precision. Therefore I find it important to discuss virtuality not in with a certain organization of these concepts listed above, but instead try

to present virtuality's confrontations with these concepts in Deleuzian Philosophy. These confrontations may then reveal a more comprehensive background for the discussion of virtuality that is operating in a series of bifurcations that continuously expand and contract through different directions, diagrams new pathways, releases further considerations that maintain with each other. Virtual reveals the plane of little commas that infinitely multiplies its finitude, in which difference is differenciated, actualized, but relentlessly not realized.

3.1. Virtual-Actual, Real-Possible

The word 'virtual' dates back to use of the word *virtus*, "meaning potential, or force" (Rajchman, *Constructions* 115). Deleuze traces the nature of virtuality from Bergson's philosophy in which virtuality becomes a distinction from possibility. Possibility is considered as an opposition to reality, and on the contrary virtuality thought in relation to actuality. In which possibility disguises an actuality whereas virtuality a reality. Deleuze cites Proust's formulation for virtuality as "real without being actual, but as such posses an actuality" (*Cinema 2* 82). The process of realization is subject to two rules for Deleuze, one of resemblance and another of limitation. The real is supposed to be in the completely given image of the possible, in which "from the view of the concept, there is no difference between the

possible and the real" (*Bergsonism* 97). As every possible is not realized, realization involves a limitation in which some possibles are repulsed or thwarted and while others pass into real. "For in order to be actualized, the virtual cannot proceed by elimination or limitation (of its capacity), but must create its own (creative) line of actualizations in positive acts" (*Bergsonism* 96). The actual does not resemble with the virtuality it embodies.

"It is difference that is primary in the process of actualization- the difference between the virtual form which we begin, and the actuals at we arrive, and also the difference between the complementary lines according to which actualization takes place" (*Bergsonism* 97). The characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by creating its own lines of differenciation from itself.

For Deleuze, "we give ourselves that is ready made, preformed, pre-existent to itself and that will pass into existence according to an order of successive limitations" (*Bergsonism* 98). And as this is a backwards projection, the possible is only the (sterile) doubling of the fictitious image of the real bounded to a resemblance which does not suggest a differentiation or a mechanism of creation. As everything is already completely given, realization is only a confrontation with the pseudo-actuality of the possible. On the other hand

actualization is a generation at all levels with all tensions. And the favoring of the virtual against the possible is to release this constructive character. It is to conceive variations through differentiation. Despite this is a differentiation that is an intrinsic character to the virtual, virtuality develops itself by differentiation, creates its lines of divergence, and attains to its heterogeneous character that actualizes itself along a ramified series. The lines of divergence correspond to a particular degree in the virtual totality, a co-existence within the virtuality and thus, virtuality actualizes its level while separating the difference between the lines, and yet it embodies the "prominent points while being unaware of everything that happens on other levels" (*Bersonism* 100-101).

> "For what coexisted within the virtual ceases to coexist in the actual and is distributed in lines or parts that cannot be summed up, each one retaining the whole, except from a certain perspective, from a certain point of view. These lines of differentiation are therefore truly creative: They only actualize by inventing, they create in these conditions the physical, vital or physical representative of the ontological level that they embody" (*Bergsonism* 101).

3.2. Difference and "Differenciation"

It is important at this point to note on the nature of difference. It is a matter of discussing how differentiation is conceptualized within the constructive philosophy that produces the creative divergence of the virtuality. Is there a divergence in degree or in kind? The separation and the distancing mechanism of differentiation needs to be elaborated in order to confront with the nature of virtuality. It is important to deal with questions as such: How the heterogeneous character of virtuality maintains its necessary consistency? How virtuality indetermines itself while enveloping its difference? How a distancing becomes a continuous movement between in degree and in kind? The concept of difference is an important example in presenting how Deleuze opens a path from the Bergson's dualism in which Bergson experiences his method of "intuition" (*Bergsonism* 38), to divide the composite according to its natural articulations. This can also be accepted as an articulation on the concept of representation in which how two component elements are experienced as a deteoriation. Two pure presences (in kind) do not allow themselves to be represented, rather they experience an interpenetration within each other and becomes subjected to a continuous of exchange of their substances.

The composite is divided according to qualitative and quantitative tendencies in which Bergson presents two kinds of differentiation: Differences in kind and differences in degree in which differences in degree show the lowest degree of difference, and difference in kind show the highest form of difference. Deleuze's reading of Bergson on the concept of difference provided him with his critique on the Bergsonian conception of intensity which he found "unconvincing" (*Difference and Repetition* 239). Deleuze's main criticism lies behind a very basic inquiry: 'is there a difference in kind or degree, between differences of degree and differences in kind?' While suggesting 'Neither' as an answer Deleuze states a third characteristic in which intensity is an implicated quantity that is not implicated in quality whereas it is implicated in itself. Both "implicating and implicated". Intensity is suggested as "neither divisible, like extensive quality, nor indivisible like, quality" (*Difference and Repetition* 237). It is formulated as follows: "by the relative determination of a unit (this unit itself never being indivisible but only marking the level at which division ceases); by the equivalence of the parts determined by the unit; by the consubstantiality of the parts which the whole is divided" (*Difference and Repetition* 237). There an intensive quality may be divided, but not without changing its nature, there is the indivisible character where no part exists prior to the division and no part retains the same nature after

division. Deleuze replies to Bergsonian critique of intensity with stating the presupposition that Bergson ordered. Deleuze points that Bergson assumes qualities ready-made, and extensities already constituted. "Difference is a matter of degree only within the extensity in which it is explicated; it is a matter of kind only with regard to the quality which covers it within that extensity. Between the two are the all degrees of difference-in other words the intensive" (*Difference and Repetition* 239). However Deleuze presents an illusion, a movement in which difference in intensity is cancelled. A cancellation that is merely outside itself, "in extensity and underneath quality" (*Difference and Repetition* 237). This is a movement in its two aspects: the two orders of implication or degradation. A primary implication designating the state in which intensity is implicated in itself, and there is the secondary implication which designates the state in which intensities are enveloped by qualities and extensity which explicate them. It is in the secondary implication (or degradation) in which differences in intensity is cancelled, the highest rejoining the lowest; and a primary power of degradation in which the highest affirms the lowest" (*Difference and Repetition* 240). Deleuze points the confusion between these two instances (of the extrinsic and intrinsic states) merely as the source of this illusion that obliterates the difference in degrees on the surface while differentiation differentiates within all its aspects.

It is possible to consider differenciation as the infinite movement, the actualization of virtuality whereas it is the intrinsic character of virtuality that diverts the character of difference in a continuous unfolding between a difference in quality and a difference in intensity. It is the virtual plateau where the true difference in between belongs to neither. It is the virtual passage from one quality to the other, where there is the "phenomena of delay", "the whole play of conjunctions and disjunctions", "resemblance and continuity", and the double genesis of quality and extensity that change their nature while dividing (*Difference and Repetition* 238-239). If one proceeds on what has disappeared on the other it is the "virtual multiplicity", it is the qualitative duration that retains the double character during the degrees of expansion and contraction. Virtuality ceaselessly becomes the entire nature of difference, the fundamental illusion of differentiation. Difference in its virtual splitting then becomes unbounded, uncoordinated, and avoids becoming a moment of contradiction, or negation. Differentiation in its infinite movement acquires its power of affirmation. According to Deleuze it is only betrayed by the figures of quantitative and qualitative opposition. "Limitation and opposition are first and second dimension surface effects, whereas the living depths, the diagonal, is populated by differences without negation" (*Bergsonism* 97). It

is the virtuality of the difference that accumulates through the actualization of the differential positings. It is only the antinomy of representation that fixes the propitious moment of differenciation to a ground, for an appropriation, subordination to a resemblance, however it is virtuality, that designate an avoidance to representation, which precedes the transcendental illusion by not returning the marks of limitation and contradiction. Virtuality actualizes ungrounded affirmations and indeterminations, and not the distribution of differences, which is a manner entirely dependent on the requirements of the excluding character of representation. The world of representation establishes the ground to substitute the identical to become the internal character of representation itself for Deleuze; therefore the identical now expresses a claim which must in turn be grounded. However the ground of the virtual is an infinite 'ungrounding' which renders representation into an infinite delay. Identical becomes non-individuated, impersonal, dismembered within the infinite differenciation and virtuality becomes decentered from its resemblance operating under the mechanisms of representation.

3.3. The Concept & The Plane of Immanence
Deleuze argues that philosophy is a 'constructivism' that has two qualitatively different aspects, the creation of concepts and laying out a 'plane.' Concepts are the assemblages, the

configurations of a machine, but the plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts. The plane is the absolute horizon that provides the concepts with their singular character and secures their conceptual linkages. The plane of immanence is not a concept, but instead the image of thought for Deleuze, the image thought that gives itself of what it means to think. "It retains only what thought can claim by right, the only moment that can be carried to infinity" (*What is Philosophy* 37). It is the horizon that is in movement, the relative horizon is at an infinite movement by a coming and going, which can only advance to a destination while turning back to itself. A double movement, a reversibility, folding from one to the other in which thinking and being are said to be one and the same. "A single speed on both sides" (*What is Philosophy* 21). Unlike the Cartesian Cogito that substances the being investing on the separation. The movement towards the infinite, concerns every moment passing through the whole plane of immanence both folding onto itself and also folding other moments or allowing itself to be folded by them. Deleuze state a difference in nature between the plane and concepts.

At this point it can be regarded useful to suggest a special consideration for the double character of virtuality as a quasi-concept. Virtuality is not only the concept but at the same time the nature of relation that suggests the description

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(but not the prescription) of the plane of immanence, the ground where there is the infinite movement of the conceptions operating. Virtuality is an incomplete image of thought that sets the indeterminable, yet consistent relation among the concepts. There is the immanent kernel in between the plane of immanence and the concepts. It is a philosophical tool, the complicated machine, which installs the concepts only with their virtuality, institutes a plane of immanence, a horizon, with its virtual difference within its crystalline image. By reactivating certain parts of concepts, and while leaving the prescribed figurations, virtuality renders them visible during their becomings into multiplicities, perceives the virtual derivatives in them and thus, suggest a continuous expansion for the immanent plane. As the "plane of immanence is only immanent to itself," virtuality can be posited as only virtual to itself (*What is Philosophy* 45). It opens a free diagram of indetermination to the strict correspondence between the established concepts and the instituted plane. Virtuality is not only a before, a 'preconcept,' for explaining the creation of the concepts; nor is only a 'preplane,' for corresponding to the becoming immanent of the plane that sets the geography, the map for the concepts. Therefore it is possible to consider the preexistence and coexistence in between, not a restoration for any externality between the plane and its concepts, but reserving an immersence for the immanent plane for the thought and unthought. As Deleuze puts, the plane of immanence is the

non thought in the thought, virtuality attends to the relation (but not the method) in between the "non-external outside" and the "not-internal inside"- and the unlocalizable differentiation. The becoming of a concept, which continuously virtualizes with itself, incarnates with its own image of thought, through the plane of immanence. Virtuality is the crystalline concept laid upon the plane of immanence, the movement of the infinitude, the speed that virtualizes the finite moments of the concepts, besides it is the special construction that virtualizes each concept, turning them back to their fragmentary surface. Virtuality is thus the character of the ground, the deterritoralization that creates the concepts with their virtual difference. It is the philosophical that lies in between the philosophical and the nonphilosophical, inbetween the concept creation, concept and the instituting plane. A virtuality that essentially addresses to infinite thinking, not for an appearance of a determination, but on the contrary to renounce the virtualization of the finitude, to force it fold differently, to continually free it from its ordinates to attain the infinite speed. Virtual becomes the trace of the variable contours inscribed on the plane, 'the incessant exchange' necessary for not substituting the constitution with the constituted. A virtualization is a conception never at rest; becomes a seamless actualization turning everything into virtuality with innumerable actualities.

