

**THE PECULIARITIES OF TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN  
THE 1930s: THE *ÜLKÜ* VERSION OF KEMALISM, 1933-1936**

**A PhD Dissertation**

**by**

**ERTAN AYDIN**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION**

**in**

**THE DEPARTMENT OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
BILKENT UNIVERSITY  
ANKARA, TURKEY**

**September, 2003**

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

-----  
Associate Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre  
(Supervisor)

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

-----  
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu  
(Examining Committee Member)

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

-----  
Assistant Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge-Criss  
(Examining Committee Member)

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

-----  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya  
(Examining Committee Member)

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

-----  
Dr. Aylin Güney  
(Examining Committee Member)

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Sciences

-----  
Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan  
(Director)

## ABSTRACT

### THE PECULIARITIES OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE 1930s: THE *ÜLKÜ* VERSION OF KEMALISM, 1933-1936

AYDIN, ERTAN

P.D. Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre

September, 2003

This dissertation analyzes a specific version of Turkish revolutionary ideology in the 1930s, the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism by means of textual interpretation of *Ülkü*, the official journal of the People's Houses, between February 1933 and August 1936. The *Ülkü* journal was published by a particular faction of the Kemalists, the *Ülkü* group, who competed with “conservative modernist” Kemalism and *Kadrocu* Kemalism for political and intellectual supremacy within the regime. *Ülkü* elite's solidarist, radical secularist, and anti-liberal alternatives to the state power enabled them to present a more appealing version of Kemalism for the context of the 1930s, which was the most authoritarian and radical phase of the Turkish Republic.

This study employs new methodological perspective for understanding the nature of Kemalist ideology, which would provide a key to understand the temporal and flexible nature of Kemalism. In fact, this is part and parcel of a general approach to revolutions that highlights “politics,” “political language,” and “symbolic politics” as the basic unit of analysis.

When the Turkish ruling elite encountered an ideological crisis owing to the world economic depression and the failed Free Party experience, prominent figures of *Ülkü* attempted to form the content of the revolutionary ideology by way of employing solidarist ideological assumptions. Solidarism became an important means to establish secular, rational and social foundations of ethics as a substitute for religion, which was said to prepare the Turkish society to meet requirements of “democracy”. The solidarist line of argumentation not only created tension between democracy and secularism but also provided justification for postponing democracy to an uncertain stage of time when the democratic eligibility of the people would be proven by the “true” representatives of the national will (*milli irade*). *Ülkü*'s solidarism gave way to an understanding of democracy that was truly embedded, if not confined to, in the restrictions of a peculiar consideration of morality which the *Ülkü* elite called “revolutionary ethics” (*inkılap ahlakıyatı*) or “secular morality” (*laik ahlak*).

**Keywords:** *Ülkü*, solidarism, secularism, secular morality, democracy, Turkish revolution, revolutionary ideology

## ÖZET

### TÜRK DEVRİM İDEOLOJİSİNİN 1930'LU YILLARDAKİ ÖZELLİKLERİ: KEMALİZM'İN ÜLKÜ VERSİYONU, 1933-1936

AYDIN, ERTAN

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ümit Cizre

Eylül, 2003

Bu tez Türk devrim ideolojisinin 1930lu yıllarda ortaya çıkan türlerinden birini, Kemalizm'in *Ülkü* versiyonunu, Halkevleri resmi yayın organı olan *Ülkü* dergisinin Şubat 1933 ile Ağustos 1936 yılları arasındaki sayılarını incelemek suretiyle çözümlemektedir. *Ülkü* dergisi, temel olarak, Kemalist elit içerisinde bu tezin *Ülkü* grubu diye tanımladığı muayyen bir ekip tarafından çıkarılmıştır. *Ülkü* grubu başlıca rakipleri “muhafazakar modernist” ve Kadrocu Kemalist gruplarla rejim içerisinde siyasal ve entelektüel hâkimiyeti ele geçirmek hususunda bir mücadele içerisinde olmuşlardır. *Ülkü* eliti'nin solidarist, radikal laik ve anti-liberal yaklaşımları Cumhuriyet tarihinin en otoriter ve radikal dönemi olan 1930lar bağlamında Kemalizm'in en cazip versiyonu olarak kabul görmüştür.

Bu çalışma Kemalist ideolojinin zamana bağlı esnek ve değişken tabiatını çözümlemeye yardımcı olacak yeni bir metodolojik bakış açısı getirmektedir. Esasında, bu bakış açısı devrimleri anlamada genel bir yaklaşım sunan ve “siyaset”, “siyaset dili” ve “sembolik siyaset”i bir çözümleme birimi olarak öne çıkaran metodolojinin bir parçası olarak geliştirilmiştir.

Türkiye devlet seçkini, dünya ekonomi krizi ve Serbest Fırka hadisesi tecrübesini müteakiben ciddi bir ideolojik kriz ile karşı karşıya kaldıklarında, *Ülkü* eliti Fransız solidarizmini bir ideolojik alternatif olarak sunmuşlardır. Solidarizm dini ahlakın yerini alacak laik, rasyonel ve toplumsal temellere sahip bir ahlak anlayışını yerleştirmenin bir aracı olarak yorumlanmakla beraber Türk toplumunu “demokrasi”nin ihtiyaçlarına cevap verecek bir düzeye hazırlayacak yeni bir siyasal gramer olarak algılanmıştır. Dahası, solidarizm laiklik ile demokrasi arasındaki gerilimin giderilme aracı olarak sunulmuştur. Bu teze göre, solidarizm, bu gerilimin aşılmasının aracı olmaktan çok demokrasinin halkın demokratik yetkinliklerinin kazandığına dair milli iradenin “hakiki” temsilcilerinin onay verecekleri belirsiz bir vakte kadar ertelenmesini haklaştıran ideolojik bir gerekçe sunması açısından önemlidir. *Ülkü*'nün solidarizmi demokrasiyi belirli bir laik ahlak telakkisine koşullu olarak formüle ederek bu ahlak anlayışını demokrasinin olmazsa olmaz bir unsuru olarak benimsemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ülkü*, solidarizm, laiklik, laik ahlak, demokrasi, Türk devrimi, Kemalizm

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several people have made significant contributions to the completion of this dissertation. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Ümit Cizre, whose detailed comments and corrections occasioned much substantive enrichment and innumerable stylistic improvements.

At Harvard University, Prof. Cemal Kafadar offered valuable suggestions and encouragement at several stages of this study. I will never forget my Harvard days, and the wonderful scholars, whose academic contributions and supports were of great value: Prof. Hakan Kırımlı, Prof. Feroz Ahmad, Himmet Taşkömür, Hikmet Yaman, Ali Yaycıoğlu, Cengiz Şişman, Rahim Acar, Hüseyin Yılmaz, Muhammed Ali Yıldırım and Prof. Nur Yalman.

Furthermore, I am especially indebted to Prof. Cemil Aydın, of the Ohio State University, for his incalculable generosity and his academic, moral and material support. I am also grateful to Prof. Juliane Hammer, of Elon University, for providing worthwhile academic and logistic assistance.

Research for this study was partly supported by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University and the Leslie Humanities Institute, Dartmouth Collage, which provided a splendid gift of time and the ideal setting for academic study. I would like to thank to Prof. Kevin Reinhart and Prof. Dennis Washburn, of Dartmouth College, for their useful suggestions for my study. I would also like to thank Prof. Şerif Mardin, Prof. Gauri Viswanathan, Prof. Peter van der Veer, Prof. Marc Baer, Prof. Jim Dorsey, Prof. Barbara Reeves-Ellington and Prof. Selim Deringil for their kind suggestions and refinements.

In my country, I am happy for the opportunity to express my gratitude to the many persons who proffered encouragement and assistance: Prof. İbrahim Dalmış, Prof. Halil İnalçık, Prof. Bülent Arı, Prof. Yusuf Ziya Özcan, Murat Öztürk, Ebru Çoban, Prof. Tanel Demirel, Prof. Cemalettin Taşkiran, Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prof. Mehmet Yılmaz, Prof. Yılmaz Çolak, Prof. Alim Yılmaz, Aziz Tuncer, Refik Yalıkaya, Prof. Metin Toprak, Prof. Özer Sencar, Ömer Lekesiz, Prof. İsmail Coşkun, Prof. Nur Bilge Criss, and Murat Çemrek.

Finally I want to thank my wife, Fatma Nur, and my daughters, Merve Rana and Zeynep Eda, for their great patience and enormous moral support.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| ABSTRACT .....   | iii |
| OZ .....   | iv  |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....  | v   |
| TABLE OF CONTENT .....   | vi  |
| CHAPTER I:   |     |
| INTRODUCTION .....   | 1   |
| 1.1. Ülkü as an Historical and Intellectual Variant of Kemalism .....  | 5   |
| 1.2. The Ülkü Group and Solidarism .....   | 9   |
| 1.3. Ülkü's Understanding of Democracy .....   | 16  |
| CHAPTER II   |     |
| GENERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS .....   | 24  |
| 2.1. How the Turkish Revolution Has Been Studied? .....  | 24  |
| 2.2. Political Culture and Symbolic Politics in Understanding<br>Revolutions: Recent Historiography of the French Revolution ..... | 38  |
| 2.3 Creating a New Man as a Revolutionary Goal: The French and<br>Turkish Ways .....   | 49  |
| CHAPTER III  |     |
| DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY<br>IDEOLOGY IN THE 1930s .....   | 57  |
| 3.1. The Specificity of the 1930s .....  | 57  |
| 3.2. The World Economic Crisis .....   | 61  |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 3. 3. Radicalization of Politics Paving Way to the Ülkü Movement:<br>The Free Party Experience.....                             | 66  |
| 3.3.1. The Dissolution of the Free Party and its Implications for the<br>Revolutionary Ideology .....                           | 80  |
| 3.4. The Abolition of the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) and the<br>Establishment of the People’s Houses (Halkevleri).....     | 91  |
| 3.5. Competing Visions And Rival Representations Of Kemalism.....   | 96  |
| 3.5.1. “Conservative” Kemalism .....  | 101 |
| 3.5.2. Kadrocu Kemalism .....   | 106 |
| 3.5.3. Ülkü version of Kemalism.....  | 118 |
| CHAPTER IV  |     |
| SOLIDARISM AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR ÜLKÜ GROUP .....   | 125 |
| 4.1. The Intellectual Origins Of Solidarism .....   | 129 |
| 4.1.1. Alfred Fouilleé: The Founding Father of Solidarism.....  | 131 |
| 4.1.2. Léon Bourgeois: The Political Triumph of Solidarism.....   | 136 |
| 4.1.3. Auguste Comte and Authoritarian Solidarism.....  | 147 |
| 4.1.3. Emile Durkheim and Pluralist Solidarism.....   | 153 |
| 4.2. The Historical Roots Of Turkish Solidarism .....   | 159 |
| 4.2.1. The Making of Turkish Solidarism in the Young Turk Era:<br>Utilization of Science for a Social Engineering Project ..... | 163 |
| 4.2.2. Populism and Solidarism in the Young Turk Era .....  | 168 |
| 4.2.3. Ziya Gökalp and Solidarism (Tesanütçülük).....   | 173 |
| 4.3. Solidarism In The Ülkü Version Of Kemalism .....   | 179 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 4.3.1. How was the Idea of Solidarity articulated in the Ülkü Journal? .....                              | 179 |
| 4.3.2 Ülkü's Consideration of Rights and Duties: "All the citizens were born as debtors to society" ..... | 185 |
| 4.3.3. A Solidarist Vision of Society: "There is no Class" .....  | 188 |
| 4.3.4. Halk Terbiyesi (Education of the People) to Create a Social Solidarity .....                       | 192 |
| 4.3.5. The People's Houses as the Embodiments of the Social Solidarity .....                              | 198 |

## CHAPTER V

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| THE FIRST PILLAR OF SOLIDARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF LAIC MORALITY THROUGH MASS EDUCATION ..... | 212 |
|--|-----|

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 5.1. Laïcité And The Problem Of Order In The French Republican Legacy .....   | 217 |
| 5.1.1. Where Does the Turkish Experience Fit within Different Paths of Secularization? .....                        | 217 |
| 5.1.2. Laïcité and Laic Education in the French Republican History .....  | 221 |
| 5.1.3. Secular Morality (Morale Laïque), Secular Education and Social Solidarity in the French Third Republic ..... | 226 |
| 5.2. The Turkish Revolution and the Problem of Laiklik .....  | 240 |
| 5.3. The Ülkü Elite and the Construction of Secular Morality .....  | 246 |

## CHAPTER VI

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| THE SECOND PILLAR OF SOLIDARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CLASSLESS HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY ..... | 266 |
| 6.1. The Tension Between Democracy and Secularism .....  | 272 |



|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 6.2. Ülkü Elite's Conception of Anti-Liberal Democracy .....                         | 275 |
| 6.2.1. One-Party Rule as the Expression of a Classless<br>Homogeneous Society .....  | 280 |
| 6.2.2. Schools as Instruments for Ülkü's Ideal of Democracy.....                     | 292 |
| 6.3. Cultural Conversion of the Peasants .....                                       | 298 |
| 6.4. Utilization of Arts and Rituals for the Cultural Regeneration of<br>People..... | 306 |
| CONCLUSION .....   | 316 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY.....  | 324 |

## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Kemalism is a topic as relevant and controversial as political Islam, and often the two are depicted as alternatives for the future of Middle Eastern politics.<sup>1</sup> Like political Islam, the definition and historical experience of Kemalism are not monolithic or closed to diverse interpretations. However, its different facets have not been studied adequately. This dissertation analyzes a specific version of Kemalist ideology, the *Ülkü* version<sup>2</sup>, which became the official ideology of the Turkish Republic during the mid-1930s. The *Ülkü* version of Kemalism enables us to understand both the historical experience of Kemalism during the turbulent decade of 1930s and its legacy for today.

This dissertation analyzes the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism as a specific variant of the Turkish revolutionary ideology in the 1930s by means of textual interpretation of *Ülkü*, the official journal of the People's Houses, between February 1933 and August

---

<sup>1</sup> There is no consensus over the definition of Kemalism among social scientists. However, it can be argued, that "the set of ideas and ideals which together formed *Kemalizm* (Kemalism) or *Atatürkçülük* (Ataturkism) as it came to be called in the 1930s, evolved gradually... The basic principles of Kemalism were laid down in the party programme of 1931. They were: republicanism; secularism; nationalism; populism; statism; and revolutionism." See Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1997), p.189

<sup>2</sup> There were three notable versions of Kemalism in the 1930s. These are *Ülkü*, *Kadro*, and Conservative Kemalism. In this thesis the adjectives version, movement, strand, representation, interpretation and variegation will be used interchangeably to denote the different versions of Kemalism.

1936. The *Ülkü* journal was published by a particular faction of the Kemalists, the *Ülkü* group,<sup>3</sup> who competed with “conservative modernist” Kemalism<sup>4</sup> and *Kadrocu* Kemalism<sup>5</sup> for political and intellectual supremacy within the regime. *Ülkü* elite’s solidarist, radical secularist, and anti-liberal alternatives to the state power enabled them to present a more appealing version of Kemalism for the context of the 1930s, which was the most authoritarian and radical phase of the Turkish Republic. The main representatives of this group, Recep Peker, Necib Ali Küçüka, Nusret Köymen, Mehmet Saffet, Kazım Nami Duru, Ahmet Nesimi, Ferit Celal, and Behçet Kemal Çağlar, were at the same time the prominent figures of both the Republican People’s Party (RPP- *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*) and the People’s Houses (*Halkevleri*) project. Their policy suggestions and conceptual alternatives had a considerable impact on the political life of Turkey.

This study is important for three reasons. First, despite the central role of the *Ülkü* journal in the formation of official Kemalism of the 1930s, there has almost never been an over-all study on *Ülkü* in the literature of Turkish politics.<sup>6</sup> Thus, this

---

<sup>3</sup> Tekeli and İlkin also contended that *Ülkü* was issued by a specific political elite of the RPP to support the ideological pillars of the party to compete with other parallel attempts, namely the *Kadro* movement. See İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, “Türkiye’de Bir Aydın Hareketi: Kadro,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, 24, (Winter, 1984): 35-67, p. 40

<sup>4</sup> This classification belongs to Nazım İrem. See his “Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Vol. 34, No. 1, (2002), 87-112

<sup>5</sup> A group of the intellectual elite aspired to form the ideology of the revolution by way of founding a monthly journal, *Kadro* in 1931.

<sup>6</sup> In a considerably short article, Şerif Mardin analyzed the symbols used in the *Ülkü* journal in terms of content analysis. However, he was mainly concerned with the

study will contribute to theory-making efforts of Turkish politics by describing the crucial role the *Ülkü* group played in shaping the political culture of the period.

Second, this study helps provide new perspectives for understanding the nature of Kemalist ideology, which is a continuous issue of controversy in Turkish politics till this day.<sup>7</sup> It can be claimed that the Kemalist experience of the 1930s has deeply affected later decades in many ways and is of great relevance for understanding contemporary Turkish politics. This thesis argues that *Ülkü* was a response to the crisis within Kemalist thought during the 1930s, and that it carried the global and national waves of thought at that time. Yet, once solidified as a set of ideological doctrines, it continued to be perceived as “the” model experience of Kemalism by both its adherents and critics.

Moreover, this dissertation employs a new methodological approach to the Turkish Revolution as well, which would provide a key to understand the temporal and flexible nature of Kemalism. In fact, this is part and parcel of a general approach

---

question whether content analysis would be an efficient tool in analyzing the studies of the history of political thought. See, “Siyasi Fikir Tarihi Çalışmalarında Muhteva Analizi,” in *Siyasal ve Sosyal Bilimler*, Mümtaz’er Türköne and Tuncay Önder (ed.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 9-24. While his study is not specifically on *Ülkü*, M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu has also analyzed the journal in terms of its approach to the issue of peasants and the peasant ideology. He does not make a periodization. See his “The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 34/4 (1998), 67-91.

<sup>7</sup> The controversies around Kemalism still occupy a central place even in the European Parliament. In the first draft of the latest report on Turkey by EU, it was asserted that Kemalism is one of the great obstacles in front of Turkey’s entry to the EU. Certain “Kemalist” intellectual figures opposed this idea and severely criticized Arie Ooslander, the EU parliamentarian who prepared the report.

to revolutions that highlights “politics,” “political language,” and “symbolic politics” as the basic unit of analysis.

Third, from the standpoint of the analysis of *Ülkü*, this thesis will show how solidarism, or its Turkish version, populism, became a major ideological pillar of the Republic in the 1930s. Furthermore, it will discuss, how solidarism, as formulated within the French political philosophy, and as an artifact of the French revolutionary heritage, was articulated within the domestic context of a Muslim country that was being exposed to high-flown modernization and secularization in the 1930s. Moreover, this study will exhibit the means through which solidarism was appropriated and further utilized by the Turkish radical revolutionaries, or “re-constructivist” revolutionaries, to find a safe ground for their peculiar conceptions of secularism and democracy. The analysis of the ideas of the *Ülkü* authors helps better explain the relationship between secularism and democracy in Turkey. Their solidarist line of argumentation gave way to an understanding of democracy that was truly embedded, if not confined to, in the restrictions of a peculiar consideration of morality which the *Ülkü* elite called “revolutionary ethics” (*inkılap ahlakıyatı*)<sup>8</sup> or “secular morality” (*laik ahlak*)<sup>9</sup>.

When the Turkish ruling elite encountered an ideological crisis owing to the world economic depression and the failed Free Party experience, prominent figures of *Ülkü* attempted to form the content of the revolutionary ideology by way of

---

<sup>8</sup> Ali Sami, “Güzel Sanatları İnkılabı Nasıl Maledebiliriz,” (How Can We Allocate Arts for the Service of Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), p. 361

employing solidarist ideological assumptions. Solidarism became an important means to establish secular, rational and social foundations of ethics as a substitute for religion, which was said to prepare the Turkish society to meet requirements of “democracy”. Solidarism, at the same time, became the ideological expression of tension between secularism and democracy, which has left a long-lasting legacy for later generations. What is more, their solidarist preoccupation with secularism and secular morality for the preparation of society to an “ideal democracy” paradoxically became the basic obstacle in front of the Turkish democratic consolidation. The Solidarist line of argumentation not only created tension between democracy and secularism but also provided justification for postponing democracy to an uncertain stage of time when the democratic eligibility of the people would be proven by the “true” representatives of the national will (*milli irade*).

### **1.1. *Ülkü* as an Historical and Intellectual Variant of Kemalism**

It is important to note at the outset that the seeming incoherence and disunity of divergent versions of Kemalism paradoxically increased the flexibility of official Kemalism and its seeming coherence. Kemalism was able to unite several competing versions of itself under the over-all aim of cultural regeneration based on the submergence of tradition and thrust for modernity. There has always been a semiotic struggle over the definition and content of Kemalist ideology. In this sense, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate how these competing elite groups, who appropriated different ideological as well as philosophical strands of Europe,

---

<sup>9</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Peasantism Project

bolstered Kemalist political legitimacy, while simultaneously attempting to establish their own authority as public experts. The ideological route of the Republic became a contested site, an object of struggle amongst competing political actors and intellectual groups.

It would be wise to delineate the context from which the variegated forms of Kemalism sprang. With the beginning of the 1930s, the Turkish revolutionary elite was primarily preoccupied with the entrenchment of the ideology of state and reconstruction of the state-society relations. The beginning of the 1930s was a very significant historical episode in Turkish politics, because certain internal and external developments brought the Turkish republican elite to a very critical point. In internal politics, there were the unsuccessful results of the Free Party experience. For the first time, the state elite could experience the potential of the opposition. They realized that the principles of the Revolution had not yet been fully inculcated in the people. Outside of the country, there began an economic crisis that caused elites questioning the prosperity promised by liberalism and more specifically liberal economy all around the world. Instead of liberal politics and economy, the state elite opted for more anti-liberal and etatist solutions. In their minds, rising totalitarian regimes especially in certain leading European countries increased the negative image of liberalism, and further discredited the liberal democratic ideas. The demand for defining the ideology of the Turkish Revolution developed within this specific historical context.

---

Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 119

Kemalism became a recurrent and pervasive theme among the revolutionary elite to denote the overall ideology of the Republic in the 1930s. In its philosophical manifestations, the Turkish revolutionary ideology represented a blend of precepts drawn from positivist, rationalist, nationalist, solidarist, and laicist sources.<sup>10</sup> That is, as Zürcher puts, it comprised many attitudes and points of view.<sup>11</sup> But a common denominator did exist. It was the desire to reduce the influence of tradition as well as religion and to modernize and laicize Turkish life as rapidly as possible. In other words, the central project of Kemalism was to attain a cultural regeneration and conversion of society through the secular quest for modern Republican creeds that would cut off people from their previous attachments and alignments mostly grounded in a traditional and religious symbolic universe. The backbone of this project was the belief that the “scholastic mentality” could never be brought into harmony with the values and needs of modern “scientific mentality.”<sup>12</sup> According to this mainstream project of Kemalism, it was necessary to free the Turkish nation from all remaining vestiges of “scholasticism” and “obscurantism.” It was contended that the social backwardness and fatalism of Turkish society could to a considerable extent be ascribed to the influence that the traditional mind still exerted upon the masses. For the revolutionary ideology of the Republic in general, a revolutionary system had to eradicate residual values of the old society and had to promote elite-sponsored values among the masses with the practical intent of helping to accelerate

---

<sup>10</sup> Ali Kazancıgil, “The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Turkey*, ed. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst, 1981), p. 37

<sup>11</sup> Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 189



the nation's macro-development towards democracy. This system takes the entire population as its target that was expected to internalize and practice the new ideology. So, there was a need for the cultural regeneration of society through employing modern and “scientific” techniques and new symbolic codes to reach the level of contemporary civilization. That quest for establishing new symbolic codes for cultural regeneration to prepare the people for the future democracy finds its true expression in the words of Mustafa Kemal:

Turkey is going to build up a perfect democracy. How can there be a *perfect* democracy with half the country in bondage? In two years from now, every woman must be freed from this useless tyranny. Every man will wear a hat instead of a fez and every woman will have her face uncovered; woman's help is absolutely necessary and she must have full freedom in order to take her share of her country's burden.<sup>13</sup>

Several ideological strands attempted to redefine the common denominator of this mainstream revolutionary project to free people from the “tyranny” of tradition and establish a “perfect” democracy. The *Ülkü* group no doubt exemplifies one of these attempts. It refers to the activities and aims of an organized elite group that sought to advance the project of cultural regeneration by way of using solidarist assumptions to establish a secular moral order or a “scientific morality”<sup>14</sup> to attain a

---

<sup>12</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Köycülük Nedir,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6: pp. 422-430, p. 425

<sup>13</sup> Cited in Grace Ellison, *Turkey To-Day* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1929), p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Ahmet Nesimi, “İnanç ve Us,” (Belief and Reason), *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), pp. 403-407, p. 405

“democratic” ideal<sup>15</sup>. It should be noted that in terms of its radical and anti-clerical nature, the project of this strand of Kemalism resembles the Jacobin side of the French Revolution or the neo-Jacobin group of the Third Republic, which grounded its political project on *solidarité*.<sup>16</sup> This analysis focuses, in part, on how the radical revolutionaries’ politics of secularization, by separating morality from traditional religious and cultural foundations, constituted the basis of the concept and practices of “mass education” which the People’s Houses took up to make the mass eligible for the anticipated ideal of democracy. The dissertation also shows that this sort of formulation of secular morality as a precondition of democracy created tension between secularism and democracy.

## 1.2. The *Ülkü* Group and Solidarism

The *Ülkü* group had a great share of solidarism in its broader sense. I take the concept solidarism or its Turkish version populism<sup>17</sup> as a form of ideological eclecticism containing a whole array of connotations regarding the entrenchment of Turkish nationalism, construction of a classless, homogenous and amalgamated

---

<sup>15</sup> Nusret Kemal (Köymen), “Halkçılık,” (Populism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), pp. 185-190

<sup>16</sup> John A. Scott categorizes “*solidarité* as the expression of neo-Jacobin predominance in French political and intellectual life” in the Third Republic. See, John A. Scott, *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 158

<sup>17</sup> For Paul Dumont, populism “was a Turkish version of the solidarist ideas outlined by the French radical politician Léon Bourgeois and the sociologist Emile Durkheim.” “The origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 31

(*kütteleşmiş*) mass, cultural regeneration of society, and all-encompassing project of secular morality politics. The terms solidarity (*tesanüt*), social solidarity (*içtimai tesanüt*) and populism (*halkçılık*) were ideals constantly reiterated by the authors of *Ülkü* as the founding bricks of the ideology of the Turkish Revolution. These terms implied a social and cultural regeneration project attached to “the idea of democracy and a militant intellectual activity aimed at leading the people on the road to progress”<sup>18</sup> by way of mass education based on a new morality consideration, captured mainly by the concepts of “secular morality” (*laik ahlak*),<sup>19</sup> “scientific morality,” (*ilmi ahlak*)<sup>20</sup> and “revolutionary ethics” (*inkılap ahlakıyatı*)<sup>21</sup>. In this sense, the *Ülkü* group considered the inculcation of secular morality to the people as *sine qua non* for a safe milieu for democracy. In sum, in the journal *Ülkü*, solidarism was the outstanding ideological intake transfused into other chief or corollary ideas. Although the word solidarity (*tesanüt*) was used more often than solidarism (*tesanütçülük*), the latter as a word was rarely utilized by the authors. It was mostly used interchangeably with populism (*halkçılık*).

The term *solidarité* was originally conceptualized in the Third French Republic, by Alfred Fouillée as “a democratic ethics...to find a middle course between the

---

<sup>18</sup> Paul Dumont, “The origins of Kemalist Ideology,” p. 31

<sup>19</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Peasantism Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 119

<sup>20</sup> Ahmet Nesimi, “İnanç ve Us,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), pp. 403-407, p. 405

<sup>21</sup> Ali Sami, “Güzel Sanatları İnkılabına Nasıl Maledebiliriz,” p. 361

competing extremes of idealism and scientism, and of liberalism and socialism”<sup>22</sup> and later by Léon Bourgeois as a political philosophy to “defuse class struggle and all potential revolutionary threats to the existing social order.”<sup>23</sup> In his formulation, the quest for national solidarity would serve as “the antidote to class conflict.”<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, Léon Bourgeois maintained an ideology that involved rejection of liberal individualism and economism, Marxist collectivism, religious clericalism and anarchist syndicalism, “though having something in common with all of them.”<sup>25</sup> Solidarism indicates a quest for classless, homogenous and organic social order based on an idea of social duty and debt, in which “every man is born as a debtor to society.”<sup>26</sup> Moreover, for the French representatives of the solidarist ideology, solidarism became an important means to establish secular, rational and objective foundations of ethics as a substitute for religious morality.

For Emile Durkheim solidarism signified a construct of secular morality that “had to curb a person’s natural instincts and give to everyone a sense of

---

<sup>22</sup> Kristin A. Sheradin, *Reforming the Republic: Solidarism and the Making of the French Welfare System, 1871-1914*, (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester, 2000), Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 6.

<sup>23</sup> Karen Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle France,” in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3. (June 1984), 648-676, 664.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, 1961, 20.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Gide, 1970, 30.

responsibility and duty, and a set of common values.”<sup>27</sup> It is worth noting that despite their bitterly anticlerical stance, many of the radical republicans of solidarist persuasion were particularly “interested in propagating a new morality.”<sup>28</sup> Having argued that “morale must be scientific”<sup>29</sup> French solidarist figures held that solidarism met the need of a doctrine for laicism.<sup>30</sup> They advocated a wedding of science with ethics under the banner of solidarity.<sup>31</sup> In this sense, the attempt of the solidarist philosophy to dominate the ethical field began to shape the content of fin de siècle French laicism. By breaking the links between morality and religion, “their work is evidently part of the task undertaken by democracy to laicise ethics themselves.”<sup>32</sup> In short, French solidarism assigns secular ethics a place at the center of the democratic order. The Turkish revolutionary ideology in the 1930s as it appeared in Ülkü testifies to the vital importance of this understanding of religion underpinned by a solidarist foundation of ethics.

Being in friendly terms with French solidarism, the Ülkü elite aimed at the elimination and further assimilation of all forms of moral, ethnic and class interests

---

<sup>27</sup> Geoffrey Walford and W.S.F. Pickering (eds.), *Durkheim and Moral Education* (London: Routledge, 1998), 6-7.

<sup>28</sup> Karen Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle France,” 665.

<sup>29</sup> Linda L. Clark, “Social Darwinism in France”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (March 1981), D1025-D1044 (On Demand Supplement), D1035.

<sup>30</sup> Joseph Charmont, “Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy.” *Modern French Legal Philosophy* (Modern Legal Philosophy Series, VII, Boston, 1916), 85-86.

<sup>31</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, 87.

and erection of new arrangements based on solidarity. It is worthwhile to stress that the Ülkü group came to be the eminent representatives of solidarism after Ziya Gökalp. Having been mainly inspired by the ideas of Emile Durkheim, Gökalp was the first intellectual figure who developed the Turkish version of solidarism, *tesanütçülük*. According to Gökalp, the anticipated results of populist ideology would fall within the context of solidarist thought. For him solidarism (*tesanütçülük*) was the most appropriate ideological system for the Turks. 33

Taking some cues from Gökalp's ideas of solidarism, the Ülkü elite even extended solidarism to a more radical and re-constructivist intonation, which highlighted the notions of secular morality and amalgamation (*kütleleştirme*) of people.<sup>34</sup> On the first anniversary of the People's Houses, Necip Ali, the general director of the Houses, wrote that the Houses had been established as hearths of duty (*vazife ocakları*), to carry out social debts and solidarist duties: in his view, as part of his understanding of social solidarity (*içtimai tesanüt*), every citizen was born as a debtor not only to the state but also to society. For the Ülkü authors, in general, every conscious citizen had its own duty and obligation in the way of executing the revolution. Accordingly, "The citizen who does not carry out his own duty is a

---

<sup>32</sup> Célestin Bouglé, cited in John A. Scott, *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 178.

<sup>33</sup> Ziya Gökalp, 1959, p. 312

<sup>34</sup> It is striking that there was almost no reference to Gökalp in *Ülkü* between February 1933 and August 1936 due to his preoccupation with the idea of culture involving traditional and religious elements. Even, Gökalp was criticized on the accusation that his ideas were defunct, not able to be tailored to the needs of the time. See Hüseyin Namık, "Türk Edebiyatına Toplu Bir Bakış," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 71-73

useless element in ‘the trough of revolution’ (inkılap teknesi).”<sup>35</sup> In this sense, for Necip Ali, the Houses were the embodiments of the citizens’ social obligation and their solidarity. He examines the concept of solidarism in terms of its significance for the Turkish Revolution. His writings were almost the direct translation of Léon Bourgeois’ work, *La Solidarité*<sup>36</sup>:

As we are distancing from individualism through accepting the idea of unity, in such a way we are departing from socialism by approving personality. We want to be an amassment within our national entity, and we want to walk to the goal in the cleanest air of solidarity. For us, a nation... is a social organism (*uzuvlanma*). Everyone has a role and duty in this organism. Today, everyone owes to his/her ancestors or contemporaries for what he/she owns.<sup>37</sup>

The impact and weight of *Ülkü* group on Republican politics especially manifests itself in the Fourth Congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1935. The definition of the principle of populism was in conformity with the solidarist assumptions of the *Ülkü* authors:

---

<sup>35</sup> Ali Sami, “Güzel Sanatları İnkılabına Nasıl Maledebiliriz,” p. 359

<sup>36</sup> It is interesting that the famous pamphlet of Léon Bourgeois entitled *La Solidarité* was translated by an *Ülkü* author, Kazım Nami Duru, into Turkish in a book prepared as a preparatory sourcebook for High School students. See, Kazım Nami Duru (trans. and ed.), *Sosyolojinin Unsurları: Seçilmiş ve Sıralanmış Metinler*, Lise Felsefe Dersleri Yardımcı Kitapları No. 11, (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936). In this sense, it is possible to say that the *Ülkü* authors were mainly acquainted with the solidarist ideology from its original sources. However, in their writings, the *Ülkü* authors generally tend not to give reference to these original sources. For the only direct reference to Léon Bourgeois in *Ülkü*, see Ahmet Nesimi, “İslahatçı İçtimaiyat Bakımından Sosyalizm,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 16, (June, 1934), pp. 241-252, p. 241. However, there are several references to Fouillée, Comte and Durkheim.

<sup>37</sup> Necip Ali (Küçük), “19 Şubat” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933), pp. 4-5

... It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor for the individual and social life of the Turkish people... The aims of our Party... are to secure social order and *solidarity* instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude, to the amount of work.<sup>38</sup>

The *Ülkü* elite was also the prominent architect of the idea of the People's Houses that were designed as sites of converting people into the values of the Turkish revolution so as to equip them with the revolutionary culture. The essence of politics of secularism in the 1930s led by the radical revolutionaries lies in "the transfer of sacrality"<sup>39</sup> from the religious domain that had for centuries been associated with the Ottoman way of life into a secular domain identified by revolutionary elites with a new type of morality, secular morality (*laik ahlak*). This form of secularism in question used the "will to democracy" as a justifiable end of the overall project. That is, reaching "good democracy" at the end is used as a pretext to validate the revolutionary practices. Making the discourse created by the revolution dominant, the radical revolutionary elite elicited the disintegration of peripheral cultural elements and then absorbed them into the revolutionary formation.

One of the main questions in the journal was if "religion should be given a place in the inculcation of moral principles or ideals, or will all morality and ideals

---

<sup>38</sup> Cited in Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Regime" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, p. 88

<sup>39</sup> This term belongs originally to Mona Ozouf who employed it to analyze the secularist politics of the French Revolution. See her *Festivals and the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).



be based on secular foundations?”<sup>40</sup> The *Ülkü* authors responded to this question by defining morality completely outside the religious and traditional realms. They considered “the emancipation of morality from religion” as the chief factor for the laicization of state and society.<sup>41</sup> The gradual erosion of the Turkish revolutionaries’ faith in the viability of traditional and religious culture to sustain the fundamental restructuring of the new Turkish polity led the *Ülkü* group to try to enlighten and secularly purify the people and uproot the vestiges of traditional authority which was regarded as hindering Turkish society’s adjustment to the modern, democratic, and civilized way of life.

### **1.3. *Ülkü*’s Understanding of Democracy**

The *Ülkü* authors’ alternative was mainly grounded on the “populist or solidarist democracy”, which they saw as the “most appropriate form of democracy for Turkey.”<sup>42</sup> Theoretically, “people” continue to be the source of supreme authority. In practice, however, they become the subjects of intensive indoctrination, and total commitment to the purposes of state. It can be maintained that the radical revolutionaries were not interested in the representation of the existing structure of society, but in the representation of an imaginary people, which they intended to construct in the future. This kind of understanding of democracy led the radical

---

<sup>40</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Köycülük Programına Giriş,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 26, (April 1935), 132-141, 139.

<sup>41</sup> Necmeddin Sadık, “Layik Ne Demektir?” (What Does Laique Mean), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 11, (December, 1933): 370-377, p. 374

revolutionaries to consider politics in a messianic fashion. They, generally, felt themselves responsible for “maturing” and “ascending” the “spiritual quality” of the people so that they could attain a position whereby they can be represented. Of course, this postponed representation of society, or this sense of understanding of “belated democracy” refracted the elites’ ‘march’ to democracy in such a way that it turned out to be serious obstacle to democracy.

The *Ülkü* elite aimed at the conversion of society in line with revolutionary religion. For this aim, they even appropriated religious terminology to embark on a revolutionary mission to “democratize” society. This is indicative of how the *Ülkü* elite utilized a symbolic discourse by appropriating pre-revolutionary symbolic resources. It used religious terms and notions interchangeably with revolutionary symbols. The People’s Houses were identified as “the Temples of Ideal” (*Ülkü Mabetleri*)<sup>43</sup>; the “apostles” (*havari*)<sup>44</sup> of revolution were called to be recruited for a “village mission” (*köy misyonerliği*)<sup>45</sup>; the “spiritual revolution” (*manevi inkılap*)<sup>46</sup> was said to be disseminated by the zealous efforts of the “saintly” (*nurlu*)<sup>47</sup> devotees

---

<sup>42</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Village Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123

<sup>43</sup> Necip Ali, “Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey’in Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March 1933), 104.

<sup>44</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” (The Means of People Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March 1933), 152-9, 152.

<sup>45</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Köy Misyonerliği,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Sept., 1933), 150.

<sup>46</sup> Mehmet Saffet (1933) “Kültür İnkılabımız” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 351.

<sup>47</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halkçılık” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1933), 185-190, 190.

of Kemalism in the way to reach “the Heaven of Atatürk” (*Atatürk Cenneti*)<sup>48</sup>. The leader of the Republic was envisaged as a genius, superior to the “prophets,”<sup>49</sup> a secular preacher, “a Great savior”<sup>50</sup>, and a “sacred altar”<sup>51</sup> of this secular religion. Even, Atatürk’s manifesto, *Nutuk*, was considered as the new “holy book (*mukaddes kitap*) of the Turks.”<sup>52</sup>

When the *Ülkü* group was in power during the mid-1930s, radical changes came about in the official ruling ideology. The revolutionary ideology, by denying traditional and religious establishments, began to function as a surrogate for religion. It determined a new identity marker for the Turks which was grounded mostly in non-religious connotations. This new secular creed was supposed to be a substitute for religion in satisfying the psychological and spiritual needs of people to free themselves from any kind of religious and traditional moral creeds. The state tried to offer answers to the spiritual longings of the people and to give purpose to their life. This was a sort of divinization and sacralization of revolutionary politics, which implied a messianic stand postulating that the only correct standpoint leading to salvation was exactly the one promoted by the revolution, and that all other beliefs were wrong and leading to false conclusions. Moreover, all those who professed

---

<sup>48</sup> Kamuran Bozkır, “Halkevleri,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March 1936), 74-5, 75.

<sup>49</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizm İnkılabının Hususiyetleri,” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 418

<sup>50</sup> Saffet Arıkan, “Yeni Fakültemizin Açılışı,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 36, (Feb., 1936), pp. 404-5

<sup>51</sup> Ferid C. Güven, “Ona El Kalkar mı?,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935), p. 162

other beliefs were to be liberated from their misconceptions, of which they were not even aware. However, to make up a religion out of the revolution was not an easy task for the radical revolutionary elite who advocated the discrediting of traditional religion once and for all. Even mentioning religion was considered harmful to the new secularizing policy of the regime: “To not mention religion at all is to present the best education of secularism.”<sup>53</sup> In order to consolidate the new secular morality of the revolution, the People’s Houses were mobilized as civilizing passages through which the traditional masses would have the necessary qualifications to be carried to a prosperous future.

The *Ülkü* elite’s conceptualization of secularism and democracy, emphasizing national uniformity and secular morality, in fact assimilated both politics and ethics of various kinds. Having adopted the French notion of citizenship highlighting the assimilation of different ethnic and cultural entities, the radical revolutionaries further stressed that the assimilation of ethical domain of society was also essential. Unanimity on a desired moral portrait was deemed necessary to establish a “real solidarity” among society: “It is the most sacred duty of state to try to bring the people up to a desired moral and cultural level at the soonest time possible with its own intervention and directive.”<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Canlı Söz,” (Lively Speech) *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 38, (April, 1936), pp. 85-87

<sup>53</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (September 1933), 105-114, 114.

<sup>54</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Danimarka Köylüsü Nasıl Uyandı,” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), pp. 467-473, p. 467

In sum, in this dissertation, the analysis of the Radical Turkish Revolutionary political language in the 1930s shows that a “revolutionary secular morality” was regarded as the only way of preparing society for the future “ideal” democracy. That is, this study will show how this language as reflected in the *Ülkü* journal sought to instigate a kind of crusading zeal among the “enlightened” members of society, in order to smother the “spiritual domination” of tradition and prepare people for the anticipated ideal of democracy. The radical revolutionaries of the 1930s, who portrayed themselves as the “apostles” and “missionaries” in their “saintly and sacred ideal” to spiritually illuminate the Turkish population, called all the intellectuals missionary guides of the society, to disseminate the sacred ideals of the Revolution.