3.4. Multiplicity

The virtual is a concept of "multiplicity". As a new image of thought, its Deleuze's "nondialectizable" logic, "a logic of sense and event" instead of "a logic of predication and truth" about identities, categories and propositions (*Deleuze Connections* 50). Multiplicity is the very nature of the concept, the realm of seamless discursive differenciation, a 'thinking' for getting away with the "illusions of recognition and representation." It is the constructive logic of the incomplete open wholes constituted with indefinite components that differ more freely without falling into categorization of discrete or continuous variation.

Multiplicitiy is not a quantitative description of a set, or a whole that is composed of 'many' substances which show variety in nature, but instead multiplicities are made denumerable singularities, infinitely neighboring differences without being any 'instantiation' or 'specification' such as a particularity or identity. As Rajchman traces from Deleuze, these are 'impure,' mixing elements from many different species, which are yet left unresolved to release the force of differenciation. It is a differenciation logic for the multiplicity that cannot be reduced only to a 'differing' or divergence, but should also be considered as convergence, the way of 'connecting' singularities in a plan of consistency for reserving what makes them as singular.

Following Rajchman, this is a logic of abstraction with a logical operator "and" that is always connecting singularities within the geography of indistincition and which works prior to the operator "is" that ordinate predications or identity that attribute oppositions or contradictions (*Deleuze Connections* 57).

As the conception of multiplicity reserves an ontological indetermination for itself, it secures a 'vagueness,' for inferring any truth from others. This is a vagueness operating on a precision by 'inventing differenciation' procreating through unexpected ways. This is the nondialectizable nature of multiplicity that is neither a 'switching of truth-values' for moving to a higher stage in dialectics, nor an "undoing for identities to claim utilization of differences to unresolve, destabilize totalities, metastructures and metanarratives. Instead multiplicity is the ontological indetermination for restless 'destitution' for 'being.'

This is the strange geography of the multiplicity where there is the real logic of virtuality operating under different figurations of difference. Virtuality is thus the nature of the multiplicity against the problem of differentiation from 'realism.' Realism is mostly posed as the problem of classification, setting a taxonomy for relations that subsist

under distinction represented as real against unreal, true against false…and etc. However the reality of the virtual comes by the invention of the indistinguishable, the unforeseen power of not deciding about the instance of difference. Virtuality is preexistence prior to any language of judgement. It is not the consequences of this indetermination between the categories, which insist on the virtual character of the multiplicity, but instead it is the logical flow of creation that bifurcate its paths through virtualization.

The conception of multiplicity should not be considered only as an assurance for an infinite construct of affirmation, or a substitute for the disbelief resonating against Cartesian certainty, reductionism (as) negation. This would still be an attempt to reserve an ontological predicate for its being only to have it available to affirm an already established proposition. The virtual character of multiplicity deduces multiplicity from any realization, any assertional way of thinking that would only condition it towards a backward projection, a resemblance by and for itself. Rather this is to open multiplicity to its immanent character that actualizes its finitude within its singular character. The logic of the multiplicity is an encounter with the logic of virtual to definite the 'inattributable' character prior to any association with reality. Virtual thus belongs to the language

of the multiplicity, a language 'not yet spoken,' 'never completely understood.' This is another language pronounced by Deleuze, that is suspending any syntactic ties with presence, but nevertheless capable of expressing the inattributable character of becoming.

Virtuality is the multiplicity, that destitute the language of the 'be' and it is therefore the improper language of the virtual that subsists through a ramification on a contingent encounter with multiplicity. Therefore the logic of the multiplicity is to conceive speaking through the (language of) virtual as virtualization, to confront with the obstinate illusion of 'language as being' and 'being as language' with a logic avoiding the 'is' operator.

It is important at this stage to note, how Deleuze traverses between the concepts that have been constructed throughout his philosophy. Concepts are not absolute propositions for him, and instead of ceasing to define a contour for them, he treats them as absolute surfaces of thought in which contours are created at an infinite speed. This infinity may be faster or slower (contracting or expanding) in speed where the thresholds, the components of the concepts traverse with each other. Therefore concepts become indistinct from each other, and this inseparability becomes not a matter of linking propositions together, but to open them to a unity of thought,

to a state of perpetuity, that is nothing, but a virtuality. It is the character of 'multiplicity' that shares the same line of meaning with the concept 'duration.' Thus, it is virtuality that prevents the concepts falling into a discursive constitution. Virtuality is not a way to fix a correlation between them. Deleuze finds no reason for them to cohere, they should be left as resonating figures (of vibration) inside a virtuality in which the bridges between the concepts are set to an infinite mobility that is never at rest (*What is Philosophy* 23). Consequently, each concept that is mentioned throughout this chapter ceases to become each other and differenciate. Virtuality becomes not only the immanent character in each of them, but also the complex whole that they are experiencing being a part of.

It is possible to find the different elucidation of the same figures of thought under different texts. Or the same concepts would show variations, nuances under different figurations. Deleuze sees them as 'unforseen' variations that can be considered as confrontations with the necessary 'reactivations' of the same concept within the immanent structure. This is a virtual conversation that Deleuze held within the concepts. Concepts neglect their state of being, and become senses of their expression through each other.

Virtual, Actual, Real, Possible, Difference, Differenciation, Concept, the Plane of Immanence, Multiplicity, Duration are a series thought, which are utilized in reflecting the nature of the conception of a concept. These can be regarded as the expressions (instead of formations) which posit a certain kind of incorporeality for the 'corpus' of a concept. For example as discussed in this chapter, although the concept of concept has new considerations in Deleuzian vocabulary, it refutes any foregrounding as 'being' a recognizable construct that establishes an ontology for conception of concepts. Deleuze's philosophy is a perpetual 'creation of concepts' and this creation is neither a refurbishing for any existing concept in order to reappropriate it for a subject to a particular kind of postulation, nor is a creation based on inventing new abstract words that contradict with any former establishment as a concept. Deleuze philosophy is not a commitment to deconstitute any critique on the history of creating concepts, but merely an inquiry that foregrounds the inferiority of any critique that bases itself on discussing the inadequacy of a certain concept. This inadequacy is endowed in two ways. First of all, it is foregrounded by the critique itself; the critique operates necessarily on an illusionary limit that asserts a contour, fixes a *façade* on the seamless surface of a concept to discuss it in relation to a particular problem. This can be considered as an act of realization, a limitation derived from the realm of possibilities for the concept. There

is a quasi-exteriority postulated against the concept, an attempt of adequation, and a move of dissolution that thinks both for and against the concept. Although there is the inconspicuous line of demarcation between the 'for' and 'against,' inside and outside of the concept, there is this very conception of a border, a limit that is figured, but obliterated at the same time. The limit is always deferred, but the idea of the limit, the idea of the idea, becomes necessarily an investment posed on to the subject of differentiation that is only considered operating between the possible and the impossible. But what is the idea of an idea, if there 'is' nothing as the assertion of the lexical 'being,' the 'is,' to language. If the body of the language is already deprived from it's being. If the constitution of a 'word,' merely points only to a fluidity of meaning at the slippery surface of thought. If virtuality is always contemplated by the very language itself at each attempt of figuring a thought when each fixation correspond not to a temporality but solely to virtuality.

As the logic of virtuality does not operate with 'is' and 'is not's. Virtualities do not correspond to any complete finalized conception, but only point multiplicities that are put in relation to other multiplicities. As Rajchman notes, Deleuze introduces a difference to any schematism of representation. The relation between signs is not considered

semiotic, but "procedural" (*Deleuze Connections* 69). Signs are not prescribed by codes, and instead instrumentalize experimentation in linking form and matter, word and image. As this is a differenciation from Platonic conception of *techne*, signs are considered, as assemblages of meaning no longer tied to predeterminations.

Thus, virtuality corresponds to the 'becoming' body of a language, the infinite movement that avoids any suppression, but becomes an enunciation for the language itself. Language becomes the realm of the seamless intensification as virtuality. All thinking, all figuration does not correspond to a repression, a suspension of virtuality, but an actualization that prevents virtuality acting as a closure to itself. Otherwise, conceptions of virtuality do not become merely associated with a 'tracing' for any reminiscent components (or opponents) of thought throughout a history, but in fact tracing becomes a virtuality, when traces becomes infinite differenciations enfolding with other traces, movements of contractions and expansions within the same perplexed architecture.

Furthermore, concepts become delimited if they are vexed for a certain plane of thought addressed to a particular problem (i.e. Descarian Cogito: I think, therefore I am). This is an involvement with an actualization for the concept from the

virtuality of the plane of immanence towards a plane reflected by the existence of its thinker. A confrontation with a particular plane that is a temporary settlement, a mark for a territory, a contraction within the infinite spatialization of the thought. This is an incompleteness that is sincere to any actualization. Any claim of thought that resembles itself becomes an actualization of its virtuality. Despite, it is the becoming of a thought in its virtual history that avoids its resembling to itself, and releases the forces of differenciation from itself. There is the incapacity, impotency reserved for the thought that undetermines itself. This second kind of inadequacy is due to a reliance on presuppositions, due to a dependence on the nature of thinking itself.

Deleuze reminds us a disappearance for the concept when it is germinated on a foreign soil. An idea based on the reactivation of another is merely pointing an erasure. This is an erasure experienced both from the inside and outside, both from the actual components of the concepts that annul themselves if they left inadequate to address the problem in different conditions (under different planes of thought), and an erasure when the new concept positions itself by deconstituting the reminiscent components of the former one.

Deleuze shows how a concept alters its nature (either breaks apart, or undergoes a complete change) if interrupted by another exterior component. He gives the example how Kantian Cogito, was different than Descartes's, and how Kant demanded an introduction of a new component (of which he considers that was repressed by Descartes) to establish a ground for constructing his conception of the 'thinking substance' in relation to a presence of a concept such as time. However Kant's notion of time is not the same concept which Descartes's time is anterior with, Kant is therefore submitting an erasure to Descarets's Cogito before reactivating it through his own concepts. An absence before the presence of the concept is reserved when it is being reconsidered or criticized. Therefore, it would be possible to note how concepts do not become subservient to the critique, but it is the critique that becomes inferior to itself.

What brings about the essential difference of these two kinds of inadequacies is the conception of virtuality that underwrites them. In the first case, virtuality is repressed with a potentiality in order to mark an expansion for the limit, the praxis for a limit that relentlessly defers itself until a new attempt of handling is introduced when it is juxtaposed near another concept. Each concept pretends as a transgression for the former one. Virtuality is extracted from the conception of a concept to render an opening to a

critique, to a philosophy discussing the same concept within different components of thought. In the second case, virtuality is unavoidably actualized, suspended; conception becomes subject to thinking, and left a vulnerability to the economy of criticism, to the dichotomous logic.

It would be possible to elaborate on the subject of virtuality by continuing with a series of concepts (Duration, Time, Space, Body and Event) that need to be observed from this point of view. These concepts are not new configurations addressed to same problems (differences are already introduced by the new problems), nor they are extrapolations within the same certainties. It is the philosophy of the virtual that secures an incapacity to establish a ground for those concepts and again it is virtuality that establishes the inseparability among different concepts, the different conceptions for the same concept and even different components of meaning within the same concept. A double character is reserved for concept. "It is absolute, and relative: it is relative to its components, to other concepts, to the plane on which it is defined, and to the problem it is supposed to solve; but it is absolute through the condensation it carries out, the site it occupies on the plane, the conditions it assigns to the problem" (*What is Philosohpy* 21).

Therefore it is necessary to assume that these latter series of concepts are not new considerations, or reconfigurations based on the former vocabulary that discuss virtuality from the technological framework. They can be accepted as further intensifications experiencing infinite reactivations within the virtuality of the former concepts. After all the purpose is not to posit a move towards a classification among concepts or try to establish an ontological ground for a taxonomical structure, but to point a differentiation in the complication of these concepts different from the former ones. They can be conceived as concepts that have different "histories" (*What is Philosohpy* 18). Throughout their history of becoming, they correlate and coincide with other concepts, undergo other planes, confront with different problems while they witness the infinite speed thought. Deleuze sees this as a "co-creation" within the infinite number of components of a concept branched towards other concepts (*What is Philosohpy* 18). The concept always ceases to become, so that it should necessarily be thought in relation to other concepts. This is also defying the logic trapped in between the 'one and the multiple,' avoiding the question whether there is one concept, or a multitude of concepts.

This is a history not of a 'before and after' relationship, but a history happening 'at the same moment' of a stratigraphic time (58) releasing the force of virtuality in

which concepts differ as creations through their differenciations in their speed and movement in thought. Deleuze explains this as the becoming of Philosophy, where there is the co-existence of concepts, within various planes of thought, that do not appear in a succession, but instead as a superimposition on a plane of immanence. The history of co-existence does not presume a true concept that is best or worst for a particular system, rather deliberately works against restoring any illusion for a transcendence of any concept. The plane of immanence is a history of distances: distances between thought and the unthought. As Deleuze puts:

> "…(The plane of immanence) is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought, and yet the absolute outside-an outside more distant than any internal world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world: it is the immanence, 'the intimacy as the Outside,' the exterior become the intrusion that stifles, and the reversal of both the one and the other" (*What is Philosohpy* 59).

Deleuze's concepts should be discussed always in relation to other conceptions for the same concept. This is thinking beside itself, alongside others. Instead of actualizing concepts from their virtuality, this can be regarded as a designation to actualize virtualization itself. This is to

juxtapose concepts that have different histories, adjoining a differenciation within a history that is immanent to itself. This is to resume into the realm of virtuality to release its forces not to encounter with a digression, but to think through the resonance of co-creation. Instead of folding back to a schematism of a singular concept, there is the perplexity of the virtuality that reveals the hidden facades of the unforseen.

The nature of multiplicity is helpful in understanding how Bergson approaches to concepts as compounds which are to be experienced by dividing up. However for him this is not a matter of diving an indivisible, continuous, nonmeasurable whole, but a division that provides a 'dividing in kind,' which avoids falling into the contradiction of thinking in terms of numerable subdivisions. The concept of multiplicity is about seamless division that involves no opposition and contradiction. As Deleuze states, multiplicity is not a matter of being 'multiple' as opposed to being 'one,' defining one state of being as a negative of the other, which would only be yielding a theory about a claim to construct a synthesis of two. In fact, this should be acknowledged as condemnation of such kind of differentiation among beings, which is nothing, but a false movement orienting towards a limitation and opposition. Thus this is neglecting two kinds of orders preoccupying each other, the one that incorporates the

multiple, or the multiple that consists the one. This is to suggest thinking a priori to the problem of installation of 'being' one vs. the other, inventing a different trajectory of a qualitative differenciation, which cannot be decomposed and recombined in quantitative terms. The actualization of a multiplicity is to re-allocate irreducability while experiencing the virtual totality by seamless infinite division and differenciation.

3.5. Duration (Time and Space)

The infinite movement as the virtual division of multiplicity then introduces us to Bergson's concept of "duration". A different figuration of temporality based on different characterizations of time and space of which can be conceived in detail to provide a differenciated understanding for the contemporary considerations of virtuality that contemplate on virtuality as a geography based on the different sensations experienced by different spatialization of time, unlike the so-called real one.

"Differenciation is essentially temporal", as Constantine Boundas states and this is the time of multiplicity when duration constantly actualizes by dividing itself (Boundas 92). As this is not a quantitative division into decomposing distinct instant moments, we are rather compelled to think a

division as a differenciation in nature among successive segments of a fusion.

> "So that at each moment, everything tends to spread out into an instantaneous, indefinitely divisible *continuum*, which will not prolong itself into the next instant, but will pass away, only to be reborn in the following instant, in a flicker or shiver that constantly begins again" (Boundas *93*).

As Boundas finds even inappropriate to say what duration 'is,' the concept can be considered as a 'becoming' of an incomplete heterogeneity that constitutes itself by implicating through its segments. Deleuze calls this a "qualitative discrimination" which ceases the traditional vocabulary of being and contributes to an ontology of the movement of becoming in which even duration, defined as a multiplicity at the beginning, does not fall into a "confusion of being itself."

As the *continua* of duration is not made of an aggregate of moments, there is the succession and simultaneous co-existence of the segments that implicate each other.

This is the characterization of time in which the present is still becoming and yet it cannot be thought separately from becoming past, whereas the past cannot be thought of as being

constituted after it has ceased to be present. Deleuze calls this as the "Paradox of Co-existence", in which past coexists with every new present in relation to which it is past. Besides, Boundas adds two more paradoxes to the idiosyncrasy of duration: "The paradox of contemporaneity", and the "paradox of the survival of the past" in itself.

The former paradox for him, make us to think that past is being presupposed by every old and new present and it is considered contemporaneous with the present it has been.

> "This is a priori past, which insists in the old present and persists in the actual, pre-exists every present in general and, as a result, it generate the paradox of pre-existence. We are indeed asked to think that the entire past preserves itself and therefore, coexists with every present. This past has never been present, since it cannot be constituted after the constitution of the present" (Boundas *92*).

The latter paradox brings an ontological difficulty for the past as itself, as the present is the contraction of entire past conserved in itself, there is the impossibility of the past to survive in itself. It is double contingency for the past, both being coetaneous and incessant. "It cannot be represented, but without it there is no representation" says Boundas. There is not a past preceding the present, but only

considered as a presupposition for the present without it would not happen.

It is in the virtuality of the duration where Deleuze does not permit any kind dualism, even in reverence to a monism. However there is only an actuality of 'dilation and contraction' that becomes the two different aspects of differenciation during the actuality of duration. As each differenciation (differences in degree and differences in kind) would not be accepted completely external to the other in terms of two distinguishing not to re-establish a monism out of the persisting differenciation, there is the coexistence of all differenciation profound within all levels. It is the nature of duration where different tendencies of differenciation experienced through dilation and contraction, in which all degrees (of differenciation) coexist in a singular nature. There is the composite virtuality of time in which past is reserved in its totality, actualized in a matter of contraction and expansion, simultaneously, on all planes. Deleuze calls this a "virtual coexistence" and discusses the presence of a certain kind of repetition within all the degrees of this coexistence. (*Bergsonism* 60). He suggests that this is a virtual repetition occurring not on certain elements, but within all the levels of its actualization, in which "the whole of our past is played, restarts, and repeats

itself, at the same time, on all levels it sketches out" (*Bergsonism* 61).

Duration can not be limited as a different approach to a new representation of time. Therefore it should not be understand as diagramming a concept of time originating from an intrinsic quality that is more expanded and extended form from the point of view of an exterior subject (such as space). Rather it is possible to consider duration as confrontation with time that expresses itself within an infinity of fluxes at each successive moment. Duration is thought as a movement of time opening itself to a spatialization which is based on "rhythmic contractions" and "dilations of varying intensity" (*Bergsonism* 103-105). Space and time become indistinguishable but provided with different actualizations within the rhythm of differenciation. This duality is overcomed by a difference of separating the two different coincidences of division and differenciation, but releasing two insisting natures through a singularity of duration which expresses an undulatory and rhythmic virtuality in an intensive manifold.

The virtuality of time provides a plurality of times that are not experienced relatively different from external references, this coexistence described above, opens to a singularity of a time with its type of multiplicity. Time is spatialized in such a way that space is not considered ready made, and time

is not adapted as a supplementary fourth dimension of it for Deleuze.

This is a spatialization in which at the limit of contraction there is 'matter' and at the limit of extension there is 'pure space.' Matter is not considered as space, but as an extensity and space, in fact, is not matter or extension, but the representation of the limit where the movement of expansion would come to an end as the external envelope of all possible extensions. Deleuze considers that "it is not matter, not extensity in space, but just the opposite" *(Bergsonism* 87). Extensities are indiscernible from the contractions, and duration is never contracted or extended enough to be thought independent from the matter where it is acquainted with. The nature of the matter is the immanent duration of the relative contractions and extensions, all distinct yet qualified extensions that are in correlative interruption and dispersion with each other to diagram a becoming of space imbued in the virtuality of duration. From an infinitely relaxed matter to an infinitely contracted space it is an acquaintance with the intrinsic movement of a single duration that forms the spatial sensation.