The origins of this new secular faith should be sought not merely in the Ottoman modernization legacy dating back at least to the *Tanzimat*, or in socio-economic factors. The majority of the society still was, in general, committed to the traditional and religious allegiances. Its origins lie closer to the imaginative appropriation of the French Jacobin revolutionary heritage together with the influence of the rising totalitarian regimes in the inter-war period. The *Ülkü* version of Kemalism attempted to create something that might be described as a new religion through assimilating Comte’s late visionary hopes for a new religion of humanity. In this sense, the *Ülkü* elite and its coreligionists anticipated in their myths, rituals, and slogans many of the forms and procedures of the new secular faith which would eventually become institutionalized by the state agents. The ideas and practices of this specific elite group had left a relatively enduring legacy to Turkey.

The body of this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter of this study will cover a methodology of studying revolutions in general by particularly departing from the recent historiography and methodological debates on the French Revolution. By doing so, this thesis will base its methodology on the revisionist and post-revisionist approaches on the French Revolution, which takes “politics,” “political language,” and “symbolic politics” as the principle way of analyzing revolutions as opposed to the methodologies grounded on “social interpretation,” and “class-based” analysis. In this sense, this study aims to develop a new methodological outlook at the Turkish Revolution.

The second chapter will mainly focus on the peculiarities of the Turkish Revolution in the 1930s. Two important motives will be underscored as contributing to the genuine character of the period, which provides the descriptive framework for this analysis of the Turkish Revolution. These were the World Economic Crisis and the Free Party experiment. Three important ideological currents emerged to formulate the ideology of the Revolution: Conservative Kemalism, *Kadrocu* Kemalism, and the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism. The *Ülkü* version occupied the core by predominating the others until August 1936, by the dismissal of Recep Peker from his Secretary General post. This dissertation suggests that this period left the deepest imprints on the direction of the Turkish revolutionary ideology.

The third chapter will be devoted to the close scrutiny of *Ülkü*’s representation of Kemalism. This will be done through the analysis of writings published in *Ülkü* so as to glean supportive clues to the argument above. In fact, *Ülkü* provides a large plethora of representative ideas all providing a springboard for the Republican

ideology. The analysis will show that French Third Republic's ideology of "solidarism" or its Turkish version, populism, was the defining feature of this ideology. Solidarism was fed by two sources: a drive to establish secular ethics ("secularism") and a will to forge a homogenous undifferentiated social order based on social solidarity ("democracy"). This study will then reveal that solidarism is an instrumental variable to relieve the tension between secularism and democracy. *Ülkü's* solidarism proves its distinctiveness compared to the other solidarist approaches particularly shaped in *fin-de-siècle* France. The tension between secularism and democracy in the minds of the *Ülkü* authors is sharper than in the French case. The dissertation's view of solidarism has something important to contribute to the literature of solidarism in general.

The fourth chapter probes the first premise of solidarism i.e. secular ethics in terms of both its French origins and its manifestation in the journal. The *Ülkü* authors explicitly yearned for the construction of a new moral stance for the Republic that would totally cut off the traditional and religious ties. This rational and secular conceptualization of morality outside of religion was deemed essential to provide the infra-structural essence of democracy. As it will appear, it turned out to be ironic: while the *sine qua non* of democracy was considered to be secular morality, albeit *qua* secular morality, it created a bottleneck for democracy. That is, in the minds of the *Ülkü* elite, secular morality was formulated as a precondition for a healthy democracy. Unless it was firmly rooted in societal conscience, democracy would never fully take root on its own right.

The last chapter then will document how the *Ülkü* elite contemplated democracy. It is argued that their neo-Jacobin and solidarist understanding of democracy led them to perceive equivalence between the general will and its representation to establish a homogenous, undifferentiated society. In this sense, the *Ülkü* elite deliberately supported a one-party system, as it was the indispensable equipment of “populist democracy.” This contemplation found a base in actual practices of that era, particularly through the People’s Houses. These Houses were the agents of preparing the conscience of people for democracy. It is clear that enormous efforts were made to educate the masses for the revolutionary cause and ideals to transform them into devout Republican electorates of the projected democracy.



## CHAPTER II

### GENERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS

#### 2.1. How the Turkish Revolution Has Been Studied: Historiography of the Turkish Revolution

It is worth mentioning that there have been only a few attempts to develop a systematic approach to the Turkish Revolution. Students of Turkish politics, generally, have a tendency to analyze the Revolution without delineating a methodology that would develop a systematic outlook on the subject. Until the 1950s, as Şerif Mardin puts it, studies on the Turkish Revolution were mainly based on "praise-blame" (*övme-yerme*) approaches and they did not develop analytical methods for Turkish history.<sup>55</sup> In those studies, the Revolution was justified against the so-called reactionary backdrop of an "authoritarian", elitist, "monarchical" old regime.<sup>56</sup> The Revolution was defended, as a mythologized, sanitized consensual

---

<sup>55</sup> Şerif Mardin. (1992) *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p.19

<sup>56</sup> See, for instance, Recep Peker, *İnkılap Ders Notları*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk ihtilali, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Derslerinden*, (İstanbul: Burhaneddin Matbaası, 1940); Munis Tekinalp, *Kemalizm*, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Gazete ve Matbaası, 1936), Yavuz Abadan, *İnkılap ve İnkılapçılık*, (İstanbul: Eminönü Halkevi, 1940), Şeref Aykut, *Kamalizm:*

phenomenon, almost as the Turkish equivalent of the French Revolution. From the outset, however, especially in the “Anglophone account,” there were dissenting approaches which considered the Turkish Revolution as the outcome of “dictatorial” attempts of a specific elite group originating from the Committee of Union and Progress. In these accounts, the Revolution and its aftermath were criticized as a part and parcel of a dictatorship and anti-liberal ideology rising all over the world.<sup>57</sup> This rather negative treatment of the subject had no correspondence, at that time, in Turkey. Certainly, it was quite difficult to criticize the Revolution and its reforms at a time when respect for pluralism hardly existed. Whether critical or not, until the 1950s, studies on the Turkish Revolution had lacked a considerable analytical and systematic perspective.

---

*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programının İzahı*, (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1936), Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938)

<sup>57</sup> For the critical account of pre-1950 that classified Turkey under the banner of dictatorship see, Arnold Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey*, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927); H. C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf – Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator*, (London: Methuen, 1932); Diana Spearman, *Modern Dictatorship*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Hans Kohn, “Ten Years of the Turkish Republic,” in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Oct., 1933): 141-155; Thomas K. Ford, “Kamalist Turkey,” in *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, Guy Stanton Ford (ed.), (London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1939), Second Edition, pp. 126-153; Mildred Adams, “Women under the Dictatorships,” in *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, pp. 272-291; Sigmund Neumann, “The Political Lieutenants in Modern Dictatorship,” in *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, pp. 292-309; Halide Edip Adıvar, *Turkey Faces West; A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930); H. E. Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1931); Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co. Ltd., 1953)

About a generation after the Revolution, especially with the beginning of the 1950s, a crop of new historians and social scientists came to the fore. They were mainly academic professionals engaged in archival work, and committed to “objective” historiography. However, what is most significant is that the color of criticism shifted from negative to a relatively positive one especially in the Anglophone world just after the end of World War II. The emergence of modernization theories began to determine the contents of area studies. These academicians generally remained within the broad parameters of Revolutionary orthodoxy. They tended to accept the Revolution as a progressive, modern, nationalist movement directed against an exploitative old regime. Actually, they were not blind to the failings and negativities of the revolutionaries, but they were generally sympathetic to, rather than critical of, the revolutionary impulse. This is not because they sympathized with the current administrations, but their commitment to the modernization theories led these scholars to characterize the 1930s as a temporary deviation from the long-term evolution to liberal democracy. In those studies, every seeming contradictions and negativities were justified on behalf of passing from traditional ways to a modern style. For one of the prominent representatives of this account, Turkey signified the “best hope for republican stability in the Middle East,”<sup>58</sup> in the way of “maintaining constitutional forms and improving democratic procedures.”<sup>59</sup> According to another prominent representative of the modernization school, the Turkish Revolutionary elite prepared unconsciously

---

<sup>58</sup> Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, (New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. viii

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

“its own eventual supersession by a more democratic form of government resting on a new social and economic order.”<sup>60</sup> It is generally argued that Mustafa Kemal opted for “some degree of autocracy” due partially to his “Oriental” character, but “he had set up a democratic system” by virtue of his commitment to the “Occidental” style.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the assertions on dictatorship of the pre-1950 accounts, authors subscribing to the classical modernization studies highlighted development and progress. That is, the unilinear, teleological assumptions of classical modernization theory have implied that every society should undergo the same line of development and modifications in a progressive and evolutionary direction. The unequal developmental paths between the nation-states would be superseded by stages of the universal standards of development.<sup>62</sup> Certainly, the West was taken putatively as the leading actor in that universal direction and the rest of the world were assumed to be the sequential components that are arrayed around this teleological route. For this

---

<sup>60</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), The Second Edition, p. 485

<sup>61</sup> Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation*, (Nicosia: K. Rustem&Brothers, 1964), p. 392

<sup>62</sup> For Partha Chatterjee, these sorts of postulation signify a liberal-rationalist dilemma. Because, in Eastern societies the evidence shows that nationalism could also give rise to mindless chauvinism and xenophobia and serve as the justification of authoritarianism. According to the modernists' views, the "Western" type manifests the good and normal side of nationalism and the Eastern (organic) type represents the evil and specific and even disturbing side of nationalism. Even so, when this illiberal special type of nationalism appears in the form of revivalist movements or oppressive regimes, it still represents an urge for progress and freedom. In sum, the Eastern backward societies would reach to the level of Western societies in terms of the stages of development in a teleological manner. See, Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) , pp. 2-3

modernist account, the foundations of the nation “lie deep in the economic, social and political processes of modernization since the French Revolution... and the nation partakes of the social and political benefits of modernity.”<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, the Turkish Revolution was also depicted as a modernizing attempt, predominantly anti-clerical and anti-traditionalist in terms of both social composition and political agenda of its leadership, signifying a rupture in Turkish history with its strong nationalist, secular and progressive character.<sup>64</sup>

Alongside these assumptions of the classical modernization account, there emerged different “revisionist” accounts after the 1960s that still occupy a considerable place in the literature on Turkish politics. “Revisionism”, as I take it, has nothing to do with pejorative connotations as in the writings of Eduard Bernstein on social democracy. This is a new historical approach to the study of revolutions originating in the scholarly efforts of certain figures such as Alfred Cobban, Richard Cobb and George V. Taylor, who brought a “neutral label for a historiographical current.” Revisionist approaches to the study of revolutions emerged with the novel book of Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* in 1964. He mainly criticized the Marxist or “social” interpretation of the Revolution by proposing the “political interpretation” as a new alternative. Actually, Cobban’s book

---

<sup>63</sup> Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy and Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations,” *ASEN*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, 8

<sup>64</sup> See especially Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill Univ. Press, 1964)

became so influential that it has almost “swept the field.”<sup>65</sup> Almost two decades later, thanks to the scholarly efforts of François Furet, the revisionist account gained “a new explanatory paradigm” based on an analysis of belief systems or “political languages.”<sup>66</sup> Although there have been various versions of revisionist reading of revolutions, we can present the “interpretative ideal types” of revisionism as classified by Alan Knight:

1. A critical stance *vis-à-vis* the Revolution and its claims, political and historiographical, to be a popular, progressive and egalitarian movement.
2. A depiction of elites as the true makers of “revolution,” and of the masses as indifferent spectators, malleable clients or miserable victims.
3. An emphasis on the Revolution’s corrupt, self-serving, Machiavellian, power-hungry, even “totalitarian” character, evident, for example, in its manipulative agrarian reform and its arrogant, unpopular anticlericalism.
4. A stress, therefore, on the Revolution as a *political* undertaking rather than a *social* transformation.

---

65 Vivian R. Gruder, “Wither Revisionism? Political Perspectives on the Ancien Regime,” *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 20, Is. 2, (Spring, 1997): 245-295, p. 245. Although the arguments of Cobban together with the approaches of other “revisionist” figures such as Richard Cobb, Robert Foster and George V. Taylor were able to undermine the classic interpretation of Marxists represented by Lefebvre, they “failed to replace it with a new social explanation or an alternative political account.” In this sense, “until recently, revisionism connoted attack more than reconstruction.” Jack Censer, “The French Revolution after two hundred years,” in *The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution*, ed. Joseph Klaitz & Michael H. Haltzel, (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994): 7-25, p. 10

66 Jack Censer, “The French Revolution after two hundred years,” p. 11

5. An insistence that the Revolution was not, in consequence, a genuine “social” revolution, and that its claims to social transformation are blather...
6. A consequent stress on historical continuity over historical rupture...
7. A rehabilitation of the... old regime...<sup>67</sup>

It is instructive to assert that different researchers “tend to stress different elements of this... revisionist ensemble.”<sup>68</sup> In this sense, the revisionist figures writing on the Turkish Revolution underlined certain points drawn above. In the existent “revisionist” account on Turkey, it is commonly acknowledged that relying on the legacy of strong-state tradition<sup>69</sup>, the Turkish Revolution is “a political revolution”<sup>70</sup> from above based on a relatively broad elite consensus<sup>71</sup>. Similarly, others emphasized the strong military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite character in

---

<sup>67</sup> Alan Knight, “Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared to England and France,” in *Past & Present*, No. 134, (Feb., 1992): 159-199, pp. 166-168

<sup>68</sup> Alan Knight, “Revisionism and Revolution...” p. 168

<sup>69</sup> Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (London: The Eothen Press, 1985), and his “Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (1992), 169-194

<sup>70</sup> Ergun Özbudun, “Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey,” in S. P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party States*, (New York: Basic Books, 1970): 380-405, p. 387

<sup>71</sup> Donald Webster argued, “The *effective* majority... [of] the educated portions of Turkish society... is vocally and sincerely in support of the Kemalist regime and its head.” *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), p. 287. For the support of elite to the Revolution see also Fredrick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965)

alliance with the local notables, aiming to establish a secular nation-state by means of redefining the political community corresponding to the major ideological parameter of the new collectivity.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, besides the economic factors, they refocused on various interacting cultural, social and personal factors in their re-assessments of the Turkish case.<sup>73</sup> In this sense, the revisionist genre generally criticized the Marxist analyses of the Revolution which defined the characteristics of the Revolution in terms of economic factors and social classes. For the revisionists, these were rudimentary for the understanding of the Revolutionary process.<sup>74</sup> In the words of Kemal Karpaz, Marxist analyses generally failed to “pay attention to the basic fact that class formation in Turkey, with its interest motives, vies with a sense of community, deep attachment to social hierarchies, and deference to elites and authority, which intermingle and often produce unexpected results.”<sup>75</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981): 127-142

<sup>73</sup> Kemal Karpaz, *Turkey's Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. vii

<sup>74</sup> The prominent works of this account are Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London: Verso, 1987); Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985*, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınları, 1989), Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler-5, 1830-1980*, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1988)

<sup>75</sup> Kemal Karpaz, *The American Historical Review*, 1990, p. 1596 Feroz Ahmad should be assessed as one of the prominent figures of these efforts based on the analysis of economic classes. Having mainly contoured by a Marxist perspective, Ahmad's studies generally analyze the Turkish Revolution as the direct outcome of class structures determined by the Young Turk Revolution, and in this sense, he depicts the character of the Young Turk Era in order to decipher the infrastructure of the Kemalist Revolution. See Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993).



Generally the revisionist interpretations focused on the study of continuity between the Ottoman and Turkish modernization. To them, Turkish revolution was not a rupture in Turkish history, but it was a radical outcome of the preceding modernization attempts initiated with the *Tanzimat* script. Its radical side mainly stemmed from its broader scope of the reforms than those attempted by the Ottoman predecessors. In other words, the Turkish Revolution is evaluated by this genre as a radical socio-political reorganization of a political unit on the remaining territory of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>76</sup>

Actually, the focal point of the existent Turkish revisionist historiography is mainly on the history of Turkish democratic consolidation rather than on developing a methodological conceptual tool to analyze the Turkish revolution. In those writings, the Turkish revolution signifies one of the important turning points of political modernization of Turkey. However, though the Turkish revolution was essential for the development of Turkish democracy, it had several perils and maladies creating certain obstacles for Turkish democratic consolidation. For Heper, for instance, the single-party conceptualization of democracy as a “rational democracy” postulates a strong elitist and utopian viewpoint highlighting the preparation of the masses to that specified understanding of democracy to guarantee the maintenance of the Republican regime:

The elites thought this would be possible to achieve by creating a new kind of Turk “who would think logically.” A new set of elites socialized in Republican values was to be raised. In turn, this elite would help the people

---

<sup>76</sup> See for instance, Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (London: The Eothen Press, 1985)

attain a higher level of rationality through education. Thus, first in 1930 and then in 1945, the governing Republican elite partially opened up the regime in order to foster debate among the “knowledgeable.” Through intelligent debate, the political class was to find the “one best way” while safeguarding the Republican reforms against the masses “who had not yet attained a higher level of rationality.”<sup>77</sup>

According to the revisionist approach Heper undertakes, this kind of apprehension about democracy by “the state elite” of the Turkish revolution gave rise to great problems that delegitimated further possible revisions and reappraisals of democracy by the political elite. Because, for the state elite who “acted as guardians of the secular-democratic state and believed in rational democracy,” the Republic came first and democracy second. On the other hand, for the political elite, who “tried to render the Republican modernization project more palatable to the masses,” the opposite is true.<sup>78</sup> For the aims of this dissertation, though he does not specifically refer to the 1930s, these arguments of Heper give important clues to understand the democratic vision of the radical revolutionaries of the 1930s. Heper’s analysis clarifies the elitist efforts of the Turkish revolutionaries to draw on the symbolic recourses of society and to manipulate them in the form of cultural politics. This sort of politics was deployed as a justification ground for legitimation of power in the hands of the revolutionary elite. The regular outcome of this style would normally be the springing of various competing circles in order to make each other’s dominancy positions in terms of the definitions of “true” meanings of cultural symbols. Unraveling one set of symbolic meanings in relation to others in a

---

<sup>77</sup> Metin Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, (Fall 2000), p. 69

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 70

competition to raise to the status of official Kemalism and in providing the content of Kemalism is the backbone of the revisionist approach to the Turkish Revolution.

Revisionist studies, which assert the cultural and symbolic traits of the Turkish Revolution occupy a distinctive place in the literature, thanks to the scholarly efforts of Şerif Mardin.<sup>79</sup> Having mainly argued that the Turkish Republic developed a new value system different from the value universe of the periphery<sup>80</sup>, Mardin held that the Turkish Revolutionary leaders took “the symbolic system of society; culture... as a target than the social structure itself”<sup>81</sup> Similar to the revisionist accounts on the origins of the French Revolution, Mardin explained the origins of the Turkish Revolution by stressing the importance of values:

The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented *bourgeoisie*, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal

---

79 See Mardin’s “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” IJMES, Vol. 2, (1971): 197-211, “Religion in Modern Turkey,” International Social Science Journal, Vol. 29, (1977): 279-297, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey,” in Islam in the Political Process, ed. James P. Piscatori, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 138-159, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey” in Ali Kazancgil & Ergun Özbudun (ed.) Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst & Company, 1981). It would be worthwhile to stress that Nur Yalman is the first social scientist who highlighted the ‘cultural’ side of the Turkish Revolution, see his “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey,” Daedalus, 102 (1973), pp. 139-67.

<sup>80</sup> See for example, Şerif Mardin, “Just and the Unjust,” Daedalus, 120 (1990): 113-129

<sup>81</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution.” In *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.2, 1971: 197-211, p. 202

privileges, but it *did* take as a target the values of the Ottoman *ancien régime*.<sup>82</sup>

Notwithstanding its extensive impact on the students of the Turkish politics, this aspect has not been extensively developed and even elaborated on. The existent literature on the Turkish Revolution is, to a large extent, does not fully depict the nature of the diverse elite composition, its role in shaping Revolutionary politics and the new revolutionary symbolic discourse of the early Turkish Republic. This study aims to make an analysis of the value system and the “political language” of *Ülkü* strand of Kemalist Revolution between the years 1933-1936 by exploring the methodological suggestions of the Turkish revisionist accounts in further detail. To a certain extent, the analyses and pioneering suggestions of Mardin together with other accounts made by Heper, Özbudun, Karpat, and Zürcher are utilized. Nonetheless, this dissertation mainly departs from the existent revisionist and “post-revisionist” accounts on the French Revolution, which undertakes by the analysis of the Revolution by focusing on “politics of culture” and “symbolic politics.” That is to say, this thesis mainly employs an outlook deriving from the revisionist account on the French Revolution that takes the “politics of culture” and “politics of revolutionary language” as the basic units of analysis.

It is significant to note that the relative heterogeneity of the Turkish Revolutionary elite does not allow us to draw a holistic and generalizing approach relegating all the competing elite visions to a single account. Without assessing the role and place of the political contest among the elite to dominate the politics of

---

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

revolutionary language and symbolic discourse, it might be difficult to evaluate the complicated features of the Turkish Revolution. That the so-called Kemalist elite was not a unitary and homogenous block is one of the main arguments of this dissertation. All encompassing approaches downgrading the value of differences and blind to significant fragmentations with respect to cultural and symbolic resources have certain limitations bringing about misleading analyses of the Turkish Revolution.

Recent debates and controversies about the French Revolution and its causes and outcomes contributed greatly to the literature not only of 1789, but also to the revolution studies in general. While the methods of state's cultural engineering in Turkish Revolution were often strikingly similar to the ones exercised by the French counterparts – for example, the stress on nationalism, solidarism and republicanism; the reliance on the laic national education; civic rituals and festivals, icons, songs, and textbooks and the like – the content was not necessarily similar. The Turkish project, especially that of the 1930s, with its anti-liberal emphasis, its preference for the single-party, and its overt étatism, was more radical than its French counterpart. Still, the Turkish Revolutionary style was indebted much to the French one. In that sense, a considerable degree of affinity can be discerned between these two revolutions, which can be used as an analytical tool to examine the Turkish revolution.

The reason behind this affinity does not originate from similar historical episodes. Rather, the Turkish Revolutionary leaders, in general, appropriated the French historical legacy and adapted it to their own context. They, generally,

appreciated the ideas and ideals of the French Revolution as their final goal.<sup>83</sup> The Turkish Revolutionaries also considered the French model a “blueprint” and did not conceive it to be a historical product of particular and unique circumstances. They did not approach French history as historians but as politicians. They manipulated and molded the French Revolution to their own ends. Reinhard Bendix pointed to this idea when he wrote that the French Revolution is one of the best examples of an ahistorical event with “demonstration effect.” Bendix argued that, regardless of the prehistory of the French Revolution and the unique combination of factors in France that led to its outbreak, “once the French Revolution had occurred, other countries could not and did not recapitulate that prehistory; they reacted to the revolution itself instead.”<sup>84</sup> The appropriation of the French Revolutionary legacy had not started with the Turkish Revolution. Even several decades before the Revolution, certain Ottoman intellectual circles struggled for the dissemination of the French Revolutionary heritage. In the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution (1908) and in the heat of the day-do-day power struggles with the old regime, *Tanin*, the official organ of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) analyzed the French Revolution, whose lessons were thought to be guiding light for the Young Turk’s missions. However, the profusion of translations and analyses of the history of the French Revolution in the post-revolutionary setting of Turkey was a grave contrast to

---

<sup>83</sup> Kemal Karpas, *Turkey’s Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. viii

<sup>84</sup> Reinhard Bendix, *Force, Fate, and Freedom: On Historical Sociology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 114-116

the situation under Hamidian censorship, during which a passing reference to the “regime of 1789” in a journal brought its suppression for a few weeks in 1901.<sup>85</sup>

Considering the fact that the French Revolution and its political style created a model of inspiration for the Turkish Revolutionary elite, certain theoretical approaches to the French Revolution would shed light to our inquiry of the Turkish Revolution. Thus, the exegesis of the French case provides for this dissertation an analytical framework to understand the Turkish case.

## **2.2. Political Culture and Symbolic Politics in Understanding Revolutions: Recent Historiography of the French Revolution**

Studying the French Revolution has been a controversial issue among the social scientists and historians. There are three broad approaches to the French Revolution. The first one is the Marxist approach that mainly focuses on class struggles<sup>86</sup>: the Revolution was mainly based on “the separate actions of four distinct social groups: the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the urban working class, and the peasants,”<sup>87</sup> which produced the conflict between the progressive capitalist-oriented

---

<sup>85</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 192-193 and pp. 195-96

<sup>86</sup> The prominent representative of this account is George Lefebvre. See his *The French Revolution*, Two Volumes, Vol. 1: *From Its Origins to 1793*, trans. Elizabeth Moss Evanson, Vol. II: *From 1793 to 1799*, trans. John H. Stewart and James Friguglietti (New York, 1962-64).

<sup>87</sup> Jack R. Censer, “Commencing the Third Century of Debate,” *The American Historical Review*, Volume 94, Issue 5 (Dec., 1989), 1309-1325, p. 1309

classes and the retrograde aristocratic classes<sup>88</sup>. Moreover, the Revolution fostered the development of capitalism by means of eliminating the feudal domination on production, and it enabled the bourgeoisie to be organized as a class to power.<sup>89</sup> In short, its primary outcome was the triumph of the alliance among bourgeoisie. According to Lefebvre, after “the people of Paris revolted in defense of the bourgeoisie,” it would be possible for the bourgeoisie to eliminate Old Regime privileges, “an effort exemplified by passage of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.” Then, before 1789 ended, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the urban workers (especially the *sans-culottes*) began to replace “the initial alliance that made the revolution”. In the summer of 1793, the alliance of the sans-culottes with the middle-class Jacobins took control of the Assembly.<sup>90</sup> The revolutionary experience was considered in the light of this general outlook. The ideas and experiences of the revolutionaries, in that sense, had meaning in so far as they served the general scenario. Interpretation of the events of 1789-1799 was heavily influenced by the Marxists who dominated the study of the national revolutionary past especially after World War II. But in the following two decades,

---

<sup>88</sup> Colin Lucas, “Nobles, Bourgeois, and the Origins of the French Revolution” in *The French Revolution and Intellectual History*, Jack R. Censer (ed.) (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989)

<sup>89</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 4

<sup>90</sup> Jack R. Censer, “Commencing the Third Century of Debate,” p. 1310



The Marxist interpretation began to lose its hegemony<sup>91</sup> with increasing challenges especially from outside France.

The second is the “revisionist” approach that attempted to challenge the Marxist outlook. The revisionist account was mainly developed in the Anglophone world as an alternative reading of the Revolution. For the revisionist account of which the prominent representatives were Alfred Cobban, Richard Cobb and George Taylor, the Marxist explanation of the Revolution or what Cobban called “the social interpretation” has failed to analyze the Revolution. It was not the triumph of bourgeoisie, but rather the venal officeholders and professionals whose interests were declining at the time of monarchy who were the agents of change. This situation provided advantages to landowners in general, and later promoted the development of the Revolutionary action. Unlike the Marxist interpretation, Cobban held that “the experience of revolution actually retarded the development of capitalism in France.” In that sense, for Cobban, Marxists have totally failed in evaluating the real origins and the outcomes of the revolution.<sup>92</sup> However, revisionists like Cobban and Cobb

---

<sup>91</sup> In recent decades there has been new efforts to revive the Marxist approach. William Sewell and Colin Jones criticized the interpretations of French Revolution that ignore the economic aspect. Though Sewell, for instance, accepts much of the critiques of François Furet and Keith Baker about the Marxist orthodoxy, he, nevertheless, sees the economic aspect as the key to understand the revolution. Hence, for both Sewell and Colin, the French Revolution was a bourgeois revolution. See William H. Sewell, Jr., “A rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution” in *The French Revolution; Recent Debates and New Controversies*, ed. by Gary Kates, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 143-156 and Colin Jones, “Bourgeois Revolution Revivified, 1789 and Social Change”, in *The French Revolution; Recent Debates and New Controversies*, pp. 157-191

<sup>92</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, p. 5. For a detailed account of the critique of the Marxist account see Alfred Cobban, *The Social*

could not develop a challenging approach to Marxist hegemony.<sup>93</sup> Their initial aim was to weaken the Marxist perspective. This aim slowed down their efforts to acquire an accomplished account of the French Revolution. Although the Marxist and revisionist historians and social scientists studied the Revolutionaries and their ideas, in their view, these were not the determiners of the formation or origins of the Revolution.

The third account<sup>94</sup>, “postrevisionism,”<sup>95</sup> is mainly based on the analysis of “political culture” and was a real challenge to the Marxist hegemony in the literature on the French Revolution. The research and studies undertaken by the revisionists enabled historians and social scientists to develop a more sophisticated account that can be labeled as third way. I will take this approach as my point of departure while analyzing the Turkish Revolution.

François Furet, Mona Ozouf and Keith Michael Baker, the chief representatives of the third account, attempted to make a radically different reading of the Revolution that is mainly based on an analysis of the role of the ideas and the

---

*Interpretation of the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).

<sup>93</sup> Lynn Hunt, “Foreword” in *Re-creating Authority in Revolutionary France*, ed. by. Bryant T. Ragan, Jr., and Elizabeth A. Williams, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. x

<sup>94</sup> Actually, some of the historians make dual differentiation between Marxist and revisionist account. They label what I call “third account” as a revisionist perspective. However, in my view, the scholarly effort of Furet, together with several Anglophone historians, paved the way for a significant account of political culture that should be designated under a different name.

<sup>95</sup> Vivian R. Gruder, “Wither Revisionism? p. 247

revolutionary discourse in shaping political culture. Furet seeks to understand the Revolution from its most obvious dimension, namely the “political” one. Furthermore, he tries to show how politics had become a mechanism in legitimating and representing historical action.<sup>96</sup> In a remarkable series of books, Furet destroyed what he himself called the “revolutionary catechism”: the Marxist and neo-Marxist account of French revolution as the model and forerunner of bourgeois revolutions everywhere, based on an interpretation of the years 1789-1794 as the classical instance of class conflict.<sup>97</sup> He argued that the Revolution was above all a radical shift in the balance of philosophical and political power, not of economic class interests. Furet acknowledges his debt to Tocqueville, and his studies would be evaluated as a continuation of Tocqueville's study of the changing basis of legitimation for regimes of the eighteenth century. Furet appreciated that the men of the Revolutionary era, especially the theorists and spokesmen of the first revolution from 1789 to 1791 – Antoine Barnave, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Jean-Joseph Mounier – were engaged in something dramatically new. Because they needed to justify and legitimize not only the overthrow of an established authority but also their own claim to replace it, they were obliged to imagine, exploit, and remake a new version of the French past, the French state, and the French people, infusing each of these with characteristics appropriate to the ambitions of the new political class that had taken power in France. In short, they had to invent “modern politics.” According

---

<sup>96</sup> François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 27

<sup>97</sup> See François Furet, *Revolutionary France 1770-1880*, tr. by Antonia Nevill, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) and his *Interpreting the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)

to Furet, then, the French Revolution became a struggle between competing and often incompatible philosophical assertions and political arguments. In this struggle, the French failure by 1792 to secure and agree on a new form of institutional legitimacy gave birth not only to the unstable and intense radicalism of the Jacobin years, but also to the cycle of dictatorship, counterrevolution, authoritarianism, restoration, revolution, and reaction that would characterize French history in the nineteenth century and divide the nation for almost two centuries.

For Furet, the most outstanding difference between monarchy and revolutionary period is that the latter created “a language of equality”. The rhetoric of equality together with the Rousseauian democratic idea of “general will” constituted a hegemonic position in French politics. Politicians competed between themselves to represent the “dominant symbolic position, the people’s will”<sup>98</sup>. Actually, their purpose was not only to interpret popular demands, but also to exercise power. Furthermore, this language of equality provided a compelling morality that no politician was able to challenge. The end result of this process was the emergence of the Terror of 1793-94, when the general will and the government (representation) were completely intertwined and even equalized. In this sense, the concept of democracy that especially the Jacobin Revolutionary elite appropriated was quite different from what we understand today. In this account, democracy does not mean governing by consent or respecting individual rights. Rather, it denotes “a radical ideology of popular sovereignty” with which “any abuse of power could be excused so long as it was achieved in the name of *the people*.” Moreover,

“democracy meant the power of a national state to defeat those who opposed its will.”<sup>99</sup>

The logic of this sort of Revolutionary politics was legitimized by the notion of “direct democracy” or “pure democracy”. With this sort of consideration of democracy, the Revolutionaries thought that the French people were an undivided whole (*comme un bloc*) in which any intra-social powers or any peculiar social interest had been considered as barriers to the General Will. This pure democracy postulated “the idea of a unitary political body where each contracting member recovered his equal share of sovereignty through a unitary representation, identical for all.”<sup>100</sup> Direct democracy was, actually, an unworkable abstraction. This situation gave rise to a possibility for particular groups of people “to claim to represent or incarnate the sovereign popular will with more justice, or greater effectiveness, than others.”<sup>101</sup> In the hands of the Revolutionary leaders, politics turned out to be a matter of competition over who represented the people, or equality, or the nation: “victory was in the hands of those who were capable of occupying and keeping that symbolic position”. In that sense, conflict of interests for power was replaced with a

---

<sup>98</sup> François Furet, “The French Revolution is Over”, in *The French Revolution and Intellectual History*, Jack R. Censer (ed.) (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989), p. 40

<sup>99</sup> Gary Kates, “Introduction” in *The French Revolution, Recent Debates and New Controversies*, ed. by. Gary Kates, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 6

<sup>100</sup> François Furet, “The French Revolution, or Pure Democracy”, in *Rewriting the French Revolution*, Colin Lucas, (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 33-45, p. 38

<sup>101</sup> Michael Sonenscher, “Artisans, *Sans-Culottes* and the French Revolution” in *Reshaping France; Town, Country and Region During the French Revolution*, ed. by

competition of discourses for the appropriation of legitimacy around some ideals like democracy which was given priority. In sum, Furet argued, “the French Revolution was the set of new practices that added a new layer of symbolic meanings to politics.”<sup>102</sup> For George Mosse, this “new political style” signified a shift from written to iconographical political liturgy that “articulated itself through festivals, rites and symbols, adopting traditional religious liturgy to the needs of modern politics.”<sup>103</sup>

Certainly, Furet was not alone in advocating these ideas about the significance of symbolic meanings of politics. Having considered language as the ultimate constituent of reality<sup>104</sup>, Keith Baker thought that the power of the revolutionary actions derives from “a set of symbolic representations and cultural meanings that constituted the significance of their behavior and gave it explosive force.”<sup>105</sup> Not unlike Furet, Keith Baker argues that politics in a society mainly depends on cultural representations, which express the relationship between political actors. He goes on to claim that the

---

Alan Forest and Peter Jones, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp.105-121, p. 112

<sup>102</sup> François Furet, “The French Revolution is Over”, p. 39

<sup>103</sup> George L. Mosse, “Political Style and Political Theory – Totalitarian Democracy Revisited”, in *Totalitarian Democracy and After, International Colloquium in Memory of Jacob L. Talmon, Jerusalem, 21-24 June 1982*, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1984), p. 168

<sup>104</sup> Peter Jones, “Introduction” in *The French Revolution in Social and Political Perspective*, ed. by Peter Jones, (London: Arnold, 1996), p. 6

<sup>105</sup> Keith M. Baker, “Enlightenment and Revolution in France: Old Problems, Renewed Approaches”, in *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, 1981, p. 303

... political actors deploy symbolic resources held in common by members of the political society, thereby refining and redefining the implications of these resources for the changing purposes of political practices. Political contestation therefore takes the form of competing efforts to mobilize and control the possibilities of political and social discourse, efforts through which that discourse is extended, recast, and – on occasion – even radically transformed.<sup>106</sup>

Thus, certain ideological and symbolic resources had been utilized by the revolutionary leaders in their political contestation to obtain power just like in the Turkish case. With the increasing effect of this new outlook on the French Revolution, instead of idealization of the Revolution as a victory of humanity, much scholarly energy has been spent to develop a critical stand. That is, the so-called *Ancien Régime* or monarchy began to be questioned in a different context. The pre-Revolutionary period was no more evaluated as a retrograde and antithetical to ‘progress’. That is, while, on the one hand historians embracing the third approach problematized the class-based analysis, on the other hand, they sought to understand the impact and even contributions of the Old Regime to the revolutionary environment. It was commonly argued that the social, political and intellectual legacy of the Old Regime had been modified, transformed and at times turned inside-out by the revolutionaries.<sup>107</sup>

For Furet, there was a strong centralization before the Revolution at the time of Louis XIV. He systematically closed the channels of communication (such as Estates

---

<sup>106</sup> Keith Michael Baker, “Memory and Practice: Politics and Representation of the Past in Eighteenth-Century France” in *Representations*, Issue 11 (Summer, 1985), pp. 134-135

<sup>107</sup> Colin Lucas, “Introduction” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, pp. xi-xii

General, *parlements*, the municipalities and the town councils) between society and the state. Under this strict centralizing monarchy, society was deprived of any political role. The use of power belonged to the king. With the abdication of the authority by the king, after Louis XIV died, there became a great vacuum in politics. The language of equality, public opinion and the notion of *volonté générale* began to fill the vacuum. At least, theoretically, every member of society was transmuted from subject of an absolute monarchy to citizen of a state.

Although the Revolutionary elite had in common with the ideas of *philosophes* and the Enlightenment, “the Revolution was not... simply the direct product of the contestation and practices of the new politics of Enlightenment.” Yet, during the crisis of the monarchy in the late 1780s, the premises, strategies and languages of that political culture provided the elements for the revolutionary discourse.<sup>108</sup> Even until 1791, the revolutionary elite did not consider a direct rupture between the old regime and the new. The term regime connoted an order of something. They saw the regime before 1789 as an order of abuse, which had now been reformed. With the beginning of the 1790s, perception of the old regime began to be transmuted. The expression “ancien régime” became a general name of corrupt and abusive order that had to be revolutionized totally. All the evils and inferiorities were attributed to it.<sup>109</sup> While until 1792, the old regime was not named monarchy, only after the Revolution

---

<sup>108</sup> Colin Lucas, “Introduction” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (ed. by Colin Lucas), (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988, p. xi

<sup>109</sup> Diego Venturino, “La naissance de l’Ancien Régime” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (ed. by Colin Lucas), (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 11-40



became anti-monarchical the *ancien régime* began to be denoted as monarchical.<sup>110</sup> In fact, discourse began to employ legitimacy as the “new regime” in rejection of the immediate past.

In theory, Rousseau’s ideal about the transformation of the absolute sovereignty of Kings into the absolute sovereignty of the people came true. Once this was achieved, politicians (Revolutionaries) competed to represent the broadest section of the public opinion. Revolutionary politics gained importance at this juncture. Actually, in Furet’s terminology, politics has, almost wholly, ideological and linguistic connotations. Revolutionary politics, furthermore, was formed by a “semiotic” struggle over who would represent the will of the people and who would control revolutionary language and ideology.<sup>111</sup> Although Rousseau proposed his famous concept of a *volonté générale* to designate a rule of a people in a republic not by its “representatives,” but by itself,<sup>112</sup> for the early leader cadre of the Revolution, representation and acting on behalf of the nation was the dominant theme. They imagined “a political order in which public service would be performed by an enlightened and public-spirited elite on behalf of the Nation.”<sup>113</sup> Since power was

---

<sup>110</sup> William Doyle, “Presentation” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, p. 6

<sup>111</sup> Lynn Hunt, “Foreword”, in *Re-creating Authority in Revolutionary France*, Bryant T. Ragan, Jr., and Elizabeth A. Williams (eds.), (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. xi

<sup>112</sup> Maurice Cranston, “The Sovereignty of the Nation” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, pp. 100-101

<sup>113</sup> William H. Sewell, JR, “*Le citoyen/la citoyenne*: Activity, Passivity, and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship”, in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, p. 121

representation, this performance could only be possible in terms of handling the control of representation.

### **2.3 Creating a New Man as a Revolutionary Goal: The French and Turkish Ways**

So, we can glean from the discussion above that representation became a contested terrain within which the revolutionary elite competed to gain power, and adopt some significant analytical standpoints to understand the Turkish case. Although everyone was speaking in the name of the general will, there was almost minimum consensus over its nature. No one even had the authority to establish that consensus. At this juncture, the ideas and acts of the revolutionary elite are of great significance to analyze the revolutionary process. Lynn Hunt argues that “it is ... essential to examine both the politics of revolution and the people who practiced them”<sup>114</sup> to understand the logic of revolutionary action. Although there were several affinities between the Revolutionaries, it is necessary to consider the divergences and variations. Not unlike the Revolutionary leaders of Turkey, the Revolutionary cadre of France was neither a unified nor a harmonious group that acted and thought in a similar fashion. They had the ideal to produce a “new man” as a common principle. However, the means and instruments to achieve that ideal varied in conformity with the ideational background they had.

Mona Ozouf held that among the Revolutionary elites there were two fundamental approaches seeking to realize the creation of the “new man”. According

to the first one, Revolution is to be understood as the act of regeneration, which produced the new people. Revolution is able to create him; it did not need to be formed by any external effect; it was an instantaneous happening demanding little prescription from the revolutionary legislator. The second approach, however, asserted that the remnants of the old regime, by the very fact of their past, were potential dangers to the Revolution. The advocates of the old regime are more inclined to resist regeneration and rebirth. For that very reason, man had to be remade and reshaped on the soil of the Revolution. In doing so, it should combat the guardians of the old regime, especially priests. Accordingly, “whereas the partisans of the first view were essentially confident of the outcome, the latter feared failure or regression. They needed, thus, to create a whole environment to train, protect and sustain new man. Hence, they were intrusive, dirigiste, and intolerant of discord.”<sup>115</sup> These two groups can also be classified under “constructivist” and “re-constructivist” labels.<sup>116</sup> Though the first one has been “concerned with the reproduction of a

---

<sup>114</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, p. 13

<sup>115</sup> Mona Ozouf, “*La Révolution française et l’idée de l’homme nouveau*” in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, pp. 213-232. The quotation was taken from the English abstract of this article, p. 450

<sup>116</sup> This distinction is inspired by Geraint Parry’s article on constructive and reconstructive education. Originally, Parry has taken these concepts from Dennis Thompson’s classical differentiation between ideals of citizenship. For Thompson, a constructive ideal is realizable by non-radical reforms; reconstructive ideals require for their realization “qualitative change in an existing economic, social, or political structure of a nation state,” Thompson, *The Democratic Citizen* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 43-52. From the standpoint of Thompson’s classification, Geraint Parry states that “reconstructive or ‘regenerative’ politics aims to bring about a qualitative alteration in the mind-set of people in order to effect a similar change in political attitudes and behavior, while the constructive or ‘redirective’ approach involves a less thoroughgoing shift, even though it may bring

political culture through education,” the other one “sought to redress the failings of present generations by re-educating future citizens.” The political philosophers of the reconstructive style, of whom Rousseau is the prominent figure, have “looked to education for redress, for the means to rectify the failings of past and present generations of adults” and “produce ‘new’ persons, transforming their priorities and ways of understanding of the world.”<sup>117</sup> Therefore, in the Revolutionary process, some people and groups were more active than the others to reshape society. In this thesis, I would argue that the thought and action of a specific Revolutionary group in Turkey fits the “re-constructivist” category.

The French re-constructivism has strong relevance to the Turkish Revolution in the 1930s. The following sketch elucidates re-constructivist attempt to shape the ideology of the French revolution. During the early years of the French Revolution, the Revolutionaries who shared this category of ideas were more dominant than the “constructivist” ones. These people wanted to form a political culture in which symbolic practices and rituals, such as language, imagery, festivals and figures were invented to reconstitute society and social relations. By means of disentangling society completely from the past, they aimed at arranging the basis for a national community in line with the requirements of modernity. Government, for the Revolutionary leaders of this approach, signified an institution with which the *l’homme nouveau* (new man) had to be created. They shared Rousseau’s assertion on

---

about significant political change.” Geraint Parry, “Constructive and Reconstructive Political Education,” *Oxford Review of Education*, (Mar-Jun99), Vol. 25 Issue 1/2, pp. 23-39

<sup>117</sup> Geraint Parry, “Constructive and Reconstructive Political Education,” *Oxford Review of Education*, (Mar-Jun99), Vol. 25 Issue 1/2, p. 25

the significance of politics, which was to shape a government capable of “forming a people that is the most virtuous, the most enlightened, the wisest, in short the best, taking this word in its broadest sense.”<sup>118</sup> Lynn Hunt argues that the re-constructivist Revolutionaries expanded and changed the shape of Rousseau’s idea of politics. In order to make the government more enlightened and suitable to mold the ignorant people, they felt themselves obliged to define a common good representing the entire French society. People could avoid anarchy and disorder in so far as they were committed to that common good.<sup>119</sup>

At this juncture, the analysis of Jacobin ideology will give significant insights to understand the new re-constructivist political style that the Revolution created. After the inauguration of the First Republic on September 22, 1792, there began a strong competition with the Girondists<sup>120</sup> and Jacobins in the Assembly over the representation of public opinion and the general will. There was no important difference between them in the sense of the basic principles they advocated.<sup>121</sup> At

---

<sup>118</sup> Cited in Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 1

<sup>119</sup> Kendall W. Brown, “The French Revolution and Modernity” in *Reflections on the French Revolution* Stephen J. Tonsor (ed.), (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1990), p. 160

<sup>120</sup> The Girondists received their name from the wealthy community which some of them represented. Vergniaurd, one of the leaders of the Girondist group, was a leading citizen of Bordeaux, chief town of the *Gironde*. The Girondins were the most ‘liberal’ members of the Assembly who supported the inalienable rights of man, promotion of the private property and free enterprise, and an ideal of *laissez-faire*. See, John A. Scott, *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914*, pp. 34-39

<sup>121</sup> John A. Scott, *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914*, p. 37

least verbally, both accepted property rights and were against state intervention in economic life. They all had the same ideal to create *l'homme nouveau* for the new order. However, from a tactical point, the Jacobins diverge from Girondists in the sense of utilizing every means necessary to protect the Republic from its external and internal enemies. Under war with the Prussians, the Girondists were not able to take the measures required for mobilizing society. They were unenthusiastic about the prosecution of the war. The Jacobins accused the Girondins of being disloyal to the Republican values and incompetence that gave rise to the long series of defeats of France after the victories of 1792. By utilizing every means to mobilize society for their aims, the Jacobin leaders became successful in overthrowing the Girondist rule.

After coming to power, the Jacobins began to be mainly in favor of the collectivist and anti-individualist visions. In their view, for the ultimate goals of the Republic, the body of the nation would subdue the individual who had no existence outside the domain of the nation. In 1794, Barere declared, “the Republic must penetrate the souls of citizens through all the senses.”<sup>122</sup> In Jacobin understanding, human nature was a raw material in need of purification and careful molding. One of the primary characteristics that the Jacobin mind displayed was its reformulation and reconceptualization of Rousseau’s notion of a “general will”:

Under the shadow of Rousseau’s notion of a “General Will” that can never be wrong and always reflects the true interest of the nation as a whole, it was inevitable that those who could know that “General Will” and truth would see it their duty – and their “right” – to impose it on France. Those

---

<sup>122</sup> Richard M. Ebeling, “Inflation and Controls in Revolutionary France: The Political Economy of the French Revolution, in *Reflections on the French Revolution*, ed. by. Stephen J. Tonsor, (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1990), p. 149

who did not see the General Will would be taught; those who refused to accept after the teaching would be commanded; and those who resisted would perish, because only “The Enemy” would oppose.<sup>123</sup>

For the idea of representation that, particularly, the Jacobins assumed, the people and its representation was almost to be fused. Just before the declaration of *gouvernement révolutionnaire* in 19 vendémiaire year II (10 October 1793), Saint-Just made a speech that exactly sums up the Jacobin idea of democracy:

You can hope for no prosperity as long as the last enemy of liberty breathes. You have to punish not only the traitors but even those who are neutral; you have to punish whoever inactive in the republic and does nothing for it: because, since the French people has declared its will, everyone who is opposed to it is outside the sovereign body; and everyone who is outside the sovereign body is an enemy.<sup>124</sup>

Furthermore, the Jacobins as advocates of direct democracy, began to consider elections with political parties as harming the direct representation between people and their representatives. Because, elections would weaken representation, divide the nation, and endanger the Revolution. Moreover, “elections may be useful in establishing the identity between representation and people, but once this identity has been established, further elections can only be redundant, or even harmful.”<sup>125</sup> In effect, this kind of logic rendered elections the moral equivalent of insurrection. In short, for the Jacobins, especially with the reign of Terror, elections were

---

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, p. 154

<sup>124</sup> Cited in John Hardman (ed), *The French Revolution; Sourcebook*, (London: Arnold, 1999), p. 186 For the wider account of Saint-Just’s ideas see Norman Hampson, *Saint-Just*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991)

unnecessary under a condition of direct democracy. In their effort to protect Revolutionary order against its domestic and foreign enemies, “the Jacobins contributed to the construction of a centralized state and to the elaboration of an ideology in which the state assumed the task and received the credit for convincing, guiding, and enforcing the general interest.” The Jacobins thus “adopted and handed down to their “jacobin” descendants institutional and mental habits they had themselves acquired from the Old Regime.”<sup>126</sup> Though Jacobins, at the beginning, advocated liberal principles<sup>127</sup>, subsequently, they came to the idea that “until people had been taught what was good for them a society in the process of moral regeneration could therefore not be conducted on the liberal principles.”<sup>128</sup> This moral regeneration could only be possible by means of eliminating moral legacy of the *ancien regime*, and further constructing a new morality through a secular education. In this sense, the subordination of religious institutions and establishing a

---

<sup>125</sup> Brian C. J. Singer, *Society, Theory and the French Revolution; Studies in the Revolutionary Imaginary*, (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 185

<sup>126</sup> Anne Sa’adah, *The Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 17

<sup>127</sup> Unlike the critical account that considered the Jacobins as the forefathers of totalitarian and anti-democratic political tradition, Anne Sa’adah argued that Jacobinism served as the basis for a form of liberalism based on “politics of exclusion”. For Sa’adah, seeing Jacobins as proto-totalitarians “both distorts the eighteenth-century record and prejudices the analyst’s chances of understanding why twentieth-century France, for all its exclusionary politics, never succumbed to a native brand of real totalitarianism, of either the left-wing or the right-wing variety.”, *The Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 15

<sup>128</sup> Norman Hampson, *Saint-Just*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 50



national, centralized education were of utmost importance for the re-constructivist Revolutionary elite.

This short account of the French Revolutionary politics from a revisionist standpoint gives fresh insights into the analysis of the Turkish Revolutionary ideology especially in the 1930s. The consideration of *Ülkü* group as re-constructivist group with their full array of revolutionary ideas and practices, employing symbolic resources and modifying and even instrumentally utilizing them as a new political style to define the borders of the center is a novel approach in the study of Turkish politics.

# **CHAPTER III**

## **DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY IN THE 1930s**

### **3.1. The Specificity of the 1930s**

In order to understand and explain the conceptualization of the Turkish Revolution along the reconstructivist approach of the French Revolution, one must start with the account of the specific domestic and international conditions in the 1930s and connect them with the *Ülkü* circle. The *Ülkü* group emerged in a milieu that disavowed any diachronic connections with the Ottoman past. Of course, the Ottoman legacy was one of the variables that caused a specific turn in 1930s, but in forming continuities between the emergence of re-constructivist style of politics and the Ottoman modernization history, one must appreciate the specificities of the new context as well: the world economic depression, discrediting of liberalism and liberal economy all over the world, the rising totalitarian regimes in Europe and east Asia, the failed Free Party experience, the *Menemen* incidents and the like all had impacts on the formation of the Turkish re-constructivist revolutionary style.

The radical and re-constructivist political style of Stalinism, Italian Fascism, German Nazism, Japanese Imperial ideology, and other parallel movements in the world in the 1930s share certain similarities. It is significant that the Turkish

revolutionary ideology in the 1930s embodied a collection of ideas that was being put together at about the same time period when several world leaders searched for an ideological formula with which they might regenerate their countries. The roots of Turkish radical revolutionary ideology and its political philosophy are not deep in history. It conjoined many philosophical aspects of Western enlightenment and modernity in a quite eclectic and pragmatic sense. The Turkish radical Revolutionary elite felt it necessary to renovate and regenerate the cultural and social fabric of the nation through substantial institutional and social changes.

The search for a “third way,” as an alternative to liberalism and communism, occupied many Turkish intellectuals after the world economic crisis. Whatever the alternatives presented by the intellectuals, the underlying basis of their formulations was always within the realm of Western enlightenment legacy. Even the conservative alternatives grounded themselves in that legacy. How then was the Turkish alternative to come about and what were to be the principles of its ideology?

Actually, one of the successes of Kemalism was to unite a considerable number of intellectuals around the critique of traditional and religious structure. In this vein, intellectuals from different circles like İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Recep Peker, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir could come together under the critique of the old. It should be noted that certain intellectuals<sup>129</sup> that would break this unity were discredited during the first decade of the Republic.

---

<sup>129</sup> For example, Arif Oruç, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, Refik Halid Karay, Adnan Adıvar, Said Nursi, and Nazım Hikmet were the prominent figures who were outside the legitimate boundaries of Kemalism.

These intellectuals from different persuasions held that scholastic mentalities and the remnants of the dark past had to be discarded and the Turkish nation would have to follow the principles of enlightenment. While the post-war alternatives to liberalism and communism in Europe emerged as reactions to the contemporary modern, liberal and rationalist ideas particularly in Germany<sup>130</sup> and Italy<sup>131</sup>, the Turkish revolutionary elite developed an alternative model, which heavily rested on the undisputed primacy of modernist considerations. Their minds were also occupied with the task of formulating a new metaphysics and spirituality for the newly established republic like the German and Italian fascist intellectuals. However, the Turkish Revolutionary elite had no problem with modernity. Rather, they were mainly disturbed with the traditional and religious mentality, which they saw as the sole reason for the nation's backwardness and discontents. Even conservative Kemalists like İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Şekip Tunç and Hilmi Ziya Ülken sought to ground their conservative ideas in the Western metaphysical philosophy such as that of Bergson. The re-constructivist Kemalists like the *Ülkü* elite, on the other hand, attempted to form an "authentic" moral and spiritual philosophy that would at the same time negate the existent traditional morality. Accordingly, the source of Turkish "cultural or divine revolution"<sup>132</sup> was an idea that the nation should be

---

<sup>130</sup> See George Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology; Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964)

<sup>131</sup> See for instance, Walter L. Adamson, *Avant-Garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)

<sup>132</sup> Mehmet Saffet, "Kültür İnkılabımız" (Our Cultural Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, (Jun., 1933), pp. 351-354

rescued from the so-called “spiritual oppression” (*ruhi tahakküm*)<sup>133</sup> of religious as well as traditional domain. More concisely, the strong Turkish commitment to the values of Western positivism and rationalism represented an idealism<sup>134</sup> that claimed to replace the previous traditional moral precepts by means of *laiklik*.

Various strains of thought in the 1930s arose out of one great common problem: how to determine and define the values and goals of the new republican era. This effort was necessitated by the relative crisis especially after the Free Party experience. This unsuccessful attempt showed the Republican elite that the values and principles of the Revolution had not yet been laid out to the wider segments of the Turkish society. Debates or even conflicts of opinion began to develop over fundamental problems such as the relationship between the elite and mass, the significance of the peasants, the characteristics of the ideology of Kemalism, the doctrines of liberalism, socialism and fascism. Verbally, all these discussions were attempts at the ideological refurbishment of the Republic. Nevertheless, these discussions could not be undertaken in a sophisticated and highly intellectual level. All were argued in relatively pragmatic manner aspiring to obtain a key position at the center. The desertion of individualism, espousal of social solidarity and construction of a secular republican morality came to the fore as a new path to Republic’s salvation. The same decade also witnessed the disillusionment of some of the elites with Western liberalism and their subsequent acceptance of solidarism and

---

<sup>133</sup> Nusret Kemal, “İnkılap İdeolojisinde Halkçılık,” (Populism in the Ideology of Revolution), *Ülke*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 41-5, p. 42

<sup>134</sup> This idealism had no explicit roots in the Western philosophy. It was particularly imagined by the Revolutionary elite for their ongoing requirements.

etatism. However, this disillusionment did not give rise to communism or fascism as in the case of several countries such as China, Vietnam or the Eastern European countries. Turkish elite might be evaluated as successful in balancing between liberalism and socialism as well as fascism.

Hence, the period covering 1930 was unique as a distinctive factor that shaped, by and large, the direction of the Turkish Revolution. Attempts at trial and error of that period determined the Turkish revolutionary conduct. Two important identifying events of 1930 help better understand the orientations of the period and the *Ülkü*'s specific role and importance. First was the World Economic Crisis and secondly the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) Experiment.

### **3.2. The World Economic Crisis**

In the winter of 1929-1930 Turkey was stricken by the effects of the world economic crisis, which reached its first peak after the collapse of the New York stock exchange at the end of October 1929. The direct economic consequences of the depression were devastating enough all over the world that gave rise to disastrous psychological effects among populations.<sup>135</sup> The sense of insecurity and despair the crisis gave rise to spread far beyond the economic realm. In political and social realms as well, people lived in a mood of expecting a catastrophe. Although initial consequences of this depression were experienced relatively mildly in Turkey in

---

<sup>135</sup> For the general results of the world economic crisis see Dietmar Rothermund, *The Global Impact of the Great Depression*, (London: Routledge, 1996) and Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)

comparison with the developed countries of the world such as the USA, Germany and Italy, it had enough impact on almost every domain of social, political and economic life. Moreover, fear of further effects of the crisis was a psychological factor that was not less strong than its real effects. The most important consequence of this depression for the aims of this dissertation was that the economic crisis of the world enabled the radicals to gain power in politics. That is, the atmosphere of crisis encouraged the re-constructivist revolutionary elite to carry on militant propaganda against liberalism and liberal economy. Anti-liberal, etatist and even more authoritarian solutions began to gain secure ground in an atmosphere of crisis, which triggered loss of confidence in worldwide liberal democracies and liberal economies.<sup>136</sup> Thus the world depression with its economic and psychological consequences propelled Turkey into a new political search mostly grounded in radical and anti-liberal ideas.

Actually, this was not unlike the situation in most other countries, which suffered the depression as much as Turkey did. The interwar and particularly the post-economic crisis period signified a great sense of despair, disillusionment and pessimism not only among the intellectuals and state elite in Turkey but also in continental Europe, including France, Germany<sup>137</sup>, Italy and Spain. The negative results of modernity in social, political and economic realms, the declining strength of these countries in international arena led many intellectuals to a pessimistic mood.

---

<sup>136</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 68

In fact, this was not unique for these countries. Also in Japan, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Egypt this kind of despair was prevalent. It is worthwhile to stress that in Germany, Italy and Spain, interrogation of the existent modern condition and the search for more irrational, anti-materialist and moral alternative became widespread among the intellectual circles.

However, in Turkey, during the same years, though the revolutionary elite discredited the option of liberalism and liberal economy, they attributed the sense of despair the crisis evoked to the old, “anti-modern”, irrational and traditional elements. The way out of the crisis was sought explicitly within the domain of modernity. Even, the more conservative intellectuals like İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and Peyami Safa saw the relative backwardness of the Turkish nation as a result of old, archaic and religious mentalities. Peyami Safa, for instance, argued that one of the big mistakes of the Turkish intellectuals is “confusing western civilization with western imperialism.”<sup>138</sup> It was, then, quite wrong to direct our hatred of western imperialism towards western civilization. For Safa, the Turkish nation should be clearly separated from the “primitive Asiatic peoples”<sup>139</sup>: contrary to the arguments of *Kadro* that took Turkey within the domain of the East against Western imperialism, he argued,

---

<sup>137</sup> For a detailed account of the origins of German inter-war cultural despair see Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974)

<sup>138</sup> Peyami Safa, *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution*, (Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar), tr. by Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, (Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 1999), p. 55

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, p. 93



Until recently, some journals and groups in their endeavors to explain Kemalism attempted to put us into the same category with the primitive and oppressed Asiatic nations. Taking into account that the Turkish nation is the least likely nation to resemble the Indians and the Chinese in terms of culture, history, religion and economics, the question of its liberation movement cannot be viewed in the same context with the struggle between those semi-colonized countries and imperialism.<sup>140</sup>

In short, Peyami Safa held that there was no need to oppose Westernism that had been developed during in decline of the Ottoman Empire: “It was possible to make Ottoman Turkism and Ottoman Westernism survive by amputating their gangrenous parts. This gangrenous zone in both of them was their Ottoman aspect.”<sup>141</sup>

Consequently, one of the significant factors that is vital to understand the peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary idea was the specific contextual character of interwar period all over the world. Without calculating the very specificity of that period and its effects on Turkish politics, it is almost impossible to interpret the features of the Turkish revolutionary style during the 1930s. The gradual decline of the image of liberalism; the rising etatist and communalist alternatives; the strengthening of totalitarian regimes; the lessening thrust for democratic governance; the quest for mass mobilization through eliminating intermediary bodies between the individual and state; and “widening the scope of politics to embrace the whole of

---

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, p. 55

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

human existence”<sup>142</sup> were the characteristics of an era that influenced most of the states all around the world, including Turkey.

In sum, it is significant to note “the Turkish leadership was inevitably influenced by the world-wide collapse of capitalism in the early thirties.”<sup>143</sup> The world depression had challenged the conventional wisdom that “the capitalist economy was basically self-regulatory, and that periodic down-swings in economic activity would soon be ironed out by free market forces.”<sup>144</sup> The population already discontented with the unsuccessful economic policies of the RPP, began to feel more uncomfortable and insecure with the gradual effects of the world economic crisis. That is, widespread resentment among the population grew because of the “authoritarian behavior of the RPP and of its regional and local representatives, the attendant favoritism and corruption, lack of civil liberties and also the reform policies of the government,” had become more intense by the world economic depression.<sup>145</sup> Within this specific conjuncture, the ruling leaders began to search for new alternatives both in politics and economics.

---

<sup>142</sup> Jacob L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960)

<sup>143</sup> William Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945”, *Bulletin (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies)*, Vol. 7, Is. 2 (1980), 100-117, p. 103

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 186

### 3. 3. Radicalization of Politics Paving Way to the *Ülkü* Movement:

#### The Free Party Experience

The year 1930 indicates a significant turning point in the history of the Republic. It can be argued that, at this point, “Atatürk’s government faced its most serious crisis since the defeat of the Greek invaders in 1922.”<sup>146</sup> Considering the economic side, “both peasants and merchants had been dealt a savage blow by the world depression.”<sup>147</sup> The Revolutionaries encountered a deep ideological crisis owing to the immediate shifts in the ideological parameters of the world. Considerable sense of despair was prevalent even in the words of Atatürk. In the course of a provincial tour that he undertook in 1930 Atatürk explained his sense of discontentment about the country to his private secretary:

I am utterly worn out, my boy, utterly depressed. You can see it with your own eyes, everywhere we go we listen continuously to complaints and grumbles. Everywhere there is destitution, moral and material collapse. How dreadful it is that this is the real state of the country.<sup>148</sup>

Faced with a severe political as well as economic crisis, the ruling elite began to search for political and economic alternatives. Their most prominent initiative was the encouragement of the foundation of an opposition party, in the shape of the Free Republican Party. The US Ambassador of the time, Joseph Grew, appraises the

---

<sup>146</sup> William Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945”, p. 101

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Cited from William Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945”, p. 103

paradoxical situation the Turkish leaders faced, with an interesting diplomatic jargon. For him, Atatürk had begun to think “the single party system as a sign of Turkey’s inferiority in comparison with Europe and the West. American and European writers have in recent years devoted much space to the Turkish dictatorship which has often been described as Western in form but Oriental in fact. These descriptions have been brought to the Gazi’s attention and he has not been pleased...”<sup>149</sup>

So, Atatürk attempted to create a “loyal opposition” as “the culmination of his Revolution”<sup>150</sup>, which was said to “air the accumulated discontent and provide some control over the government both to correct its shortcomings, and... to seek new ways of coping with the economic situation.”<sup>151</sup> This was the second serious attempt after the failed Progressive Republican Party project, which was suppressed in 1925 due to the accusation that the party members were responsible for several rebellions that occurred in eastern Anatolia. This time, Fethi Okyar, prime minister of the Republic during 1924-1925, was invited to form a party that would contribute to the idea that the Republic was based on truly democratic tenets, and further discredit the accusations that Atatürk was a dictator.<sup>152</sup> In the wake of forming the idea of an

---

<sup>149</sup> Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, Vol. II, (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co. Ltd., 1953), p. 869

<sup>150</sup> Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 5

<sup>151</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 65

<sup>152</sup> Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), p. 109

opposition party, Atatürk explained his primary objectives to Ali Fethi Okyar as follows:

... Our contemporary appearance is more or less a picture of dictatorship. Actually, a parliament exists, however, I am still considered as a dictator at home as well as abroad...Nevertheless I did not establish the Republic for my own personal benefit. We are all mortal. After my death, the inheritance will be an oppressive institution (*istibdat müessesesi*). I would not like to inherit an oppressive regime and to be recorded in history as a dictator... The problem is that the Republic should become firmly established without depending upon the life of persons. You (Fethi) should undertake this task.

Responded Fethi (Okyar), “Your idea is so brilliant. It is true, while the existing regime is officially called a Republic; in reality it resembles a dictatorship... However, the issue is quite tricky. Those who have been accustomed to do things by force would face certain difficulties in administrating the government through persuasion... I am grateful for your confidence and for the duty you assigned, but I am aware of the difficulties of the duty I’ll undertake”<sup>153</sup> At the moment, Kazım (İnanç) Paşa, the leader of parliament, argued that though an opposition was essential for the country, it would be better to start it from within the party itself. Fethi Okyar agreed with Kazım Paşa on account of the fact that it would be plausible to start the opposition from within the party instead of an artificial opposition supervised by the government. İsmet İnönü severely opposed this idea of forming an opposition group within the party. He maintained that this sort of attempt would give rise to anarchy, resulting in a division and fragmentation among the revolutionary elite: “It is not correct to make opposition from within the party. Such an opposition would bring

about a formation of a clique (*hizip*). The previous detriments we faced due to the intra-party cliques are in everyone's mind."<sup>154</sup> Then, Atatürk resolved the discussion: "We shouldn't create cliques (*hizip yapmayalım*), we should directly establish an opposition party, as this would be the best. And, Fethi Bey should take the lead of this party."<sup>155</sup> After taking on this task, Fethi Bey asked Atatürk not to intervene in the competition between these two parties, and remain impartial. Joseph Grew somewhat sarcastically reports the artificiality of the foundation process of the Free Party:

Last summer he [Mustafa Kemal] approved, if he did not urge, the founding of Fethi's Opposition Party. Why? Perhaps it was something as naïve as this: there are a lot of modern buildings in Ankara; Turkey is therefore a modern country; modern countries have Opposition Parties; Turkey must have an Opposition Party. It was the inferiority complex which explains so much in Turkey.<sup>156</sup>

Having mainly admitted the principles of Republicanism, Nationalism and Secularism as its basic traits, the party set its program on some minor executive programs so as to resolve the existent economic and social problems and to satisfy the needs strongly felt by the population. Instead of incorporating broad theoretical and ideological issues, the party program was too short, pointing only several

---

<sup>153</sup> Fethi Okyar, *Fethi Okyar'ın Anıları: Atatürk, Okyar ve Çok Partili Türkiye*, ed. Osman Okyar and Mehmet Seyitdanlioğlu, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p. 98

<sup>154</sup> Ali Fethi Okyar, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Fesh Edildi*, (İstanbul, 1987), pp. 14

<sup>155</sup> Ibid, pp. 15-16

shortages and failures of the existent RPP government in handling the problems of economic and social matters. Certainly, in the Free Party program, individual rights and freedoms were also markedly acknowledged. However, in many cases, there was almost no difference between the RPP and FP party programs. On foreign policy matters, for instance, the Free Party's program was nearly the same as the RPP.<sup>157</sup>

The correspondence between Fethi Bey and Atatürk about the party program is important for the purpose of this dissertation. In his letter to Atatürk, Fethi Bey highlighted the issues of Republicanism and Secularism in the party program. Having defined himself as “a lover of Republic” (*Cumhuriyetin aşığı*) and as “an entirely secular” (*bütün manasiyle laik*) person, Fethi Bey argued that all his attempts to form an alternative party and carry out an opposition was to make the Republican regime eternal. In his reply, Atatürk held that except laicism and republicanism differences in the party programs and executions were not so essential: “I see again with pleasure that we are together on the principle of secular republic (*laik cumhuriyet*). In any case, this is the ground I have always looked for and will always seek in the political life by taking side with it.”<sup>158</sup> Hence, for Atatürk, the two parties could freely compete with each other in so far as they were committed to the same secular republican principles. He, finally, stated that within the secular republican

---

<sup>156</sup> Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, Vol. II, (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co. Ltd., 1953), pp. 887

<sup>157</sup> Çetin Yetkin, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı*, (İstanbul: Karacan Yayınları, 1982), pp. 93-97

<sup>158</sup> Ali Fethi Okyar, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Fesh Edildi*, (İstanbul, 1987), pp. 56-60

domain, the new “party’s political activities of various kinds will never be hindered in any case.”<sup>159</sup>

On August 12, 1930, Fethi (Okyar) established the party, which was “presented to the public as a genuine opposition party.”<sup>160</sup> Some of the founding members of the party were the ones who were hitherto the outstanding figures of the RPP, notably Nuri Conker, Reşit Galip, Mehmet Emin and Ağaoğlu Ahmet.<sup>161</sup> They were explicitly urged by Atatürk to join the party to provide a justification and legitimation of this new establishment. Atatürk even urged his own sister, Makbule, to join the new party.<sup>162</sup> In the wake of founding the party, Fethi Bey was interviewed by the newspaper *Yarın*. He was asked what were the main criteria of recruiting into membership to the party. Fethi Bey replied, “ I am occupied with not leaving the valley of ideas (*fikir vadisi*) out. I want to draw the votes of the citizens who are republican and secular. Everyone is free to be a member of the party provided that they are republican and secular. I am not interested in the personalities much.”<sup>163</sup>

Fethi Okyar’s interest in ideas mainly rather than personalities was not matched by those who once wanted to keep the already established parameters of the

---

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> Kemal Karpaz, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System*, p. 65

<sup>161</sup> Cited in Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952*, (Doğan Kardeş: İstanbul, 1952), p. 622

<sup>162</sup> Ali Fethi Okyar, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Fesh Edildi*, pp. 41-42

<sup>163</sup> *Yarın* [Tomorrow], a daily newspaper, 14 August 1930



single party based on a Jacobin idea of exclusive representation. In fact, the main reason of its dissolution three months later was the personality factor rather than the ideas it advocated. Once established, the party began to attract enthusiastic followers, particularly expressing a traditional voice. Whatever the similarities and agreements on the essential matters of the Republic the two competing parties obtained, considerable segments of the society began to consider this new party as the base for their reaction to the existent regime. Although the party was allowed to open its offices only in certain big cities namely Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, various illegal party offices were founded particularly in cities of Eastern region.

Among many incidents, the famous Izmir incident is worth mentioning to show the extent of popular appeal of the new party, and the popular reaction to the RPP. The Izmir incident of early September hinted at not only “the first evidence that religious and political reactionaries were backing the Free Party,”<sup>164</sup> but also the beginning of the end of the multi-party initiative, “which led to the party’s death only a few weeks later, and shattered many illusions about Turkey’s readiness for unrestricted multi-party politics if the Atatürk reforms were to survive.”<sup>165</sup> As a prerequisite to be a mass party to vie the RPP, Fethi Okyar decided to undertake a tour for organizing party activities. Primarily, the Aegean region was chosen as the new party’s first venture in public due to the fact that this region was considered as one of the most prosperous and advanced regions of Turkey, which might have positively responded to the economic program of the party. Furthermore, according

---

<sup>164</sup> Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 56

to Atatürk, this region, with its nationalist and republican character, was the most secure and safest one in terms of its modern and civilized character, which had hitherto proved its loyalty to the new regime on several occasions.

However, the venture ended up with several unintended results and caused anxiety to the revolutionary leaders. Just before Fethi Bey arrived in İzmir, a relative crowd of enthusiastic welcomers (estimated 30-40.000 by *Cumhuriyet*)<sup>166</sup> gathered in front of the dock. When Fethi Bey got there, he was faced with big demonstrations of people supporting his party. They easily turned out to be demonstrations against the ruling RPP. Some demonstrators broke the windows of the newspaper, *Anadolu*, which had criticized and attacked the Free Party before. As *Cumhuriyet* newspaper reported, during the demonstrations, the police arrested about 300 people who were “from the rabble (*ayak takımından*)” for they offended the police.<sup>167</sup> The police, even opened fire over the crowd, several got wounded and even a fourteen year boy got killed<sup>168</sup>. The day after, Fethi Bey decided to deliver a speech at the balcony of the hotel. During the speech, a man embracing the dead body of his son loudly cried: “This is the martyr in the way to freedom, save us (*kurtar bizi*)”<sup>169</sup>

---

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> *Cumhuriyet* [Republic], 6 September 1930

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> (Feridun) Kandemir, *Serbest Fırka Nasıl Kuruldu Nasıl Kapatıldı*, (İstanbul: Ekicigil Yayınları, 1955), p. 90

<sup>169</sup> Fethi Okyar, *Üç Devirde Bir Adam*, Cemal Kutay (ed.), (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980), p. 499

The RPP leaders began to get much troubled with the Izmir incident. The pro-RPP newspapers like *Anadolu* and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* further agitated the public even exaggeratedly. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* pointed deliberately to the so-called *mürteci* (reactionary) and communist figures among the welcomers of Fethi Bey.<sup>170</sup> *Anadolu* highlighted those figures that are “tramps, drunkards, mercenaries, and rough rowdies (*baldırı çıplaklar*)” longing for “an opportunity to go back...”<sup>171</sup> The incidents were reported by the RPP agents to Atatürk and İnönü continuously via telegrams. Mahmut Esat, the Minister of Justice, who had come to Izmir for a regional meeting of legal representatives on September 3, reported to Atatürk that the speeches of Fethi Bey had to be cancelled. He, particularly, insisted that the forthcoming speech of Fethi Bey in Alsancak stadium should be cancelled due to the possible turmoil and worrisome incidents. However, Atatürk “made the decision that Fethi Bey should go ahead with his speech.” The speech was held anyway to a big crowd estimated at 50.000 according to the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. During the speech, due to some technical and logistic difficulties<sup>172</sup>, the audience misunderstood the pro-republican and pro-secularist messages thinking that they were anti-

---

<sup>170</sup> *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, September 6, 1930. The prominent figures the newspaper reported were Dr. Bahtiyar and the communist Kerim.

<sup>171</sup> *Anadolu*, September 4 and September 5, 1930. Cited in Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 89

<sup>172</sup> The microphone system was not so developed to carry the messages to the audience, for that reason, after Fethi Bey’s speech a man with strong voice reiterated the sentences. Sometimes, the sentences were misunderstood by the people in exactly opposite sense. For instance, Fethi argued “Some people think that we will abolish the hat law and bring the fez back again. But, it is not true.” While the mediator was transmitting this message, people understood that “we will abolish the hat law and bring the fez back again.” Then, many people threw their hats to the ground and trampled them.

republican messages. The pictures of İnönü and RPP flags were torn down. Many people took their hats off and threw them to the ground and trampled on them to protest the hat reform. The incidents could hardly be kept under control. The day after, fig and harbor workers of Izmir went on strike mostly about wages. For the RPP front, this event demonstrated a Communist connection of the Free Party. According to this perception, two great enemies of the regime, reactionaries and the communists were increasingly overwhelming the party. The following day, Fethi left Izmir and continued his party venture in Manisa, Aydın and Balıkesir. He was welcomed in similar enthusiastic tone. Several demonstrations were held supporting the Free Party cause.

All the reports of violent opposition and of the counter-revolutionary activities began to re-shape Atatürk's mind about the plausibility of the multi-party experience. He sent an inspector, Assembly President Kazım Paşa (Özalp), to Izmir, to make on-the-spot investigations. He wrote several reports to Atatürk indicating the relative incapability of the RPP in having influence among the people. More than thirty years later, Kazım Özalp interpreted the failures of the RPP in a newspaper as follows: "In reality, the RPP melted away just after Fethi Bey had arrived in Izmir. And, while he was venturing from Izmir to Balıkesir, Fethi faded the influence of the RPP away wherever he went."<sup>173</sup> Moreover, communist and reactionary factors in the Free Party ranks were also highlighted in the telegrams of Kazım Paşa. Although the report was not threatening enough for Atatürk to authorize Fethi Bey to continue his tour, the Izmir events showed the necessity for policy change. Fethi Bey's initiative was

---

<sup>173</sup> *Milliyet*, November 3, 1963

supposed to be the reason behind the so-called counter-revolutionary activities, and opposition to the government sprung first in the Aegean area. Actually, there was no distrust in Fethi Bey as a person as such. But rather, the RPP leaders were haunted with the specter of the spread of an upheaval driven by Fethi Bey's initiative all over the country and dissidence that would trigger the collapse of the revolutionary premises the RPP. Actually, Fethi Bey played the game within the legitimate borders of politics. However, he was relatively ignorant of the local realities. The US Ambassador explains this fact again in a somewhat sarcastic tone:

Fethi made a mistake; as a result of his contact with the West he acted as a Western leader of an Opposition would act. He organized his party; he went about the country, he made speeches where they would count: Izmir, for instance. The Gazi was ignorant of Turkey because he lived at Ankara and Fethi was ignorant of Turkey because he had lived in Paris. Fethi's reception at Izmir was the most significant event in Turkey since the hanging of Djavid. The second marked the zenith of the dictatorship; the first the initial crack. It disorganized the whole show. Complacency came to an abrupt end and uncertainty followed.<sup>174</sup>

Shortly after the venture, the İzmir incident was fiercely debated in the Assembly. Fethi Bey was mainly criticized of causing anarchy and chaos in the country by carrying the reactionaries and communists into his party. Fethi Bey criticized the RPP of having "a policy based only on fighting reaction while forgetting the economic and financial ills of the people,"<sup>175</sup> and he denied the accusations that the followers of the Free Party were reactionists. He stated that the

---

<sup>174</sup> Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, Vol. II, p. 888

<sup>175</sup> *T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi*, Dördüncü İn'ikat 2-X-1930 Perşembe, Devre: 3, Cilt: 21, İçtima: 9, Birinci Celse

program presented by İsmet İnönü had no concrete policy that would meet the needs of nation: “The reality is that the people have economic and financial problems... Forgetting the maladies which plunge people into deep economic and financial problems and concentrating merely on the reactionists (*mürteciler*) and with this consideration, precluding a normal life for the Republic is the most erroneous thing.”<sup>176</sup> Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya responded that the extremists and reactionaries captured considerable power in the party and in the police dossiers, there were many records proving the reactionary background of the Free Party members. Furthermore, “by opposing many of the key aspects of the government’s policy Fethi Bey was in fact opposing the interests of the nation.”<sup>177</sup>

Gradually, the Free Party was approaching its tragic end as RPP leaders were relegating nearly all the problems and discontents of the country to the existence of the Free Party. Several pro-Free Party journalists were arrested and put in jail for their bitter criticisms of the government. It was in this context that the Free Party “approached its next and thus far its most serious test...”<sup>178</sup> as the municipal election of 1930 was actually the real test for the ruling cadre and the extent and dimension of the opposition at the local level. Although Fethi often declared his good faith in the government’s promise that it would in no way tamper with the fairness of the voting, from the very outset of the elections, “allegations of voter intimidation and interference of government and election officials on behalf of the RPP came from all

---

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 105-106

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 110

parts of the country.”<sup>179</sup> Certainly, these elections with many irregularities and frauds increased the tension between the Republicans and Liberals. There were several demonstrations and riots in various election regions against the unjust applications during the voting process. In the city of Mersin, the Free Party protested the elections on the grounds that the government made several interventions into the voting process and refused to take part in it. The only election province the government forces did not intervene was Samsun. The governor of Samsun, Kazım İnanç was a relatively liberal and moderate person, who had witnessed the initial foundation process of the Free Party in Yalova. He did not permit any irregularity that might prevent the free voting of the citizens. Against 416 votes, the Free Party got 3312 votes in Samsun. This result demonstrated the relative power and influence of the new party. The Free Party might have won the greater part of the votes, if the government would not intervene the election process in general.<sup>180</sup> Although the RPP won the majority of the votes officially, that was not the case in reality.. Since almost everyone witnessed the irregularities and election frauds, Atatürk was well aware that the election results did not reflect the truth. When somebody showed him the election results and told him “our party is winning,” Atatürk became quite angry and replied, “No, it is not our party which is winning, it is the administration, police, and the gendarmerie. There can be no good for the nation from this kind of

---

<sup>179</sup> Ibid, p. 112

<sup>180</sup> For the success of the Free Party in charming the popular support particularly see, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım*, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), pp. 224-231, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk’le Üç Ay*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945), pp. 30-54

politics.”<sup>181</sup> However, even Atatürk himself was not able to thwart the antagonistic campaign against the Free Party from various fronts. Finally, the RPP elite “persuaded Mustafa Kemal, who initially had professed neutrality with respect to both parties, to change his position to support the Republican Party.”<sup>182</sup>

Again, in the Assembly, several controversies were heated up about the elections between the representatives of the parties. Once more, the RPP leaders accused Fethi Bey of paving way for reactionism (*irtica*). Fethi replied these accusations with much anger and discontentment: “How was the movement of so-called *irtica* incarnated? Has anybody said, “we don’t want secular laws”, or “we want Caliph (*Halife*)”? (Noises from the seats, do you wish to hear such demands). No my dear. Thousand times, no. But, what you mean by *İrtica* is nothing other than the will of people to make their preferences freely and to vote for whomever they choose.”<sup>183</sup> He went on saying,

Those who interpret the free will of the people to vote the Free Party as *irtica*, are the ones willing to monopolize the votes of people. The ideals of these monopolist persons have nothing in common with the ideas of republic and democracy. True republicans should turn their faces away from those pursuing their petty interests (*menfaatperest*) with certain ideals alien to the republican philosophy.<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>181</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 116

<sup>182</sup> Kemal Karpaz, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System*, pp. 66-7

<sup>183</sup> *T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi*, Beşinci İn’ikat 15-XI-1930 Cumartesi, Devre: 3, Cilt: 22, İçtima: 4, Birinci Celse

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.



These expressions are illustrative enough to show the semiotic struggle as in the French case over the definition of certain essential concepts. The RPP leaders generally utilized the term *irtica* for their opposition strategy to discredit the alternatives at least in a semiotic sense. On the other hand, Fethi Bey attempted to countermand the assumptions of the RPP leaders by defining *irtica* as the “will of the people.” Actually, this was the struggle between the moderate (constructivist) and radical (re-constructivist) revolutionaries. Undoubtedly, the 1930s heralded the victory of the latter thanks to the anti-liberal and totalitarian winds in all over the world.