Deleuze articulates on the virtuality of time in his book "Cinema 2", in which he cites Proust stating that "time is not internal to us, but that we are internal to time, which

divides itself into two, which loses itself, and discovers itself in itself, which makes the present pass, and the past preserved" (82-83). Thus, Deleuze continues by stating that subjectivity is never ours, but it is time, the virtual. The actual is always objective and the virtual is subjective. It is the experience of time, which divides itself in two, as "affector" and "affected", the affection of self by itself, corresponds to definition of time. In addition, time becomes an affectionate experience, a movement of sensation extended and contracted in varying degrees and styles in the endless splitting of the singularity of duration. This is a virtual existence of a sensation in accordance with its pure actuality (which does not need to be actualized). There is a small circuit between time and space where everything becomes a certain kind of reciprocal movement in all directions in an infinity of ways.

3.6. Body

Deleuze contemplates on a thinking that adjoins Platonic conception of time with Stoic's expression of time, as a sensation of an event, through the incorporeality of the body. Stoic's thinking is deprived from the conception of body that is a 'being' as such, but in return, is always a 'becoming' of a multiplicity in relation to other bodies. This relation is complexity based on composition, recomposition and decomposition with other incorporealities. Bodies are

disembodied from any predetermined cause and effect relations based on identification with a taxonomy of genus and species, instead bodies are considered as assemblages of plication:

> "It is no longer a question of organs and functions, and of a transcendent plane that can preside over that organization only by means of analogical relations and types of divergent development. It is a question not of organization, but of composition; not of development or differenciation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness" (*A Thousand Plateaus 266*).

Deleuze invites a Spinozist perspective, introduces the study of Ethology instead of Biology, which he conceives as the relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterize each thing.

This is a conception that introduces two different axes for the definition of the individual for Moira Gatens. A kinetic one, that characterizes the individual in terms of relative states of motion (of speed and slowness) and rest that maintains the individual in existence as the same thing, and the dynamic one, which considers the body as a realm of forces in an immanent relation to affecting or being affected by other bodies. It is the range of affects and affectability that considers the differenciation between the bodies within the dynamics of existence. Bodies are encountered as

trajectories in which their "degrees of power" locate their existence on the cartography of existence (Gatens 167).

As Gatens reminds, bodies become "social cartographies" mapped on the plane of immanence in which the two axes become the analysis of the "intensive capacities" and "extensive relations" of the bodies (168). This is the cartography where "…the body is defined with its longitude and latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude)" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 260).

Bodies become geographies of incorporealities in which the differential powers of individualities posit a complex differentiating. Bodies are constituted with a complication through other bodies where there is a constant indetermination that ceases all singular bodies to become a united assemblage. As this is not a cause and effect relationship actualized within a reciprocal manner, bodies do avoid any kind of organization based on a reductive or dualistic approach that contemplates on a definite separation in between. Bodies instead become experimental compositions, complex molecular coagulations, and instable figurations on the plane of existence, in which they infinitely move to become by folding

and unfolding into other becomings. Bodies encounter with the chance of becoming in relation to other compossible bodies within an economy of compatible and incompatible power relations with their surrounding. As those relations are at immanently constant flux, bodies do not become distinguishable by a hierarchy of forms (as animals or humans), but with their interrelated power relations that put the singular components into unstable tectonics of a molar assemblage. The incorporeality of a body is not apprised with the integrity of other forms, but instead with the intensive capacity to differenciate with the dynamics affects. Bodies do not become stable realizations, but instead actualizations within the ordinates of their becoming.

Bodies, as such, do not become intrinsic parts of an organization adopted within the politics of a nature addressing pure species, genders or race, but instead considered as virtualities actualized with respect to other bodies. They are characterized with a precise indefiniteness, with an immanent introjection to a virtuality that disguises any specific or permanent contraction subjected to an appropriation as a realization. As Gatens cites from Deleuze, bodies do posit "various components (biochemical, behavioral, perceptive, hereditary, acquired, improvised, social, etc.)", however there is the crystalline infrastructure of virtuality that actualizes any sort of relationship through an expression

of an experimental corporeality that ceases to be identified particularly with any means of pregiven origins or ends.

Bodies are always at the midst of their intervals, and it is the intensity, the "non dynamic energia," the virtuality, unfolding through the fabric of the body, perplicating, implicating, explicating and yet complicating this deep or groundless complexity (Constructions 72). Bodies become subject to unseen spatial dispositions in nature. Before being subject to any resemblance or identification, or congruent and commensurable forces, bodies belong to the slippery surface of multiplicities, that are so smooth that fixed qualities do not stick on them (*Constructions 115*). So that, the becoming of a body in its seamless architecture, is a continuity, which avoids any contemplation with a referential discourse that subordinate it in a temporary framework. Nevertheless, bodies are always 'reconsiderations' within the virtuality of thought. Provoked within a spatio-temporal individuality, bodies do territoralize, reterritoralize, and deterritoralize under different conceptions within the different faculties of thought such as perception, memory, imagination and understanding. Therefore it is always possible to consider a recapitulation for the singularity of a body without recognizing any violation such as presupposition of a 'being' by falling onto an ontological ground. Any legislation imbuing a temporality for the body becomes insignificant and

necessarily speculative as bodies become subject to an
expression of an actuality only in the midst of their
becomings rather than their representation as coherent and
complete beings.

Bodies are neither natural nor artifice, nor there is a
definite separation imposed on both categories. It is a
thinking along all former conceptions (Aristotelian, Platonic,
Cartesian or Kantian) that is incorporated to the virtuality
of the body. The 'technology of the body' is the cartography
of both the intrinsic and extrinsic relations of its virtual
structure. This is the reality of the body immersed in a
virtuality with its genetic and differential elements, its
'virtual' or 'embryonic' elements. These elements posit a
determination for virtuality without "being possible to
designate a point of view privileged over others, a center
which would unify the other centers" (*Difference and
Repetition* 129). For Deleuze, this must be a complete
determination of the body, yet only form part of it. As he
carefully distinguishes between the idea of completeness and a
wholeness for an object for him:

> "What is complete is only the ideal part of the object,
> which participates with other parts of objects in the
> Idea (other relations, other singular points), but never
> constitutes an integral whole as such. What the complete
> determination lacks is the whole set of relations

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belonging to actual existence. An object may be *ens,* or *rather (non)-ens omni modo determinatum,* without being entirely determined or actually existing" (*Difference and Repetition* 209).

This is a conception of technology that is not recognized with an ontological separation between nature and culture or inside and outside. The "idea" contains all the varieties of differential relations, and all the distributions of singular points coexisting in diverse orders perplicated in one another" (*Difference and Repetition* 206). Therefore the idea of technology does not correspond to a doubling, to an inferior realization, imaging itself from the realm of possibilities, but instead responds to a conception of actualization that apprehends any becoming as a construction of another virtuality in which any differentiation is yet indistinguishable from the logic of virtuality. This is a technology of "affirming all chances at the same time" (*Difference and Repetition* 52). However affirmation is itself differenciation for the virtual body to become beside itself. The technology of the body is itself an unsettlement, a distantiation that is never at rest in which difference is itself differenciated within the incorporeal body.

Once technology is not rendered as an extrinsic quality of the body, it does not extrapolate any conception as prosthesis,

which instruments the 'supplementary' to the integrity of the corporeality. In fact it becomes the incompleteness, always at the midst of its thinking, and continually arrives at other dispositions in relation to other incorporealities. Technology becomes a bodily construct, an expression, and an image of thought that is liberated from being either 'mind' or 'body.'

Hence, bodies cannot be framed with an idea of origin, nor can be embraced with an evolutionary perspective for Deleuze. Instead, bodies continuously construct to become with other systems, with other fields of intensities, "pass between points" in a nonlocalizable relation during their "absolute speed of movement" and form more complex virtualities out of their virtual origin. Therefore, there is no necessity for the separation of the subject and object of the body, in terms of marking a form and content for the line of becoming. Becoming becomes the duration of expressibility itself. And the idea of the body is not restored to posit a ground, a center, a history for becoming, but instead it is the becoming of a body that proceeds in continuity, in its infinite movement of differenciation, to be infinitely diluted in existence. It is a "perception", an actualization, an immobility, on its interrupted continuity, that reveals the inner history of things as bodies (*Matter and Memory* 208). Bodies do not exist as signs, words, marks of existence, or any simplified

conciliation, but as the realm of forces which are locus of production/expression of individuation.

Thus, virtuality is the technology of the singularity (of the body) that experiences not a schematism of differential state of beings, inferior temporalities, in its infinite movement of becoming, but in return experiences a geography of creative, yet minor intensifications. Ethology endorses an inquiry of thinking in terms of "haecceities." Deleuze reserves this name for an event, "a spontaneous constellation of intensities that is not fixed or static, is not a subject, yet that nevertheless bears its own unique mode of becoming" (Davies).

> "You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slowness between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its duration)--a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity)" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 262).

A haecceity is an infinite mode to feel spatio-temporal relations, determinations as dimensions of multiplicities, an event that has neither beginning nor end, which is always felt at its middle. (ATP, 263). Deleuze points the indistinction between the nature of the things and the nature as climate, wind, season or hour.

"The becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal,
blood nuptials. Five o'clock is this animal! This animal
is this place!" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 262).

In fact, Deleuze considers two different haecceities: an
assemblage haeccetiy, a body that is contemplated on its two
axes, the longitude and latitude; and the interassemblage
haecceities, that are in return the singular becomings within
each assemblage.

3.7. Event

At this point it is important to be familiar with the
conception of event, and consider how it is constellated with
the concept of body, with a different conception of
temporality of time.

Deleuze acquaints the duration of the event with the Stoic's
conception of the indefinite time: 'Aion' in relation to
'Chronos.' Aion is the time of the "floating line, that only
knows speeds, the time of "already there", and "not yet here",
a measure of something that is both going to happen, and
already happened, is put in relation to Chronos, "the time of
measure that situates things, develops forms, and determines
subjects (*A Thousand Plateaus* 262).

For Deleuze, all bodies are relation to each other as causes for other causes or refer as effects in relation to other effects. (*Logic of Sense* 6). Bodies are appropriations as not as effects, but rather logical or dialectical attributes, actions and passions instead of physical qualities and properties. The corresponding of the body to a "state of affairs" is for a difference in nature. Events, the exegesis of the only living time of the bodies, are all at once the infinite present and the individuation of the Aion, where the present grasps both past and future, but only actualized by becoming infinitely divisible when the simultaneous reading of past and present is giving birth to it.