### **3.3.1. The Dissolution of the Free Party and its Implications for the Revolutionary Ideology**

After Atatürk explicitly changed his impartial position on behalf of the RPP, Fethi Bey made a speech in the Assembly stating that the FP was established unequivocally on Atatürk’s initiative and support. He went on saying that a political struggle against Mustafa Kemal was antithetical to the *raison d’être* of the party. Then, he declared the dissolution of his party:

With the encouragement and approval of the Great Gazi the Honorable Mustafa Kemal, I organized the Free Republican Party. I did not envisage that the party which I formed on this basis would enter into political struggle against the Gazi. At no time did it occur to me that I would become responsible for bringing into existence a political organization contrary to this premise. However, the development of our party and the trend of events has made it clear that we would soon be placed into a situation face to face with the Gazi in the political arena. I find this prospect intolerable for any political party of mine. For this reason, I have decided to dissolve the Free

Party, and am communicating this decision to the entire party organization.<sup>185</sup>

Hence, the second multi-party attempt of Turkey “had to be abandoned until the populace be further prepared for democratic behavior.”<sup>186</sup> Shortly after Ali Fethi had declared the dissolution of the Free Party, the so-called *Menemen* incident<sup>187</sup> happened on December 23, 1930. Although there was no direct evidence for the connection between the Free Party and any of the leading members of the Menemen outbreak, it was evaluated as “the consequence of freedom granted through the establishment of the Liberal Party in 1930.”<sup>188</sup> Moreover, this incident provided sufficient evidence for the RPP to justify the abolition of the Free Party with an allegation that “religious reactionaries used it as a cover for their own purposes.”<sup>189</sup> The remarks of the US Ambassador Joseph Grew are instructive enough to have an insight into the matter:

Intrinsically Menemen has no importance: a few people were killed, one of them apparently under circumstances of brutality. But as a symptom Menemen is of incalculable importance. It means that Westernization hasn't penetrated; that while the Ministry of Public Instruction at Ankara may sit at the feet of Professor John Dewey and talk about Teachers College at

---

<sup>185</sup> Cited in Walter Weiker, p. 136

<sup>186</sup> Donald E. Webster, “State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey,” *American Sociological Review*, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Apr., 1939): 247-256, p. 256

<sup>187</sup> A group of dervishes of an outlawed religious order rebelled at Menemen near Izmir to protest the anti-clerical policies of the RPP. During the rebellion, the rebels killed an army officer, Kubilay. The rebellion's leaders were then executed by the government.

<sup>188</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 278

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, p. 67

Columbia and Bergson and Durkheim and all the rest, Sheikh Essat, leader of the reactionary Nakhshbendi sect, has the inside track. It is impressive to visit the Bacteriological Institute at Ankara and see Zeiss binocular microscopes and all the centrifuges that Paris manufacturers can produce, but *muskas* (amulates) are being used in all the villages around Ankara itself and a catalogue of *muskas* is at present of more practical value than a catalogue of Zeiss microscopes.<sup>190</sup>

The RPP leaders began to utilize these types of reactions against the existent regime as the resource to legitimate their subsequent non-democratic practices. This can be argued as a kind of tutelage over people in terms of relegating these types of reactions into a realm that would be functional for the regime. Furthermore, they aimed to make the people barren of their reactionary capacity. Needless to say, the terms of reaction or what the reaction means were defined by the RPP leaders. This was a central problem. All the debates carried over the democracy problematique (whatever it is defined by the RPP leaders later, and used as seedbeds for revolutionary transformation through a series of institutionalized policies) took cognizance of such feverish and of course seemingly minor incidents. The Free Party and Menemen cases indicated an ensemble of incidents all made instrumental use of by the RPP cadres as their re-constructivist policies to be enacted upon firmly. That is, the regime used these incidents instrumentally. Furthermore, these incidents provided a proper ground for such institutions as the People's Houses which would be placed at the center as the instruments for enrooting re-constructivist thrusts. Furthermore, the RPP elites set a rationale for the dissolution of the Free Party, which was closely related to their strategy they raised so far. The apparent tone in

---

<sup>190</sup> Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, Vol. II, p. 888

these pretexts appeared to be interspersed through the words of the elites; they underlined one thing throughout: If the society were mature enough, they would allow democratic multi-party experience. But due the “nature” of the society with its immanent quality that included reactionist elements (they, for the RPP leaders, would doubtlessly handicap the normal course of the democratic way), they legitimated the disbanding of the Free Party on the pretext that the Free Party followers deserved being suppressed as they permitted reactionist elements among the followers.

After the Free Party experiment, the RPP leaders came upon to the idea that the Revolution was not as deeply rooted as they would like it to be. It led them to reconsider what went wrong and what should be done to consolidate the regime. Why did the regime seriously consider the Free Party and *Menemen* episodes as true threats? Behind the reasons of the demise of the Free Party democratic experiment, certain points can be underlined. First of all, the breakdown of the traditional organizational foundations of the society were not easily being replaced by efficient and effective institutions capable of satisfying the emotional needs of the society and even fulfilling the prevailing void. The swift introduction of modern political institutions had some disappointing social consequences. It, on the one hand, created premises for the participation of the broad masses of the population in political life and included them (through the system of elections) in the process of political decision-making. On the other hand, the strict control mechanisms over the political processes did not pave the way for the realization of democratic premises. That is to say that the Revolution brought about a form of “democratization” of politics in the sense of not installing a functioning liberal democracy, but rather of broadening political participation and forging links between governors and governed mainly

through elections. At the same time, the revolutionary regime aimed at social transformation, which in turn, implied a substantial degree of “social engineering” (*cemiyet mühendisliği*)<sup>191</sup>. The transformation of customs and cultural symbols were the outstanding elements of the social engineering project. It would not be wrong to contend that the ruling elite who saw themselves as the chief carriers of democracy to the masses was not (because of their limited historical experience) ready to accept truly democratic values in the form of freedom of choice and parliamentary democracy. Diana Spearman spells out this situation in 1939 as follows:

It seems probable that it is really the intention of the Turkish Government to prepare their people for a kind of democracy, which would be modified indeed by the Turkish respect for discipline and the military virtues, but which would allow a certain measure of freedom.<sup>192</sup>

Another problem that the Republic faced was the relative problem of legitimacy of the existing political regime. After the swift collapse of the Empire, there emerged a power vacuum, which could not be filled in a short time by the newly established regime. In place of the Ottoman principle of politics, whose legitimacy derived from the divine right to rule<sup>193</sup> and its correspondence with tradition came the Republican principle, which in practice led to the establishment of the secular authorization. William Hale concludes that, “the Free Party was dissolved

---

<sup>191</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizm İnkılabının Hususiyetleri,” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 418

<sup>192</sup> Diana Spearman, *Modern Dictatorship*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 38

<sup>193</sup> Halil İnalcık, “Kanun and the Shariah,” Yusuf Abbas Hashmi (ed.), *Shariah, Ummah, Khilafah*, (Karachi: Dr. I. H. Qureshi Memorial Lectures, 1987): 1-13

in November 1930 primarily because it attracted support from those who opposed the basic principles of the secular Republic, rather than because of its economic policies.”<sup>194</sup> In fact, due to this insecurity about the safeguarding of the secular Republic, a proclaimed national sovereignty and democracy increasingly turned out to be a non-democratic control. And its principal characteristic made it much more powerful than the Empire because total control over society was made possible by a new technology of power based on the achievements of the Revolutionary cadre.

Another contribution to the insecurity felt by the state elite as a result of FP experiment and *Menemen* incident was made by the specific nature of the process of modernization in peripheral regions, which found themselves faced with the necessity of overcoming backwardness within a brief period or of reforming traditional institutions to take care of new functions. This factor is closely related to the idea of being a latecomer and the striving to overcome this situation without delay.

The experimentation with multiparty democracy through the formation of the Free Party and its consequences led the state elite to develop a strong conviction that the politics and culture of the Revolution could not be effectively implanted in the ‘people’. Considerable segments of population supported the Free Party in showing their discontent toward the RPP. With the dissolution of the Free Party after several months of its establishment, the ruling elite aspired a strong reconstruction of the state and the party. Mustafa Kemal decided to visit several cities and provinces of

---

<sup>194</sup> William Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945”, p. 103

Anatolia with a group of intellectual and bureaucratic elite to come into contact with ‘the real people’, listen to them and define the actual problems and reasons that caused relative failure of the RPP in the short multi-party period.<sup>195</sup> Furthermore, he attempted to find a solution to the increasing weakness of the RPP by meeting the demands of the people. He took several notes when he noticed a problem, and wrote some telegrams to İsmet İnönü to make him aware about the problems to be resolved.<sup>196</sup> In these notes, there are certain points that Atatürk saw very crucial for the restoration of state power. First, the need to define and determine the main ideological pillars of the regime was highlighted, for it is argued that Free Party received strong popular support because RPP could not deliver its messages to the masses clearly. In this vein, étatism and revolutionism was seriously considered to be included to the party program.

Second, Atatürk decided to utilize more direct and top-down policies concerning the state-society relations until society would be persuaded of the ultimate ideals of the state. That is, he never thought to draw back or at least revise any of the previous reforms, but rather felt the need to strengthen the authority of state and the RPP through new reforms and designs. When the state elite realized that the relative success of the Free Party stemmed from its assertion of liberal and

---

<sup>195</sup> For the detailed account of this travel see Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk’le Üç Ay*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945)

<sup>196</sup> For the travel notes of Atatürk, see Gürbüz Tüfekçi (ed.) *Atatürk, Seyahat Notları (1930-1931)*, (Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998), and Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk’le Üç Ay*, Başar’s book is entirely about this travel and he was also invited to the group that discussed and debated the problems of the party during the journey.

pluralist themes<sup>197</sup>, this did not lead them to adopt liberal and pluralistic policies as a compromise, but it worked the other way around. Centralization became the chief concern. In that sense, the memoirs of Kılıç Ali who was one of the best friends of Atatürk, are meaningful enough to show this intent:

...During the Free Party demonstrations, some news was heard that Fethi Bey was welcomed with applause and religious slogans in Balıkesir. Even, a cable was received informing that some merchants in Istanbul were manufacturing and stocking Fez (traditional Ottoman headgear). Atatürk was pleased with this news and said: "So, it is now well clear that our revolution has not been consolidated yet, we had the operation on the wound just at the right time. Now, we have got to make this an opportunity." Having said this Atatürk started thinking about remedies to firm the revolution up more and more.<sup>198</sup>

This case shows that, even opposition movements were used instrumentally for the revolution to be successful, particularly in the eyes of the revolutionaries. Doubtlessly, the hidden drive behind this type of attitude can be reasoned on the basis of entrenched revolutionary idea that the situation was not ripe for rousing the enlightenment and emancipatory potential of the people. This is even more striking when we consider the Free Party experience as a democratic thrust at least in procedural terms. Because, this thrust implied an appeal to the difference and diversity of voice. The Free Party experiment in democracy was to be frustrated so firmly, that it implies the revolutionaries were committed to the democratic ideal

---

<sup>197</sup> For Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Atatürk explicitly affirmed that the relative success of the Free Party arose from its assertion of the liberal economy and the discourse of freedom it granted particularly to religious issues.

<sup>198</sup> Kılıç Ali, *Atatürk'ün Hususiyetleri*, (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955), p. 58



only in words but not in deed. For the sake of revolutionary goals, even the simplest inclinations towards democracy at the procedural level were foregone.

Atatürk and the elite group discussed the causes of the success of the Free Party during the Anatolian journey they took shortly after the dissolution of the party. They concurred that its assertion on freedom and liberal economy influenced the people who were suffering from economic problems. However, they generally came to an understanding that they could not accept liberalism in general and liberal economy in particular. For, liberalism had already become discredited all over the world. Instead, they reached the agreement that étatism, populism and revolutionism were the best options for the general purpose of the Revolution. Secondly, they thought that the Free Party became successful as it promoted the idea of freedom, particularly about religious issues. Questioning themselves whether they can give such a freedom, laicism outweighed freedom of belief in their minds. That is, they came to the agreement that laicism was the essential pillar of the Republic and it was impossible to go back on the existent policies of secularization.<sup>199</sup>

In short, after the Free Party experience, Republican leadership wanted to increase state authority to make people respect the policies of the state and revolution. In this sense, they interpreted the demonstrations and rallies of people that protested the government in several Anatolian districts as a threat to the survival of their power and revolutionary legacy. Thus, all the meetings during the multi-party experience in favor of the Free Party were considered as “violation of the sacred persona of the

---

<sup>199</sup> See, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk’le Üç Ay*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945)

state” (*Hükümetin manevi şahsiyetine tecavüz*).<sup>200</sup> For instance, Mustafa Kemal criticized the courts of İzmir, Balıkesir, Mersin, Silifke and Antalya because they tried only a small number of people that protested against the RPP during the multi-party municipal elections. He argued that this kind of attitude of the courts mainly encouraged other similar violations. For him, this showed that the justice mechanism of the state were not sensitive to the power and security of the regime. Atatürk held that

the lawyers seemed to protect people from the inspection of the government. In this sense, the lawyers also should be heavily punished together with the all magistrates (*müstantikler*). All the demonstrators had to be charged and imprisoned. For, they were reacting to the authority of the state. This was the prime offense that the courts should take into serious consideration.<sup>201</sup>

He further commanded İnönü that a special law has to be passed that would safeguard the Republic and the regime. Those who act, encourage to act, and induce with word and text against the Revolutionary principles should be heavily punished (*agir ceza*).<sup>202</sup>

It would be instructive to document the didactic terms of the US Ambassador that makes a significant comment on the Free Party experiment:

Should one be pessimistic? Not necessarily. Turkey has learned a lot since August, 1930 – chiefly that Westernization cannot be decreed from Ankara and that is not quite so simple and completely materialistic thing as was at

---

<sup>200</sup> *Atatürk, Seyahat Notları (1930-1931)*, pp. 81-82

<sup>201</sup> *Atatürk, Seyahat Notları (1930-1931)*, pp. 82-83

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*

first imagined. Ankara isn't at all sure as to just what it wants to teach, but in view of the success of Sheikh Essat it is perfectly certain that something must be taught in a hurry. But how? This is the question that is now agitating Ankara. Will it be mass education with Russia and Italy as examples or will it be an attempt to educate individuals in the path of responsibility, initiative and the other qualities that have distinguished Anglo-Saxon countries? I fear the former. I hope for the latter...<sup>203</sup>

The presumptions of Joseph Grew about the pessimistic scenario on Turkey came, nearly, true. From that time on, the Turkish ruling elite opted for more authoritarian alternatives to make social and political conditions ripe for the future “democratic” days. What were the fundamental dynamics of the change necessary to perpetuate the ideals of the Republic? How was it possible to make conditions appropriate for a more secure and safe public order? The various incidents of collective action mentioned above led the Kemalist elite to take the problem of social control very seriously. Moreover, developments that began to challenge the Republic brought into the agenda “the need for additional reforms if the new Turkey were to become a permanent creation...”<sup>204</sup> For this aim, “Atatürk inaugurated fundamental changes in many aspects of educational and intellectual life.”<sup>205</sup> To the minds of the Republican leaders, the existing institutions such as Turkish Hearts (*Türk Ocakları*) were no longer capable of homogenizing the nation in accordance with the values of

---

<sup>203</sup> Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, Vol. II, (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co. Ltd., 1953), p. 888

<sup>204</sup> Joseph S. Szyliowicz, *A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case* (London: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 28

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

the “spiritual revolution” (*manevi inkılap*)<sup>206</sup>. The question “how to manage them or, even better, how to orient them in a direction that was desirable and not harmful?” became crucial for the ruling cadre. The answer was convenient control of the state over social behavior through efficient institutions. In this vein, the ruling cadre of the Republic promulgated the great educational reforms in the 1930s. The Turkish Hearths and the *Darülfünun* (traditional university) were replaced with the People’s Houses and a modern university respectively. These educational reforms were initiated “to raise the level of the masses, close the elite-mass gap, and to create a modern, westernized elite that shared Atatürk’s philosophy.”<sup>207</sup>

### **3.4. The Abolition of the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*) and the Establishment of the People’s Houses (*Halkevleri*)**

When the Kemalist ruling cadre seriously began to handle the problem of social control, they sought a model with which they could realize their future ideals of social transformation. The existent institutions of education, primarily Turkish Hearths were gradually being discredited by the RPP leaders, especially by Recep Peker, with the rationale that these institutions were not adequate to meet the educational needs of the Republic. Furthermore, several alleged links between the Free Party and the Hearths were used as evidence for the inevitability of this institution’s closure.

---

<sup>206</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Kültür İnkılabımız” (Our Cultural Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, (June, 1933), p. 351

<sup>207</sup> Joseph S. Szyliowicz, *A Political Analysis of Student Activism*, p. 28

The Republican leaders did not abolish the Hearths until they saw them as obstacles to the dissemination of the Revolutionary ideal in 1930. The establishment of the Turkish Hearth went back to the early years of the 1910s. Until mid-1925, under the effect of young pioneers of Turkism, especially Ziya Gökalp, the Turkish Hearths had served as centers of refining and diffusing the ideals of Turkism. Attaching more importance to the need for such cultural organization, the rulers of the new regime supported this organization nation-wide and tried to give it a semi-official status.<sup>208</sup> Here the aim was to propagate the necessity and benefits of the reforms.<sup>209</sup> At first sight, the Hearths targeted especially young people who were seen as more ready to accept new ideals. To this end, the Turkish Hearths used “every device of the missionary technique - the school, the dispensary, the spoken and printed word, the talkie and the movie to convert the youth of the country to the new ways.”<sup>210</sup> By 1930, once the rulers realized that their cultural policies had failed in indoctrinating the new standards, a desire to make reforms within the Turkish

---

<sup>208</sup> The Turkish Hearths took a semi-official status by the 1927 Congress of the RPP, which made the Hearths the RPP’s cultural branch. See Yusuf Sarıınay, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1994), 308.

<sup>209</sup> In this regard, the Turkish Hearths, as Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) -the president of the Hearths- said during its Second Congress, were committed to work for “the Turkish nation passing from one civilization to another”... as “representatives of Westernism.” See Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, *Seçmeler*, ed. M. N. Sepetçioğlu (İstanbul: MEB Yay., 1971), 72-73.

<sup>210</sup> David Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal*, p. 180. For more details on the Turkish Hearths, see Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997); Yusuf Bayraktutan, *Türk Fikir Tarihinde Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türk Ocakları*, (Ankara: Kültür Bak. Yay., 1996).

Hearths came to the fore.<sup>211</sup> The Hearths began to be perceived as insufficient to meet the needs of the new conditions that is, to create a new revolutionary culture free from all particularisms. That is to say, the ruling elite believed that the Hearths failed to provide mass education and indoctrination on the basis of new ideas they reconsidered after the dissolution of the Free Party. Perhaps the most important rationale for this was that the influence of Ziya Gökalp's formulation of culture was still dominant among the circles of this institution. Unlike the radical revolutionaries' understanding of culture, which was manufactured as the domain of social engineering via state agencies, Gökalp gave special importance to the living values in the definition of "authentic" culture. Beside this ideological difference, with a semi-autonomous status, the Hearths continued to be the means of potential political opposition for the new regime during the Free Party election campaigns. It is commonly acknowledged by the RPP rulers that the Turkish Hearths had completed their task as an institution. Recep Peker insisted to merge the Hearths with the party in order to gather all the Revolutionary forces under the canopy of the RPP.<sup>212</sup> In line with the ideas of Peker, Atatürk made a speech defending unification of the revolutionary forces: "There emerged such occasions in the history of the nations that all the material and spiritual forces are to be gathered and directed to the same route so as to reach specific purposes. In recent times, our nation also conceived the

---

For the necessity of reform in the Hearths, see Reşit Saffet (Atabinen), "Milli Tarih" [National History], in *Atatürk Dönemi Fikir Hayatı II* (original publication 1930), 237. All discussions on the status and works of the Hearths occurred around the ideological disorder, and, as implicitly emphasized, the uncontrollable structure of the Hearths. See Karpat, "The People's," 57.

<sup>212</sup> Hasan Rıza Soyak, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar*, (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 1973), p. 476

significant results of such gathering and unification experience.”<sup>213</sup> In another speech Atatürk justified the dissolution of the Hearths as follows:

In order to protect the country and the Revolution against internal and external threats, all the national and Republican forces have to gather around a single place. I think proper the incorporation of the Turkish Hearths, which has been trying to disseminate the populist and nationalist ideas with sincerity and faith from the beginning, with my party, which certifies the same principles in the political and practical (*ameli*) field. This decision is the expression of my confidence regarding this national institution. The forces in same kind should be united for the sake of the common goal (*müşterek gaye*).<sup>214</sup>

The increasing radical tone of the post-1930 period can definitely be observed in the speech of Mustafa Kemal, “which prompted Atatürk to generalize and broaden the reforms in order to assure the Republic’s survival.”<sup>215</sup> He also was not able to escape from the non-democratic character of the times, which pushed the state elite into creating a uniform and homogenous way of life. The closure of the Hearts was equally part and parcel of this non-democratic restructuring in Turkey. Then in 1931 the Hearths were compelled to close, and their property was transferred to the RPP.

Alongside these concerns about the potential inadequacies of the existing education system and institutions including the Turkish Hearths, a new alternative institution was planned to function as the center for mass education. Leaders of the Republic sought to guarantee the loyalty of the citizens through continued civic

---

<sup>213</sup> Cited in Hasan Riza Soyak, pp. 466-7

<sup>214</sup> Cited in Ibid, pp. 466-7

<sup>215</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, “The People’s Houses in Turkey, Establishment and Growth,” *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 17, 1963, p. 58

education, designed to counter the appeal of the wider segments of society. Furthermore, they “instigated a far-reaching cultural transformation to substitute enlightened reasoning for Islamic dogma.”<sup>216</sup> Thus, in the 1931 RPP Congress, it was decided to found a new cultural institution of the Revolution, with a mission of transforming the masses into a more “enlightened” stage. Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the RPP, in the opening speech of the People’s Houses, frankly expressed the rationale for establishing the People’s Houses. For him, the Houses were founded to carry out people’s education and training beside regular schooling. This sort of education would make the nation a collective mass (*kollektif kütle*) sharing the same ideal.<sup>217</sup> Working as a cultural branch of the RPP the Houses came to be the centers of adult education, thought of in terms of *halk terbiyesi* (the people’s education).<sup>218</sup> The People’s Houses were designed to replace any pre-existing cultural associations. That the Houses even used all the former buildings of *Türk Ocakları* reveals the extent of the replacement.<sup>219</sup> In the same vein, in a couple of years nearly all the relatively autonomous associations – except the sports clubs – like the Turkish Women’s Association (*Türk Kadınlar Cemiyeti*), Masonic lodges, Teachers’ Association (*Muallimler Derneği*), Scouts’ Association (*İzciler Derneği*) and Porters’

---

<sup>216</sup> Metin Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, Is. 1, (Fall 2000), p. 64

<sup>217</sup> For the full text of his speech, see Recep Peker, “Halkevleri Açılma,” 6.

<sup>218</sup> For one representative example of how the terms *halk terbiyesi* was conceived among the elite circle, see Hamit Zübeyir (Koşay), “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları” [Vehicles for Training/Educating People]. *Ülkü*. 2 (February 1933), 152-159.

<sup>219</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, “The People’s Houses, p. 59



Association (*Hamallar Cemiyeti*) were invited to dissolve themselves and join the People's Houses.<sup>220</sup>

### 3.5. Competing Visions And Rival Representations Of Kemalism

The 1930 incidents not only gave rise to a radical institutional reorganization of the Republic, but also to a need to redefine the basic contours of the revolutionary ideology. The dissolution of the Free Party marked the beginning of a period of reconstruction of the Republic to reshape the nation in a more effective way. The major challenge of the Free Party experiment for the newly established regime was the awareness that “the Atatürk Revolution in its first seven years had penetrated only the surface of both the elite and mass of Turkish society.”<sup>221</sup> Moreover, the Turkish revolutionary elite came to the point that the principles and values of the Republic could not be disseminated or inculcated to the wider segments of the society. Particularly, the *Menemen* incident gave rise to a strong despair and anger among the revolutionary elite from all fractions that something very urgently had to be done for the perpetuation of the republican ideals. Even Ahmet Ağaoğlu, former deputy of the Free Party and a representative of liberal-conservative faction of Kemalism, was quite affected by the *Menemen* incident:

---

<sup>220</sup> *Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı 1923-1953*, Feridun Aksın (ed.), Vol. 1, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), p. 62

<sup>221</sup> Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill: 1973), p. 5

The Republic itself is principally a religion and faith. However, the bible of this religion has not yet been written. Its apostles who would consecrate their beings to the Republic and its geniuses who will enlighten and educate the people by penetrating into the dark segments of the masses have not yet appeared! We have left the Republic alone and we have been occupied with our own personal matters, occupations and interests. Naturally, this [Menemen] is the end result.<sup>222</sup>

This quotation shows the increasing radical tone even among the most moderate figures of the Republic. The radicalization of politics came to the fore during the attempt to meet the needs of this specific conjuncture. For Weiker, the Republicans spent most of their energies in the direction of mass political education and indoctrination in the 1930s. One of the clearest lessons that the Republican elite draw from the Free Party experience was the need to establish far greater contact with the society both in depth and volume. For the RPP elite, the society had to be shaped in such a way as to be able to adapt to the conditions and norms of the new regime.<sup>223</sup> The inclination towards a more non-democratic form of politics was strengthened by the trends of the time when liberal democracy was being challenged, conceptually and physically, by the totalitarian systems of Communist and Fascist persuasion in the 1930s.

In the wake of the dissolution of the Free Party, the Revolutionary elite, in general, began to interrogate the existent principles and conducts of the RPP. Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), for instance, complains about the indifference of the elite, considering it as the main reason of this failure. For him, certain questions had to be

---

<sup>222</sup> Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Vicdan Azabı Duymayanlara," *Son Posta*, January 12, 1931

<sup>223</sup> Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), p. 168

asked to the Prime Minister (İsmet İnönü) about the very efficiency of the Revolutionary means:

Pasha, His Excellency (*Paşa Hazretleri*)! After your seven-year rule, we see that you have spent almost no energy in establishing the principles of our party in the country. You could not put the people even a step forward in rescuing them from their ignorance and backwardness they inherited from the Ottoman Sultanate era. Considering the issues of revolutionism and *laiklik*, we have encountered a deep fanatic reaction (*koyu taassup reaksiyonu*) that even the army of Caliph could have not dared during the years of National Independence. The policies of étatism you have imperfectly applied... paved the way to an economic and financial crisis... No, no! Do not lay all your mistakes and irresponsibility on Fethi Bey or the Free Party. It is clear that all these maladies and troubles threatening the Republican regime did not come into being suddenly.<sup>224</sup>

Furthermore, Yakup Kadri argued that no one had asked these kinds of questions after the dissolution of the Free Party. For him, *Kadro* was the first attempt that had begun to disseminate new ideas and opinions against conventional wisdom, which claimed that the revolutionary order was totally established and that it would not be destroyed.

The sense of discontent and despair about the prospect of the Revolution became also prevalent among the ruling cadre. The ruling cadre decided to handle the problem of social control in a quite vigorous sense. Their primary objective was to introduce and support the ideology of the ruling government that would justify their programs and projects around which popular commitment and action was organized. Their ambition was to produce new generations of Kemalist and

---

<sup>224</sup> Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), pp. 121-122

nationalist citizens who were expected to realize that Turkey did not need another revolution. Furthermore, the revolutionary elite faced the task of creating awareness in each citizen of his/her individual capacity for effectiveness and directing their efforts and allegiances in conformity with the national ideology. Determining and articulating the national ideology was one of the prominent issues in their mind.

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that there emerged several competing attempts among the ruling as well as intellectual elite aimed at formulating the national ideology of the regime. There was a consensus about the overall name of the ideology. It was Kemalism. However, there began a struggle over the content of it.

Intellectuals played a substantial role in the construction of the Revolutionary ideology. In other words, there was a division of labor between political authorities and intellectuals, and their activities were coterminous in the construction of collective identity. Participation in the formation of institutionalized order is the basic characteristics of what Eisenstadt called “secondary intellectuals.” They, predominantly, serve as “channels of institutionalization, and even as possible creators of new types of symbols of cultural orientations, of traditions, and of collective and cultural identity.”<sup>225</sup> Contrary to the common assumption that defines the basic character of the intellectual as standing critically against power holders and that presumes a certain amount of tension between intellectuals and political

---

<sup>225</sup> Their involvement in the revolution of values reflects the transformation of the primary intellectuals which is the ideal-typically constructed conception of intellectuals dominant in the Western literature into “secondary intellectuals”. As in the case of Turkish revolution, not only the secondary intellectuals did not withdraw into private activity of contemplation on ideas, but they also participated in

authorities, the study of the role of intellectuals in the formation of the Turkish Revolutionary ideology shows that they were largely engaged in the institutionalization of the political order. The relationship between intellectuals and those who hold power is very significant in analyzing Turkish revolutionary politics. During the formation of the Turkish Revolutionary ideology, the Turkish intellectuals were, generally, subservient to the power holders in establishing a social control regime. Furthermore, they helped to strengthen the legitimacy of revolutionary cadres rather than taking a critical stance against them. It is important to underline that Kemalism became quite successful in convincing intellectuals about the very legitimacy of the regime, and about the unavoidability of the chosen direction.

After the dissolution of the Free Party, intellectuals of the Republic began to debate the elementary principles and characteristics of the Revolution. What was the ideology of the Revolution? What would be its fundamental principles? How is it possible to make it an overall worldview for the later generations? In his well-known book, *Tek Adam*, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir argues that they are faced with the reality of revolution, but not yet with a theory of it. Therefore, for him, the Turkish Revolution had to be defined in terms of explaining its historical specificity and characteristics. His main problem was to provide a definite answer to the question “what is the ideology of the Revolution?”<sup>226</sup>

---

institutionalization of the ordering of the social and cultural experience. See, S. N. Eisenstadt, *Intellectuals and Powers*, op. cit., p. 12-18

<sup>226</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, Vol. 3, (İstanbul, 1965), pp. 456-457

There were basically three factions among the Revolutionary elite that this thesis would like to highlight. These were the Kadrocu Kemalists, Conservative Kemalists, and the “re-constructivist” Kemalists of the Ülkü group. Actually, this competition over the definition of the ideology of the revolution had much to do with the semiotic struggle over who would represent the “will” of the people and the struggle over who would control the revolutionary language and the political game. Even if we choose to believe that this power struggle is more a semiotic struggle or a political game than an ideological debate, it is worth noting that the widely accepted way to exercise power in this political game is through ideological debate. In this sense, it is important to understand the main underpinnings of this debate.

### **3.5.1. “Conservative” Kemalism**

Within the Kemalist power structure, there were certain intellectuals that attempted to articulate particular norms and values to the mainstream agenda of the Republic, which were based on relatively traditional and conservative arguments. The unifying factor in their ideas was that they commonly “offered a mid-way between religious reactionism and modernist radicalism.”<sup>227</sup> They were, in general, “part of the new Republican cultural elites and were known for their self-defined ‘conservative’ stand on cultural matters and ‘modernism’ in politics while being

---

<sup>227</sup> Nazım İrem, “Kemalist Modernizm ve Türk Gelenekçi-Muhafazakarlığının Kökenleri,” (Kemalist Modernism and the Roots of Turkish Nationalist Conservatism), *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 74, (Güz, 1997), pp. 52-101, p. 101

ardent supporters of the formal principles of the Kemalist Republic.”<sup>228</sup> The prominent figures of the conservative Kemalists were İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Mustafa Şekip Tunç.<sup>229</sup>

Having been mainly inspired by the philosophy of Henri Bergson, these intellectuals attempted to articulate “a new philosophical-political vocabulary in which genuine Kemalism was interpreted as a conservative force rather than as a rationalist dogma.”<sup>230</sup> For them, the radical revolutionaries, or in other words, the “Unionist positivism” had fallen short of responding to the nationalist claims of a moral order on the new principles of national creation. They maintained that positivism and religious scholasticism was represented negative poles. In order to foster the creative evolution of the nation, these poles should be abandoned and a new conception of Kemalism based essentially on a “conservative force in action” should be appropriated. This would symbolize “the Turkish search for a unique national tradition.”<sup>231</sup> In essence, however, conservative Kemalists shared the political considerations of the radical revolutionaries although they seemed to favor the cultural priorities of the Islamists. Their commonalities with Islamists and radical revolutionaries gave them the opportunity to undertake the reconciliation between

---

<sup>228</sup> Nazım İrem, “Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal,” *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* Vol. 34, No. 1, (2002), 87-112, p. 88

<sup>229</sup> This classification belongs to Nazım İrem. This thesis relies mainly on this classification to analyze “conserveative modernist” Kemalism.

<sup>230</sup> Nazım İrem, “Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal,” p. 89

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 94-98

two extreme views of modernization by means of facilitating modernization without sacrificing cultural peculiarities.

In their attempt at consolidating “a modern secular moral order,” conservative Kemalists predominantly detached themselves from similar attempts led by the radical revolutionaries, specifically *Ülkü*. In their philosophical vocabulary, religion, custom, tradition and language occupied a relatively higher place in the formation of secular moral order.<sup>232</sup> True, they aimed at replacing the traditional religious-universalistic mores with secular-nationalist ones paralleling the goals of the Kemalist radicals. However, it was dubious whether the radical republican revolutionaries considered national values as the natural outcome of past experience. On the other hand, conservative Kemalists were generally opposed to questioning cultural values under the light of modernist assumptions, as culture was a matter of historical continuity and a cumulative outcome of the experiences that a society internalized in its unique history.<sup>233</sup> Thus, contrary to the assumptions of the radical revolutionaries that assumed culture as the synonym for “political re-education”, or “re-construction” in the Jacobin sense, for the conservative revolutionaries culture was a sphere to be kept against alien influences as much as possible. The conservative Kemalists also held that in order to maintain the legitimacy of culture, it should not be suffocated for the sake of progress. For them, the erosion of the cultural peculiarities also meant the weakening of the state legitimacy. In this sense, reforms could not take roots unless they were being supported by traditions.

---

<sup>232</sup> See for instance, İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Mürebblere*, (Semih Lütfü: İstanbul, 1932), pp. 254-256



The nation should be defined by its unique history and traditions, which exclusively included religious elements while the radical revolutionaries preferred to emphasize the collective will and to describe the nation in an abstract way that ignored the priorities of traditional society and to redefine it in the direction of their own considerations. Conservative Kemalists stipulated the celebration of customs as a different domain outside the politics but as a factor which reinforced the modern Turkish state. The state could not dispense with customs and traditions nor change them.

The conservative revolutionaries, Baltacıoğlu, and Ağaoğlu for instance, rejected the accusation that their conservative ideas constitute a threat to the secularist paradigm of the regime. While they shared the political ideals of Kemalists, they were not eager to disregard the living traditions of society in the cultural sphere.<sup>234</sup> Conservatives demanded to celebrate morality, customs and other cultural peculiarities besides Western civilization in the new Republican regime.

In spite of the remarkable differences in their treatment of the role and importance of culture/tradition, radical and conservative Kemalists shared the assumption that Western civilization was a model to adopt to eliminate the corrupt state-religion relations. They both advocated that religion should be excluded from political affairs. Both shared the belief that as long as religion operated as an actor within the political arena, its spiritual power and its moral charm would be

---

<sup>233</sup> İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Türke Doğru*, Ankara, 1972, p. 13

<sup>234</sup> Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, (İstanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933), pp. 56-57

diminished. Then what should be the boundary between religion and politics, tradition and ideals? Conservatives perceived religion as an inherently national and inalienable component of the historical national character. Religion could not be disregarded at all since religion and nationality bolstered each other. On the other hand, radical revolutionaries were suspicious about the meaning of religious bonds. Radical Kemalists conceived religious and traditional loyalties as hampering the cultivation of purely nationalist feeling. It is worthwhile to stress that conservative Kemalists, however, did not value religion for its own sake, but considered its instrumental potency in entrenching social harmony. They also tried to benefit from the power of religion in deepening individuals' sense of collective identity.

The conservatives assessed religion as one of the irreplaceable instruments of the social harmony while radical revolutionaries tried to replace the religious components with secular/ political ideals. As David Apter puts, revolutionary ideals may be called a kind of political religion. The projects of the new nation states, whose primary concerns focused on to create and integrate new roles for the individuals and redefine the customs in the direction of political ideals, could not be restrained within the political framework as they aimed not only to invigorate the state apparatuses but also to be the sole source of the meaning and purpose of the individual ideals.<sup>235</sup> Radical revolutionaries were not contented only to dominate the milieu of politics. They irresistibly urged to intervene and reshape the cultural sphere in order to make reforms durable. Conservatives on the contrary agreed on the inevitability of Kemalist reforms on condition that it should not undermine its

---

<sup>235</sup> David Apter, "Political Religion," p. 59

genuine cultural identity. Reforms should not erase the essential nature of the culture rather it should facilitate the rehabilitation and invigoration of the political institutions.

The conservative option had several disadvantages within the relatively radical atmosphere of the 1930. Their views had already been tested during the Free Party period, and due to the exclusionary efforts of the radical revolutionaries, they could hardly gain ground in the center. Their comparatively moderate (constructivist) ideas about the state-society relations and on the essential principles of the revolution made them irrelevant to state power in that intricate time of radicalism. However, the intellectual efforts of conservative modernists were able to add a new color within the broad spectrum of Kemalism.<sup>236</sup>

### **3.5.2. *Kadrocu* Kemalism**

In the wake of the dissolution of the Free Party, the Revolutionary elite, in general, began to question the existing principles and practices of the RPP. Şevket Süreyya argues that until 1930, there was not a clear-cut, sophisticated formula of the revolutionary principles. For him, it was very difficult to talk about an ideology of the Revolution: “There was only the study of Afet İnan, her famous *Medeni Bilgiler*. Six arrows had not yet been concluded. The formulas in *Medeni Bilgiler* were not

---

<sup>236</sup> It is worthwhile to stress that Atatürk had begun to reconsider the conservative-liberal option, after discarding the re-constructivist leaders first by firing Peker from his post in 1936 and later forcing İnönü to resign from his job in 1937.

clear enough to draw certain concrete ideas.”<sup>237</sup> The Free Party experiment and its aftermath prompted the revolutionary elite in general to search for alternative formulas. Yakup Kadri, for instance, complained about the indifference of the elite considering the main reasons of this failure.<sup>238</sup>

Several leading intellectuals of the time, namely Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and İsmail Hüsrev Tökin decided to publish a journal that would formulate and develop the ideology of the Revolution. Though Yakup Kadri came from a considerably different ideological background than that of the revolutionary Marxist backgrounds of the other members, he had a central position for the movement in terms of establishing the link between Kadro and Çankaya. At the onset, Yakup Kadri asked Atatürk to permit them to initiate a project of journal that would attempt to form and disseminate the ideology of the Turkish Revolution. Atatürk did not hesitate to give them the permission to publish a journal for the revolutionary purposes. On January 1932, they introduced the journal Kadro to the Turkish public. From that time onward, the authors of Kadro began to be identified as Kadroçus especially by their adversaries.

It can be argued that the *Kadrocu* group was, undoubtedly, one of the outstanding elite groups who attempted to provide an ideological as well as

---

<sup>237</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, in *Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri*, (İstanbul: İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi, 1973), p. 74

<sup>238</sup> For him, *Kadro* was the first attempt that had begun to disseminate such ideas and opinions against the conventional wisdom assuming that the revolutionary order was totally established and that it would not be destroyed. See Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), pp. 121-122

“theoretical basis to Kemalism”<sup>239</sup>. They were also the most organized and theoretically coherent group dedicated to the task of constructing an ideology that could respond to the ideological despair of the Republic suffering from a relative crisis by the upshots of both internal and external turmoil. The social background of the members of the *Kadro* had been the major difficulty for the aims of the movement in persuading the RPP elite of its sincerity. That is, the communist reputation of *Kadrocu* had always been a question mark in administrative circles that attempted to hinder the *Kadrocu* efforts.

*Kadro* authors, in general, held that Turkey was experiencing an ongoing revolution, yet its intellectual elements had not yet been organized to create a coherent ideology for the revolution. Additionally, the authors of *Kadro* argued that since the Turkish Revolution was the first successful national liberation movement in the world, it had a unique place and could be a guide for all the nations on the road to freedom. In its first issue, the journal justifies its *raison d'être* in the following statements:

Turkey is in a state of revolution. This revolution has not yet ended... The revolution is not an impartial order. Those who live in it, whether they support it or not, must participate and conform to it. Revolution means unconditional attachment of wills of the adversaries to the wills of those who support it. The will and interest of the revolution is represented by the wills of a conscious vanguard *Kadro* (cadre) who are a few but forefront that attend to the revolution and that marches it... Turkey is in a state of revolution... Nevertheless, it is not in a system of idea (*fikriyat*) that would constitute an IDEOLOGY for the Revolution...<sup>240</sup>

---

<sup>239</sup> David Hotham, *The Turks*, (London: John Murray, 1972), p. 95

<sup>240</sup> *Kadro*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (II. Kanun, 1932), p. 3

They proposed a Kemalist strategy based on “nationalist étatism.” Accordingly, the state did not belong to any particular class, nor acted on behalf of any particular class. Rather, the state was composed of a conscious cadre who would act on behalf of the nation, and in the best interest of the whole nation. The authors of *Kadro* justified this seemingly authoritarian and re-constructivist formulation of apprehending the state-society relations as the natural outcome of the current conditions:

No to multi-party regime! Yes to the single party... Furthermore, we prefer national guidance to national sovereignty, that is, the dominance of Kadro, the dominance of a leader and an enlightened minority. Under the existent conditions of the time, it was not an exaggeration and surprising that Kadro adopted such ideas. That is what Atatürk also preferred. It is to say that for Atatürk single will, single chief, single party and authoritarian government was also essential. If you assemble those elements, then Kadro would arise. In fact, it was the natural outcome of the current conditions.<sup>241</sup>

Moreover, the authors of *Kadro* explicitly denied “classical democracy” and democratic form of government, which they call “oligarchic democracy.”<sup>242</sup> They advocated a “new form” of democracy based on more disciplined order. For instance, Yakup Kadri maintained that if a democratic election were held in the first National Assembly, Atatürk would not have won the elections, as the majority of the first Assembly consisted of Unionist members. So, in certain conditions, classical democracy would be an obstacle.

---

<sup>241</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, in *Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri*, (İstanbul: İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi, 1973), p. 108

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., p. 73

The authors of the *Kadro* claimed that they would formulate the ideology of Kemalism and fill a void. Yakup Kadri, initially, went to the office of Recep Peker, general secretary of the Republican People's Party, and said, "I want to publish a journal propagating the principles of the RPP to the people and the deputies as well."<sup>243</sup> When Peker asked what they were going to do with that journal, Yakup Kadri responded that "That is, *Kadro* means an ideological cadre of a party, a vanguard cadre," to which Peker said, "This duty is ours, I can't give it to you."<sup>244</sup> As it is clear, Peker became quite discontented about the *Kadro* movement and tried to prevent the project. He thought that there was no need to formulate the ideology of the Revolution outside the party. If there was a need, only the party could accomplish this task. Peker later showed his discontent about the articles in *Kadro*. He accused *Kadrocus* of being influenced by dangerous foreign ideologies, notably by Communism. Moreover, Peker made a complaint of *Kadro* to Atatürk. For Peker, the articles published in *Kadro* were not only endangering the economic developments of the country, but also unsettling the very basis of the regime.<sup>245</sup> He requested Atatürk to stop the publication of the journal. It is important to note that Atatürk did not take sides in this competition and was very successful in reducing the tension between the elites. Then, Recep Peker and his supporters could do nothing but publish their own journal, *Ülkü*, to shape the ideology of the regime.

---

<sup>243</sup> Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, in *Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri*, p. 82

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Çetin Yetkin, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınları, 1983), p. 121, For the memories of Yakup Kadri on these matters, see *Zoraki Diplomat* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998)

Although it was publicly declared to be the official publication of the People's Houses, the idea to publish a journal entitled *Ülkü* was in fact a reaction against the so-called *Kadrocu* group, *Ülkü* began to be published in February 1933 as the official journal of the People's Houses. Although *Kadro* was closed in January 1935, the publication of *Ülkü* continued till 1950. Historians have explained the closure of *Kadro* by various reasons. According to the most credible account, it was closed due to the increasing pressures of the rival elite groups that pushed Atatürk to intervene to stop the activities of the *Kadro*.<sup>246</sup> For these rival elite groups, *Kadro* was propagating dangerous foreign ideologies that would harm the unity and harmony of the nation. Vedat Nedim Tör, the editor of *Kadro*, explains the reason of the closure as follows: "... Unfortunately, we could not be successful in convincing the ideological administrators of RPP, namely Recep Peker and Necip Ali, that we were sincere in this new ideology."<sup>247</sup> Necip Ali, the first editor of *Ülkü* and the general head of the People's Houses, explicitly blamed the authors of *Kadro* for distorting the very principles of Kemalism by misrepresenting it. He argued that *Kadro*'s definition of etatism places the state above the national will. This was the idea of German school. However, for Necip Ali, Kemalist understanding of etatism considers state as the outcome of the national will.<sup>248</sup> That is, there is equivalence between national will and the state. The critiques of Recep Peker and Necip Ali

---

<sup>246</sup> For this account see Temuçin Faik Ertan, *Kadrocular ve Kadro Hareketi*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1994), pp. 65-73, Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1968), Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1968)

<sup>247</sup> Vedat Nedim Tör, *Yıllar Böyle Geçti*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976), p. 130

<sup>248</sup> Necip Ali, "Başvekilin Dersi", *Varlık*, No. 19, 15 April 1934, p. 289



together with the liberal conservative intellectuals like Ahmet Ağaoğlu<sup>249</sup>, became influential over the attitudes of Mustafa Kemal towards *Kadro*.

It should be noted that beside the critiques and rumors of the elites mentioned, the reactions of the newly forming entrepreneurial group were also very influential over Atatürk in the closure of the journal. For the representatives of this so-called *İş Bankası* group, the etatist views of *Kadro* were in conformity with collectivism and even communism<sup>250</sup>. They saw the *Kadrocu* arguments challenging their positions. Celal Bayar, who had served as Director General of *İş Bankası* from the time of its foundation until 1932 when he became Minister of Economy (1932 and 1937) and Prime Minister (1937-38), disliked the etatist propaganda of *Kadro* as he considered it harmful to private entrepreneurship.<sup>251</sup> Celal Bayar emphasized that the aim of etatism was to encourage, rather than to replace, indigenous capitalist development: “... Our principle... is to guarantee ourselves, to encourage and support private enterprise. We wholeheartedly desire the development of private initiative in the industrial sphere, and we are continually investigating the best ways of achieving it.”<sup>252</sup>

---

<sup>249</sup> For the critiques of Ahmet Ağaoğlu see especially his *Devlet ve Fert* (İstanbul, 1933)

<sup>250</sup> It is important to note that almost all the authors of *Kadro* were engaged in communist activities in their previous life episodes. Because of that they were assessed with suspicion from the beginning of their journal life. In fact, they could not persuade the elites that they had no connection with communism and communistic activities anymore.

<sup>251</sup> Temuçin Faik Ertan, *Kadrocular ve Kadro Hareketi*, p. 67

<sup>252</sup> Cited in William Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945”, pp. 106-107

The technical views that Bayar maintained received intellectual elaboration and extension from Ahmed Ağaoğlu. In his *Devlet ve Fert*, Ağaoğlu mainly argued that the etatist and interventionist economic policies of the RPP stem from the current requirements of the country aiming at elimination of the contradictions among society. However, the problem is to set the limits to this intervention. Ağaoğlu went on saying that the involvement of the state in economic affairs is a form of suppression of the individual. Furthermore, he emphasized that desirable economic development could be achieved only in an environment where individual enterprises were allowed to use their free initiative. According to him, in Eastern countries in general, and particularly in Turkey, the state has an absolute and commanding power over individuals and society. This, he argued, repressed individual initiative, and frustrated the development of private entrepreneurship. In his view, European economic progress was directly linked to European institutions and in order to achieve the desired economic development in Turkey, internal restructuring was necessary. By internal restructuring, he meant parliamentary democracy and the freedom of individual initiative.<sup>253</sup> He argued that parliamentary democracy in Europe had been damaged by the emergence of Hitler and Mussolini, but he believed that it would sooner or later restore itself, because it was the only workable method which governments in European countries could follow. Contrary to the *Kadrocu* thesis about the vulnerability of parliamentary democracy, Ağaoğlu suggested that parliamentary democracy and individual freedom were, and should be, the major

---

<sup>253</sup> Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, (İstanbul, 1933), pp. 64-67

goals for Turkey, at least in the long run.<sup>254</sup> For Ağaoğlu, the primary goal of the Kemalist regime was to save the individual from destructive agencies. In order to discredit the *Kadrocu* assumptions of étatism in the eyes of the ruling elite he argued, “I am of the opinion that the RPP’s version of étatism is closer to my own ideas... than the *Kadro* (group’s) planned étatism, which hands capital over the state.”<sup>255</sup> Ağaoğlu accepted that *Kadro* was not an advocate of socialism or fascism, but he condemned *Kadro* for advocating totalitarian and authoritarian notions similar to those of socialism in Soviet Russia, Pilsudski’s regime in Poland, Nazism in Germany and fascism in Italy.<sup>256</sup>

It is clear that there were divergent, competing and even conflicting attempts to form the content of Kemalist ideology. Every attempt aimed at placing itself at the center to get a legitimate ground. The specific conjuncture of the 1930s prepared a fertile ground for these efforts to define the principles of Kemalism. Undoubtedly, except Mustafa Kemal, no one had the competence to authorize the validity or legitimacy of these attempts. Even İsmet İnönü as the Prime Minister and as the second man had a relatively limited impact. He may also be considered as one of the competing figures endeavoring to transform the mainstream ideology of the regime in accordance with his image of perfection. For instance, İnönü published an article

---

<sup>254</sup> Ibid., pp. 73-76

<sup>255</sup> Cited in William Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945”, *Bulletin (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies)*, Vol. 7, Is. 2 (1980), 100-117, p. 107

<sup>256</sup> Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert*, pp. 52-55. Despite his allegation about the congruity between his ideas and the RPP’s vision of étatism, Ağaoğlu’s arguments had never gain ground in the mainstream of RPP thinking in the 1930s.

entitled “Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı” (The Etatist Character of Our Party)<sup>257</sup> in *Kadro* where he articulated his interpretation of étatism. In this article, as pointed by Korkut Boratav, İnönü spelt out his interpretation of étatism as if he was the leader of an opposition party rather than the Prime Minister.<sup>258</sup> Sometimes, his ideas as well as his post was utilized and even exploited by the competing elite groups in order to legitimize their projects. After İnönü published his article in *Kadro*, there began a fierce controversy between the *Kadrocu* and the other elite groups, including the *Ülkü* group. The authors of *Kadro* considered the article as the defense of *Kadrocu* arguments. For them, this article was signifying an approval of their ideas at the top of the government. If İsmet İnönü did not agree with *Kadro*, he would not have written an article for the journal. However, in his article “Başvekilin Dersi,” (The Lesson of the Prime Minister) Necip Ali, the first general director of *Ülkü* and the general head of the People’s Houses, regarded İnönü’s article as an explicit denial and critique of the ideas proclaimed by *Kadro*. For him, the authors of *Kadro* should draw certain lessons from that article. Necip Ali explicitly blamed the authors of *Kadro* of distorting the very principles of Kemalism.<sup>259</sup> Actually, Necip Ali was relatively right in saying that there was an incongruity between *Kadro* and İnönü. They both rejected the assumption that the private sector does better than the state sector, and argued that the state should take up a leading role in the industrialization of Turkey. However, while İnönü’s reason for giving priority to state investment in industry was the inability of the private sector to take up a leading role in Turkey’s

---

<sup>257</sup> İsmet İnönü, “Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı,” *Kadro*, (October, 1933), pp. 1-3

<sup>258</sup> Korkut Boratav, *Türkiyede Devletçilik*, (Ankara, 1982), p. 108

industrialization, *Kadro*'s reasoning was that one way or another, the private sector put its interests before the interests of the state, and could not be trusted in economic development.

Eventually, all these reactions led Mustafa Kemal to appoint Yakup Kadri as ambassador to Albania:

At the end, even Atatürk himself could not stand the critiques and rumors about *Kadro*. What was he able to do as the chief of the state? His party and government did not tolerate us. Because, they did not understand what we advocated. RPP thought that only it could do this task. For instance, Recep Peker gave seminars<sup>260</sup> on the Revolution in order to silence our voice.<sup>261</sup>

Actually the appointment of Yakup Kadri as an ambassador to Albania was the sign that Atatürk wanted the authors of *Kadro* to stop the activities of the journal. Vedat Nedim explains this situation as the result of the deliberate attempts of the competing elites:

When those who felt themselves uncomfortable about the development of the Kadro Movement within the Kemalist ideological system, and those who assumed it as a source of danger to their private self-interests saw that their various rumors were not effective, they tried to cut our connection with Çankaya by making our director Yakup Kadri be appointed to Albania as an ambassador...<sup>262</sup>

---

<sup>259</sup> Necip Ali, "Başvekilin Dersi", in *Varlık*, No. 19, 15 April 1934, p. 289

<sup>260</sup> Yakup Kadri meant the *İnkılap Dersleri* of Recep Peker.

<sup>261</sup> Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, in *Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri*, p. 83

<sup>262</sup> Vedat Nedim Tör, op. cit., p. 136

Niyazi Berkes describes the competition between *Kadro* and *Ülkü* cliques among the members of the RPP as between that of Fascists and Marxists.<sup>263</sup> In fact, once a member of the *Ülkü* group Necib Ali (Küçük) asked young Niyazi Berkes to inspect the articles of *Kadro* whether they included certain Communist arguments or not by comparing the writings of Şevket Süreyya and Marx's *Capital*.<sup>264</sup> This study will not categorize Recep Peker and his friends, namely the *Ülkü* group, under the banner of Fascism. Albeit sharing Fascist assumptions to some extent, the *Ülkü* group explicitly rejected Fascist arguments in general. In fact, some of the arguments of the *Kadrocu* group were closer to Fascist ideas than the *Ülkü* group. In fact, the Fascist International led by Italy officially invited the *Kadro* members to their organization, though *Kadro* rejected this invitation.<sup>265</sup>

What were the main arguments that the authors of *Kadro* developed as ideological components of Kemalism? Furthermore, what was their potential challenge that disturbed the rival elites so much, although they advocated parallel ideas? The techniques of power they employed in Foucaultian sense in terms of having connections with Çankaya together with the ideas they advocated, were the crucial factors that determined their position vis a vis the rival groups. In this sense, the complaint of Vedat Nedim about the appointment of Yakup Kadri to Albania is meaningful. Çankaya benefited from all these competitions too. Those who developed better representations of Kemalism in line with the changing context and

---

<sup>263</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, (The Forgotten Years), ed., Ruşen Sezer, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p. 74.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., pp. 80-85.

time would gain the approval of Mustafa Kemal. Actually, this explains the strength and resilience of Kemalist ideology. Consequently, Kemalism's pretension to be a unitary and common ideology gets its power from all these competitions and conflicts within its legitimate boundary.

### 3.5.3. *Ülkü* version of Kemalism

Having been favored by Atatürk over the others (the Conservative and *Kadrocu* Kemalists) and driven by a feeling of being at the center, Recep Peker<sup>266</sup> and Necip Ali<sup>267</sup> began to develop a new journal project that would help define the fundamental premises of the revolutionary ideology from 'within', or from the party

---

<sup>265</sup> See Vedat Nedim Tör, *Yıllar Böyle Geçti*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976)

<sup>266</sup> The Deputy of Kütahya, Recep Peker had been appointed to the RPP's Secretary-General post as part of the 1931 reorganization of the party. His organizational skills and dynamic personality qualities made him favorable in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal. As Weiker puts it, "since assuming his post he had indeed been a leader in developing and interpreting Kemalist ideology, especially the doctrines of *étatisme* and revolutionism, and had acquired a reputation as efficient, energetic, and an uncompromising demander of rapid results in all fields of development. It is likely that many of the political education and indoctrination measures were originated by Peker." Weiker, op. cit., 212.

<sup>267</sup> Deputy of Denizli between 1923-1938. He was also the General Director of the People's Houses. Necip Ali was the famous Public Prosecutor (*müddeiumumi*) of the Independence Courts (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*). He was known for his stern and radical attitudes towards opposition. He, at the same time, prepared the formal charges against the leaders of the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) on the accusation that they instigated the sequence to the events that finally culminated in the famous Izmir assassination attempt (*İzmir Suikastı*). See *Türk Parlamento Tarihi, TBMM-II. Dönem 1923-1927*, Vol. II (Ankara: TBMM Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), p.585.

organization itself. In February 1933, the journal *Ülkü* came to life.<sup>268</sup> *Ülkü* was published from 1933 to 1950. However, this study will analyze the journal from February 1933 to August 1936. This period was selected due to the fact that the specific elite group, which I call the *Ülkü* elite, was politically dominant during this particular period. From August 1936, the weight of the *Ülkü* elite in the journal gradually decreased. This is mainly because of the dismissal of Recep Peker from his General Secretary post in June 1936. The increasing power of Peker in the party as a ‘third’ figure apart from Atatürk and İnönü began to be felt as a threat especially by Atatürk.<sup>269</sup> On June 1936, state control was further strengthened by the removal of the secretary general and the provincial party secretaries and the transference of their functions to the minister of the interior and the provincial governors respectively. Thus, the merger between state and party was established to eliminate the potential autonomy of party organizations that would challenge the very authority of state power.<sup>270</sup> Recep Peker, who had to retire from his post, was the chief victim of this decision. This decision was also signifying the end of the *Ülkü* movement. From that time on, Fuat Köprülü became the general director of the *Ülkü* journal. Both the author cadre and the content of articles changed noticeably.

---

<sup>268</sup> The literal and figurative meaning of the word *Ülkü* is ‘ideal’ in English. Atatürk named the journal *Ülkü*. In the first issue of the journal, Atatürk sent his congratulations stating, ‘I am expecting from *Ülkü* auspicious products in disseminating our genuine ideal (*öz ülkümüzü*).’ It should be noted that one of Atatürk’s adopted daughters name was also *Ülkü*.

<sup>269</sup> Hasan Rıza Soyak, *Atatürk’ten Hatıralar* (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 1973), pp.487-492

<sup>270</sup> For details of this merger see especially Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), pp.295-296.



Although *Ülkü* introduced itself to reflect the official state view and declared that it would be the official journal of the People's Houses, it revealed the perspectives of a particular elite group within the RPP. When the author cadre is examined, it is most noteworthy that it comprised of those specific names that were within the close circle of Recep Peker. The general director of the journal was Necip Ali (Küçük), while the owner was Nusret Kemal (Köymen), a young intellectual who had graduated from Columbia University in the United States. Recep Peker was the chief representative of the journal in the RPP. Together with the articles written by Recep Peker, Necip Ali and Nusret Kemal, the recurrent names were Mehmet Saffet (Engin), Behçet Kemal (Çağlar), Kazım Nami (Duru), Ahmed Nesimi, Ferid Celal (Güven) and Aydoslu Sait.

The articles of *Ülkü* were classified into fifteen sections as Literature and Language, Fine Arts, History, Sociology and Philosophy, Economy and Agriculture, People Education (*Halk Terbiyesi*), State Defense (*Yurt Koruma*), Woman (*Kadınlık*), Science, People's Health and Population, Sport and Recreation, Peasantism, Bibliography, News from the People's Houses, and News and Suggestions.<sup>271</sup> Despite these different sections aiming to collect writings on specialized subjects, *Ülkü* was explicitly designed to create an ideology of the revolution, and to further the institutionalization of this ideology by and within the People's Houses. In the first article of the journal, Recep Peker describes the characteristics of the *Ülkü* authors as follows: "In *Ülkü*, the articles of those people will be published, who believe the great cause (*büyük dava*), and make the Turkish society believe this, and

---

<sup>271</sup> "Ülkü'nün Yazı Bölümleri," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): pp. 76-79

who want to take part and duty in the way of the service that expects the creation of a collective and excited national totality.”<sup>272</sup> Furthermore, he stated that those intellectuals are welcomed who would enlighten, advance, enforce, and amalgamate (*kütleleştirmek*) people by rescuing them from individual life.<sup>273</sup> Thus, this study will focus the articles highlighting the formation of the revolutionary ideology and reflecting the peculiar efforts of the *Ülkü* group to reveal their ideological viewpoint. At this juncture, it is instructive to look at the mission of the journal in its own words:

*Ülkü* has assumed the task of gathering people for the ideological and moral institutionalization of the revolution. Accordingly, the primary role of the man of idea and art is to make the national and collective endeavor (*maşeri ceht*) understood, and direct it to the current and future requirements. Furthermore, *Ülkü* aims at creating a national revolutionary culture from this collective endeavor and at inculcating a collective solidarity (*maşeri tesanüt*) on the basis of this culture. In this sacred and hard task, *Ülkü* will be a moderator.<sup>274</sup>

The *Ülkü* elite preponderantly aimed at a cultural regeneration of the Turkish nation through the secular quest for new, revolutionary values by way of using the axial notion of solidarism. In this sense, by *Ülkü* group, I refer to an organized group of both state and intellectual elite that sought to advance this project of cultural regeneration of the society by way of employing solidarist assumptions, which take

---

<sup>272</sup> Recep (Peker), “Ülkü Niçin Çıkıyor”, *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February, 1933), p. 1

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., p. 2

<sup>274</sup> “Ülkü İki Yaşına Giren Okuyanlar ve Yazarlarla Konuşma,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): pp. 74-75.

secular morality as *sine qua non* of a safe ambiance for democracy. This group represented the more anti-liberal and anti-clerical side of Kemalism.

The relative failure of this group in gaining intellectual legitimacy was their inability to recruit a prominent intellectual figure.<sup>275</sup> In other words, the *Ülkü* movement could not recruit a respectable ideologue that would elaborate the vision of the group in a sophisticated formulation. However, though not sophisticated, their ideas were able to gain ground especially among the state elite. Furthermore, the absence of overwhelming ideological attachment to a single idea among the leaders made them prone to search for instrumental and pragmatic ideas.

Actually, the Kemalist ideology alone represented a considerable variety of political viewpoints ranging from relatively liberal to the more authoritarian stance. It might be argued that Kemalism was generally fissured along several axes representing diverse interpretations and representations that aimed to fill its content. At this juncture, it can be argued that Kemal Atatürk was essential as the harmonizer of all conflicting impulses. The greatest success of Kemalism in gaining intellectual legitimacy was its allocation of ideational varieties around one key ingredient i.e. submitting to the absolute authority and charisma of Atatürk. Actually, the Kemalist idea of making a revolution and a new political culture for Turkey would have been much less convincing without the charisma of Mustafa Kemal.

---

<sup>275</sup> Niyazi Berkes narrates this issue in his diary. In his talks with Necip Ali, Necip Ali plainly stated that the main problem was the absence of a prominent ideologue. Then, he offers Berkes to be the ideologue of the group. However, Berkes kindly rejected this offer. See, Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar...*

While Atatürk himself appropriated those various intellectuals' understanding of the world, and even as he used some of them to legitimate his politics, he, at the same time, discredited many of them. Even more important than those differing intellectuals' assistance in legitimating Kemalism was their role in providing Kemalism a cultural-practical orientation. It may be that Mustafa Kemal was, above all, a masterful political pragmatist and that Kemalism was essentially a pragmatic response to the inter-war period crisis of the world rather than a movement deeply rooted in an ideological tradition. Atatürk needed ideas, and, since he had few original ones himself, he attempted to utilize and assimilate nearly every philosophy to which he was exposed in line with the specific historical conjunctures: Nationalism, étatism, solidarism, liberalism and even conservatism. However, the poverty of speculative and philosophical ideas among Turkish intellectuals<sup>276</sup> prevented Atatürk from appropriating a sophisticated ideology of state and society, which might have provided his regime a secure justification. He, usually, opted for pragmatic and eclectic proposals that would encompass a range of ideational components. After the Free Party experience, solidarist arguments the authors of *Ülkü* held corresponded to the general strategy of Atatürk. Furthermore, by solidarism, both Atatürk and the *Ülkü* authors were able to find a crucial source for a cultural regeneration that would transcend the relative supremacy of traditional and religious culture by infusing secular symbols, language, and myths into the society through educational institutions to “democratize” and “civilize” the country.

---

<sup>276</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 10

The outstanding tenets appeared in the writings of *Ülkü* can be outlined as such: (1) solidarism and populism, (2) secularism, anti-clericalism, and secular/revolutionary morality, (3) education (or inculcation- *terbiye*) and enlightenment of people and a peculiar conception of democracy. The following chapters will examine these tenets respectively. The next chapter will scrutinize solidarist and populist ideas of the *Ülkü* group in terms of analyzing the intellectual origins of solidarism both in France and Turkey and their reflections in the *Ülkü* journal.

## CHAPTER IV

### SOLIDARISM AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR *ÜLKÜ* GROUP

The *Ülkü* journal promoted solidarism or its Turkish version populism (halkçılık )<sup>277</sup> as a form of eclectic ideology which included Turkish nationalism, the idea of a classless, homogenous and amalgamated (kütelleşmiş) mass, the cultural regeneration of society, and a politics of secular morality. Solidarity (tesanüt), social solidarity (içtimai tesanüt) and populism (halkçılık) were constantly reiterated ideals which the authors of *Ülkü* used as founding blocks of the ideology of the Turkish Revolution. These terms implied a social and cultural regeneration project by way of mass education which was based on a new morality, described by the corresponding concepts of “secular morality” (laik ahlak)<sup>278</sup>, “scientific morality,” (ilmi ahlak) <sup>279</sup> and “revolutionary ethics” (inkılap ahlakıyatı) <sup>280</sup>. In this sense, the *Ülkü* group saw the inculcation of secular morality to the people as a basic precondition for democracy. Hence, the *Ülkü* elite preponderantly aimed at a cultural regeneration of

---

<sup>277</sup> For Paul Dumont, populism “was a Turkish version of the solidarist ideas outlined by the French radical politician Léon Bourgeois and the sociologist Emile Durkheim.” “The origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 31.

<sup>278</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Peasantism Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (September 1933), 118-125, 119.

<sup>279</sup> Ahmet Nesimi, “İnanç ve Us,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), 403-407, 405.

<sup>280</sup> Ali Sami, “Güzel Sanatları İnkılabına Nasıl Maledebiliriz,” (How Can We Ascribe Arts to the Service of Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July 1934), 361.

the Turkish nation through the secular quest for new and revolutionary values by way of using the central notion of solidarism.

The assertion above is supported by my findings that the term “solidarity” (tesanüt) or “social solidarity” (içtimai tesanüt) is one of the most reiterated terms in the journal texts, that the term solidarity is coined in the Turkish context as populism (halkçılık), which is also made frequent use of throughout articles as the underlying basis of the Turkish revolutionary ideology, and that solidarity and populism appear as pivotal concepts around which other facets of the Turkish Revolution are interwoven. Thus, the analysis of the terms solidarity and populism in Ülkü deserve considerable attention to understand the Ülkü version of Kemalism.

The problematic on solidarism intersects with the main theoretical debates on Turkish Revolution, such as analyzing the phenomenon through nationalism, populism, positivism etc. However, none of these ideologies alone has been adequate to explain the overall nature of the Turkish Revolution. In this sense, this study will attempt to show that solidarism, as an eclectic ideology comprising various components of several ideologies, would be a better tool in conceptualizing the basic political ideas of the Turkish radical revolutionary elite in the 1930s. Solidarism was generally underemphasized in the literature of Turkish politics while evaluating the basic tenets of the Revolution. It is true, however, that there have been only a limited number of studies on solidarism in Turkey. While the works of Zafer Toprak widened the scope of Turkish version of solidarism, he nevertheless mainly

emphasized the economic side of it.<sup>281</sup> Taha Parla's study on the corporatist and solidarist ideas of Ziya Gökalp provided a better outlook, which filled an important void.<sup>282</sup> Though mainly highlighting the economic interest groups' sphere, Bianchi's study of Gökalp and Atatürk in his book in terms of analyzing Turkish corporatism has also contributed to the existing body of knowledge on the characteristics of the Turkish corporatism and solidarism.<sup>283</sup> Finally, Mardin has underlined several times the role of solidarism in shaping the main features of the Turkish Revolution. In my view, all of these studies, though providing an important body of knowledge on Turkish solidarism, commonly lack the overall theoretical agenda of solidarism in general. Moreover, the ideas of these writers on the Turkish version of solidarism are either non-systematic or one sided. In order to overcome the problem of defining the underlying political philosophy of the Turkish Revolution, this study will attempt to provide a systematic outlook for the intellectual history of the early Republic. Studying the Turkish version of solidarism will also contribute to the general theoretical structure of solidarism.

The main objective of this chapter is to analyze and document the solidarist ideas of the Ülkü group and, in doing so, to show how "solidarism" became the prominent ideological basis of this strand of Kemalism. In order to analyze the

---

<sup>281</sup> See his "Aydın, Ulus-Devlet ve Populizm," in *Türk Aydını ve Kimlik Sorunu*, Sabahattin Şen, ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995) and "II. Meşrutiyet'te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık," *Toplum ve Bilim*, (Spring, 1977): 92-123

<sup>282</sup> Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985)

<sup>283</sup> Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984)



dynamics of the solidarist line of thinking among this elite group, I will examine the early origins of the concept, which was developed in France during the Third Republic. Solidarism was formulated as a political philosophy in France, which involved a rejection of liberal individualism and economy, Marxist collectivism, clericalism and anarchist syndicalism, though having something in common with all of them. Actually, it was mostly an eclectic formula, which invoked that association not competition was the predominant characteristics of all life. Solidarism, in France, developed into a logical, secular moral system of rights and duties underlying national cohesion and interdependence. Although French solidarism particularly aimed at reorganization of the socio-structural realm by paying attention to welfare and justice in society, Turkish solidarism was mostly inclined to homogenize the different parts and the groups of society and unite them under a single national community as well as under a national culture by constructing new symbolic values which were directly sponsored by the State. This study would take the People's Houses (Halkevleri) as the chief institutionalization of the solidarist ideology in Turkey. Though it was not profoundly developed, solidarism appeared to be the prominent ideology of the Ülkü group. It was basically utilized as an alternative way against both liberalism and communism. Solidarism has two important premises. The first one is to develop a moral consensus based on the secular notions of duty and debt with which social order was said to be possible. The second one is to establish a classless and undifferentiated social entity unified around "common" goals that was expected to prevent social conflicts and disorder in the way of progress and democracy.

#### 4.1. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF SOLIDARISM

Towards the last decade of the nineteenth century, one word became a fundamental motto for the French Republican elite that melted the entire Republican legacy in a magical conceptual pot. This was *solidarité*. This was the concept with which the leaders of the Third Republic of the time were able to revive the Jacobin ideal to afford a classless, egalitarian, harmonious nation. Actually, John A. Scott categorizes “*solidarité* as the expression of neo-Jacobin predominance in French political and intellectual life.”<sup>284</sup> Moreover, by “the utilization of solidarist theory as the basis of a new moral system for the Third Republic,”<sup>285</sup> the French Republican elite initiated a new secular education reform aiming at inculcation of the “scientific” approach opposite of the “theological” and “metaphysical” approaches, which is capable of refurbishing the moral codes of society in line with rational, scientific and secular senses in order to put aside the potential dangers of democracy.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in France, solidarity was a much used and manipulated term in the vocabulary of political leaders of all tendencies, from moderate to socialist. Almost everyone began to talk about *solidarité*. Georges Clemenceau, a radical republican leader of the Third Republic, for instance, “hoped that political leaders would be able to strengthen the bonds of solidarity among men and thus overcome conflicting class interests by instilling a greater sense of altruism among people and by restricting the freedom of the strong to overpower the

---

<sup>284</sup> John A. Scott, *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France*, p. 158

weak.”<sup>286</sup> The term *solidarité* was even regarded by Millerand, minister of commerce in 1900, as a new scientific revelation that embraces “the secret for the material and moral grandeur of societies.”<sup>287</sup> Ferdinand Dreyfus, a candidate for election to the Senate in 1890, asserted the significance of republic with which “democracy and human solidarity” could best be achieved.<sup>288</sup> Even the monarchist comte d’Haussonville argued, “Today, anyone wishes to receive a sympathetic hearing or even to obtain professional advancement must speak of solidarity.”<sup>289</sup>

Léon Bourgeois attempted to combine these diverse facets of solidarity into a broad but unified doctrine with specific objectives which would get support from all classes and all political groups favorable to social progress. In order to attain this objective, he offered a synthesis of the two ideologies, idealism and materialism, which his generation inherited and formed the two poles of division on social problems of his age. Undoubtedly, he was not the first figure in this attempt.

---

<sup>285</sup> William R. Keylor, *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 166-168

<sup>286</sup> Lawrence A. Minnich, *Social Problems and Political Alignments in France, 1893-1898; Leon Bourgeois and Solidarity*, (unpublished PhD Dissertation), The Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University, (September, 1948), p. 103

<sup>287</sup> Cited in Theodore Zeldin, *op.cit*, p. 290

<sup>288</sup> Lawrence A. Minnich, *Social Problems and Political Alignments in France, 1893-1898; Leon Bourgeois and Solidarity*, pp. 102-103

<sup>289</sup> Cited in Zeldin, *op.cit*, p. 290

Drawing upon an eclectic reconciliation of Rousseauian philosophy with that of Auguste Comte, Alfred Fouillée<sup>290</sup> was the founder of the solidarist philosophy.<sup>291</sup>

#### 4.1.1. Alfred Fouillée: The Founding Father of Solidarism

It was Alfred Fouillée who was able to reconcile idealism and materialism: “The problem which we have now to solve is... to find an effective and *observable* bond of union between idealism and naturalism, such that the ideal may descend into nature itself, transform it to its own image, and lift it up to itself.”<sup>292</sup> Having had the logical and profound eclecticism, Fouillée attempted “to reconcile in sociology naturalism with idealism, the theory which makes society an organism, with that of

---

<sup>290</sup> Fouillée was very well known among the Turkish intellectuals of both late Ottoman and early Republican period. The first figure who talked about Alfred Fouillée and his philosophy of *idée force* was Ahmet Şuayıp (1876-1910), an Ottoman philosopher during Young Turk era. Baha Tevfik (1881-1914) and Ahmet Nebil translated Fouillée’s book on the history of philosophy. See Mehmet Emin Erişirgil, *Bir Fikir Adamının Romanı: Ziya Gökalp*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1984), p. 75. Ziya Gökalp was mostly inspired by Fouillée’s philosophy. For this account see, Niyazi Berkes “Sociology in Turkey” in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 (September 1936, 238-246. In the *Ülkü* journal, the impact of Fouillée can be seen in several articles. For instance, Kazım Nami recommends one of Fouillée’s books, *L’enseignement secondaire au point de vu national*, to his readers to have detailed knowledge on humanism. See, “Humanisma”, *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), p. 336 See also Ahmet Nesimi, *Mesuliyetin Hakiki Telakkileri*, *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 19, (Sept., 1934): 3-8. Nesimi makes a solidarist definition of responsibility by using the arguments of Fouillée on *idée force* (*fikir kuvveti*).

<sup>291</sup> For the impact of Fouillée on the formation of solidarist philosophy see, Augustin Guyau, *La Philosophie et la Sociologie D’Alfred Fouillée*, (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1913), pp. 139-142 and p. 232.

<sup>292</sup> Alfred Fouillée, “Some Important Points of View in Contemporary French Legal Philosophy,” in *Modern French Legal Philosophy* (Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. VII, Boston, 1916): 149-237, p. p. 178

the social contract.”<sup>293</sup> He drew from these diverse philosophies a thoroughly coherent system that mainly contributed to the later formation of the solidarist ideology. It can be argued “he was the first man to bring together and discuss exhaustively the principle elements out of which later developed the mature doctrine of “Solidarité.”<sup>294</sup>

By the mid-1880s, Fouillée had developed the basic tenets of the solidarist social philosophy for the later generation among which the politician and writer Léon Bourgeois determined solidarism as the official ideology of the French Republic in 1895. Through the theory of *idées-forces* Fouillée had reconciled the scientific ambitions of his era with the idealism of republicanism. He formulated the “correct conception of social solidarity as a motivating idea-force” which was utilized by Fouillée “as the basis of his social contactualism and social organicism.” His ideas provided a scientific ground for French republicanism that made French republicanism conform more closely to the scientific demands of late nineteenth century scienticism developed by Auguste Comte. It should be argued that French republicanism took the shape of solidarism towards the end of the nineteenth century, and this link between republicanism and solidarism can also be detected in the Turkish Republic, particularly in the mid-1930s.

---

<sup>293</sup> Fr. Paulhan, “Contemporary Philosophy in France”, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 9, Is. 1 (Jan., 1900), 42-69, p. 46

<sup>294</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, “Solidarity and the Reformist Sociology of Alfred Fouillée, I” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 22 (1963): 205-222, p. 206

For Fouillée, “in general and on the whole, science tends to transform natural and intellectual solidarity into voluntary solidarism.”<sup>295</sup> Most importantly, “Fouillée had demonstrated that a scientific assessment of humans and their society led logically to democratic politics.”<sup>296</sup> In his formula, solidarity among society based on a democratic ethics would become the guiding principle for the needed social reforms of the French Republic.<sup>297</sup> This solidarist assumption of democratic ethics involved “the *hypothetical ideal* of the mutual limitation of wills which took the form of justice, restrictive of egoism... persuasive of altruism.”<sup>298</sup> His redefinition of republicanism amounts to find a middle course between the competing extremes of idealism and scientism, and of liberalism and socialism. Moreover, “he endeavored to synthesize the ideas of the naturalistic and moralistic pioneer solidarists, the social organicists and the social contractualists, the statist and the associationists, the socialists and the individualists.”<sup>299</sup> In that sense, he mainly paved the way for the late nineteenth-century solidarism as an eclectic political philosophy. Moreover, he developed the concepts, “social debt” and “social quasi-contract” as the basis of his philosophy of solidarity and his solidarist theory of “reparative justice”<sup>300</sup>, to which

---

<sup>295</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 208

<sup>296</sup> Kristin A. Sheradin, *Reforming the Republic: Solidarism and the Making of the French Welfare System, 1871-1914*, (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester, 2000), Unpublished PhD Dissertation, p.Ibid, p. 68

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, p. 69

<sup>298</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, “Solidarity and the Reformist Sociology of Alfred Fouillée, I” p. 213

<sup>299</sup> Ibid, p. 206

<sup>300</sup> Ibid, pp. 219-220

the later representatives of solidarism were indebted much. For the solidarist epistemology of Alfred Fouillée, the state has a considerable role in regulating and arbitrating solidarity among the masses:

The more civilization develops, the more are contrasts accentuated and frictions increased, the more complicated the relations between persons and things become, the more contractual and organic reciprocities appear, the more essential it is for the State, in enforcing the supremacy of the law, to intervene as a third party in social relations as arbiter, justiciar and *redresser*.<sup>301</sup>

It can be argued that “the reformist social engineering”<sup>302</sup> project of Fouillée assigned the state a role of creating a just social order based on solidarity independent of different class interests. Actually, his project used a kind of democratic vision as a pretext to validate his solidarist epistemology. For him, a democratic vision excepting solidarist ethical prescriptions would degenerate into a clash of egoisms each seeking their own immediate interests. In order to overcome the crisis of democracy in France, he argued that the people should be equipped with “the necessary instruction to exercise their rights and propose a higher ideal for themselves.”<sup>303</sup> He maintained that only an enlightened minority which he called “a moral elite” could “raise the ethics of the masses” for the realization of a perfect democracy and for the regeneration of the society: “True progress in a democracy

---

<sup>301</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 218

<sup>302</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, “Solidarity and the Reformist Sociology of Alfred Fouillée, I” p. 221

<sup>303</sup> Cited in Kristin A. Sheradin, *Reforming the Republic*, Ibid, p. 70. The original text is from Alfred Fouillée, *Idée du droit*, p. 377

consists in the universal ascent of a nation behind its intellectual and moral elite.”<sup>304</sup> Thus, according to his “democratic elitism”, “the onward march of the best” or a “democratic aristocracy” would promote the solidarity and progress of society in the way of democracy. Therefore, he was pessimistic about the masses that he saw them unable to “rise above their personal interests and prejudices to recognize the greater needs of both France and humanity in general.”<sup>305</sup> For that reason, Fouillée spent most of his energy to ensure the existence of a moral elite to guide the French Republic, rather than to raise the masses to their new responsibilities. In his book on democracy, he argued that only a minority “could see the more general, universal concerns of the nation” and could raise the morality of the people: It is not from below, but from above that the movement of regeneration and the first effort against the evils from which *la patrie* suffers could come. The most important task thus fell on the most enlightened minorities.<sup>306</sup> As it is seen, he attempted to overcome the dilemmas of democracy by circumventing the democratic logic itself. He deemed that the universal education essential for the fundamentals of his elitist understanding of democracy: “It was a duty of reparative justice on the part of the State to provide this education freely, so as to make equally available to all the social heritage.”<sup>307</sup>

---

<sup>304</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 76. The original text is from Alfred Fouillée, *Démocratie politique*, p. 76

<sup>305</sup> Ibid, p. 81

<sup>306</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 82

<sup>307</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, “Solidarity and the Reformist Sociology of Alfred Fouillée, I” p. 221



One other significant characteristics of Fouillée's solidarist epistemology was its stark criticism of liberalism and liberal economy. He thought that orthodox liberalism was inadequate to develop a sound solution to the existing social problems of France. Considering the fact that liberalism was incompetent to handle moral and social issues, which he saw the preconditions of a just application of economic principles, Fouillée maintained that liberalism gave way to "the disastrous effects of the rampant egoism of 'homo-economicus.'"<sup>308</sup> As a solution, he offered a twofold model based on "the solidarist associationism" and "State intervention." According to him, "individualism and collectivism were equally inadequate doctrines, half-truths that required synthesis."<sup>309</sup>

#### **4.1.2. Léon Bourgeois: The Political Triumph of Solidarism**

The philosophical attempts of Fouillée to formulate solidarism were not part of a state policy or official ideology until the end of the nineteenth century when the socio-political conjuncture of the time enabled the state elite to adopt solidarism as an official doctrine of France. The state elite needed "an organizing concept" not only to provide an objective basis for social ties<sup>310</sup>, but also to manipulate the social and economic problems of the state, which would bring a permanent restructuring of French politics that might ensure the Republicans' continued control regardless of electoral results and further prevent the potential dangers of democracy. The political

---

<sup>308</sup> Ibid

<sup>309</sup> Ibid

triumph of the concept came in 1895 when the leader of the Radical Party, Léon Bourgeois, became Prime Minister of the Third Republic. With Bourgeois, solidarism became the official doctrine of the Third Republic. In his well-known book, *La Solidarité*, Bourgeois formulated Solidarism as a political philosophy that was hoped to “defuse class struggle and all potential revolutionary threats to the existing social order.”<sup>311</sup> For this formula, the quest for national solidarity would serve as the answer to class conflict. Furthermore, Bourgeois maintained an ideology, which involved a rejection of liberal individualism and liberal economy, Marxist collectivism, religious clericalism and anarchist syndicalism, “though having something in common with all of them”<sup>312</sup>. Actually, it was mostly an eclectic formula which invoked that “association not competition was the predominant characteristics of all life.”<sup>313</sup> Turkish Revolutionary ideology in the 1930s also manifested this eclectic formulation.