Returning back to the Stoics, events are no less beings than bodies, substances, physical qualities, however they are something what Deleuze calls a higher sense of being at its incorporeal surface that incorporates being and non-being, "existence and inherence". Events are 'something,' part of the substance and disjointed from the cause-effect relation in the sense that they are incorporated into an expression of coexistence. This is an unlimited becoming at the border of things and propositions, when events are giving birth to the actualizations of things. Bodies produce new attributes to other bodies, but these attributes are in fact expressions of the events in nature, which constitute the endless activity of

becoming 'already' and 'not yet' by putting the incorporeality of the bodies into an immanent relation.

By maiming the passivity introduced by the cause and effect relationship, Deleuze introduces an infinite activity of actualization and counter-actualization at the immanent moment of becoming. The two temporal frameworks of the 'already' and 'not yet' are the time of the event traversed in their becoming by effectuating the substantiality of the bodies.

There is a recitation at the kernel of the becoming as a 'will' coming into being. A 'will' that escapes any pity, any resentment, any narration of passivity, but instead on its way of becoming itself actualizes or counter-actualizes its body within the geography of the event. Events are the surfaces of presence where they subsist or insist in relation to each other, or to other bodies. They develop in respective tensions. Events are the "verbs" of the language for Deleuze, that happen not before or after substantives or adjectives, but through the split in the language, they become the 'existence of a conjugation of effects.' Neither bodies, nor events do not exit outside the propositions that express them.

Events have critical points for Péguy: "points of fusion, congelation, boiling, condensation, coagulation, and crystallization" (*Logic of Sense* 53). There is a virtuality of

the event that communicates a state of differenciation, a meticulous spatialization from one state of singularity to the other, felt at the same time. As they are only passes in between the same event, Deleuze introduces them as the only "idealities" as they are deduced from any conception of essence and essentiality in their nature. Rather, events are considered 'problematic,' according to a determination by the singular points in expressing the conditions and yet problematizing, as an infinite movement of imperfection that subsist an instance of a problem along with their spatio-temporal actualization.

And as events are not instances of problems that demand to be resolved, they cease to attain any subjective category, rather the event is the 'dead time,' time of the meanwhile, time of the virtuality, where all the 'meanwhiles,' all the components are affixed on each other. These are the simultaneous, yet imperceptible instants when the event is actualized from the 'composite becoming' of virtuality.

> "Nothing happens, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and restore the event" (*What is Philosophy* 158).

The virtuality of the event ceases to be fixed within a realm of effectuated moments. Event becomes an 'episode' within the continuous movement of virtuality. The origin of the event is movement, a character of immanent passing within the difference of the state of affairs in which there is a view of action as a fulcrum. In respect, there is the 'will' at the kernel of the event that makes it inseparable from the state of affairs, realities it actualizes, and yet makes these realities inseparable from the virtuality in return. Deleuze calls this the philosophy of "*amor fati*: being equal to the event, or becoming the offspring of one's own events" (*What is Philosophy* 158). However, this should not be regarded as an associationism with a precontrived knowledge about a fixed event, rather conceiving a confrontation with the event as a singular experience, a line of action. The reality of an event desists to become with a kinship or analogy with a former knowable experience and instead turns out to its virtuality that releases its own reality through an act of actualization of all its tacit components at the same time.

Events are not immobile if they are perceived as condensed considerations of an enormous period of indefinite time. They should not be regarded as quasi-instantaneous views within a permanent conception of time; rather they are definite and precise virtualities that restore a consistency of change and movement by all of their components. The conception of events

does not utilize a privileged indefiniteness, an obstruction, which is pointing an essence of repression exterior to its virtuality. In fact, the virtuality of the event is not constructed out of multitudinous successive moments as different states, as different 'reliefs' for being.

Consequently, the virtuality of the event is always the movement that banishes all preconceived idea of interpreting time and space by measuring the disparate moments. If we return to Bergson, the successive moments are only the imaginary halts of representation, and yet the continuity cannot be conceived with an instant, "the path cannot be substituted for the journey" (Matter and Memory 220). The event prolongs within its virtuality. Bergson points the artificiality of the mind that separates the corpuscles from the corpus. By avoiding a conception of relativism of the moments with each other, there is the reality for the movement of the event that pictures the motion as a whole. This conception ceases to presuppose a realization of time by a dividing into representable instants, but conceive a reality of the composite virtuality that is expressed by the will of actualization and counter-actualization, the differentiation of the line of action at all planes of the becoming of the event.

The conception of the time and space of the event are not preexisting definitions, the event is neither the illusion of a certain perception, nor the perception itself is different than the thing perceived. "Space is no more without us, than within us" (*Matter and Memory* 209). It is the movement that grounds time and space beneath itself. The conception of the movement banishes the solidarity of time and space, besides it is devoid of any relativistic perspective that will reconstruct one in opposition/relation to the other, by the relative position of a subjectification. The conception of the event does not to propose new correspondences between the extensities of time and space, rather introduces an abstraction that interprets time and space as conceptions conditioned to the problem of the event.

For Bergson, the immediate reality is to banish all preconceived interpreting and measuring of the quality and movement of the event. The illusory character of perception (of the eye) and imagination (of the mind) posit false problems, "prejudices" exposed on the experience of the event (*Matter and Memory* 209). This is to register a contradictory approach to translate the event out of the individual experiences of the mind and the body in relation to a fixed conception of time and space as the essential difference between the movement and the quality attributed to individual conceptions. Rather it is the singularity of the instance, the

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moment when everything is new born at the actualization of the event. Time and space and a subject are not pre given, and do not correspond to the data of the senses; indeed conform with the becoming of the event, expressions of the movement, and therefore become indistinguishable from each other, as composite singularities perceived in the virtuality, anterior to the movement.

Each event becomes an actualization of a virtual composite, however each event cannot be thought as an opposition, as a separation from its other. As each actualization does not lose contact from the rest, they should not be thought outside the movement. Deleuze reminds us that the character of the event introduces virtuality to any actualization, which will in return provides a seamless architecture to the creation of new events beside themselves. Unlike realization from a possibility, actualization can never be thought separate from its virtuality, but only as an alienation from the rest of itself. An actuality of an event, a becoming, is still a movement within the virtuality, which is never given, but acted out through actualization (*Bergsonism* 104).

3.8. Natural-Artificial and Technology

While thinking along these concepts, it would be important to return back to the concept of technology, and think along the nature of relations among concepts. It would be important to

consider how the nature of technology can be reconsidered with its virtuality and then how virtuality can be discussed along its way as an actualization of technology. The nature of thinking about the acquisition of knowledge and the instrumentation of knowledge would be substantial in understanding the mechanism of thought that displays the nature of constructing relations. Thereupon it would be possible to articulate on the inadequacies of conceptions that are obstructed not with the quality of their relations, but with the very underlying mechanisms that situate thinking to a particular ground of contemplation. Therefore the technology of virtuality can be discussed with the mechanisms of ordering relations, recognitions and knowledge, and additionally can be discussed with the way it illustrates an opening to the virtuality of technology along its way of becoming.

In this way Bergson's articulations on the nature of thinking and the orders of acquiring knowledge on things can be regarded useful in introducing a different conception to technology in relation to virtuality.

Bergson considers a continuous activity of creation, a becoming for all bodies by moving along their intrinsic and extrinsic relations and associates this system of relations to a theory of knowledge that expresses a mechanism of thought for the mind in ordering two different kinds of relations in

nature: one in a 'natural direction,' and one as an 'artificial' direction coined as the 'geometrical mechanism' (*Creative Evolution* 244). The natural direction is expressed with a "will", that continually thinks freely and advances in the form of tensions, and the latter is adopted as the inversion of the other by utilizing an "inert" or "automatic" order that operates on reciprocally determined elements externalized and imposed on a relation to the others. The order of knowledge expressed as the natural direction corresponds to a thinking with a spontaneity of movement towards unforseen ends, however the geometric mechanism in return resembles a conception foreseeing ends by utilizing already established agreements between subjects and objects in terms of determinations by causes and effects. This is a thinking that orders a reality that exactly satisfies a degree of thought by isolating individual conceptions, regarding things from certain bias, and applying certain conventions of measurement to them.

This is the artificiality of the mind to comprehend knowledge by dividing the continual movement of thought through its different faculties (perception, intelligence, and language). Bergson posits this science as contingent and relative to its variables, relative to the order in which the answers become successive correspondings to the foreseen problems. This way of ordering knowledge will always fall back into some of our

mathematical formulae for Bergson, as "it is weighted with this geometry" (*Creative Evolution* 243). There is a remarkable expectation and disappointment related to this system, in which there is the presentation of a mind that is in quest for a certain system, for a certain order, a possibility, but that is not concerned with a virtuality of thought at that moment. This is a mind seeking after reciprocal answers, therefore it discloses itself to any awareness for unforseen ends. Bergson comments on the "idea of disorder" as the disappointment of a mind that ends up with "something different from what it wants, an order with which it is not concerned at that moment" (*Creative Evolution* 244). There is a confrontation with a different order in nature that relentlessly does not correspond to answers and in which the questions raised ordering the knowledge for the foreseen order, already have vanished.

The ordering of knowledge towards the natural direction, on the other hand, utilizes an oscillation. Without falling into a conception of finality, it refutes into falling into a category determined by former thought. It is a creative evolution for Bergson, that cannot be expressed by any approximation of ideas or possible generalizations that are the views of the mind (*Creative Evolution* 245). 'An order of unforseeability' itself is reserved for this nature of thinking that does not correspond with the features of other

orders, but in contrast, deviates from them, with a spontaneity of a movement that acclaim its features in itself. There is the instrumentation of relations, a conception of technology, without inferring to certain special manifestations of life, which almost repeat forms and facts that are already known, similarity of the structure that we find everywhere between what generates and what is generated. Bergson coins the habit of designating and representing relations to a certain point of view as follows: "I find a mechanism where I should have looked for", however any unforseen reality is due to "shutting our eyes" to things that do not interest us. The natural direction of thinking utilizes a conception of thinking knowledge not in its states, or instants in which the mind utters an artificial plan to represent the complex movement of thinking, but rather conceives knowledge in its change, in its becoming.

However, the artificiality of thought cannot be grasped unnatural indeed. Although the different faculties of the mind conceive any conception as a snapshot of a transition, transition itself teaches nothing to us according to Bergson (*Creative Evolution* 334). It is the movement of the very reality of the mind that restlessly installs itself within the movement of change, to grasp both the change and the successive instants that might be immobilized. For Bergson this is to "advance with the moving reality". However,

although there is the decomposable reality that ceases to correspond to a motionless point, and slips through the intervals, the intelligibility of reality is a continuos experience with the infinite sensation of the infinitely infinitesimal elements which correspond to the "qualities, forms, positions and intentions" of the intervals. The faculty of knowing acts upon a determination by a generalization (by denotating and connotating incompatible objects and elements) and the experience of reality is prolonged with the movement of thought yielding to a perpetual becoming and thus confines it into an infinite creation in every consideration.