Moreover, solidarism as an official ideology of the French Third Republic became an important means to establish secular, rational and objective foundations of ethics as a substitute for religion that was seen as ‘outdated’, to lay the basic preconditions of democracy. The question, “How shall we give to our democracies

---

<sup>310</sup> Paul Rabinow, *French Modern*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 185-186

<sup>311</sup> Karen Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle France”, in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3. (Jun., 1984), pp. 648-676, p. 664

<sup>312</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, “The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Léon Bourgeois and Solidarism” *International Review of Social History*, Vol. VI (1961): 19-48, p. 20

the moral doctrine which is necessary to their existence?”<sup>314</sup>, was at the center of the solidarist preoccupation of seeking alternative foundations of morality independent of religious sense. The Turkish Revolution in the 1930s also promoted this perception of democracy underpinned by solidarist foundation of ethics. There had been several attempts to find a place for the idea of solidarity in the realm of ethics. Among these attempts, the works of Henry Marion, Charles Gide, Léon Bourgeois and Emile Durkheim were of utmost importance. For instance, Gide mainly highlighted the moral aspects of the idea of solidarity in the economic domain.<sup>315</sup> He asserted the feeling of mutual dependence and relief for the progress of society. The motto, “each for all and all for each” became a governing principle for the solidarist ethics. The key words of the epoch were progress and solidarity. Progress signified “the dynamic need to go beyond the limits of an outdated social structure”, whereas solidarity stressed the will to reorganize the idea of progress “on a sound and just basis.”<sup>316</sup>

It is worth noting that despite their bitterly anticlerical stance, many of the radical republicans of solidarist persuasion were particularly “interested in propagating a new morality, a morality that insisted on the functions and obligations

---

<sup>313</sup> Ibid, p. 26

<sup>314</sup> Joseph Charmont, “Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy”, in *Modern French Legal Philosophy* (Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. VII, Boston, 1916): 65-149, p. 78

<sup>315</sup> Sanford Elwitt, *The Third Republic Defended, Bourgeois Reform in France, 1880-1914*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 228

<sup>316</sup> J. E. S. Hayward, “Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in Nineteenth Century France,” p. 275

of men and women in the name of the nation and on the family, not the individual, as the basic social and political unit of the nation.”<sup>317</sup> Having argued that “*morale* must be scientific”, Bourgeois defined the solidarist ethics as the “union for life”, instead of the “struggle for life.”<sup>318</sup> Actually, with Léon Bourgeois, the idea of solidarity was given a new impulse. Under his leadership, “solidarity seemed destined to become the moral viaticum of a great party, which was to draw from that idea a new store of idealism, and the inspiration for a whole new program of practical activities.”<sup>319</sup> He attempted to render solidarity a doctrine independent of any dogma and any attachment to religion and favorable to a totally *laïque* connotation. Furthermore, the doctrine of solidarism was said to be anchored in deliberately a *laïque* and scientific character.<sup>320</sup> In this sense, as a solidarist intellectual argued,

The most important work of the actual régime, the organization of a *laïc* system of education in the elementary schools, remained compromised unless this instruction should prove capable of providing a solid moral education. *Laïcism* had need of a doctrine; it was conceivable that Solidarism might furnish it. The idea of solidarity, borrowed from science, would perhaps enable men to realize the long-deferred hope of finding a scientific basis for ethics, or erecting a passageway, “an arch,” between conscience and science...<sup>321</sup>

---

<sup>317</sup> Karen Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle France”, p. 665

<sup>318</sup> Linda L. Clark, “Social Darwinism in France”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 58, Iss. 1, (Mar., 1981), pp. D1025-D1044 (On Demand Supplement), p. D1035

<sup>319</sup> Joseph Charmont, “Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy”, p. 85

<sup>320</sup> Maurice Hamburger, *Léon Bourgeois*, (Paris : Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1932), pp. 51-53

<sup>321</sup> Joseph Charmont, “Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy”, pp. 85-86

So, solidarism, as a so-called scientific ideology, was considered as the new organizing concept around which the ethical principles were testified. In this way, Croiset argued, “our modern generations, eager for positive, objective knowledge were in need of a word which should express the scientific character of the moral law.” Thereby, it is contended, “the word ‘solidarity,’ borrowed from biology, admirably fulfilled this obscure but profound necessity.”<sup>322</sup> It is worth mentioning that solidarists sought to establish a link between science and ethics. For Bourgeois, in those nations capable of reaching a superior degree of evolution we witness a combination of two different modes of thinking. These are a scientific method (*la method scientifique*) and a moral idea (*idée morale*),<sup>323</sup> which should also constitute the basis of social solidarity. Science has the role of determining the laws of human action, and morality or the moral sentiments play the role of activating the will of individuals to realize these laws. Having argued this, Bourgeois attempted to settle morality with experimental science.<sup>324</sup> Such an undertaking went hand in hand with the search for an alternative morality independent of any religious domain.

Actually, this kind of understanding can be traced back to the search of Alfred Fouillée for “the rational basis of morality,”<sup>325</sup> which had, now, become dominant for

---

<sup>322</sup> Cited in Joseph Charmont, “Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy”, p. 86. For more account see A. Croiset, *Essai d'une Philosophie de la Solidarité*, preface, p. x

<sup>323</sup> Léon Bourgeois, *Solidarité*, (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1902), Third Edition, p. 16

<sup>324</sup> Ibid, p. 36

<sup>325</sup> Alfred Fouillée, “Hegemony of Science and Philosophy,” *International Journal of Ethics*, 6:2 (Jan., 1896): 137-164, p. 150

the ruling and intellectual elite of the Third French Republic. Beside Fouillée, Ernest Renan had an enormous influence on the scientism of Bourgeois.<sup>326</sup> According to Renan, society should organize and order itself by way of scientific operation of human mind in order to improve itself in need of progress. Having argued that science alone would form the creeds, he rendered science a religious position. The question “is there, can there be a system of ethics that is purely scientific, capable of satisfying both will and intellect?”<sup>327</sup> or how “science will have the moral hegemony of humanity?”<sup>328</sup> is illuminating for this quest of the French Republican elite for a secular ethics that would substitute for the religious ones. Emilé Boutroux, a famous solidarist university professor of the time, obviously, preferred a marriage of science with ethics under the idea of solidarity: “In order to put ethics on a truly scientific basis, there must be an existing fact which is capable at the same time of being observed objectively and of furnishing a norm of human conduct. Now, solidarity seems precisely to unite these two conditions.”<sup>329</sup> The aim of differentiation of the notion of *solidarité* from the traditional Catholic and other Christian doctrines was to become central for the solidarist philosophy. In this sense, the attempt of the solidarist philosophy to dominate the ethical field began to shape the content of the French laicism and republicanism at the *fin de siècle*. As indicated by one of the prominent representatives of solidarism, “one must recognize that the solidarists do

---

<sup>326</sup> Phyllis Stock-Morton, *Moral Education for a Secular Society*... p. 115

<sup>327</sup> Emile Boutroux, *Education and Ethics*, (tr. by Fred Rothwell) (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1913), p. 53

<sup>328</sup> Alfred Fouillée, “Hegemony of Science and Philosophy,” p. 153

<sup>329</sup> Cited in Joseph Charmont, “Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy”, p. 87

all in their power to break the links between their doctrine and religious traditions.”<sup>330</sup> In this sense, “their work is evidently part of the task undertaken by democracy to laicise ethics themselves.”<sup>331</sup>

Beside the “scientific” and secular conception of ethics, solidarism has another important notion, which will be traced also in the context of the Turkish Revolution. This was the conception of a “social debt” which each man owes to society. Having inspired by Comte<sup>332</sup> and Fouilleé, Bourgeois declared that every man is born as a debtor to society: “Man is born a debtor of human association” (*L’homme nait débiteur de l’association humaine*)<sup>333</sup> based on a tacit contract (quasi-contract). The point of special interest is the effort to give this debt a quasi-legal status. To pay the debt of a man to the past ancestors or to his fellows should be regarded as a matter of justice rather than charity. Moreover, the conditions crucial to the existence and perpetuation of society were to be determined on the basis of recognition of the indebtedness of each individual to his ancestors as well as his fellowmen. Because, “payment of the debt was the charge for the benefits they had received, and it was the

---

<sup>330</sup> Célestin Bouglé, cited in John A. Scott, *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 178

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

<sup>332</sup> In his famous book, *La Solidarité*, Bourgeois gives a reference to Comte to support his idea about the social debt: “Auguste Comte a depuis longtemps mis ce fait en pleine lumière: «Nous naissons chargés d’obligations de toute sorte envers la société.»” p. 117

<sup>333</sup> Léon Bourgeois, *Solidarité*, p. 116

price of their liberty of development.”<sup>334</sup> In this sense, this notion was to be extended to legal regulations of right and duty. The law regards all individuals as accepting a quasi-contract to pay their social debts with the principle of “mutualizing risk and advantage.” In order to satisfy the moral needs of the people this principle was deemed necessary.

This conception of “social debt” was furnished by the idea of a “quasi-contract d’association” which means acceptance by citizens of a state of social obligations and duties towards the society as well as to the state which extracts the payment of the social debt. What Léon Bourgeois targeted, through this understanding, was to transform the *de facto* (or natural) solidarity in society into the *de jure* (or contractual) solidarity by the regulations of the state.<sup>335</sup> It is argued that the duties and obligations derived from this contractual law could limit and even restrict the individual rights and freedom. However, for Ferdinand Buisson, the minister of education of the time, obedience of the people to this contractual law did not mean the lessening of freedom, but it was the identification of debt the man could not neglect.<sup>336</sup> Léon Bourgeois thought that the idea of solidarity was developed to reinforce the unfinished project of the French Revolutionary ideology. The famous three-partied motto of the Revolution: equality, freedom and fraternity was strengthened by the fourth one: *solidarité*. Even, he maintained that beside “the

---

<sup>334</sup> Lawrence A. Minnich, *Social Problems and Political Alignments in France, 1893-1898; Leon Bourgeois and Solidarity*, pp. 106-107

<sup>335</sup> Jaques Droz, *Histoire des Doctrines Politiques en France*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), p. 110

<sup>336</sup> Nicolet, p. 373



declaration of rights” of the Revolution, now “the declaration of duties” should also be added.<sup>337</sup> Actually, his “scientific” moral theory of social duty and debt “substituted for the Christian morality of charity, and for the even more abstract republican morality of fraternity; it was a quasi-contractual obligation, source and measure of the rigorous duty of social solidarity based on the social debt humans owe one another.”<sup>338</sup>

Solidarists had an authoritarian vision of state-society relations. This can easily be seen in their approaches to democracy. Bourgeois argued that democracy was not just a form of government but also a form of organization and ordering of the entire society. Moreover, solidarism would provide the social and moral conditions essential to a true democracy. In order to guarantee these conditions, state intervention was considered essential. In this sense, a republican education that would “teach men the moral commitments necessary to their fraternal vision of democracy” was seen as the basis of “promoting an active citizenry and teaching men the mutual respect and habits of cooperation critical to a healthy Republic.”<sup>339</sup> So, solidarist conception of social reform was said to assure the moral underpinnings of democracy.<sup>340</sup>

---

<sup>337</sup> Léon Bourgeois and Alfred Croiset (eds.), *Essai D'une Philosophie de La Solidarité, Conférences et Discussions*, (Paris: Félix Alcan, Éditeur, 1907), p. 210

<sup>338</sup> Phyllis Stock-Morton, *Moral Education for a Secular Society; The Development of Morale Laïque in Nineteenth Century France*, (New York: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 116

<sup>339</sup> Kristin A. Sheradin, *Reforming the Republic*, p. 324

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

In a speech on the relationship between science and sentiment, Bourgeois maintained that successful reform depended, not only on a public that understood the scientific rationale of reform, but on a public that felt a strong moral commitment to reform.<sup>341</sup> He preferred a model based on the good will of the people as much as the authority of science. The engagement of the hearts together with the minds of the people was deemed necessary for a reform to be successful: “It will be necessary to find the way to awaken the popular sentiment, it will be necessary to find the means best-suited to France for getting past their minds and into their hearts.”<sup>342</sup> Accordingly, the moral support of the people was required to alleviate the tension between egoistic and humanistic logic of the theory of solidarism in order to overshadow the potential dangers of democracy. For the solidarist theory, a hybrid model of social reform was considered essential. It favored state intervention in society to prepare a social system based on the private initiative. The representatives of this theory defended intervention “in the name of democracy.” As a solidarist thinker asserted:

To remain prudent and fruitful, the state must remain subsidiary and be organized so that instead of substituting itself for private initiative, it favors and develops [such initiative] until the day when the latter will suffice itself. It is only on that condition that the new [social] legislation will be educational and fruitful, and thus truly democratic.<sup>343</sup>

---

<sup>341</sup> Ibid, p. 328

<sup>342</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 339

<sup>343</sup> Cited in Ibid

By their theory of solidarism, the solidarist thinkers aimed to conceptualize democracy in more mutualist terms:

In organizing democracy, in developing its admirable schools of civicism which are our mutualist sections, we will give [democracy] a national and social soul, a social soul because we will furnish it with the means to liberate the individual, to snatch him away from the various powers of oppression and money that grip him, a national soul, because, having liberated individual, we will increase his power tenfold, we will make him a free citizen, conscious and strong, and of all these free and strong citizens, we will make a more powerful France and a more beautiful Republic.<sup>344</sup>

As it is seen, the moral training of people in line with solidarist teachings was regarded as vital to make people eligible for the anticipated democratic ideal. For Bourgeois, the education of people was important because the state could not legislate justice without the consent of society. Education would provide the necessary equipment of society with which they would voluntarily consent to the social order prescribed by the idea of solidarity. For him, “what was needed therefore a new development in human consciousness, a recognition of solidarity,”<sup>345</sup> that would assure the consent of the individuals to the laws of natural solidarity. Hence, social education was considered to prepare people to the solidarist vision of democracy totally based on scientific ethics. This effort was being conducted “in the context of a newly-established discipline,” which was formulated first by Comte and later Durkheim. Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim were the prominent figures that had considerable impact on the Turkish revolutionary elite of the 1930s. Although the Ülkü elite appropriated mostly the authoritarian solidarist assumptions

---

<sup>344</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 342

of Comte, they tended to utilize Durkheim's relatively pluralist conception of solidarity for their authoritarian aims.

#### **4.1.3. Auguste Comte and Authoritarian Solidarism**

Positivism, developed by Auguste Comte and later Emile Littré<sup>346</sup> and Pierre Laffitte, became a philosophical base of the solidarist policies of French Radicals in the Third Republic. Actually, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the reign of positivism dominated both in political and intellectual life of France. The quest for infallibility was the major concern for the men of age. It was not in the infallibility attributed to science by positivists, but also in the papal infallibility advocated by the conservatives like Bonald, Maistre, and Lamennais, or in the infallibility attributed to metaphysical or materialist philosophies by Hegelians or Marxists. In fact, from Catholics to atheists, from positivist to conservative, there were numerous thinkers who had the same affection for the grand projects, and all-inclusive, high-flown abstractions – History, the Absolute, Science, the Ideal, the 'Great All'. Consequently, "any mood of scientific caution yielded to prophetic fervour, and any destructive intent stemmed not from our present-day attitudes of skeptical interrogation but from a deeply sincere desire to build anew upon cleared foundations, to erect new philosophies –new religions, indeed– to replace the old,

---

<sup>345</sup> Phyllis Stock-Morton, *Moral Education for a Secular Society...* p. 117

<sup>346</sup> For the further account on Emile Littré see, Stanislas Aquarone, *The Life and Works of Emile Littré 1801-1881*, (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1958).

‘pre-scientific’ creeds of the past.”<sup>347</sup> In this sense, positivism or scientism was the one of the responses to the rising industrialization, social upheaval and intellectual confusion that was so obvious after the French Revolution. The disruptions of economic, political, social, and industrial change made intellectuals more responsive toward the society. The Positivists, primarily, wanted to reconstruct the social system philosophically and religiously. They thought, “social unity can be founded only upon philosophic and religious unity”<sup>348</sup>. The search for unity traced back to the Revolutionary idea began to besiege all the philosophical and intellectual concerns of the whole nineteenth century. The emergence of positivism and solidarism was “conditioned by the weakening of religious traditions and the rupture of political equilibrium.”<sup>349</sup> It is, in this sense, meaningful that Auguste Comte made use of the new science for the re-establishment of order and the realization of an ideal society. The thinking of Comte together with Ernest Renan and Hippolyte Taine was described as a transition from true Positivism to “Scientism.” Comte sought to create a scientific social and political system; Renan endeavored to set up a scientific religion; Taine aimed to provide a scientific critique and method for metaphysics. They all pretended to abolish metaphysics, but in several of their efforts they brought back in a peculiar metaphysic of their own. In this sense, they had departed from

---

<sup>347</sup> D. G. Charlton, “New Creeds for Old in Nineteenth-Century France”, *Canadian Journal of Theology*, Vol. VIII (1962), No. 4, 258-269, p. 259

<sup>348</sup> D. G. Charlton, *Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870*, p. 1

<sup>349</sup> Robert Marjolin, “French Sociology - Comte and Durkheim”, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, Is. 5, (March, 1937), 693-704, p. 693

literal Positivism.<sup>350</sup> The Turkish re-constructivist revolutionaries also testify to the vital importance of this sort of positivist consideration, aiming to construct a revolutionary metaphysics.

So, the primary effort particularly of Auguste Comte was to be thought as a moral concern. He basically attempted to discover some guiding principles to find a way out from the apparent chaos of the French society in particular, and the whole humanity in general. Science, natural science especially in Western Europe was built on a belief that the study of Nature was the one and only source of knowledge. In Comtean epistemology, positivism connoted an anti-theological outlook attached itself to anticlericalism<sup>351</sup> and laicism. Natural science based on facts, observation, experimentation and induction are realistic, positive, empirical and experimental. These are the methods that should be employed in the pursuit of truth. In this sense, religion, whose foundation was tradition and authority, became incompatible with these positive methods. Above all, “Comte invented a ‘scientific religion’ that was to provide a non-theological form of worship and ritual and to give a higher sanction to the findings of social scientists and to their applications.”<sup>352</sup> In line with Comte’s

---

<sup>350</sup> See, D. G. Charlton, *Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870*

<sup>351</sup> Roy Wood Sellars, “Positivism in Contemporary Philosophic Thought”, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 4, Is. I (Feb., 1939), 26-42, p. 27

<sup>352</sup> W. M. Simon, “The ‘Two Cultures’ in Nineteenth-Century France: Victor Cousin and Auguste Comte”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 26, Is. 1, (Jan.-Mar., 1965), 45-58, p. 46

solidarist and positivist thought, Ernest Renan, for instance, considered science as a religion that we can attribute to it alone the ability to formulate creeds.<sup>353</sup>

While formulating the principles of sociology, Comte set down the prescriptions for an ideal society in a somewhat prophetic style. He combined scientific knowledge with ideological components. This combination had also been apparent in the Turkish version of solidarism. Although various philosophers have subsequently claimed that “the whole apparatus of his positive doctrine is ideological... and science never achieves very much autonomy in his doctrinaire and totalitarian system”<sup>354</sup> and that he gave the name ‘sociology’ to what is known as ‘ideology’ in order to conceal the biased connotation of the latter<sup>355</sup>, Comte was certainly one of the foremost figures in the Solidarist tradition. Comte saw the division of labor as the constitutive element in the formation of social solidarity and as the basis of society’s development. Yet, as the division of labor is expanded, for him, it would extinguish the sense of community<sup>356</sup> by dispersing and fragmenting the society.<sup>357</sup> Comte overcome this paradox by means of propounding the role of the State as a unifying force which should intervene to prevent the ensuing anarchy

---

<sup>353</sup> De Hovre-Jordan, *Philosophy and Education* (A Translation of *Essai de Philosophie Pedagogique*), Vol. 1, (New York, 1931), p. 6.

<sup>354</sup> Irving M. Zeitline, *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory*, (New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987), p. 68

<sup>355</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, *Yasa Koyucular ile Yorumcular*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996), p. 122

<sup>356</sup> Steven Lukes, *Émile Durkheim: His Life and His Work*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 141

<sup>357</sup> Irving M. Zeitline, op.cit., p. 68

and fragmentation in order “to sustain continuously the idea of the whole and the sentiment of common solidarity”<sup>358</sup>

In Comtean epistemology, we can see an opposite tenet to the eighteenth century philosophy’s insistence on rights. Having almost ignored rights, Comte recognized only man’s duties towards humanity. This emphasis on duty rather than rights had become an inspiration source for the later representators of *solidarité*. He attributed almost no value to personal ‘rights’, “for what men need to be instructed in is their duties”<sup>359</sup>. This negligence of rights was compatible with his ideas that assumed the subordination of the individual to humanity. That is, individuals “have ethical significance only in so far as they embody the spirit of humanity as a whole.”<sup>360</sup> In this way, “the rights and duties of mankind, which had previously been... distinguished, were in positivism merged into the notion of one’s duty as a member of humanity.”<sup>361</sup> This sort of formulation of rights and duties, in general, contributed much to the development of solidarist ideology in France and later to the Turkish version of solidarism. As Jack Hayward puts, Comte formulated an “authoritarian solidarism”<sup>362</sup> in which there is not much place for individual autonomy and liberty and there is greater place for the intervention of and

---

<sup>358</sup> Cited in Steven Lukes, *Émile Durkheim*, p. 142

<sup>359</sup> Bernard M. G. Reardon, *Religion in the Age of Romanticism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 209

<sup>360</sup> Mabel V. Wilson, “Auguste Comte’s Conception of Humanity”, p. 99

<sup>361</sup> Ibid.



subordination to the State for the sake of social harmony and concord. Comte, in general, propounded the role of the State as a unifying force which should intervene to prevent the ensuing anarchy and fragmentation in order “to sustain continuously the idea of the whole and the sentiment of common solidarity”<sup>363</sup>. This Comtean understanding of solidarism constituted a great ideational legacy not only for the French Third Republic, but also for the Turkish radical revolutionary elite of the 1930s.

The intellectual efforts of Comte enabled the concept of solidarism to achieve a scientific status and turn into a fundamental component of any “extensive programme of social reorganization calculated to replace post-Revolutionary political, economic, intellectual and moral anarchy by a harmonious, integrated society.”<sup>364</sup> Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, French sociologists and philosophers, following the path opened by Comte studied the relationships of elements in biological units, the relationships existing among animals, and those of men living together in organized societies. Their findings all emphasized the interdependence of the parts of a whole and increased the vogue of the idea of solidarity.

---

<sup>362</sup> Jack E. S. Hayward, “Solidarist Syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit”, in Peter Hamilton (ed.) *Emile Durkheim; Critical Assessments*, Vol.2, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 132

<sup>363</sup> Cited in Steven Lukes, *Émile Durkheim, His Life and Work*, (New York: Harper&Row, 1972), p. 142

<sup>364</sup> Jack E. S. Hayward, “Solidarist Syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit”, p. 128

#### 4.1.3. Emile Durkheim and Pluralist Solidarism

As opposed to Comte's holistic and authoritarian conceptions of solidarity, Durkheim maintained a highly dynamic, immanent functional solidarity which mainly focused on the countervailing secondary groups in society standing between the individual and the State. The State's "essential function" was to "liberate individual personalities" <sup>365</sup> by preventing the suppressive influence of the community over individuals.

At the turn of the century, it was Emile Durkheim who spent most of his energy to prove scientifically the solidarist visionary of morality, democracy and education. Accordingly, he was one of the most prominent figures in the solidarist tradition that had a direct influence on the Turkish intellectuals as well, as was the case with Ziya Gökalp who built his ideas of solidarism on Durkheim's solidarist theories. Although Durkheim shared most of the ideas in common with Bourgeois and other solidarist figures, he had some distinct thoughts that would shed light on understanding not only of French solidarism but also of the Turkish version of solidarism. With Durkheim, *solidarité* gained, indeed, a scientific character.

Actually, the second half of the nineteenth century France marked an era when the intellectuals and the philosophers sought to find a solution to the rising *anomie morale*<sup>366</sup>, "a moral and cultural crisis"<sup>367</sup>. However, this so-called moral crisis were

---

<sup>365</sup> Steven Lukes, *Émile Durkheim*, p. 271

<sup>366</sup> Geoffrey C. Fidler, "On Jean-Marie Guyau, Immoraliste", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 55, Is. 1 (Jan., 1994), 75-97, p. 75

in considerable measure be unsettled by the solidarist political leaders. Durkheim was the first prominent figure that could develop strong theoretical alternatives bespeaking an unadulterated influence over his generation. Durkheim also shared the reformist social engineering ideal of Fouillée and Bourgeois, which would provide sound prescriptions as a remedy to the existent malaise of the milieu.<sup>368</sup>

The problem of social integration was a central issue in Durkheim's epistemology<sup>369</sup>. The questions he addressed included how society could continue to cohere, what were the nature and modes of social cohesion and what would be the main resolution to overcome the discontents of modernity? The main notion Durkheim offered in answering these questions was "*solidarité*". He believed in the primary and crucial importance of "moral beliefs" in forming the collective conscience of society.<sup>370</sup> For him, unless we put an end to the dissolution of the moral beliefs, it would be impossible to overcome the social crisis that caused disintegration and disorder in society: "the present malaise derives essentially from a dissolution of our moral beliefs." Accordingly, he argued, "The ends to which our fathers were attached have lost their authority and their appeal, without our seeing

---

<sup>367</sup> David J. Peterson, *Revoking the Moral Order*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999), p. ix

<sup>368</sup> Célestin Bouglé, *The French Conception of "Culture Générale" and Its Influences upon Instruction*, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, 1938), p. 26

<sup>369</sup> See Harry Alpert, "Emile Durkheim and the Theory of Social Integration" in Peter Hamilton (ed.) *Emile Durkheim; Critical Assessments*, Vol.2, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 29 and Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1994), p. 23

<sup>370</sup> Steve Lukes, *Émile Durkheim*, p. 353

clearly, or at least with the necessary unanimity, where to find those that must be pursued in future.”<sup>371</sup> Durkheim tried to find a way out from this problem through “secular morality” based on an occupational ethic that would impose restraint upon special and selfish interests for the sake of the interests of the whole and diminishes conflict by enhancing the solidarity of society.<sup>372</sup> The Turkish revolutionary elite explicitly adopted this formulation via Gökalp.

Durkheim, as one of the prominent theoreticians of the solidarist ideas, accommodated his visionary of integrated and morally well-ordered society in the realm of social science. Like Comte and Fouillée, Durkheim also attempted to provide a remedy for social problems by utilizing social science.<sup>373</sup> Once again, we see the conciliation of social moralism with social scientism for the sake of constituting a desired social and political system. His theories were easily articulated in politics not only in France, but also in Turkey.

Durkheim preferred a diversified social order based upon functional (organic) solidarity, instead of the mechanical solidarity grounded on common homogenized consciousness. He claimed that the organic type was progressively eliminating the mechanical one in modern civilized society.<sup>374</sup> It is important to note that Durkheim’s main problematic was to overcome the undesired effects of increasing differentiation and individuation, namely *anomie*, by forming a secular morality

---

<sup>371</sup> Cited in Ibid, pp. 354-355

<sup>372</sup> Irvine Zeitlin, *Ideology and the Development....*, pp. 240-242

<sup>373</sup> Jack E. S. Hayward, “Solidarist Syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit,” p. 134

<sup>374</sup> Ibid.,” p. 137

through solidarist corporatism. He could not and even did not want to touch the essential problems of capitalism that was increasingly felt in an industrializing France. In this sense, he shared the “social pacifism” of other solidarists and hoped for social solidarity through reconciliation by questioning class warfare, as it was not worth the cost: “His whole program savors of *solidarism* more than of a through-going proletarian program of reconstruction. His aim is to bring about a restoration of social and economic *morale* through a strengthening of the functional organization of society, rather than to produce a sweeping reorganization of the whole productive and distributive system.”<sup>375</sup>

One other important contribution of Durkheim to the solidarist current of the Third Republic was his theories of education that mainly highlighted the moral teaching grounded on secular and rational ethics. Actually, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the national education in general and the institutionalization of the teacher training in particular was taken much more seriously in France than any other Western European country. The main impetus behind this seriousness stems from the fact that teachers were considered as the representatives of the state in disseminating the ideals and principles of the Republic to the wider segments of society: “It was these *instituteurs* and *institutrices* of the Third Republic who, it was hoped, would supplant the *cure* as the moral leader, not only in towns, but in the thousands of villages of rural France.”<sup>376</sup> Accordingly, “the policy was to replace a

---

<sup>375</sup> Harry E. Barnes, “Durkheim’s Contribution to the Reconstruction of Political Theory,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 35: 2, (Jun., 1920): 236-254, p. 251

<sup>376</sup> Goffrey Walford and W.S.F. Pickering (ed.), *Durkheim and Moral Education* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 2-3.

rigid ecclesiastical morality with a secular one.”<sup>377</sup> In this sense, the teachers were considered as the priests of modern secular France. Especially, in the rural regions of France, the instructors were hailed as “secular missionaries” in the project of national unification.<sup>378</sup> Hence, *l’enseignement* completely separated from ecclesiastical control is a *sine qua non* of national education and the Republican secular morality. This was also a guiding principle for the *Ülkü* elite who deliberately aimed to implement secular moral education in the People’s Houses.

Consequently, it is clear that Durkheim contributed much to the development of the solidarist philosophy particularly by means of locating the idea of solidarity within the secure domain of “science.” The discipline of sociology, with Durkheim, gained enormous attraction of the politicians aspiring to build a stable order in society. His scholarly effort to depict the nature of the existing moral anomy and the ethical void triggered by increasing modernization, turned out to be somewhat the guiding principle for political reformers of both contemporary France and later of other countries, including Turkey.

The positivist and solidarist line of republican argumentation took a somewhat different but radical shape especially shortly after the famous Dreyfus Affair. Although the Dreyfus Affair implied an extreme anti-Semite reaction of nationalist and religiously oriented groups of France, this Affair was then exploited by the radical republican French elite as a catalyst to assimilate the different ethical and

---

<sup>377</sup> Ibid.

<sup>378</sup> Deborah Reed-Danahay, *Education and Identity in Rural France, the Politics of Schooling*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 24

ethnic postures among society in the way to create a uniform secular French identity. As Robert Kaplan argues, the Dreyfus Affair was mainly utilized by the Republican elite to overcome the fin-de-siècle crisis of democracy in France. That is, in order to forestall the potential risks of democracy, the French radical republican elite aimed at restructuring French politics so as to ensure their continued control irrespective of the electoral results. Kaplan identified this sort of restructuring as the revival of “Jacobin mentality,” which was “sympathetic to government intervention in social and economic activity for the greater good of society...”<sup>379</sup> The problem of anticlericalism “suddenly became of permanent importance,” which overshadowed “every other social and political question.”<sup>380</sup> In that sense, Durkheim’s sociology based on solidarist assumptions became the most conscious and sophisticated body of thought that could play this role: “Like many others, Durkheim was preoccupied with the need to save the Republic and what it seemed to stand for: that meant, above all, establishing a liberal secular, republican ideology, a new civic morality to be taught in all the nation’s schools.”<sup>381</sup>

This solidarist political style of the Third Republic created a long lasting legacy not only for the later generations of France but also for the revolutionary elites of several countries in the way of their nation-building processes. Without doubt, Turkey was one of the prominent models, which showed evident relevance to the

---

<sup>379</sup> Robert E. Kaplan, *Forgotten Crisis: The Fin-de-Siècle Crisis of Democracy in France*, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1995), p. 24

<sup>380</sup> Malcolm O. Partin, *Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, and the Church: The politics of anti-clericalism, 1899-1905*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), p. vii

<sup>381</sup> Lukes, op. cit. p. 77

neo-Jacobin reconstruction of politics. It can be maintained that this sort of attempt to construct a secular morality for democracy in France was also apparent among the Turkish Republican elite, especially after 1930. The French solidarist legacy was appropriated and internalized by the Turkish Revolutionary elite in times of crisis. Hence, this peculiar phase of republicanism of French Third Republic, with its radical, anti-clerical and solidarist tone, became a *modus operandi* for the Turkish Revolutionary elite in the 1930s.

#### 4.2. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TURKISH SOLIDARISM

It should be noted that it is not possible to separate solidarism of the radical revolutionaries of the 1930s from the overall modernization attempts of Ottoman-Turkish history, and also from the traditional Ottoman-Turkish political culture. Ignoring the individualist philosophy in favor of the solidarist one at the level of the ruling elite is mainly due to political culture. It is commonly argued that the Ottoman-Turkish political culture had the legacy of ‘patrimonialism’ in which the center totally subdued the periphery, a situation characterized as “a strong state and a weak civil society”<sup>382</sup>, and that there was no intermediary structure between the state and the subject. The “legal notion of subjective rights” which was developed within feudalism in Europe<sup>383</sup> lacked in the Ottoman Turkish tradition. Moreover, while the Ottoman state disallowed the formation of the countervailing groups “that could

---

<sup>382</sup> Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985), pp. 14-16

<sup>383</sup> Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 228-229



operate independently of the central government”<sup>384</sup>, there was strong communitarian values in which there was not an autonomous place for the individual. Much scholarly energy has been devoted to theories on the Ottoman State, which emphasize this strong state-weak civil society link and the communitarian type of organization of the society. In fact this high level of stateness in Turkish tradition as a “deviant case”<sup>385</sup> among the Muslim states<sup>386</sup> can be explained partly because of its peculiar state tradition based on the *adab* tradition.

Hence, the other aspect of the Ottoman state tradition that would shed light onto our problematic is the *adab* tradition which was a kind of “organizational socialization” based upon a formulation of “a particular outlook that provided ideals and values for the ruling strata” and “developed as a consequence of efforts to identify the state with established values”. Heper argues that this institutionalization of the state around certain norms resembles the state institutionalization of France in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century around certain values as order, hierarchy, secularism and solidarism. He calls this situation “moderate transcendentalism”

---

<sup>384</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11, (1969): 258-281, p. 264

<sup>385</sup> Ali Kazancıgil, “The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Turkey*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst, 1981): 213-238

<sup>386</sup> Gellner and Lewis also argued that the Muslim states are characteristically weak (Gellner), and the power of the state was limited by the holy law and several intermediate powers (Lewis). See Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981) p.551) and Bernard Lewis, “Loyalty to Community, Nation and State”. In *Middle East Perspectives: The New Twenty Years*, ed. by George Issawi, (princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1981) pp.15-16

similar to the “enlightened despotism” of France.<sup>387</sup> The other important political tradition based on state-oriented norms is the “circle of justice” (*daire-i adalet*)<sup>388</sup>, which was the important aspect of “the Ottoman enlightenment tradition.”<sup>389</sup> The values that the ruler and the bureaucratic center had to conserve were social order and security under a norm of justice: “a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subject, and no popular well-being without justice.”<sup>390</sup> The political philosophy of the Ottomans was shaped with these traditions during the classical age.

After the defeat of the armies of Mahmud II by Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1833 and 1839, a new generation of reformers emerged “to save the state from total destruction”<sup>391</sup>. These reformers were mostly from the bureaucracy. These bureaucratic elites, of whom Mustafa Reşit Pasha was typical, were trained within the *kul* system and had no organic links with social groups. They viewed themselves primarily as the servant of the state and dedicated themselves to “the secular interests

---

<sup>387</sup> Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, p. 25

<sup>388</sup> For a detailed account of *daire-i adalet* see, Kınalızade Ali Efendi, *Devlet ve Aile Ahlakı*, Ahmet Kahraman (ed.), (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser), p. 283; Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, (New York: New York University Press, 1972); and Mehmet Öz, *Osmanlı’da Çözülme ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları*, (İstanbul: Dergah, 1997), p. 5

<sup>389</sup> Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, p. 25

<sup>390</sup> Halil İnalcık, “The Nature of Traditional Society,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.): 42-63, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 43

<sup>391</sup> Ibid, p. 43

of the state.”<sup>392</sup> On November 3, 1839, they started the reform movement called *Tanzimat* for the first time in Turkish history.

With the Tanzimat script, there began important changes in this traditional political framework, though the strong state-weak civil society and the communitarian type of organization of society persisted. Tanzimat signifies not only a beginning of westernization/modernization, but also the emergence of certain set of new ideas of which the idea of solidarity could be traced. For the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire, references in order to save the state were explicitly deduced from the outside of the traditional political framework. In other words, the norms and values around which the state was institutionalized began to transmute in conformity with the ideas from the West. “The Muslim-Ottoman *imaginaire*... was gradually displaced by the Western reformist *imaginaire*...”<sup>393</sup> From the bureaucratic elite itself, a new group of intellectuals emerged. These intellectuals, namely Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa and Ali Suavi formed a new society called Young Ottomans.

The Young Ottomans, who were the first intellectuals in the Ottoman-Turkish history who made the ideas of the Enlightenment part of their intellectual equipment for the Turkish reading public. Furthermore, they were the first intellectuals who attempted to decipher a synthesis between the ideas of Enlightenment and Islam.<sup>394</sup> Not unlike Comte, the Young Ottomans utilized science for their utopia, their ideal

---

<sup>392</sup> Ibid, p. 55

<sup>393</sup> Şerif Mardin, “The Just and the Unjust”, *Daedalus* 120, (1991): 113-129, p. 121

social order. However, during the Young Ottoman era, Western ideas provided only an “inspiration” for the intellectuals to formulate their prescriptions to the problems of the state. The Islamic and traditional values that they saw compatible with the Western ideas and techniques still served as the legitimizing creeds for their formulations. Actually, they pursued the alternative “always within the Ottoman frame and in an Ottoman sense.”<sup>395</sup>

#### **4.2.1. The Making of Turkish Solidarism in the Young Turk Era: Utilization of Science for a Social Engineering Project**

Later, towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with the beginning of the Young Turk era, especially among the Turkists and Westernist (*Garbci*)<sup>396</sup> groups, Western models not only continued to supply inspiration, but also increasingly became the ground for legitimization and, furthermore, became the “self-referential” parameters. As Mardin pointed, “With the Young Turks, legitimacy begins to assume a new

---

<sup>394</sup> Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962), p. 3

<sup>395</sup> Halide Edip Adivar, *Turkey Faces West; A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 99

<sup>396</sup> Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura were the main representatives of Turkism. Abdullah Cevdet, Kılıçzade Hakkı and Celal Nuri were the prominent figures of *Garbci* group. For a detailed analysis of the Westernist group, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “*Garbcılar*: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic”, in *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 86, 1997/2, pp. 133-149. Though there were several differences and divergences among these groups, their attitude towards science displayed common characteristics.

cast.”<sup>397</sup> Western epistemic tradition was accepted as a universal and ahistorical category that should be taken for granted while explaining and formulating their views on the state and society. The “authenticity” of “local” values was revised in accordance with “universal” Western teachings. Western ideas were seen as a privileged category, which took its primacy and power from being “scientific”. In some cases, science was celebrated due to the increasing power of the Western states. *Garbcılar*, for instance, credited science “for the perceived supremacy of the West.”<sup>398</sup>

In line with French solidarist legacy, the Turkist and Westernist intellectuals of the Young Turk era aimed at conciliating scientific knowledge with that of social doctrine as a prescription to establish a well-ordered society. It is accurate to note that the chief impetus behind this celebration of “science” was not only to strengthen their power of discourse, but also to lessen the impact of the existent religious and traditional belief system. Certain intellectuals of this age began to assimilate Renan’s problematic on science and religion which had hitherto been denied and contested by the Young Ottomans. As Mardin puts, “the positivist-nationalist generation had no instrumental view of Islam as a lever for social mobilization which often disguised, as in the case of the Young Turk leader Ahmed Rıza, deistic or atheistic beliefs.”<sup>399</sup>

Relying on that disenchanting understanding, the intellectuals of the Young Turk era, educated in the western secular stream and emerging as the Turkish

---

<sup>397</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution, 1971, p. 201

<sup>398</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “*Garbcılar*: Their Attitudes Toward Religion...” p. 134

<sup>399</sup> Şerif Mardin, “The Just and the Unjust,” p. 125

positivist generation, aimed at conciliating scientific knowledge with that of social doctrine as a key to provide a harmonious and ordered society. Their basic endeavor, especially after they came to power with the government of the Community of Union and Progress (1908-1918), was, first of all, to search for a national Turkish identity that was assumed to have been, for a long time submerged underneath the Ottoman cosmopolitan identity. They conceived nationalism and secularism as two inevitable aspects to modernize their state and society. This led to the strong discussion for the replacement of Islam as the basis of the state, and introduced the “notion that the nation was the source of all authority.”<sup>400</sup> It might not be wrong to contend that this was the first attempt to transform the Empire into a model of nation-state. On account of their reformist and secularist structure they put into practice common secularizing changes notably in education and law.<sup>401</sup>

There were three main competing currents of thought during the period of the CUP, namely Turkism, Westernism and Islamism. On the CUP's policies the first two gradually gained significance.<sup>402</sup> The pioneers of these three currents primarily dealt with the question of what would be the focal point of patriotism and the basis of identity of the Empire's subjects. Put it in another way, all their efforts and discussions came to invite a debate on to which civilization they belonged to and

---

<sup>400</sup> Metin Heper, “The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective”, *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1991, p. 13.

<sup>401</sup> On that policy of the CUP, see Tevfik Çavdar, *İttihat Terakki*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), pp. 95-96.

<sup>402</sup> With its 1916 Congress the CUP completely gave up Ottomanist and liberal policies, and instead began to assume a Turkist, secularist and statist policies, Tevfik Çavdar, *İttihat Terakki*, p. 91

whether or not theirs was unique. Islamists proposed the idea that Muslims had an *authentic* character and unique civilization totally opposite of the Western one, especially at the cultural level; that was why they had to preserve it as the true essence of their identity. Nevertheless, the Westernists defended a project of modernity that called for the complete transformation and secularization in every domain of social life in conjunction with Western models. The Turkists were between two movements: although putting emphasis on Turkish culture exposed from primordial history, being part of civilized world was usually accentuated.<sup>403</sup>

The prominent figures of the Young Turk era, Ahmet Rıza, Prens Sabahattin, Abdullah Cevdet and Ziya Gökalp were at the same time the disciples of one of the Western social scientists. They proposed their formulations of an ideal society by supporting them with scientific explanations. Ahmet Rıza used the arguments of Auguste Comte, Prens Sabahattin accepted the route of Le Play, Abdullah Cevdet was mostly inspired by Gustav Le Bon and Ziya Gökalp became the chief representative of Emile Durkheim. In order that the prescriptions gain validity, they felt themselves obliged to ground them on one of the social science currents.

Auguste Comte's attempt to construct a stable social order and remedy the political unrest inherited by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras<sup>404</sup> appealed to the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual and state elite who faced similar problems especially towards the end of the nineteenth century. The increasing loss of Ottoman territories

---

<sup>403</sup> On these three schools of thought, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964, pp. 337-346.

and decreasing economic prosperity affected the attitudes of the Ottoman elite towards the West. It is not the content of the Western science or philosophical tradition, but the military power and its prerequisite “narrative of capital”<sup>405</sup> which convinced the Ottomans to despise or question their own scientific, economic and cultural tradition. The military defeat against the West was the main impetus to import Westernization and modernity. The Turkish intellectuals, from conservative to Westernist, turned to Comte’s positive philosophy which heralded a society offering both “order and progress” as a solution to their domestic difficulties. Comte’s new system utilized science in its attempt to discover the laws which governed man’s social and political progress. Once these general laws were discovered, man would be able to modify his future,<sup>406</sup> and avoid the political, social, and economic troubles threatening the states.

The reason for Comte’s impact on young Turkish intellectuals is because of an emotional belief in progress corresponding to their high-flown engagement to the idea of “science.” They were heartened by Comte’s idea that all human knowledge was moving toward a positive, scientific stage, that each discipline moved from

---

<sup>404</sup> D. G. Charlton, *Positivistic Thought in France*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 35

<sup>405</sup> I borrowed this phrase from Partha Chatterjee. For him, the narrative of capital is the outstanding figure of modernity which gives rise to the modern regime of disciplinary power with itself. Moreover, “it is the narrative of capital that can turn the violence of mercantilist trade, war, genocide, conquest colonialism into a story of universal progress, development, modernization, and freedom.” Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments...*, pp.234-235

<sup>406</sup> Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, trans. Harriet Martineau, (London, 1893), II, p. 79



theology through metaphysics to the positive level, and most significantly, that all social problems would soon be resolved by means of the last and promising of the sciences, the science of society. This sort of idea gave the intellectuals power of portraying themselves as agents and movers of the historical process.

#### **4.2.2. Populism and Solidarism in the Young Turk Era**

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 marked the beginning of an era when much of the theories especially of Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah Cevdet and Ziya Gökalp became the official ideology of the Union and Progress Party. As Murat Belge puts, “Positivism and solidarism, with the emphasis on the ‘supra-class’ nature of society, and with the imposition of inter class solidarity in society, as well as with their scientific justifications best fitted the *state-savor* characteristics of the Union and Progress Party.”<sup>407</sup> Solidarism as a social and political philosophy was explicitly formulated during the time of Union and Progress Party (1908-1920).

Hence, the history of populism and solidarism did not begin with the Republican era; a populist discourse emerged already in the late Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, as solidarism manifested itself especially in the principles of populism and etatism, it is essential that we briefly examine the historical roots of populism. The late Ottoman populist movement was mainly influenced by the Russian Narodnik Movement. It was fledged around such intellectual clubs as *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearths), and *Milli Talim ve Terbiye Derneği* (National Education and Teaching

---

<sup>407</sup> Murat Belge, *Türkiye, Sosyalizm ve Gelecek*, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1989), p. 129

Society), and in such journals as *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Land) and *Halka Doğru* (Toward the People). Émigré intellectuals from Russia like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade Ali played substantial roles in the currents of Turkist and Populist movements.<sup>408</sup> At the heart of the movement “to go to the people” (*halka doğru*) lay the revolutionist strategy of reaching the masses and making them rebel against so-called oppressive and exploitative practices of political authority.<sup>409</sup> The main aims of the movement to go to the people were to get down to the people, to awaken them, to educate and enlighten them.

Populism was articulated through solidarism (*tesanütçülük*). The French intellectual discourse lent the idea of *solidarité* to Turkey as supplementary to the idea of populism, all converging in the aim of creating a homogenous collectivity of people. Moreover, they presupposed the obliteration of all classes and cultural-ethnic differences. Also, they justified their etatist views together with the division of labor based only on professions. This idea was also adopted in 1931 RPP party program as the principle of Populism. This principle was in tune with efforts to establish a nation-state with its nation as an amassed entity without any “destructive” divergences within nation.

---

<sup>408</sup> Zafer Toprak, “Aydın, Ulus-Devlet ve Populizm,” in *Türk Aydını ve Kimlik Sorunu*, Sabahattin Şen, ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995), p. 40

<sup>409</sup> For the detailed discussion of the movement to go to the people see Andrzej Welicki, “Russia,” in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia* (New York: MacMillan, 1969), especially pp. 496-506

In social and cultural matters, populism became the chief representative of solidarism. Paul Dumont<sup>410</sup> and Zafer Toprak<sup>411</sup> call Populism the Turkish version of the solidarist ideas developed by Léon Bourgeois and Emile Durkheim. From the beginning of the twentieth century, populism had been the most popular current among intellectuals. According to Toprak, this solidarist line of thinking can be traced back to the Young Turk era populism and Gökalpian sociology. With the 1908 Revolution, positivist thought developed as a reaction to scholastic philosophy during the second half of the nineteenth century and brought about “sociologism” (*sosyolojizm*). In other words, a set of viewpoints that based social philosophy on a trajectory of “*ilm-i içtima*” (social sciences), to the Turkish lands. Afterwards, sociologism could appropriate itself to the nationalist objectives of the era. Toprak argues that solidarism, as a sub-category of sociologism, was likely to be the dominant ideology shortly after 1908 in Turkey. The prominent figures that carried solidarism and “its state philosophy, populism,” to the country were Unionists like Ziya Gökalp, Tekin Alp, Necmettin Sadak and Yusuf Kemal.<sup>412</sup> There were, for Toprak, several facets of populism in the Constitutional period: political, economic and social. The last one, social populism or social solidarism is important for the aims of this dissertation. Since, it spawned the germs of the Republican solidarist idea which revealed itself in the *Ülkü* circle. Toprak defines social solidarism as the idea undertaking solidarity and harmony of interests as opposed to class struggle, and

---

<sup>410</sup> Paul Dumont, “The origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 31

<sup>411</sup> Zafer Toprak, “II. Meşrutiyet’te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, (Spring, 1977): 92-123, pp. 92-95

in doing so; it accepts cooperation of occupational groups instead of conflicting social classes.<sup>413</sup>

There were even certain intellectual attempts to conceptualize populism on the basis of class differences. According to Yusuf Akçura, for instance, “the people” meant small landowning or landless peasants of the countryside and the small artisans and wage earners of the cities. In a way this definition of the people was based on class analysis with which Akçura was not unfamiliar from his intellectual experiences in Russia and France. One of the most important issues that differs Akçura from the other populists of the time was his considerable emphasis on the economic prerequisites of populism and nationalism. He accepted economy and the bourgeois revolution as *sine qua non* material condition of nation states. Unlike Gökalp's solidarism and corporatism, he favored the class-based analysis of the society, which resembles Marxist approaches.<sup>414</sup>

Gökalp, on the other hand, defined “the people” as part of the nation which did not belong to elite groups, differentiated from the rest of society by their educational background: “What does ‘going to the people’ mean? Who are to go to them? The elite of any nation are its intellectuals and thinkers, those who are set apart from the common people by reason of their superior education and learning.”<sup>415</sup> What Gökalp

---

<sup>412</sup> Ibid, pp. 94-95

<sup>413</sup> Ibid, pp. 99-101

<sup>414</sup> Cited in Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill Univ. Press, 1964), p. 425

<sup>415</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 34

meant when he emphasized the notion of going to the people was that the elites, who had the privileged knowledge of what “civilization” meant, had to carry this knowledge to “the people.” In turn, *halk*, as the “living museum of culture,” would teach the cosmopolitan intelligentsia the merits of Turkish culture, which only survived among the people:

They must go among the people, live with them, note the words and phrases they use, listen to their proverbs and maxims, grasp their way of thinking and feeling, listen to their poetry and music, watch their dances and plays, share their religious life and moral feelings, learn to appreciate the beauty in the simplicity of their clothing, architecture and furniture. In addition, they must learn the people’s folk-tales, anecdotes and epics and the surviving doctrines of the ancient *töre*<sup>416</sup>

Unlike Akçura, Gökalp saw Turkish society as a classless entity unified around common goals. His distinctions between the elites and “the people” were at the educational rather than the social and economic level. In that respect, he argued, “in Turkey, a single class cannot monopolize the title of the people. Everybody, either rich or poor, is of the people... There are no class privileges among the people... There are no privileged classes among the people.”<sup>417</sup> Once Turkish society was conceived of as classless, contradictions and conflicts in society naturally became reconcilable. Gökalp envisioned society as a sum of different mutually dependent organs. These ideas originally adopted from French solidarist philosophy developed mainly by Alfred Fouillée, Léon Bourgeois and Emile Durkheim. It can be argued that Gökalp was the first man who developed the Turkish version of solidarism,

---

<sup>416</sup> Ibid. pp. 34-35

*tesanütçülük*. According to Gökalp, the anticipated results of populist ideology would fall within the context of solidarist thought. Similar to the solidarist motto, he held that populism grounds its philosophy on the norm that presupposes “not class, but profession!”<sup>418</sup>

The particular understanding of populism developed by Gökalp can be discerned in several official documents and writings of many intellectuals in the single party period. The similarity between Gökalp’s ideas and the ideas manifested in the Fourth Party Congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1935 is striking. Actually, the attempt to prove that Turkey was a classless society was the ideological core of populism. The ruling elite denied the existence of social classes. For instance, Atatürk told the Russian Ambassador of the time, S. I. Aralov, “in Turkey there are no classes... there is no working class as there is no developed industry.”<sup>419</sup>

#### **4.2.3. Ziya Gökalp and Solidarism (*Tesanütçülük*)**

Ziya Gökalp was the first thinker in Turkey who systematized populism and solidarism as an overall ideology. Gökalp’s genius lies at the very heart of his formulation of solidarism as a political philosophy in articulation of Turkish nationalism. In that sense Turkish solidarism owed much to the studies of Gökalp.

---

<sup>417</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Makaleler VII*, edited by M. Abdülhalik Çay, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1982), p. 116

<sup>418</sup> Zafer Toprak, “Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Oluşumu” in *Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarihiyle İlgili Sorunlar Sempozyumu*, (İstanbul, 1977), pp. 13-31

<sup>419</sup> Cited in Feroz Ahmad, “The Political Economy of Kemalism.” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, p. 157

Since this research will attempt to demonstrate that solidarism became the dominant ideology in stimulating the reformist elite to shape the political philosophy of the Turkish Revolution in the 1930s, and since solidarism of the radical revolutionary elite was mainly indebted to the ideas of Gökalp, his endeavors are extremely relevant for our problematic.

Based on the works of Durkheim, Gökalp formulated Turkish nationalism upon a solidarist outlook. Gökalp's importance stems from his adaptation of Durkheimian epistemology to the Ottoman-Turkish political culture. In doing so, he generally modified most of Durkheim's ideas to fit his own terminology. He used sociology as an instrument to provide an ideological basis for the newly emerging Turkish nation-state. While Durkheim argued that the increasing division of labor, with the effect of modernity, especially gave rise to an immediate erosion of common sentiments and the appearance of anomie and class struggle, Gökalp saw the division of labor in Ottoman-Turkish context as positive in the sense of perpetuating common sentiments. While it "eroded the only one type of common sentiment (religion), it strengthened another (culture and language)"<sup>420</sup>. Gökalp did not see a problem in the increasing individuation and the liberation of individuals. His main agenda was to find an alternative common sentiment that would provide national solidarity and homogeneity.

Gökalp maintained that unless we strengthen the institutions of solidarity in society, it would be impossible to ensure order and peace, welfare and happiness. In

---

<sup>420</sup> Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 95

that sense, the primary duty of the elite and intellectuals, who aimed at salvation of the nation was to develop institutions of relief and solidarity in economic and social domains.<sup>421</sup> As Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu puts, Gökâlp explicitly maintained the solidarist considerations developed and systematized by Léon Bourgeois.<sup>422</sup> Through solidarism, Gökâlp attempted to find a middle way between communism and individualism as in the case of Bourgeois: “...As Turks love freedom and independence, they cannot be communists. But as they love equality, they cannot be individualists. The system most suited to Turkish culture is solidarism (*tesanütçülük*).”<sup>423</sup>

In his formula, there was “no room for the absolute value of the individual”<sup>424</sup>. Individuals could survive in so far as they sacrificed their interests to the national one: “Do not say ‘I have rights’; there is only duty no right. There is no ‘I’ and ‘You,’ but We... We means One.”<sup>425</sup> Gökâlp asserted the state’s role in adjusting the harmony and concord in the individual interests. For him, when the situation demanded, even the corporations that represent individual interests in the nation should subordinate themselves to the state. In this sense, it is worthwhile to stress

---

<sup>421</sup> Tekin Alp (Mois Cohen), “Ziya Gökâlp’te Tesanütçülük” in Jacob Landau (ed.) *Tekinalp: Bir Türk Yurtseveri*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), pp. 411-412

<sup>422</sup> Z. Fahri Fındıkoğlu, “Ziya Gökâlp ve Sosyalizm,” *1964-1965 Ders Yılı Sosyoloji Konferansları*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Neşriyatı, 1965), pp. 42-70, p. 59

<sup>423</sup> , Ziya Gökâlp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, trans. and ed. by Niyazi Berkes, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1959), p. 312

<sup>424</sup> Uriel Heyd, *The Foundations of the Turkish Nationalism*, 1950, p. 124



that it was the Comtean “authoritarian solidarism” which was more asserted in his formulations.

For Ziya Gökalp, culture was a harmonious whole of different aspects of life of a single nation, whereas civilization is a rational product of man’s conscious actions. The aim of Turkism, for Gökalp, was to “seek for the national culture” (*milli harsı aramak*) in order to bring the light what was hidden in the soul of the nation. Only in a homogenous nation and culture, not in a heterogeneous society as the Ottoman Empire, a true democracy can be attained. However, he understood democracy not in liberal terms, but in solidarist terms. He used ‘populism’ as a synonym of democracy in which the interest of the common people and the equality of all sections of the nation is determinant.<sup>426</sup> The Revolutionary elite in their nation-building process inherited the formulations of Gökalp on culture, civilization and Turkish nationalism. His program on solidarism (*tesanütçülük*) or social populism (*içtimai halkçılık*) later became the guiding principles for the Republican elite.

In the general epistemology of Gökalp, the issue of morality occupied a considerable place, which was undertaken in a totally solidarist tone. He generally underlined the significance of social as well as secular morality. However, contrary to the radical revolutionaries’ anti-clerical stance granting almost no place to religion in the realm of morality, Gökalp considered religion as one of the components of morality. Weakening of religion resulted in the rise of crude individualism and only

---

<sup>425</sup> Cited in Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924*, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1985), p. 68

<sup>426</sup> Uriel Heyd, *The Foundations of the Turkish Nationalism*, 1950, pp. 140-145

religion could domesticate the evil features of individualism. Individuals relinquish all kind of moral values and social ideals and try to satisfy individual needs and interest while disregarding communal ones. Immorality was the natural outcome of this unbounded individualism and this process endangered social life. In this sense, for him, social morality (*içtimai ahlak*) was the real morality<sup>427</sup>. Without a set of moral values shared in common, a community could not survive, since the moral values and love of community constitutes the framework of national solidarity. Gökalp claimed that a healthy society was possible in so far as its individuals gave priority to common values over their personal interests. This society would melt individuals into the collective conscience and would construct common ideals for all its individuals.<sup>428</sup> Solidarity was the feature of these kinds of healthy societies that succeeded to create a common feeling and consciousness among their members while in the decaying societies, individuals were deprived of common values that would create a harmony and accord among themselves.<sup>429</sup>

Actually, the main peculiarity of Turkish version of solidarism that differs from the French case was its utilization of the concept for the nation-state building process. The revolutionary elite, as the heirs to the preceding modernization attempts, initiated their projects by redefining the bases of political legitimation (nation-state)

---

<sup>427</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Ahlakı*, p. 28

<sup>428</sup> Ibid, p. 16

<sup>429</sup> Ibid, 12

and the boundaries of the political community (national society).<sup>430</sup> Since this was not an easy task, they required an organizing political philosophy with its values and norms that would provide an objective basis or a justification for their intended reforms. They had several eclectic ideational elements, which they inherited from their predecessors. This was mainly the idea of progress, laicism, nationalism and positivism. By tracing the line to Gökalt, they combined all of these ideas under the notion of “solidarity”. According to İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, the pioneers of the Revolution attained to the idea of solidarist (*tesanütçü*) weltanschauung and society that aimed at constituting a social system which will provide a harmony of interests without harming each other, and in doing so, procure “a social order and solidarity” (*içtimai intizam ve tesanüt*) instead of the class struggle.<sup>431</sup> Therefore, to enforce the national solidarity (*milli tesanüd*) and to provide harmony of interests became the chief motivation of the Turkish reformist elite. The principle of national solidarity based on Gökaltian solidarism aimed at presenting a new integrative system for an imagined community and to eradicate the “outdated” system based on the religious solidarity i.e. *umma*. In this sense, solidarist ideas provided “a model for social transformation” which proposed a replacement of the traditional types of social organization with “the corporatism of secondary groups and nationhood based on

---

<sup>430</sup> See Ergun Özbudun “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” Eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997): 79-102, pp. 83-84

<sup>431</sup> İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin Dünya ve Cemiyet Görüşü*, (Genel Esaslar), (Ankara: Ülku Basımevi, 1946), p. 16

citizenship”<sup>432</sup> for the newly emerging nation-state. Moreover, it provided a scientific ground for social transformation.

Tracing some contours of Gökaldian idea of solidarism, the *Ülkü* elite extended solidarism to a more radical and re-constructivist intonation, which highlighted the notions of secular morality and amassing (*kütleleştirme*) of people. It is striking that there was almost no reference to Gökald in *Ülkü* between February 1933 and August 1936 due to his preoccupation with the idea of culture, involving traditional and religious elements. Even Gökald was criticized by the accusation that his ideas were defunct, and not could be tailored to the needs of the time.<sup>433</sup> The *Ülkü* authors did so for a pragmatic purpose that the time was of increasing radicalism which would not allow for a relatively softer use of Gökald’s ideas.

#### **4.3. SOLIDARISM IN THE *ÜLKÜ* VERSION OF KEMALISM**

##### **4.3.1. How was the Idea of Solidarity articulated in the *Ülkü* Journal?**

Solidarist ideas began to occupy a core place with the beginning of the 1930s and provided the philosophical justification and basis for the existent regime. Since unity and authority were considered fundamental for the dissemination and preservation of the revolutionary ideology, the authoritarian solidarist assumptions were regarded indispensable. Solidarism served, furthermore, to structure the new

---

<sup>432</sup> Ahmet Evin, 1984, p. 15

<sup>433</sup> See Hüseyin Namık, “Türk Edebiyatına Toplu Bir Bakış,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 71-73

legal basis and political power of the Republic, which had sought a new alternative to restore itself after an economic as well as political crisis in 1930. Solidarism became the instrument of constructing a classless, homogenized, disciplined “democratic” order and establishing a secular morality in a Muslim country. Moreover, it was intended to provide stability and “scientific” power needed to transmute the traditional society into a modern nation similar to the Western “civilized” nations. Solidarism developed into a philosophical instrument utilized for justifying practical programs of action, and, often, political platforms. The *Ülkü* journal became the chief representative of this ideology particularly between 1933-1936.

At first, it should be noted that the idea of solidarity as the prominent theme in the journal texts was considered as an alternative to liberalism, socialism and even fascism. In the first issue of the journal, this was laid in quite an obvious manner:

As we are distancing from individualism through accepting the idea of unity, in such a way we are departing from socialism by approving personality. We want to be an amassment within our national entity, and we want to walk to the goal in the cleanest air of solidarity (*tesanüt*). According to us, a nation... is a social organism (*uzuvlanma*). Everyone has a role and duty in this organism. Today, everyone is debtor to his ancestors or contemporaries due to his possessions.

Though it is formulated in more radical intonation, the portrayed idea of solidarity is almost congruent with the one developed in the French context. The assertion on social debt and duties, the search for a middle way between individualism and socialism, the idea of social organism and the like are all

reminiscent of the French solidarist tradition.<sup>434</sup> Necip Ali tries to explain the quasi-contract idea of Léon Bourgeois as follows:

Today this social solidarity is so necessary and natural for the society that even though each side had not comitted to a contract with a ceremony, certain deeds and acts have authority and power (*hüküm ve kudret*) like almost a contract.<sup>435</sup>

In general, *Ülkü* authors underlined the theme of “creating a mass” (*kütleleşmek*), and they tended to formulate the idea of solidarity within this term. This might stem from the fact that the increasing radical ambit of both internal and external conditions led them to utilize more militant and authoritarian terminology. Even the term solidarity was employed as an equivalent of the term *kütleleşmek*:

*Kütleleşmek* is one of the most apparent features of this century... The world of individualism has eventually become an old fashion. It is impossible for a departed thing to reinvigorate once more. For that circumstances and occasions will no longer come back again... What is the characteristic of this bond that amass individuals, which is entitled solidarity? It is the sense of duty that attaches people to each other with a

---

<sup>434</sup> In *Ülkü*, there are several references to the solidarist thinkers namely Auguste Comte, Alfred Fouillée, Léon Bourgeois, Charles Gide, and Emile Durkheim regarding various occasions. Though there is only one direct reference to the name, Léon Bourgeois (see Ahmet Nesimi, “İslahatçı İçtimaiyat Bakımından Sosyalizm,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 16, (June, 1934), pp. 241-252, p. 241.), the *Ülkü* authors, in general, were well aware of his theories. In one of the High School books, *Sosyolojinin Unsurları* translated from the French by an *Ülkü* author, Kazım Nami Duru, some parts of the famous work of Léon Bourgeois, *Solidarité*, were also translated under the title, *İnsan Cemiyete Borçlu Olarak Doğar*. In this same book, several studies of the other solidarist philosophers were translated as well. See, Kazım Nami Duru (trans. and ed.), *Sosyolojinin Unsurları: Seçilmiş ve Sıralanmış Metinler*, Lise Felsefe Dersleri Yardımcı Kitapları, No. 11, (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936).

<sup>435</sup> Necip Ali (Küçüka), “19 Şubat,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933), pp. 4-5

common faith by means of various material and spiritual bonds. Individual has several duties towards society. Under the regulation and rule of the will of state (*devlet iradesi*) as the will of all individuals and as the supreme will, the duties would be able to come to forefront... This is what we understand by amalgamation.<sup>436</sup>

In conjunction with the idea of *kütleleşmek*, the extreme emphasis on the role of the state in regulating and ordering solidarity was very dominant in the Turkish version of solidarism. In *Ülkü*'s terminology, the state was considered "as the direct expression of the will of society."<sup>437</sup> The solidarist assumption of duty and debt were also verbalized within the theme of the strong state. Recep Peker, the General Secretary of the RPP, argued, for instance, "in order to have a national duty and harmony, everyone has to pay his/her national debt (*milli borç*) to the state."<sup>438</sup> Peker objected to the notion that individuals possessed certain inherent and inalienable rights that were independent of and preceded society or the state. Such a conception of individual rights would weaken the integrity and solidarity of the nation. Peker was convinced that the real personal and individual rights could be attained by means of establishing a disciplined order. Outside this order, it would be a mistake to search for further liberties. In this sense, for Peker, individual liberty was not sacrosanct, but something that must be restricted. Accordingly, Turkish people required organization, loyalty, and a disposition to sacrifice themselves for the nation. The same set of ideas is easily discernible in the writings of the other authors. They, generally, conceived

---

<sup>436</sup> Necip Ali, "Halkevleri Yıldönümü Nutku," (The Annual Speech of the People Houses) *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 5-15, p. 6

<sup>437</sup> Ibid.

<sup>438</sup> "Recep Peker'in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku," *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), 1-5

of society and the state as organic and natural entities serving certain purposes that transcended the individual. Any emphasis on individual rights and individual liberties would impair national sovereignty, and would be a harbinger of national disintegration and dissolution.

For the authors of *Ülkü*, in general, class struggle among members of the same nation was somehow pathological and even illegitimate, not natural. A society, for them, was an organic unity, which had to be composed of functionally integrated and mutually supportive parts if it was to survive. When those parts were in conflict, the entire organism was threatened with dissolution. The only division in their mind was between the *münevver* (enlightened) class and the *halk* (people) class. The former one denotes a disciplined and enlightened elite who have been allegedly equipped with certain mental and personal qualifications for the preparation of the latter to the standards of modernization including democracy. Again, the former would create a new and perfect democracy which accorded sovereignty to all of the Turkish people, rather than to a class, a sect, or a faction. Peker maintained that the liberal state type and classical parliamentarianism gave rise to an anarchy that would destroy the forces of the nation (*ulus kuvvetleri*). Furthermore, for him, they brought about some artificial fragmentations such as “partisanship” (*particilik*) and regionalism/localism (*memleketçilik*) among citizens. In this sense, in the liberal states citizens pursue personal and class interests rather than state interest: “an idea ‘*memleketçi* outside party’ has appeared in those states. However, in our country, RPP is the single



national party. For that reason, we have no such idea as ‘memleketçi outside party’ (*parti dışı memleketçi*)”<sup>439</sup>

Therefore, the imposed and interventionist character of the state is more dominant in Turkish solidarism than the French case. This was not only due to the dominance of state tradition which ordered and regulated social and political life for several hundred years, but also to the preference for the Comtian authoritarian solidarism on the reformist elite rather than the Durkheimian pluralist solidarism based on the countervailing secondary groups. Although the Republican principles embraced the idea of solidarism and corporatism of the secondary groups based on the occupational division of labor, their *de facto* attitudes towards them did not give rise to liberation of the individual as in the theories of Durkheim. Nonetheless, the high degree of stateness in every aspect of the social and economic life signifies Comtian connotations that presuppose the role of the state as the unifying and regulating force in constituting the perfect system.

Whatever similarities are between the Turkish Revolutionary ideology and that of the authoritarian or even totalitarian ideologies, in fact, indicative of their common preoccupations is with saving their states from the global economic and political crisis. They all wanted to renovate and further regenerate the cultural and social fabric of the nation through substantial institutional and social changes. They, preponderantly, advocated a strong, centralized political apparatus that would effectively govern a united community and thereby generate a sense of national

---

<sup>439</sup> Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in Partililerle Bir Konuşması,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 39, (May, 1936): pp. 161-162, p. 161

solidarity. The sense of solidarity that would provide such political integrity was said to arise from the natural affinities of geography, ethnicity, language, art and common history. This community of similars constitutes the natural foundation of the nation. Only such a union, articulated in a vital and effective state, could reduce the feelings of inferiority and humiliation that afflicted Turks as a nation.

#### **4.3.2 *Ülkü*'s Consideration of Rights and Duties: "All the citizens were born as debtors to society"**

In line with the Comtean "authoritarian solidarism" the notion of rights was totally conceptualized as the result of duties and debts one owes to the state as well as society. On this account, Mustafa Kemal argued that if the state is demolished then the forces and means preserving the rights of the individuals would not exist. Therefore, for him, freedom should be considered as a two-sided phenomena. He went on saying that the state was a guarantor of rights.<sup>440</sup> Likewise, *Ülkü* authors contended that "basically, 'right' is a social phenomena like freedom." In this sense, any claim opposing the general interests cannot be a right: "Populism abolishes the classes among society."<sup>441</sup> Mehmet Saffet gives a good explanation of their solidarist assumption of rights and duties:

The sum of personal (*ferdi*) rights and duties of citizens form the moral order system which is acknowledged by state and society. For that reason, the personal rights of citizens always rely upon the principle of common

---

<sup>440</sup> Cited in Hasan Rıza Soyak, p. 463

<sup>441</sup> Mehmet Saffet, "Devlet ve Vatandaş" *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1934: pp. 181-184, p. 184

interest of all and at all times correspond to (*mütere'ffik*) duty. In this sense, the notion of right is a product of and sponsored by society.<sup>442</sup>

Although French solidarism particularly aimed at reorganization of the socio-structural realm by paying attention to welfare and justice in society, Turkish solidarism was mostly inclined to homogenize the different parts and the groups of society and unite them under a single national community as well as under a national culture by constructing new symbolic values which were directly sponsored by the State.

One of the most relevant points for the purpose of this thesis is the inseparability of culture from secularism in the minds of the *Ülkü* elite. That is, culture was employed as the seedbed of secularism. Culture developed as the domain of the social engineering by which the *Ülkü* elite imagined their ideal community in terms of modern science and civilization as substitutes for the religious and traditional elements. In this sense, culture had begun to function as an organizing concept, which played a greater role in compensating the spiritual void. It might be argued that culture, in *Ülkü*, was formulated as inseparable from modern and secular ethics. In other words, the radical revolutionary leaders designed culture inherently as a secular concept. Hasan Ali Yücel, one of the leading figures of the Republican elite, argued that in their point of view, Turkish culture was basically secular (*Türk kültürü layiktir*)<sup>443</sup>. In fact, they did not deny the spiritual character of culture. But,

---

<sup>442</sup> Ibid.

<sup>443</sup> Hasan Ali Yücel, "Dil İnkılabımız," *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 22, (Dec., 1934): 255-7, p. 257

the source of this spirituality was anti-religious.<sup>444</sup> At this juncture, it should be noted that there was no attempt by the radical revolutionary elite to search for a traditional and folk culture in several other nationalisms in the world did. It was, therefore, the duty of Kemalist nationalism in the 1930s to eliminate the popular notions of Islam and the Ottoman heritage in defining a new cultural identity for the Turks. It, first of all, refused the idea of culture to preserve its own particular way as protest against modernity. Contrary to the attempts of other non-Western and anti-colonial nationalists who put strong emphasis on traditional and local values in determining their very identity, the main orientation of the radical Kemalists was to structurally and culturally adapt Turkey to the West, and so to exclude a *resentful* nationalism confronting the cultural traits of the West.<sup>445</sup>

For the *Ülkü* elite, to attain social solidarity around certain substantive norms and cultural symbols became more important than implementing a solidarist policy on procedural issues. *Ülkü*'s understanding of solidarism, primarily aimed at transforming the identities of the individuals in line with the nationalist visionary of the radical revolutionaries: "a solidarist (*mütesanit*) society is a nationalist society as

---

<sup>444</sup> See Mehmet Saffet, "Kültür İnkılabımız", *Ülkü*, Vol.1, No. 5, (Jun., 1933): 351-54

<sup>445</sup> In Turkey in the 1930s, generally, the dichotomy between the spiritual and material domain of nationalism that Partha Chatterjee deals did not occur. Chatterjee argued that the post-Colonial elite of India claimed their nation's originality remarkably in the cultural or spiritual domain. The inner/cultural domain refers to the fundamental characters of cultural identity. Their foremost aim was to construct and shape a 'modern' national culture which is after all not Western. The way of implementing this aim was to establish a modern state (one of the elements of the material, outside domain) in which the cultural and inside domain, ironically, had to be transformed for the requirements of Western universalism. See Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, pp. 6-7

well.”<sup>446</sup> For this formula, “real solidarity and social harmony could only be attained by means of cooperation of certain natural factors such as blood unity, the unanimity of moral quality and history, unity of language and life-style, and finally a unity of ideal and interest...”<sup>447</sup> Hence, the *Ülkü* elite assumed the idea of social solidarity as the basis of their ideology around which other principles of the Revolution are interwoven:

We consider social solidarity as a truth (*hakikat*) corresponding to today’s life conditions. In line with this way, we claim that all the citizens were born as debtors to society, that they are debtors to society for both their material and spiritual identities, and that they are duty-bound in their duties towards society with not only their state obligations but also their social obligations.<sup>448</sup>

#### **4.3.3. A Solidarist Vision of Society: “There is no Class”**

It is argued that the Turkish Revolution was “the result of cooperative study of faithful children on the way of common ideal with a mutual sense of obligation.”<sup>449</sup> The idea of common good and mutuality was frequently reiterated. Fragmentation and division was regarded as the enemy of national solidarity. In this sense, class differences and conflicts were assumed damaging to the harmony of the nation. For the *Ülkü* authors, the Turkish society was not the sum of parts thinking apart. Rather,

---

<sup>446</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” (The Revolutionary Education), p. 108

<sup>447</sup> Ibid

<sup>448</sup> Necip Ali (Küçük), “19 Şubat,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933), pp. 4-5

<sup>449</sup> Necip Ali, “Halkevleri Yıldönümü Nutku,” (The Annual Speech of the People Houses) *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 5-15, p. 6

it is a society that thinks and hears together under the presence of “saintly principles” and “sublime interests” of the country. Naturally, “among people who are walking together for the sake of great principles and purposes, there is no class difference and a class.”<sup>450</sup> Necip Ali explains the idea of class in predominantly solidarist terms like Léon Bourgeois:

In our opinion and belief, the class differences are not appropriate to the historical tendencies and current objective of the Turkish nation. There has never been a class division in Turkey and it won't be [in the future] either. The classes of the Turkish society are the sign of a large division of labor among society for the performance of the national duties. Among society, the occupational groups performing different duties are connected to each other based on a debt of duty. All these groups (*zümre*) constitute a balancing harmony under the intervention and direction (*nezaret*) of state, as an expression of the general will. Therefore, we do not regard a group superior to others, and a domination of one class over others. We identify this performance of mutual duty as “social solidarity,” as a real attribute of physiological and psychological life, instead of the abstract ideas of logic and sensation... We draw all the moral and judicial principles from this truth.<sup>451</sup>

As opposed to class divisions favored by the socialist systems, *Ülkü* authors argued that the primary aim is to organize and dominate the “people force” (*halk kuvveti*) in the country: “we want neither the individual or the group, nor class dictatorship, but we want cooperation, unity of feelings, ideas, and ways.”<sup>452</sup> Beside socialism, liberal political and economic philosophy was also condemned by the authors. While introducing “the legislation on employment” (*iş kanunu*) in the

---

<sup>450</sup> Ibid

<sup>451</sup> Ibid

<sup>452</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halk Kuvveti,” (Force of People), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933)

Assembly, Recep Peker generally underlined the significance of the necessity of discarding the liberal option and further undertaking a “regulatory soul” (*tanzimci ruh*)<sup>453</sup> in order to establish a national order and harmony (*ahenk*) in the field of economy:

Friends, we are injecting the application of the idea of unity and collectivity of national Étatism (*ulusal Devletçilik*) to our life as replacement of the liberal state type of which our generation witnessed its fragmenting, conflicting and destroying spirit dissolving the national unity.<sup>454</sup>

The etatist program of the 1930s was to use both private capital and state initiative. Clearly, it was not opposed to the principle of private ownership. Accordingly, private capital should be allowed only a relative autonomy in the service of not the exclusive interests of the capitalists themselves, but those of the entire nation. Simply, this could offset Turkey’s economic backwardness. Nevertheless, the private economy was said to be under state control and management. Recep Peker was particularly in line with this conciliation between private economy and state control as opposed to the *Kadrocu* thesis that highlighted state control over the entire economic activity (or that left no room for the private entrepreneurship.) This did not imply a relative abolition of private property, but rather a relative subordination of private initiative and ownership to the superior interests of the nation. These superior interests would find expression in the planned organization of the state, for the state should be the fundamental agency of national

---

<sup>453</sup> Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in İş Kanununu İzahı,” (Recep Peker’s Explanation of the Legislation on Employment), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936), p. 325

<sup>454</sup> Ibid, p. 326

organization and discipline. This system of private initiative that was subject to regular tutelary control and intervention of state might resemble socialist understanding of economy. However, Peker and his friends were strongly opposed to the socialist arguments. To further enhance that opposition, they contended that any form of class warfare was to be rejected: “In general, in our society, there is no such division between the proletariat and bourgeoisie.”<sup>455</sup>

The general policy of *Ülkü* was in conformity with avoiding class struggle of any type. Such a struggle could only impair the unity it considered necessary for national survival and national solidarity: “We want to achieve social order and solidarity instead of class conflict (*klas kavgası*) and we wish to establish harmony between different interests to such a degree that they would not ill-treat (*hırpalamak*) each other.”<sup>456</sup> For Peker, this consideration is the cachet (*kaşe*) of their understanding of populism.

Actually, for the *Ülkü* authors, the new Republic required a regime of discipline, solidarity, and sacrifice if it were to survive and prevail in the face of the world economic crisis. For that reason, they mainly deplored class warfare as inimical to national solidarity. They regarded classes as organic components of the national unity that must collaborate in the development and modernization of the nation. In their mind, if the Turkish Republic was to survive it would be necessary to evoke a sustained sense of national solidarity among its citizens. This could only be

---

<sup>455</sup> Recep Peker, “Uluslaşma-Devletleşme” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 40, (June, 1936): I-VII, p. IV

<sup>456</sup> Ibid, p. III



possible by means of eradicating any sort of egoism, factionalism and scholastic mentalities. When they spoke of the Turk as a race, their reference was to what the French have termed an *ethnie*, a breeding community that occupies a given territory and shares a cultural distinctiveness. That is, they never appealed to some racist arguments as in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy that highlighted biological homogeneity. An awareness of common descent, shared cultural similarities, and a sense of common mission equipped the Turkish nation with a social solidarity was more important than blood relationship. Furthermore, as Köymen clearly stated, the Kemalist regime aimed at establishing a classless society. However, “it does not want to set up an artificial alignment among the classes or to establish a domination of a class over others.”<sup>457</sup> Rather, the purpose is “to prevent the defective development (*sakat inkişaf*) of society and to hinder the conditions that lead to class formation by means of assuring a healthy development of society within a willful (*iradeci*) order, which finds its way through the light of the social sciences.”<sup>458</sup>

#### **4.3.4. *Halk Terbiyesi* (Education of the People) to Create Social Solidarity**

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to stress that the education of the people (*halk terbiyesi*) “to prevent the defective development of society” and “to make people cultivate (*yetiştirmek*) themselves and getting them to fit” the revolutionary

---

<sup>457</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizmin Hususiyetleri” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 416.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid.

conditions<sup>459</sup> that would provide the solidarity and unanimity of the nation, occupies a central position in the journal texts. Unless an individual reach to a desired social and moral level by means of identifying his personal good and perfection with the common good and perfection (*müşterek hayır ve tekemmül*), he cannot realize himself. In this sense, a society should be a unit in which its members are attached to each other with a sense of voluntary solidarity of moral purpose. By this sense of solidarity, “every individual should be taught that they could be genuine citizens (*hakiki vatandaş*) in so far as they represent the society and state in themselves and as their wills are being moralized and socialized in terms of the principle of solidarity.”<sup>460</sup> However, the ordinary education techniques were considered inadequate to meet the revolutionary need of creating genuine citizens at the time:

Currently, the civilization ship is in a new vortex (*girdap*). The humanity is left, for a while, with no ideal and light (*nur*)... The social bonds as the basis of civilization are dissolved during times of crisis. The end result is anarchy and dogmatism. The unique solution is people’s education. Nevertheless, the existent schools are not adequate for a sound education and training in our country. We have to seek as well as produce the real means and ways of education outside schools. We call all these means and ways “people training” (*halk terbiyesi*). In other countries, they call this “adult education.”<sup>461</sup>

The moral education of the people outside the existing school system in line with revolutionary ethics was particularly essential. This point also testifies that the

---

<sup>459</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” p. 153

<sup>460</sup> Ahmet Nesimi, “Fert ve Cemiyet,” (Individual and Society), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 4, (May, 1933): 264-267, p. 267

<sup>461</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halk Terbiyesi,” (People Education) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): pp. 16-20

Turkish radical revolutionaries' concern about secularism was built on a solidarist understanding of ethics that was said to replace the traditional and religious moral precepts in society. The specificity of the 1930s was also regarded as critical to instigate an entire moral training of society: "the issue of moral and patriotic education proves its worth apparently in times especially when rapid economic and social changes occur."<sup>462</sup> In these times, for Mehmet Saffet, it is hard to adapt to the new conditions. Since there have never been such great social and economic transformations in Turkish history before, "moral issues are extremely critical. During this critical phase, we are witnessing the impact of materialist philosophy among our youth."<sup>463</sup> Such a philosophy, for Saffet, is destructive and separatist. For the materialist philosophy inculcates unbridled egoism instead of consciousness of duty (*vazife şuuru*) and responsibility. Furthermore, it prefers immediate interests and pleasures against national interests. For that reason, the idealist philosophy of revolution should be constructed against materialist philosophy. However, it is worth mentioning that this kind of consideration of idealism does not correspond to the Western idealist philosophical legacy. It denotes, rather, a solidarist implication that was justified in so far as it served the requirements of the Revolutionary elite in line with the efforts of the construction of *laik* morality. The relationship between the idea of solidarity and social/non-religious morality was explicitly deduced. In order

---

<sup>462</sup> Mehmet Saffet, "İnkılap Terbiyesi," (The Revolutionary Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): pp. 105-114, p. 108

<sup>463</sup> Ibid.

to live in an ambiance of solidarity (*tesanüt havası*), people have to obey the norms of the “social morality” (*içtimai ahlak*).<sup>464</sup>

Actually, as in the case of the French solidarist philosophers, the *Ülkü* elite attempted to find a middle way between materialism and idealism in favor of the revolutionary ideals. For instance, on the one hand, the German romanticist and idealist philosophy was appreciated due to its endorsement of national idealism as a substitute for religious idealism:

The collective conscience of the Turkish nation is... a divinity (*ülûhiyet*). Therefore, the social conscience should also be subject to this divinity. The philosophical basis of the symbol of excellence (*ekmelîyet remzi*) and a divinity of the Turkish nation will be taught in congruence with the national idealism represented by Kant, Fichte and Hegel in the nineteenth century<sup>465</sup>

On the other hand, the German idealist philosophy was condemned for backing of new dogmas that would risk the very foundations of the Revolution: “...Most of us are inclined to a kind of strange spiritualism by the impact of German romantic philosophy.”<sup>466</sup> This would lead to intemperance (*ifrat*) of conservatism and traditionalism. It is argued that revolution means the collapse of most dogmas. In this sense, it should not be allowed that “new religions and sects (*mezhep*) to replace the

---

<sup>464</sup> See for instance Ahmet Nesimi, “Fertçilik ve Cemiyetçilik,” (Individualism and Communalism) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933), pp. 1-7

<sup>465</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Köycülük Nedir”, (What is Peasantism) *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6, (July, 1933): 422-430, p. 430. For the endorsement of idealism and the spiritual character of the Turkish nation, see also Aydoslu Sait, “Ölü ve Diri Tarih,” (Dead and Live History), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933): 18-19

<sup>466</sup> Niyazi Hüsni, “İlim ve İnkılap,” (Science and Revolution) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 115-7, p. 117

previous ones.”<sup>467</sup> Hence, the primary duty of schooling is “to instill morality and citizenship to the people”<sup>468</sup> in conjunction with secular moral values. That’s why “ensuring a better revolutionary education and bringing up (*yetiştirmek*) good citizens of the republic” is of utmost importance.<sup>469</sup> For this aim the citizens “have to be taught courses possessing social and moral values.”<sup>470</sup> Consequently, Turkish solidarism emphasized the individual as part of a moral collectivity. It was the individual’s duty to find his appropriate place within this collectivity. For the *Ülkü* authors, a sense of “collective responsibility” (*müşterek mesuliyet*) has to be developed in order to overcome spiritual defects of individuals.<sup>471</sup> All deviations contrary to the principles of solidarity and justice were also to be eliminated by means of rationalizing and “cultivating” the Turkish mind. Since, a “non-cultivated Turkish mind” (*işlenmemiş bir Türk kafası*) would be damaging ten times more than the loss of corps.<sup>472</sup>

In fact, rationalization of every means of social relations was respected as part and parcel of the moral education of the people based on solidarist assumptions of ethics. It is argued, “the Turkish Revolution aims at rationalizing every kind of

---

<sup>467</sup> Ibid.