Bergson coins an "unco-ordinated diversity" between the two different approaches of thinking, a continual coming and going which refutes a differenciation that constitutes "encountering with an absence" in one in relation to the other. Instead, there is a virtuality of thought that reserves many aggregates of different relations with their diversity without being endowed with any provisional expectation. (*Creative Evolution* 306)

Therefore the technology of thinking does not associate with a form of reality, but a reality that is the continual change of form at every instant (*Creative Evolution* 327). The apparatus of knowledge place itself on a realization of thought, however the conception of virtuality correspond to the mobility of

reality that is not realized from a realm of possible expectations, but ceases to be actualized in its becoming.

The conception of naturally and artificiality of thinking is an experience of thinking in movement, and installing oneself to the movement to grasp it. Different natures of ordering knowledge can be regarded useful in elaborating the instrumentality of setting different relations of thought as the conception of technology.

As it is possible to conceive the faculty of knowing in its movement, in its continual change, it is also possible to find a conception of technology in its entire becoming, a becoming contrived as a virtuality of thought that is seized as actualized with the different faculties of knowledge. Different relations and different schematism of systems are consequently the instants cut as distinct bodies of thought from the perception of the continuo of thinking. Therefore it is possible for the conception of technology to be emancipated from an artificial "will", substituted for the mechanism of nature or released from an alleviation as an "automatic order" of a geometric mechanism that correspond to an inability of knowing due to a contemplation with pre ordered, reciprocal determinations. Technology can be grasped in its virtuality without being reduced to the externalized conceptions or generalizations that constitute the intelligibility of

knowledge. Instead, it is possible to utter a "willing" experimentation of thought, a natural direction of thinking to its conception that orients towards the reality of thought. Corresponding merely to the instrumentation of all the (intrinsic or extrinsic) relations between the individuated bodies of thought, technology ceases to be reduced to certain conception of science and measurement system that implement preconceived individual systems that are relatively independent to each other.

The course of movement of technology cannot be reduced to a thinking with a logic of realization, a course to realize a possibility once conceived as impossibility or unreality, to be thought isolated from unforseen ends. Nor it cannot be completely detached, isolated from a movement of "detension" that falls outside the geometry of thinking, outside the foreseen ends. Instead, the evolution of technology can be comprehended as the "unco-ordinated" diversity of thinking 'along,' as the virtuality attaining its unceasing creative transformation. Hence, it is possible to subsume the different natures of this movement of thought with its acceleration and deceleration. Differentiation between the different signification systems of thought such as thinking in different representation systems, languages, algorithms or various other mathematical lexicon then corresponds to an evolution within the virtuality and thus does not become devalued as thinking

in foreseen possibilities of thought, but considered as instrumentations of accelerations and decelerations within the same *continua* of thinking. If the technology of perceiving the knowledge is confined in its movement, the virtuality of technology is imbued within this movement as an inner becoming, rather than disposed at an outside to reconstitute it with immobile conceptions. Although each isolated conception cannot respond to the continuity of a change, coincide with a motionless point; the installation of this artificiality within the flux, is not a formidable obstacle in the immanent evolution of technology, rather is the advancing of this mobility in its very reality, comprehended as an intelligible reality.

Technology can rather be conceived not as the artificiality that is a prosthesis posed on to the natural direction, but the very becoming of the knowledge of the mind in a multitude levels of awareness. As an experimentation of thinking is always reserved before the conception of knowledge in its finality, technology of the thought corresponds to the virtuality of thinking that is still attaining to an alienation from itself in its becoming. Any becoming of technology, either as the form of intelligible conception of thought or as an instrumentation finalized as an apparatus or device that coincide with an actualization, still prolongs with its virtuality with its continuity of becoming.

Technology, similar to the Zeno of Eloa's arrow 'is' not at any point of its course, and could not be regarded only as intelligible knowledge or sensible reality, but rather it corresponds to the continua of the sum of relations experienced in the composite structure of its virtuality.

According to Bergson the very mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is cinematographic (*Creative Evolution* 332). The apparatus for knowledge proceeds through the faculties of "perception, intelligence and language" attain qualitative, evolutionary and extensive movements, but nevertheless represented as "discontinuities", "particular becomings of a series of views" (*Creative Evolution* 333). As "what is not determinable is not representable", and as all representation is exclusionary in nature, the "becoming" in general corresponds to a movement "like in the cinematographical film", a movement hidden in the apparatus, whose function is to superpose the successive pictures on one another in order to imitate the movement of the real object" (*Creative Evolution* 335). The nature of becoming is thus conceived as an act of imitation of the reality by reactivating the immobile percepts into the mobility of becoming. However, Bergson reminds of a 'becoming' in which the mind is attached to the inner becoming of things where becoming becomes indistinguishable from the reality of the continua of change and escapes such cinematographical mechanism of thought.

This two kind of differenciation for the nature of 'becoming' can be considered helpful in foregrounding the confusion between reality and unreality. The experience of reality is often reduced to a perception, which tries to constitute the immobilized movement with potential immobilities and hence cannot escape the illusion of unreality due to the necessary distance between the real and the represented thing, a distance operating on an exclusionary character based on certain determinism. Reality, thus in its becoming is the movement of indifference between the perceived thing and perception, foregrounding the composite, virtual, crystalline structure.

Therefore, it would be positing a false problem against the nature of knowledge only as a state of thinking rather than a movement, to insist only in its discontinuous character, and to question the immanent artificiality embodied within the very nature of us that enables the possibility of intelligibility. It would also be positing a false problem against the nature of technology as a state of knowledge rather than a continua, in which different actualizations correspond only to the extensions of the very nature of the evolution, the creative movement. It is the virtuality of thought at the very kernel of technology, which refutes to see any disclosed system, any engineered reality as an unreality,

and instead confronts with an actuality of becoming of a reality through its virtual character.

4. REMARKS ON DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF VIRTUALITY

Given these articulations above it might be contingent to depict some significant aspects of thinking that might be considered helpful in understanding the influences of Bergson and Deleuze's conception of virtuality to the general discourse. These aspects could be pointed not as taxonomical positions of a composite organization of thinking for a subject, rather as passages within a cartography of relations, the very technology that yield further fertile grounds to discuss the subject matter. As discussed within the previous chapter, virtuality perpetually becomes itself by avoiding any completion in thought. However, it would be important to think virtuality along with these countenances to release the force of thinking in its infinite directions. It would be possible to consider virtuality as an event of thinking, experiencing many confrontations in variety of strata.

The concept of virtuality can be an experienced as a singular approach on each conception by enunciating the concepts with other planes of thought. In other words, it becomes the movement within the plane of immanence in which different aspects can traverse with each other in the accumulation of the faculties of thought.

It is possible to consider these aspects as follows:

4.1. Virtuality and Criticism

Virtuality does not operate on a critique based on limited conceptions addressed to particular problems, but always opening itself to an affirmation for a constructionist thinking. However this thinking is not appraising values on top of other values and operates on the symbolic exchange between values. It is rather experimentation with thought without any claim of recognizing the boundaries of the capabilities of each concept. Instead, virtuality provides different levels of awareness within the becoming knowledge of each conception and let them traverse without even becoming enclosures to themselves.

Virtuality does not obstruct thinking, nor bases itself in any obstructionist, sedentary point of view. As it does not claim to offer solutions to formerly conceived problems, it actualizes the individuation of each problem with its virtuality and explores them in their own merits (becomings). Therefore, it would be more convenient not to pose any articulation of virtuality onto a extraneous framework and discuss it with a critical manner. As this will only celebrate the inferiority of the critique, the concept of virtuality will only be obliterated, more or less, with an appropriation to secure its distance against its other.

As the idea of the critique always renders itself possible by positing itself by an idea of a limit, that is, in other words marking the 'difference' between the exact interior and exterior for the concept by indicating the very territory that the concept acts upon. Thereupon, this conception of a critique can only address to certain figurations of the concept that are already transfixed with their contour and left incapable of confronting with the problems casted upon other planes of thought.

> "To criticize is only to establish that a concept vanishes when it is thrust into a new milieu, losing some of its components, or acquiring others that transforms it. But those who criticize without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy" (*What is Philosophy* 28).

In this sense Deleuze's example is illuminating:

> "The fact that Kant 'criticizes' Descartes means only that he sets up a plane and constructs a problem that could not be occupied or completed by the Cartesian cogito. Descartes created the Cogito as concept, but by expelling time as *form of anteriority*, so as to make it a simple mode of succession referring to continuous creation. Kant reintroduces the time into the cogito,

but it is a completely different time from that of
Platonic anteriority. This is the creation of a concept.
He makes time a component of a new cogito, but on
condition of providing in return a new concept of time:
time becomes *form of interiority* with three components-
succession, but also simultaneity and parmenance. This
again implies a new concept of space that can no longer
be defined by simple simultaneity and becomes form of
exteriority. Space, Time and 'I think' are three
original concepts linked by bridges that are also
junctions" (*What is Philosophy* 32).

Therefore, the conception(s) of virtuality discussed through
Deleuze's philosophy should not be regarded as positioning a
critical distance to any (vanishing) concept that celebrates
or criticizes virtuality within a particular framework. As any
criticism takes the 'rest' as its points of reference, Deleuze
suggests every explication corresponding to a relative
success, an inferior solution to the conditions of the problem
raised to a discrete conception. Throughout its vocabulary,
the conception of virtuality becomes neither an attempt to
locate any strategy as presentation of an enduring
(metaphysical) completion in thought, nor becomes a practice
of thinking at the proliferation of a border resisting and
desisting through other figurations of former thought. It is
rather an immanent structuration of relations at their midsts.

However, as Andrew Benjamin notes, "relations involves recognitions (that what cannot be precluded at connections and interconnections)", virtuality is not about an absolute differentiation proceeding on "temporal set-ups" as recognizable conceptions. Rather there is the introduction of a different kind of relation, the "fold", that traverses each conception with its virtual totality. As Andrew Benjamin reminds from Heraclitus, "the issue is not whether or not it is possible to represent the all-that which is given to be represented-in the totality of the conception", rather to release it with its force, that confines a multiplicity of other relations expressed throughout its becoming. The virtuality of the whole is not to emancipate the unthinkable from its thinker or to foreground the recognizable unrecognized by its subject, yet to present the movement of thought instantiated on different planes as an act of folding. Each folding is onto another folding at its midst so that it does not posit an ontological deteoriation, but instead a fertile complexity, a continuity that prolongs until the end of the act of thinking.

Virtuality suggests contemplation without inextricably falling into constrains of coherent and composite formations, and thus resists becoming any mediation in between concrete determinations. Rather there is a relentless thinking in virtuality releasing a 'sincere vagueness' to the conceptions.

Conceptions do not become conflated with their language and interrupted as representations of disparate beings. There is the vagueness expressing itself at the *continuum*, the becoming, which is irregularly composed through an indefinite flow.

4.2. Virtuality and the Conception of the Metaphor

Returning back to the language of this *continuum*, the technology again is virtuality itself, both as the composite whole, and yet as the singular becoming individuated in an actualization. It is important at this point to return to the popular understandings of virtuality as a construction of a linguistic or visual metaphor within the different articulations of time and space expressed with the technology of the medium that represents it.

As discussed in the contemporary articulations on technology, there is the presentation of an ambiguity that renders the mechanism of virtuality always in relation with a separation from reality. The representation of the reality and the registration of the realness of a thing are often thought as separate modes of thinking. Therefore the thing itself, and its representation and the perception of it are experienced as different natures uttered to 'thingness.' Virtuality is brought into consideration either as a linguistic or visual possibility of a dissimilar nature, being apart from the so-

called 'real' one. The mechanism of virtuality is essentially based on the technology of language that operates within the metaphors of thought. However, what corresponds to the exactitude of a 'meaning' and what builds the 'metaphor' in relation to a particular meaning are two concepts that can be articulated with a different layer of thought under Deleuze's philosophy. There is the immanent conception of movement that ineliminably defers any recognition as concrete meaning. Once significations are presented within their virtuality, they develop by necessarily becoming other then themselves. There is no fixed position for a meaning, but yet singular individuations that are encapsulated with the virtuality of their thought. The concept of metaphors undergoes a different conception in two ways. First of all, each conception is uttered with its unique becoming that is in other words, concepts do not attain a certain meaning, but only refer to temporal significations referring particular moments within particular contexts. Secondly as each conception is a becoming in itself and ceases to 'be' a closure onto itself, they only traverse within the multiplicity of their meanings during their line of differenciation. Therefore the difference between an actual meaning and a metaphor that stands for that actuality is unsettled within this framework. Once the proximity between the reality and the virtuality of the meaning is crossed and the indistinction in between is experienced with its limits, there will not be a need for a

necessary claim to render something as a real meaning and something as its virtual other. And once the distinctions is erased the conception of meaning only refer to singular representations of virtuality along its line of differenciation within the continua of thinking. As concepts do not even become themselves, they cannot be conceptualized with and as metaphors, but along their way of becoming only rendered as infinite actualizations within the seamless architecture virtuality. Thereupon metaphors are not installed before and after of the fixation as meaning, but confined into the very nature of the concept, that interprets any claim of separation unnecessary.

Accordingly, the conception of virtuality in Deleuze is not a re-discovery of an elusive singular metaphor. Rather there are the different velocities of thinking as acceleration and deceleration in meaning. The reality of the seer and the reality of the seen, become indistinguishable enough and yet sufficiently differenciated within the virtual structure. There is the movement of a mobile distance, a variation as the differentiation among infinite conceptions. Moreover, imagination of a metaphor corresponds only to a fixation of the trajectories of thought, which are only trespassing within the continuum. As discussed above, the conception of virtuality is not an inspection to release other fixations, but instead it is to utilize the movement itself as the

indefiniteness before any figuration of thought. There is a virtual structure in which every singular conception, every differentiation corresponds to the movement itself.

It is important to note that there is no beginning and end for the spatialization of movement. The utilization of movement is not 'an application of the movement' oriented towards the static mode of being, to release the fixed trajectories from their static mode of being in order to yield a reconsideration to emancipate 'unthought' possibilities out of them. The movement is already a plane of immanence, a preconception in which every singularity is infinitely new born with its virtuality without any recognition, and any fixation that signifies a futile redemption. All conceptions are already mobile and the virtuality of thinking is actualized as a rhythm of movement within the constant flux. All remarkable points of meaning have different velocities within the movement and it is the movement that abandons any solidarity of meaning.

Deleuze reminds us two conceptions of actualization from virtuality: Virtual images, and actual objects. Virtual images cannot be separated from actual objects, and in a continuum, objects become virtualities in return. It is a conception of time, a 'hesitation' in becoming that spatializes time within the virtual cartography and hence distinguishes the actual

image (of the present) and the virtual image (of the past). However, this distinction, the utterance of an unassignable limit, is only crystallization for Deleuze and form a circuit of exchange. Virtuality is discussed as a crystalline structure in which actual and the virtual are part of the same circuit, the object and its image become indiscernible.

Virtuality does not fix further meanings or dispose rigid utterances, but utilize the indefiniteness of movement of thought in the realm of language. The term of indefiniteness corresponds not to a state of identifying with an indefinite identity (anything), but rather points to a preconception in which no identification took place at all (something). The concept is actualized within its virtual incorporeality without any grounding such as ontological projection as a being associated to something. Thus, it is the language itself as the immanent virtuality that is grasped as the syntax of 'the movement of thought' which is not semantical but sensational.

4.3. Virtuality and Technology

Once virtuality is conceived as the language of the perpetual actualization of technology, and once this language is discussed as incorporated into the very nature of virtuality, it would be important to consider the concept of technology in confrontation with all its infinite components of thought

actualized within its line of becoming. Technology, then, may not be considered with a limited point of view, which may only consider instrumentation of a particular kind of knowledge. Thus, would be emancipated from its particular definitions (i.e. 'Technology as prosthesis,' 'technology as an instrument') and be conferred with its own 'becoming' under all configurations of thought that may correspond to the whole geography, the *summa continua* of all relations among all bodies. The form and becoming of technology of virtuality bifurcates to all directions, all layers of thought and becomes indiscernible from the virtuality of its language.

Imbued with virtuality in nature, all progress of activity that is essentially practiced or thought thus becomes persistent within the virtual character and articulated inwardly within this movement. Therefore it becomes diffident to problematize a decomposable history of technology, as a history of mediation through successive positions, discussing it a set of activities posed on particular time and geography. Rather, technology in its virtuality becomes the whole cartography of relations, the natural and artificial orders for acquiring knowledge under different reference points. Within its indivisible and irregular movement, technology becomes a history of evolution of a complexity, a folding and unfolding of relations that never conclude with an idea of finality or progress of certain conceptions. Even following

the movement itself as a heterogeneous multiplicity articulated in rhizomic structure, virtuality explicates the involvement with technology, as the rhythm of expansion and contraction in setting relations between the bodies in the continua. The flow of thinking does not correspond to a linear reality, a narration based on cause and effect relation but instead as a ramification towards a realistic multiplicity that contemplates on each singularity as rupture. Nevertheless, contemplating on the concept of virtuality at a singular point (i.e. The virtuality within the technology of a single word, image, book or a computer system… etc.) then becomes a false attempt to render it visible. As each actualization may not differenciated from the flux and can only be introduced with its virtuality in its own becoming, each actualization can be regarded as an event, an 'episode' at the immanent becoming of technology throughout its components.

The virtualities created within the rhizomic environment are differenciated conceptions as different complexities that undergo different histories. It is possible to conceive these singular histories, technological ruptures, actualizations, becomings as different states within the intelligibility of knowledge identified with a genealogy of representation systems (such as images, marks, signs, codes, alphabets… etc.) mediated through different complexity of assemblages (such as

geometry, algebra, language…etc.). Albeit these systems are only particular perceptions of technology, infinitely ramified through different histories, the reality of the virtuality is within the infinite constant flux, within the all faculties of knowledge.

The conception of virtuality can be regarded in its own becoming as used a fulcrum to introduce different nature of relations based on the technological framework discussed in the second chapter. As John Rajchman illustrates the conception of virtuality could be regarded as a blueprint of an immanent architecture for constructing different typologies of time, space, body and experience, different then the contemporary articulations based on Platonic, Aristotelian, Cartesian, Kantian, Newtonian or Einsteinian conceptions. Deleuze and Bergson's conceptions could be discussed both against 'dogmatic determinism' and 'relativist points of view' that criticize specific speculations on virtuality leaning on particular standpoints.

For example, from a historical perspective, images, paintings, books, photorealistic graphics, photography, certain kind of computer generated imagery, immersive digital environments and simulations are discussed as virtualities in relation to a specific conception of reality which is often contemplated as the analogical resemblance with what is so-called 'natural.'

The progress within the technology itself is recurrently engaged with the experience of creating 'better' virtualities, better in the sense of achieving more accurate resemblance with naturals, referenced to an outer reality or better in the sense of realizing more complex self-conceptions, simulacra that are conceived artificial enough as self referential, reflexive individuations themselves.

The artificiality, as the determination of thought, is often discussed discernable from its natural character (brain is separated from its body) and thus posed onto the nature of 'being.' By reducing each conception to identification with deterministic subjectivity, a critical distance is always secured between disparate conceptions to exercise a dichotomous logic that is both criticized and celebrated at the same time.

The enunciation provided for the concepts duration, time, body, event could be considered helpful in understanding how the technological framework discussed for virtuality can be opened throughout the vocabulary that impeded it once. Virtuality, within the framework of digital technologies, is often projected 'for and against' a reality, its actual presence is often presupposed with an absence. However the subject is never thought as a reality in itself and along different conceptions.

For example, due to grounding to a certain trajectories of technology, virtuality is only discussed as different experiences of spatialization in a context of a book, a computer game, a VR installation, or any verbal and visual construct that correspond to a mediation of space based on certain inception of language, and end up with only representing the realization of a possibility retrieved from a potentiality of thought which is not considered with its virtuality.

Starting from a single image, and proceeding throughout the history within the framework of a multiplicity of media, the so-called artificial environment is changing its locality of meaning within different environments. Today, virtuality is mostly associated with digital technologies, and computational thinking that enable the possibility of considering more and more complex and intense virtualities to be constructed with the suppositions of many different conceptions that utilize different considerations of thought. Such as different interpretations of time (Aion, Chronos) and different understanding of space (Cartesian, Eistenian, Rainmanian) are studied and cultivated within the former thought in order to consider different possibilities of virtuality. When a virtual reality experience is discussed, it is often grounded to a corporeal body that is situated with a linear conception of

time, a definite conception of space based on a Cartesian geometry and amplified through different sensations based on the knowable, expected narration based on cause-end effect relations. However, based on the advances on different complexities with the technologies, the experiences of the virtualities are often thought extended and intensified. It is possible to discuss today, singular experiences within the digital environments, that promise a multitude of experimentation with the corporeality of the body, enforcing further discussions within different spatio-temporal structures, and opening the self to a multiplicity of relations with its environment. These journeys through the artificial environments are not only simulation based exercises necessarily bounded to referential qualities with nature. These transformations, abstractions, interactions and sensations are unique exercises experienced within the realm of digital technologies. It would only be a limited understanding to believe that the immersant[4] is only disclosed to the means of established relations. The augmented reality is the very reality of the immersant that is instrumenting a natural exploration within the environment of its becoming. The grasping and the processing of these mechanisms cannot be thought too far from the technology of the immersant mapped to the cartography of relations, opening and transforming a conceptual framework. The technology that forecasts the future of virtuality within the digital systems, is never at rest,

and always affect our thinking to a considerable extent. The conception of virtuality is always 'undefined' by each singular experiment, and each attempt nevertheless is part of the same actualization that comprehends virtuality to a certain extent.

The concepts of technology and virtuality can be naturally discussed in relation to each other as both of them are intertwined and do operate on the same nature of relations that are in fact virtual. Here virtuality can be postulated as the very experience of constructing different orders of knowledge or even utilizing the indefiniteness in order to correspond the multitude of relations among bodies.

Within this entire framework, the crucial point is not to set a definite conception for virtuality, and try not be confined into an immersion with this definition. Whether the technology experienced is as basic as writing, or more intensified as experiencing the highly advanced computational systems, virtuality shall not be grasped with the idea of its 'limit' (its foreseen, and representable ends) and shall not be restraint only with the logic for transcending this limit. As the possibilities to extend the limit is always presented within the same mechanism, the emerging and withdrawals depend necessarily on the experience within a definite conception posed onto this limit. Each different actualization of

technology will always contribute to the complexity of virtuality that is not 'pre-configured' with its limit, but with its movement of becoming.

4.3.1 The Reality of the Virtual

As any actualization is necessarily territoralized within its own conditions, the concept of virtuality can be regarded as 'undetermined' for each conception in its own becoming and experiencing the midst of every thought with the infinite rupturing of the infinitesimal elements during thinking. This would be similar to the experience of installing the cinematographic knowledge apparatus, the mind, attaching itself to the inner becomings of things (Bergson) and attain an immanent rethinking through each conception. This is to instrument a creation originating from outside, to mobilize immobile conceptions and exercise a recomposition, reinstallation into the decomposable movement. Virtuality can be considered as an immanent practice of actualization from one disparate conception becoming the another. The reality of the virtuality can be grounded as the technology of thought becoming itself at every actualization, yet imbued within a virtual character which enables it to be discussed always in other fertile grounds, other planes of thought, in other words each form can be reintroduced to its incorporeality under different contingencies within the continua of thinking.

It is possible to elaborate with an example. Seeing through the 'eye' machine or the VR helmet do not become too different actualizations of virtuality if they are only confronted with the problem of seeing, to solve a problem posed on finding a solution "in terms of light" (*Bergsonism* 103). As Deleuze notes, each time the solution will be as good as it could have been, "given the way in which the problem was stated, and the means that the living being had at its disposal to solve it". Virtuality is not an act of responding with more complete and better solutions, but insisting on the subsistence in rethinking with more complex assemblages of thought. Different histories of technological conceptions could therefore be discussed in relation to other geometries of thought, to release a creativity ordering different orders that were not concerned at particular moments. Instead of a narration based on cause-effect relations, predeterminisms or expectations, the conception of virtuality becomes the experimentation with the technology of thought by ordering the unforseen relations.

Any actualization, instrumentation can be discussed as a contraction and expansion relationship within the rhythm of the spatialization of virtuality. Actualizations can never be regarded as too contracted that turn into a 'being' conceived outside the becoming of virtuality, and never extended enough to become pure formless incorporealities that correspond to the non-existing, to the 'unthought.' To be engaged with an

immanent discussion of a singular virtuality, any sense of thought is still a formation, but with an incomplete logic; a becoming of a thought at its midst, attaining a certain vagueness through its movement. As the nature of 'becoming' is discussed here as a 'verb' of indetermination, it is constituted by the superposition of the successive points in between to imitate the nature of the immanent movement. (*Creative Evolution* 336)

4.3.2 The Virtuality of the Real

The conception of the reality of the virtuality discussed above can be discussed as inserting other movements by other conceptions, within the immanent movement as the continua of thinking. However it is also useful to discuss the nature of the virtuality of the movement in itself, the becoming virtuality of the virtuality, the natural direction where no particular virtuality, no actualization is yet ordered. The immanent movement is experienced without any reconstitution along disparate conceptions. Virtuality is discussed in its own becoming, as a subject in itself, which escapes the cinematographical mechanism and corresponds to the transition, to the change itself.

The conceptions provided within the second chapter, which are discussed within Deleuze's and Bergson's philosophies, can be understood as the reflection of the very nature of virtuality,

in which virtuality partakes a logic of differenciation even under different conceptions of the same concept. The diminution of a 'being' for the virtual subject is imbued in its nature where the partial views provided by the actualizations become indiscernible from the movement itself. The becoming of the virtuality thus refuses to undergo an approximative determinism based on singular conceptions and retain as the plane of immanence for each conception. The very nature of the virtual concept cannot be regarded as 'lost' during its movement and then re-encountered under different circumstances, however as there is the necessary incompleteness in the crystalline structure, each actualization of the virtuality adds itself to the complexity of the structure and partakes a role in virtualization. This is the perpetual creation of virtuality along its actualization. As each actualization is affirmed within the immanent structure, virtuality is never suspended or repressed, but intensified and complicated. The reality and the virtuality of the virtual are in fact, inseparable becomings from each other, as the very nature of thought is advancing the movement, the creative unfolding, through its infinite conceptions.

5. CONCLUSION

Char Davies coins the verb "de-habituation" when she means to describe the intimate experience, the "unusual modes of perception" felt during her challenging approaches to virtual reality installations[4]. These activities merely correspond to installations that are experiencing the nature of the technology actualized throughout its infinite components. The ground of this experience are bodies that embrace many different roles in experiencing a multitude of relations. In between the flux of the actual becoming of the experience, immersants[5] stray within a multitude of speeds in thought and becomes unavoidably associated with the movement, its actuality and its virtuality in the continua of their becoming. These actualizations of technology can be conceived as events where virtuality is experienced within its different thresholds, with other openings intensifying the very nature of bodies that are de-habituated from their regular order. The reality of the nature of the bodies are opened to an unforseen visibility that is not conditioned with an invisible or non-visible, but to the continua of seeing, sensing and experiencing virtuality along itself.

If this study did not aim to arrive at conclusions about a definite conception of virtuality, it basically endeavors to elucidate the movement of thought subjected to illustrate both the foreseen means and unforseen ends, and vice versa. If the

movement itself is considered as the cause of the continua of thinking, the thought stripped bare from its layers and represented within its finitude would be only expression of the movement confining in its own body throughout the whole act of becoming. It would not be a wrong attempt to consider this study as only as a glimpse, as an episode of meaning during the 'collective assemblage of enunciation' for virtuality. As each 'episode' will already change its nature at the second consideration, it will only be possible to attain an approximation, and adequation for the conception if virtuality is expected where it has been lost.

If one still strives to think a distinguishing mark among the different natures of virtuality represented by different figures such as the 'insectness of Gregor Samsa' or 'the reality' of the digital character Lara Croft, the conception of virtuality flees from itself and only undergoes a degradation subjected to providing answers to the questions raised to define differenciated nature of beings in relation to each other, but not to the nature of becoming itself. Thus, it would be possible to conceive an actuality of an unrepresentable order that is immanently represented as a virtuality, an unforseen order that cannot be rendered visible if figured by a formerly established one.

Rather, it is possible to note an awareness for an immersence in particular thought while still looking for unforseen directions. The immersant will always roar among different realms of meaning within the continua of thinking, therefore the complication of virtuality will always get more intensified at each attempt that endeavors to unfold it to its bare structure.

The typographical, lexical or syntactical virtualities will only correspond to the very reality of language, the technology of thougt. The reality of the world, the field of representation and the field of the subject thus become multiple entryways and exits that shall always be experienced with this continuum. Therefore, different directions within this motion will only conform by thinking along with the former conceptions and with the continuously introduced ones, virtuality becomes only a denser surface. The denser surface of meaning that inevitably introduces further considerations and enforce the immersant to contemplate inexorably on other episodes of thought. It would be the infinity of this thought that will confront with the finitude of this text and let the immersant stray, again with another conception, to be immersed to its immanent plane of thinking, to be attached to its technology of becoming. One must not need to repulse or thwart against each figuration of thought or each actualization of such kind of a text, rather confide into the virtuality itself

that will be rendered visible at its finitude, but should be grasped at its infinitude, as the inhabitation of the reality on its 'de-habituated' artificiality and along the 'natural' way of its becoming.

Not for the sake of all the things that should be known by nature, but of which that are eventually not need to be dismissed at the infinite moment of thinking within the synthetic topography of thought.

Notes

[1] The word "differenciation" is adopted as a convention from C.
Boundas's article "Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the
Virtual" (90-91). The use of this verb instead of
"differentiation", for him, is presetenting the totality of
the diacritic relation that occur within the structure of
virtuality. 'Differenciation' corresponds to the actualization
of a virtuality and refer to more complex relations then
differentiation. "What is 'differenciated' must first of all,
differ from itself, and only the virtual is what it differs
from itself."

[2] For a specific referral to these media studies, it is
possible to state that, the general framework discussed is
mainly part of the studies handled by Bolter, Darley, Hillis
and Kirby. These remarks are presented as some of the major
aspects held around the discussion of virtuality. These
approaches are considered 'critical' in terms of their focus
on a certain aspect of virtuality that mostly refer to the
social and cultural impacts of digital technologies and
computer generated environments on human life. These
'critical' approaches are considered 'alleviative' points of
view as they privilege certain conceptions to other possible
meanings and operate on utilizing the difference, the limit
held in between. As ordering a specific conception for

virtuality will necessarily exclude many others, these approaches are not criticized but presented with their own range of capabilities expressing an awareness of virtuality.

[3] The use of 'image of thought' in this text is a conception adopted from G. Deleuze and J. Rajchman. For Rajchman, creation of concepts always supposes creation of images. However these images do not correspond to "representations of something," but instead to the fabrication of the relations, temporal figurations, the 'seen' directions of thought as the objects of thinking. (*Deleuze Connections* 32-33)

[4] The word "immersant" is adopted from the vocabulary used by Char Davies. This term refers to the 'user' or 'agent' of a virtual reality installation experiencing an 'immersence,' by sensing being part of this environment.

[5] *It is referred here to Osmose and Éphémère*
"*Osmose* (1995) is an immersive interactive virtual-realty environment installation with 3D computer graphics and interactive 3D sound, a head-mounted display and real-time motion tracking based on breathing and balance. *Osmose* is a space for exploring the perceptual interplay between self and world, i.e. a place for facilitating awareness of one's own self as consciousness embodied in enveloping space."

"Éphémère (1998), is an interactive fully-immersive

visual/aural virtual artwork which furthers the work begun in

Osmose (1995)."

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