<sup>468</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” (The Revolutionary Education) p. 108

<sup>469</sup> Ibid.

<sup>470</sup> Ibid

<sup>471</sup> Ahmed Nesimi, “Mesuliyetin Hakiki Telakkileri,” (The Genuine Considerations of Responsibility), *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 19, (Sept., 1934): 3-8, p. 6

<sup>472</sup> “Okuyanlarımızla Konuşma,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933)

mechanism of national body.”<sup>473</sup> Furthermore, the Revolution requires “citizens who feel and think in conformity with the structure and character of the Revolution.”<sup>474</sup> In order to save the people from “being captive of ignorance” and to harmonize with “the soul and nature of the revolution” economic activities and social relations should be rationalized:

It is required to remove the alienation... of people towards the innovations the Revolution and the Republic brought about. In this sense, our people should be taught the modern meanings of spiritual sanctions (*manevi müeyyideler*), moral inclinations, and relief and participation that would occupy the place of old religious dominion.<sup>475</sup>

In view of that, to make people accustomed to the fruits of the revolution, people’s education should be “the inculcation and orderly inculcation (*nizamlı işlemek*) of the minds of people who have reached a normal level of enlightenment in the sense of their psycho-physiological qualities.”<sup>476</sup> This inculcation will be the work of national organization and management in terms of manifestation of the national values. It means, “melting (*yoğurma*) of the separated parts (*zümre*) in regard to their accent, sect (*mezhep*) and civilization into a social body as well as a

---

<sup>473</sup> Hilmi, “Halk Neşriyatının Ehemmiyeti,” (The Significance of the People Publication) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): 70-79, p. 70

<sup>474</sup> Ibid

<sup>475</sup> Ibid, p. 73

<sup>476</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halk Terbiyesi,” (People Education) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): pp. 16-20

nation.”<sup>477</sup> Furthermore, it denotes “bringing up the spirit, thought, hearing and will of all individuals through inculcation in conformity with the whole ideal of the nation.”<sup>478</sup> As it is seen, the high-flown radical agenda of the *Ülkü* elite manifests itself also in their consideration of solidarity. One of the *Ülkü* authors argued that the Turkish Revolution became a pioneer for many nations aiming to adapt these kinds of radical principles: “Earlier than the Italian fascism and German national socialism... the Turkish Revolution had established a secular and revolutionary republican foundation on the basis of populism, nationalism and revolutionism.”<sup>479</sup> Since, it was “concerned about the welfare and freedom of individuals through populism” and wanted to “combine the interests of individual and society” through the principles of nationalism and étatism.”<sup>480</sup>

#### **4.3.5. The People’s Houses as the Embodiments of Social Solidarity**

The radical tone of the *Ülkü* elite became more intense with the establishment of the People’s Houses. In May 10-18, 1931, during the RPP Congress, it was decided to found new education centers with the mission of transforming the masses into a more “enlightened” form. For this aim, the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) were

---

<sup>477</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” (The Means of People Education) Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9, p. 152

<sup>478</sup> Ibid

<sup>479</sup> Şevket Mehmedali, “Hukuk Bakımından Buhran,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 20-26, p. 26

<sup>480</sup> Ibid.

founded on February 19, 1932 in 14 different cities.<sup>481</sup> The People Houses as adult education (terbiye) centers were expected to propagate the principles of the RPP. Their purpose was “to bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and people by teaching the first of these the national culture which existed among the Anatolian masses and, the second, the rudiments of civilization, and an indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime.”<sup>482</sup> In other words, People’s Houses were founded to provide ideological and political education.<sup>483</sup> They are the institutional setting for the revolutionary rituals and harbinger of the radical Kemalist elite who played profound roles in designing rituals and acting out root paradigms of the laic national ideology of the Turkish Revolution.

In the opening speech of the People Houses, Recep Peker, the general secretary of the party and the prominent ideologue of the Houses, argued that the state should nourish and train people to transform them into a collective mass (kollektif kütle). Moreover, he stated, “under the roof of the Houses, we aimed at gathering all our citizens and ascending them to national unity by means of an accomplished cultural study.”<sup>484</sup> The leaders of the RPP mainly targeted to establish alternative centers of socialization based on the ideology of the Turkish Revolution that were going to replace the previous traditional ones. On the first anniversary of the People Houses,

---

<sup>481</sup> Nurettin Güz, *Tek Parti İdeolojisinin Yayın Organları: Halkevleri Dergileri* (Ankara: Bilge Yapım, 1995), 14.

<sup>482</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, “The People’s Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Growth,” *The Middle East Journal*, 17 (Winter-Spring, 1963): 55-67, p. 55.

<sup>483</sup> Tevfik Çavdar, “Halkevleri,” in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 4, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), p. 879.



Necip Ali, the General Director of *Ülkü*, wrote that the Houses had been established as “duty hearts” (vazife ocakları), which “corresponded to the social debts and social solidarity.” In his view, as part of his understanding of social solidarity (içtimai tesanüt), every citizen is born as a debtor not only to the state but also to society. In this sense, for Necip Ali, the Houses were “the embodiments of the social obligation and solidarity.”<sup>485</sup> Parallel to this, in 1935, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, the Head of the Youth Department of the People’s Houses, prepared an official report on the Houses for the RPP. In this report, Çağlar summarized the functions of the Houses as “the institutions of social solidarity and obligation” aimed at homogenizing Turkish people.<sup>486</sup>

In short, it can be argued that the People Houses were founded as the chief ideological agents of the Republic that performed the task of socialization of people in accordance with the principles of the RPP. Actually, this was the state-imposed task to ‘mature’ the people culturally for the requirements of contemporary civilization. The establishment of the People’s Houses was, therefore, part of a general effort to civilize the crude masses and to mold the adults to participate in a politically and culturally new regime, which stipulated certain duties for them to be performed. In this sense, the main task of the instructors in the Houses was one of bringing the elements of general culture and modern civilization rather than vocational training.

---

<sup>484</sup> Recep (Peker), “Halkevleri Açılma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1933), p.6.

<sup>485</sup> Necip Ali (Küçük), “19 Şubat” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933), pp. 4-5

The Houses, first and foremost, were regarded as the essential and valuable national institutions disseminating the “Kemalist ideal” (Kemalist Ülkü).<sup>487</sup> Furthermore, people were invited to the Houses “so as to enlighten their brain (dimağ) and to nourish their belief more in the ideal of Atatürk.” The aim of the Houses was to “bring the nation up to the good and right.” The solidarist idea was highlighted particularly with respect to the functions of the Houses: “The Houses will create a totality of people retaining solidarity on sublime ideals.” Moreover, they will transform the people into “a mass that is single in faith, contemplation and excitement.”<sup>488</sup> In one of the prominent newspapers of the Republic of the time, *Cumhuriyet*, it is contended that the Houses “provides the new principles of life created by the Turkish Revolution as moral precepts for the citizens.” (Türk İnkılabının yarattığı yeni yaşayış kaidelerini bir ahlak halinde vatandaşlara verir.)<sup>489</sup> The radical revolutionaries of the 1930s sought to guarantee the loyalty of the citizens through continued mass education via the People’s Houses designed to appeal of all segments of society.

For the *Ülkü* elite, normal schools were not able to assure this kind of education that would raise the people’s consciousness commensurate to the new conditions. The main factor in education should be teaching of “collective culture.”

---

<sup>486</sup> *Halkevi 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, Behçet Kemal (Çağlar) (ed.), (Ankara, 1935), pp. 3-4

<sup>487</sup> Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), p. 1

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid*, p.5

<sup>489</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, (29 October 1933), p. 5

Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior of that period, explicitly argued, “there is not a class difference and class struggle in our culture.”<sup>490</sup> Accordingly, the People's Houses provided a strong basis for the perpetuation of the new Turkish regime. The Houses were established to create the Turkish culture. Only by the impact and power of collective culture created by the revolution, an ideal society could be created:

Distribution (*pay vermek*) of national culture over the wider segments of the people of Turkish nation, and in doing so, making the mindful groups take part in political and social life is of utmost importance. So, the primary goal of the people education via the People's Houses was to make people's become conscious of the desire to progress and be civilized and to have this desire remain permanent. Furthermore, it aims at inculcating people to make them cultivate (*yetiştirmek*) themselves and getting people to appropriately fit the new conditions.<sup>491</sup>

This meant that through mass, adult education, the radical revolutionary elite aimed at securing the revolution from potential future disappointments. However, the relative heterogeneity and differences among society in religious, ethnic, economic and cultural sense was the basic obstacle in front of the revolutionary ideal that aimed at unifying all the elements in congruence with the principles of the new state. How could a sense of unity be fostered in a country with so many varieties and divergences? The revolutionaries aimed at the assimilation of all forms of religious, ethnic and class interests and the erection of new arrangements based on solidarity. The basic national goal should be the cultivation of the masses until the time came when people themselves were so well disciplined that they did not need strict control.

---

<sup>490</sup> A speech delivered by Şükrü Kaya. Cited in *Cumhuriyet*, a daily newspaper (22 February 1938), p. 1

<sup>491</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” p. 153

The primary objective of the revolutionary elite was to establish the authority and discipline needed to organize the people. The People's Houses as the national culture centers were considered as the "safety props" (*emniyet payandaları*) of the future of the Turks. It is contended that the "invigorating charm" (*ihyakar sihiri*) of the Atatürk regime will spring up from these institutions which were charged with a mission to gather and mobilize the whole nation.<sup>492</sup>

By establishing the People's Houses, the Republican regime aimed at cultivating and training the people and actually introducing them into a so-called "civilized" world. Moreover, these were the institutions creating conditions for "re-making ourselves" (*kendimizi yapmak*)<sup>493</sup> that were to shape the political subject required for the Kemalist values to be realised in practice. Hence, the basic agenda behind the establishment of such institutions was not only to enable the internalization of the values and principles of the new regime, but also to create a nation that would learn how to rule themselves in conformity with the directions as well as prescriptions given by these institutions. Indoctrination was, therefore, accompanied by the creation of institutional practices as in the case of the People's Houses:

After saving the country, the People's Party (*Halk Fırkası*) is brought to undertake the duty of constructing a strong Turkey. The Party strives to make citizens believe its own cause. It will gather and unify the youth around the republican, nationalist, populist, etatist and laic principles via the

---

<sup>492</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, (22 February 1938), p. 1

<sup>493</sup> Necip Ali, "Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey'in Nutku", Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 104-114 p. 105

People's Houses. Furthermore, it will mobilize the mass around the revolutionary cause.<sup>494</sup>

At the same time, the justification of such institutions was produced: a collection of knowledge that designated the people (*halk*) as an object of inquiry that would enable the state elite to shape their policies in a more concrete manner. That is, the information about the people collected through the Houses would provide new data for the state elite in their social engineering projects. Orderly society and docile bodies could only be possible by means of these institutions which create new domains of disciplinary matrix for the state. Politics alone was unable to guarantee order. Politics had to be superseded by the new techniques of power that would look at the very roots of social behaviour. In this sense, the intellectuals were invited to take part in enlightenment of society to construct a harmonious, well-ordered and amalgamated nation:

In *Ülkü*, there will be issued articles of those who believe the great cause (*dava*), and who make the Turkish society believe this, and who want to take part and duty in the way of the service that expects the creation of a collective and excited national totality... We call the current Turkish intellectuals to the People's Houses for the service that would enable the intellectuals to enlighten, advance, and enforce their society, and amass (*kütelleştirmek*) them by saving from individuality.<sup>495</sup>

---

<sup>494</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, (3 January 1932), p. 5

<sup>495</sup> Recep (Peker), "Ülkü Niçin Çıkıyor," (Why *Ülkü* is Being Issued) *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933): 1-2

For that reason, first of all, “the national culture should remove the elements incongruent with its character.”<sup>496</sup> Certainly, it can be argued that the character of the national culture was determined by the enlightened *imaginaire* of the revolutionary elite. It was extremely unsafe to leave the realm of national culture to the initiative of a nation who was already not ripe for the anticipated ideal conditions of democracy. According to Nusret Kemal, “the party and state, which aimed at bolstering and consolidating democracy in the country, assume the issue of training as the most urgent task.”<sup>497</sup> Accordingly, “the primary target of inculcation (*terbiye*) is to bestow culture in its broadest sense.”<sup>498</sup> For the most urgent thing necessary for a democratic citizen (*demokrasi vatandaşı*) is to have a broad culture by means of the principle of populism. In this sense, it is quite interesting that Atatürk defined populism as a synonym for democracy.<sup>499</sup> For Kemal Karpat, the People’s Houses, which embody the principle of populism were aimed to “bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and people by teaching the first of these the national culture which lay among the Anatolian masses and, the second, the rudiments of civilization, and an indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime.”<sup>500</sup> Along these lines, as Necip Ali maintained, “The People’s Houses as “National Temples”

---

<sup>496</sup> Nafi Atuf, “Lozan ve Milli Kültür,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934): 405-408, p. 408

<sup>497</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Terbiye Meselesi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6, (July, 1933): 436-439, p. 436

<sup>498</sup> Ibid

<sup>499</sup> Ahmed Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk’le Üç Ay ve 1930’dan Sonra Türkiye*, Second Edition, (Ankara: AİTİA Yayınları, 1981), p. 44

<sup>500</sup> Kemal Karpat, “The People’s Houses,” p. 55

(*Milli Tapınaklar*) are donated with such significant duties and obligations, which would bring people to the high culture.”<sup>501</sup> İsmet İnönü put in plain words the significance of the role of the Houses in moral and scientific training of the people in that world conjuncture:

The People’s Houses were devised as the places where notions of morality, science and intelligence are being explained, applied, developed, enrooted and established in the Turkish fatherland. Particularly, I want to focus on the great role the Houses are playing in the realms of morality and personality... The primary moral stance must be the Turkish citizenship... Self-sacrifice (*fedakarlık*) should be the first and foremost duty of our citizens in this quite intricate ambiance surrounding our globe.<sup>502</sup>

For the advancement of economic and social life, the existent economic (external) conditions were regarded not sufficient. The inner existence (*iç varlık*) of the individuals and society should also be fed and rised.<sup>503</sup> In that sense, the Houses were designed to fill the “ethical vacuum”<sup>504</sup> the revolution had hitherto created. For that reason, much of the articles in the journal occupy a central place to the missionary role of the Houses to convert the hearts of the people who were regarded to be in need of secular purification. Dissatisfied with the existing traditional and religious moral standings, the ethical assimilation of people was explicitly pursued.

---

<sup>501</sup> Necip Ali, “İsmet Paşa ve Halkevleri,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934): 402-404, p. 404

<sup>502</sup> İsmet İnönü, “Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, p. 2

<sup>503</sup> Necip Ali, “İsmet Paşa ve Halkevleri,” p. 403

<sup>504</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey,” 1983, p. 156

The revolutionary education was, in this sense, imparted in a missionary spirit of civilizing the uncivilized, as is revealed, for instance, in Koymen's invitation of the village teachers to act as the "village missionary". He argues that the previous techniques of missionary including the ones exercised in the savage African tribes became outmoded. The contemporary missionary, for Koymen, is aimed to capture the souls of uncivilized village populations.<sup>505</sup> Therefore, to the mind of the *Ülkü* elite, "the people's education and administration is an apostolic (*havarilik*) craft."<sup>506</sup> For that reason, "only the person who possesses an apostle spirit... moral quality, definite principle, and carries humane affection in his heart would be able to achieve it."<sup>507</sup> This "Salvationist myth" that aspired to rescue the people from their present moral attachments generating "spiritual oppression" was reminiscent of the Jacobin political philosophy descended from Rousseau, which ascribed education a secular missionary role. The adherents have looked to education for redress, for the means to rectify the failings of past and present generations of adults. The existing society and politics are perceived as corrupt. Accordingly, a prime objective must be to distance the people as far as is possible from the various forms of socializations provided by the traditional authorities.

The People's Houses helped institutionalize several practices that the secular morality would leave at least as an unconscious legacy to later generations. The intense associations of regeneration and new life came to be invented in the concept

---

<sup>505</sup> Nusret Köymen, "Köy Misyonerliği," *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (September, 1933), p. 150

<sup>506</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, "Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları," p. 154



of the people, the *halk*. Having rejected all religious bases for morality, and having lost some of their faith in traditional populations, the *Ülkü* authors came increasingly to invoke the name of the people as a deeper source of truth. However, their idea of the people had little to do with real people and much to do with their own need for some new sanction for their activities. Actually, they found it useful to rebaptize the old instruments of power with the sacred name of *halk*.

In that sense, their understanding of democracy was totally different from the one in the Western sense, but something new which went under the name of people's democracy, or "populist democracy" (*halkçı demokrasi*). The radical revolutionaries' alternative was mainly grounded on the solidarist and populist assumptions of democracy, which they saw as the "most appropriate form of democracy for Turkey."<sup>508</sup> This kind of perception of democracy generally highlighted the unanimity and harmony of society centered on the concepts of duty and obligation rather than that of individual rights and responsibilities. For the alleged "democratization" of society, the People's Houses were designed to remove all outer signs of conflict and the suppression of alternative value systems to preserve the harmony and uniformity of society.

It can be argued that with the beginning of the 1930s, the Kemalist ruling elite aimed to succeed not only in entrenching a strong stable system of single party rule, but also in launching its own variety of modernizing revolution. A great deal of time

---

<sup>507</sup> Ibid

<sup>508</sup> Nusret Kemal, "Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi," (A Village Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123

and energy was invested in mobilizing society in line with the ideals of the Revolution. The realization of such ideals depended on the entrenchment of a workable system of recruitment and socialization of the individuals through certain effective institutions. The peculiar conditions of 1930 in the history of the Turkish Republic led the ruling cadre to restructure and refashion the existing institutions of revolution.

What they required was to rigorously organize recruitment in order to solve the contradiction between the need for quantity and quality. Whether those recruited from the traditional society would identify themselves with the new political order and the current revolutionary goals became a crucial question for the ruling elite. Maximization of ideological quality of people was necessary for the perpetuation of the new regime. In this sense, the establishment of People's Houses was the result of an idea of creating an effective institution of recruitment, which would cultivate people in line with the solidarist and populist aims of the Republic. Furthermore, through these institutions, the radical revolutionaries sought to centralize power to control the wayward ethnic and religious populations, to encourage notions of national solidarity, and to inculcate "collective habits," thereby to resolve the crisis of social, political and economic order prevalent at the beginning of the 1930s.

Hence, the radical revolutionary elite of the 1930s aimed at creating a homogenous, ordered and unified national society by means of articulating the French solidarist assumptions to the present needs. Turkish nation and culture has been characterized only in an abstract and formal sense. We see a populist idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious community, free

from internal dissent and struggle. The *Ülkü* elite aimed at giving priority to constructive planning, regulatory, and imperative role to the state in order to reach the contemporary level of civilization and to realize social peace and order without giving rise to class struggle.

The imposed and interventionist character of state is more determinant in Turkish solidarism than in the French case. The *Ülkü* elite preferred Comtian “authoritarian solidarism” rather than Durkheimian pluralist solidarism based on countervailing secondary groups. The Republican principles embraced the idea of solidarism and corporatism of the secondary groups based on the occupational division of labor. However, their *de facto* attitudes towards these groups did not give rise to liberation of the individual as in the theories of Durkheim. In my view, the *Ülkü* elite accepted Durkheim’s formulations generally on the theoretical level. Nonetheless, the high degree of stateness in every aspect of the social and economic life signifies a Comtian connotation that presupposes the role of the state as the unifying and regulating force in constituting the perfect system.

To bring the society to an ordered and harmonious entity was the main impetus behind the Turkish version of solidarism. It not only had the goal to improve the country economically and technically, but also attempted to create a citizen who would sacrifice himself in favor of the interest of the whole. Individual life should be sacrificed for the society; moreover, it is a duty to put even life in jeopardy in favor of society.<sup>509</sup> Individuals had certain duties and obligations towards the nation to

---

<sup>509</sup> İsmet İnönü, “Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1933): 1-4, p. 2

which he or she was debtor. Because of the interests of the nation are the same and single, there was no need to maintain different interests and ideas in society.

## CHAPTER V

### THE FIRST PILLAR OF SOLIDARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF *LAIC* MORALITY THROUGH MASS EDUCATION

The aim of the present chapter is to examine the attitudes of the *Ülkü* elite towards the problem of morality and religion as expressed in their articles. Although the most highlighted issue in *Ülkü* was education (inculcation) of people (*halk terbiyesi*), the reason why this study underlines the problem of morality and religion is due to the fact that not only this point constitutes the essence of the issue of national education but also it shows the solidarist character of *Ülkü*. As mentioned before, solidarism has two important premises. The first one is to develop a moral consensus based on the secular notions of duty and debt with which social order was said to be possible. The second one is to establish a classless and undifferentiated social entity unified around “common” goals that was expected to prevent social conflicts and disorder in the way to democracy. Given that this study traces the line of solidarism in the first decades of the Turkish Republic, this chapter will analyze the first characteristic of solidarism in *Ülkü*: the formation of revolutionary secular morality (*laik ahlak*).

The main problematic of this thesis is that the *Ülkü* elite’s consideration of morality, based on solidarist assumptions revealed a tension between secularism and democracy. Solidarism is the expression of this tension. The *Ülkü* elite was actually

torn between the competing goals of enlightening (secularism) and emancipating (democracy) the people. This tension between secularism and democracy proved to be a serious obstacle to achieving a democratic system and society, an issue that was addressed by arguing that in a society which was not converted to secular or revolutionary morality, democracy was not possible.

In the minds of *Ülkü* elite, secularism (*laiklik*) denotes an alternative morality to religious moral teachings. The religious morality, which should be preserved only in the individual conscience, was considered as a potential threat to this alternative revolutionary morality. In this sense, the religious morality filled with “scholastic dogmas” was seen as an obstacle for preparing people for the ideal democracy. In order to establish democratic representation, religious and traditional remnants had to be extirpated by means of national education. Hence, constructing a secular morality outside the domain of religious and traditional understanding of ethics, which they saw as the ultimate basis of their peculiar vision of democracy became one of the chief concerns of the authors of *Ülkü*.

This chapter also discusses how the People’s Houses (*Halkevleri*) became the chief instruments of inculcation of a new secular morality to transform the society. It can be argued that the People’s Houses were established so as to construct and further disseminate *laik* morality to the wider segments of society. By these institutions, the re-constructivist revolutionary elite targeted to instill the principles of the regime in society through using the secular rites and symbols to supplant the social meaning and power of popular religious beliefs. Hence, the principles of the RPP had not only become the basic terms of the Turkish constitution, but also

guiding codes that determined the goals of ritual performances enacted in the Houses. According to the authors of *Ülkü*, the People's Houses that they called "Temples of Ideal" (*Ülkü Mabetleri*)<sup>510</sup> were the centers where the principles of the Republican People's Party (RPP) were taught and practiced. The analysis of the *Ülkü* journal as an official publication of the People's Houses would also show how members from society were recruited to the party-state through the Houses in line with solidarist ideas. In this sense, the authors of the *Ülkü* journal, in general, sought to develop an alternative moral ground on which the Turkish nation would be able to perpetuate their lives independent of any religious moral precept. For this aim, religious control of influence over education, marriage, funerals, festivals, holidays and the like were to be sharply curtailed. It can be argued that this was the greatest anti-clerical struggle in Turkish history, at least at the level of discourse.

This ideology of anti-clericalism had long roots in eighteenth century rationalism and enlightenment developed in France. The various philosophies of the nineteenth century, positivism, the cult of science, solidarism etc., contributed to the intellectual heritage of the French Republicans who had relatively plausible reasons to dislike religion and tradition in their own political battles. In fact, at first sight, it may be possible to consider the *Ülkü* circle as the immediate outcome of the domineering impact of Western rationalist, solidarist and positivist philosophy that had hitherto constituted a strong consensus among the Revolutionary elite. Nevertheless, if it is thoroughly examined, the peculiar conditions of the 1930s also paved the way to a novel consideration of morality that would assure the moral order

---

<sup>510</sup> Necip Ali, "Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey'in Nutku", Vol. 1, No. 2,

of society through making them exalt the very fruits of the Revolution. In this sense, this also signified a new direction in Turkey's path to secularization.

The formation of the Free Party and in the aftermath, developments led the state elite to adopt a strong conviction that politics and culture of the Revolution were not successfully disseminated to the people. A considerable segment of the population were tempted to support the Free Party in showing their discontent toward RPP through several public protests and demonstrations. After the Free Party experiment, the secularization policy of the RPP underwent certain modifications in terms of attitude to the issue of religion. The control of religion was accompanied by more intensive concentration on developing an alternative moral ground quite apart from any religious and traditional ethics. It was just after the dissolution of the Free Party that a major effort was made to formulate the theoretical basis of the regime and that much attention was devoted to the problem of the education of the people (*halk terbiyesi*). The old values and patterns were being seriously revised in order to overcome that relative weakness of the regime in charming the popular appeal of the nation during the municipality elections in 1930. The radical laicist and positivist thoughts of the previous Young Turk intellectuals represented by *Garbçılar* were gradually able to gain ground during those years. As Adnan Adivar puts, "The domination of Western thought, or rather of the positivism of the West, was at that time so intense that one can hardly call it thought."<sup>511</sup> Adivar identifies Turkey as "a

---

(March 1933), 104.

<sup>511</sup> Abdulhak Adnan Adivar, "Interaction of Western and Islamic Thought in Turkey," in *Near Eastern Culture and Society: A Symposium on the Meeting on East and West*, T. Cuyler Young (ed.), (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 128



positivistic mausoleum” where the predominance of the “official dogma of irreligion” is a salient feature that transformed positivistic thought into a kind of religion and further “assumed much the same position as was formerly occupied by the old Islamic dogma.”<sup>512</sup>

Hence, with attempts at multi-party experience, the Kemalist elite of that specific time period felt a strong necessity to handle the problem of national education in a totally different way that emphasized the redefinition of morality. This kind of perception of morality marked a significant shift from control to the displacement perspective with respect to the issue of religion.<sup>513</sup> Religion began to be no more a constituent part of morality than had been before; rather it was even considered as a detrimental factor in establishing “revolutionary or national morality”. It should be noted that before 1930 the Revolutionary leaders aimed at eradicating the public visibility of Islam through certain acts and reforms. However, there had been several attempts to utilize religion in favor of the modernization of the country. The Gökalpian way of modernization that assumed religion as a relatively important factor in the nation-building process was not totally discarded by the Kemalist ruling elite before 1930. It is true that “the highest value and central symbol” for the ruling cadre “became not Islam but Turkism, or nationalism, or

---

<sup>512</sup> Ibid.

<sup>513</sup> Andrew Davison argues that there were two dominant ways of handling the problem of religion in Turkey: “control” and “displacement.” See *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

Kemalism, or, simply, ‘the Revolution’”<sup>514</sup> While, on the one hand, the Revolutionary rulers aimed at breaking up the existence of Islam in politics via several secular reforms, on the other hand, they aspired to control and further restructure religion in conformity with the general objectives of the Revolution. It can be argued that the pre-1930 Revolutionary politics of religion signifies a pendulum swinging between control and disestablishment attitudes concerning religion. However, after the Free Party experience, there began a tendency towards constructing a secular, revolutionary morality that would not require the resort to religion. The disestablishment perspective began to be the most stressed approach as state policy.

## **5.1. *LAICITÉ* AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER IN THE FRENCH REPUBLICAN LEGACY**

### **5.1.1. Where Does the Turkish Experience Fit within Different Paths of Secularization?**

Drawing on a theory of secularization, David Martin held that there is not a particular and unitary pattern of secularization. Each state has its own secularization pattern dependent upon the historical events that one experienced. In simple terms, secularization is not a unilinear process, but it has different consequences in different societies. Martin continues to argue that secularization initially takes place within the realm of the Christian societies. That is, for him, a general theory of secularization

---

<sup>514</sup> Robert Bellah, “Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan”,

can only be drawn by means of taking Christianity and the societies with a Christian historical period as the unit of analysis. However, secularization was then exported to or qualified for other societies with certain modifications. Moreover, each Christian state with a different sect and historical background also carries different patterns of secularization. He mainly points to six patterns of secularization: (i) The American Pattern; (ii) The British Pattern; (iii) The French (Latin) Pattern and The South American (extended Latin) Pattern; (iv) The Russian Pattern; (v) The Calvinist Pattern and finally (vi) The Lutheran Pattern. Beside these patterns, there are three main criteria that Martin defines with which the basic patterns were manifested. These are individualism, pluralism and Calvinist salience. For instance, the degree of pluralism of a country determines the range of its pattern of secularization. In a country with mass religious beliefs based on Catholic monopoly and lesser degree of pluralism like France, secularization has resulted in a polarization and a radicalization of both the religious and secular sides. On the contrary, in a pluralistic country like the United States, religion has never caused such a polarization and cleavages.<sup>515</sup>

From the standpoint of this general theory of secularization, it can be argued that Turkey has also its peculiar way of secularization that has certain idiosyncratic characteristics. Actually, in the Turkish context, it is more accurate to talk about secularism than secularization. It is a common idea that secularization is not the same as secularism. Secularization relates essentially to a process of decline in religious

---

*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, Is. 1, (Jul., 1958), pp. 1-5, p. 3

<sup>515</sup> David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1978)

activities, beliefs, ways of thinking, and institutions that occurs primarily in association with, or as an unconscious or unintended consequence of, other processes of social structural change. On the other hand, secularism is an ideology that “aims to denounce all forms of supernaturalism and agencies devoted to it, advocate nonreligious, antireligious, or anti-clerical principles as the basis for personal morality and social organization.”<sup>516</sup> Secularism, in short, aims to establish a secular society. Therefore, for a secularist presumption, the ultimate structure of society will be secular. Cox expresses this in his famous book *The Secular City*. For him, whereas secularization implies a continuing and open-ended process in which values and world views are continually revised in accordance with evolutionary change in history, secularism, like religion, projects a closed world-view and an absolute set of values in line with an ultimate historical purpose having a final significance for human beings.<sup>517</sup> In view of that, the Turkish case can, to a considerable extent, be categorized under the banner of secularism. However, the term “secularism” does also not correspond to the complex structure of the Turkish *laiklik*.

Along these lines of argumentation, this study argues that Turkish secularization has also its own peculiar pattern though its peculiarity is mainly based on its appropriation of the French legacy and modification of French secularity tradition to the Turkish context. Furthermore, the secular conversion of Turkey in the 1930s was the artifact of the combination of the French legacy with the “political religion” of a rising totalitarian regime. The French Revolution created a political

---

<sup>516</sup> Bryan Wilson, “Secularization” in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, editor in chief Mircea Eliade, (New York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 159

legacy in which the object of worship was shifted from God to nation. As George Mosse aptly notes, it was a new politics that sought to express and enhance national unity or general will “through the creation of a political style which became, in reality, a secularized religion.”<sup>518</sup> This new style, actually, embraced the utilization of national myths and symbols and the creation of a liturgy that enabled people to a direct participation in national worship. For Mosse, the mass movements and revolutions of the twentieth century adopted and appropriated this style with minor modification and thus became the heirs of a French revolutionary tradition that had long presented an alternative to parliamentary democracy. So, the Turkish Revolution was also one of its heirs, which showed this style mostly in the 1930s. In this sense, though *Laiklik*<sup>519</sup> could solely be understood within the peculiar historical context of Turkey, the Turkish peculiarity could not be deciphered unless the French Revolutionary and Republican heritages are covered. For that very reason, this study traces the roots of Turkish *laiklik* within the historical circumstance of France. Like the French Revolutionary elite, the Turkish Revolutionary elite imagined their own

---

<sup>517</sup> Harvey Cox, *The Secular City*, (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 21

<sup>518</sup> George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), p. 2

<sup>519</sup> The main reason why this study prefers, in general, the terms *laïcité* or *laiklik* instead of secularism or secular is due to the fact that French *laïcité* and Turkish *laiklik* have rather exceptional meanings that are almost non-transferable to any other word in English. Their meanings can only be detected by means of understanding the historical specificity of France and Turkey. That is, these terms were verily embedded to the local contexts. So, the concepts secularism or secular is not the exact thesaurus of *laïcité* or *laiklik*. However, though both of them carry certain specific meanings, there are close affinities between *laïcité* and *laiklik*. See, Jean Bauberot, “*Laïcité* and its permutations at the *fin(s) de siècle(s)*” in Kay Chadwick

*ancien régime*, monarchy, feudality, scholasticism and the like. That is, they began to read their history more or less the same as the French Revolutionaries did. Moreover, the undertaking of *laïcité* as a central pillar of state; anticlericalism; the creation of *morale laïque* and solidarist foundation of ethics; laicization of education and the church-state relations in France became the chief model for the Turkish Revolutionary leaders in their nation-building process. In this sense, the French case is extremely important in analyzing the Turkish secularization path.

### **5.1.2. *Laïcité* and Laic Education in the French Republican History**

Durkheim considered the Revolution of 1789 as having comparable features with the most primitive and simple religions. To him, in the Revolution, “things purely laical by nature were transformed by public opinion into sacred things.”<sup>520</sup> In this sense, the very principles of the Revolution themselves became a religion: “In a word, they have been a religion which had its martyrs and apostles, which has profoundly moved the masses, and which, after all, has given birth to great things.”<sup>521</sup> The Revolutionary elite was mainly concerned with “the problem of symbolic legitimation”, especially with the Jacobin era. Albert Mathiez argued that the Revolution formed a new symbolic system, which had constituted a revolutionary

---

and Timothy Unwin (ed.) *New Perspectives on the Fin de Siècle in nineteenth and twentieth- Century France*, (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), p. 21

<sup>520</sup> Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. by Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Macmillan, 1915), p. 245

<sup>521</sup> Emile Durkheim, “The Principles of 1789 and Sociology,” in Robert Bellah, ed., *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 35

religion in the Durkheimian sense. In this sense, “the festivals and federations that were convoked to celebrate important revolutionary events were the rituals of the new religion”.<sup>522</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville made also similar argumentations about the religious character of the Revolution:

Thus the French Revolution, though ostensibly political in origin, functioned on the lines, and assumed many of the aspects, of a religious revolution. Not only did it have repercussions far beyond French territory, but like all great religious movements it resorted to propaganda and broadcast a gospel. This was something quite unprecedented: a political revolution that sought proselytes all the world over and applied itself as ardently to converting foreigners as compatriots.<sup>523</sup>

Tocqueville was mainly concerned with the messianic quality of revolutionary religion. Especially in the recent decades, many scholars have focused on this religio-sacred character of the French Revolution. Mona Ozouf is the most popular among them. Her famous *Festivals and the Revolution* contributed much to the analysis of the symbolic system of the Revolution. According to her, the revolutionary festival, first and foremost, was aimed at accomplishing “a transference of sacrality”. For Mona Ozouf, the festivals of revolution bespeak of a “transfer of sacrality onto political and social values”<sup>524</sup> and a definition of a new legitimacy through which the new regime instituted and consecrated itself. This

---

<sup>522</sup> Cited in Lynn Hunt, “The Sacred and the French Revolution”, in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 25-43, p. 28

<sup>523</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, tr. by Stuart Gilbert, (New York: Anchor Books, 1955), p. 11

<sup>524</sup> Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, tr. by Alan Sheridan, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988), p. 282

attempt of transference of sacrality, spread throughout Europe by the French Revolution, put the relationships between politics and religion into a new dimension. It can be argued that, this attempt “made politics religious and gave an educational mission to the state.”<sup>525</sup> Furthermore, “it thus initiated a new era of rivalry and conflict between “civic” and “traditional” religion”<sup>526</sup>.

Drawing upon the Durkheimian conception of culture, Ozouf argued that the revolutionary festivals should not be viewed as the epiphenomenal superstructure of the Revolution, but rather, as its constitutive infrastructure by which the new regime ordered and revitalized itself. Festivals were the attempts to satisfy social and psychic needs for order, for community and for the sacred. Moreover, the festival was the Revolution’s utopian vision of itself. The general characteristics of the Revolutionary festivals were their utilization for the consecration of the new regime through certain rites and symbols that aimed at fulfilling the utopian vision of Rousseauian *volonté générale*. The festival, furthermore, represented the revolutionary embodiment of the French Enlightenment thought which foreshadowed not only the imposition of a uniform social vision upon a divided nation by a strong centralized state, but also a victory of the egalitarian principle over that of individual freedom. This thought had been interpreted by the Jacobins as a new political style assuming an ultimate unanimity that could only be fully achieved through an order of terror. This utopian Rousseauist understanding of politics became also a guiding

---

<sup>525</sup> Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, trans. by Keith Botsford, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 2

<sup>526</sup> Ibid.



principle, especially for the Jacobins, in shaping the revolutionary cultural policy.

Jacobins like Maximilien Robespierre realized that

The common people need the stimulus of ceremonies if they are to share (in Rousseau's words about his civil religion) those 'sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be a good subject and a faithful citizen': hence the provision of frequent festivals, with 'hymns and civic chants, in honor... of liberty and equality, justice, courage, love, infancy, agriculture, posterity, as well as Supreme Being.'<sup>527</sup>

Jacobins systematically utilized popular societies and meetings, theaters, civic games, military institutions and national as well as local festivals for the civic indoctrination of the population as a whole. For Robert Palmer, these activities and festivals cannot be evaluated as "an acute form of the patriotic celebrations once more common in democratic societies", but on the contrary they were "the signs of a compulsive ideology and foretaste of the mass manipulation used... recently by totalitarian regimes."<sup>528</sup> Moreover, all these would be considered as part of a program of adult education as in the case of the People's Houses in Turkey. The rationale behind this education was "to create a world of sights and sounds by which grown men and women would be remade for the Revolution."<sup>529</sup> This seeming attempt of acculturation had actually less to do with culture than with control. It was the social control of the population that aimed to construct a "civic vision of classless

---

<sup>527</sup> D. G. Charlton, *Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 5

<sup>528</sup> Robert R. Palmer, *The Improvement of Humanity*, p. 191

<sup>529</sup> Ibid.

harmony”<sup>530</sup>. On February 5, 1794 Robespierre made a public speech in which he drew the essential characteristics of the Revolutionary regime opposite of the *ancien régime*:

In our country, we want to replace egoism with morality, honour with honesty, the tyranny of fashion with the rule of reason, contempt for misfortune with contempt for vice, insolence with self-respect, vanity with greatness of soul, love of money with love of *gloire*... the pettiness of *les grands* with the greatness of man, an amiable, frivolous and wretched people with one that is magnanimous, strong and happy, that is to say all the vices and stupidities of the monarchy with all the virtues and miracles of the republic...<sup>531</sup>

In a similar fashion with Saint-Just, Robespierre also thought that in order to establish the reign of virtue, all the factions and parties had to be annihilated. The Revolutionary Government should overcome and subdue the storm of the Revolution.<sup>532</sup> Actually, for Robespierre, “politics was nothing more than public morality”.<sup>533</sup> Motherhood; respect for the old; gentleness to the young: “all these values were held to be a school for citizenship.”<sup>534</sup>

Though Napoleon’s Concordat with the Pope in 1802 allowed the restoration of religious cults, the search for alternative cults and beliefs continued to gain

---

<sup>530</sup> Patrice Higonnet, *Goodness beyond Virtue; Jacobins during the French Revolution*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998), p. 166

<sup>531</sup> Cited in John Hardman (ed), *The French Revolution; Sourcebook*, (London: Arnold, 1999), pp. 225-226

<sup>532</sup> Jacob L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, p. 138

<sup>533</sup> Simon Schama, *Citizens; A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 153

currency among the intellectuals. The immediate memory of Revolution that made possible various counter-religious cults were still flourishing. The replacement of the Gregorian calendar with the Republican one, the conversion of parish churches to the Temples of Reason, the discrediting of any other religion than that of Truth and Reason and closing the churches of all other sects by the Paris Commune, and Robespierre's non-deistic creed paved the way to ideas and cults based on anti-clerical, laic, rational and scientific faith for the later generations.<sup>535</sup> Albeit discontinuities, the Revolutionary legacy that stressed the creation of egalitarian, laic and civic society continued to inspire the Republican elite throughout the nineteenth century.

### **5.1.3. Secular Morality (*Morale Laïque*), Secular Education and Social Solidarity in the French Third Republic**

The second half of the nineteenth century marked an era when almost every Frenchmen felt the necessity to formulate a prescription for the "profound anarchy" in all spheres of social and political life. "What could be done to cure the spiritual sickness of France?" or "what kind of edifice should be erected on the site left vacant by the disappearance of Monarchy and Feudalism, the Nobility and the Church"<sup>536</sup> were the common questions for the intellectuals and rulers from the most

---

<sup>534</sup> Ibid.

<sup>535</sup> Charlton, *Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 4

<sup>536</sup> G. P. Gooch, *French Profiles; Prophets and Pioneers*, (London: Longmans, 1961), p. vii and p. 281

conservative to the atheist. It was generally agreed that the nation should obtain certain common goals in shaping its destiny. But, its method and means in determining the very principles of this commonality varied in accordance with different ideological stances. The 1870s were the most outstanding periods when the competition as well as struggle over the formulation of these principles reached its peak among the intellectual and state elite.

The first prominent character of the Third Republic that contributed to the formation of a solidarist laic ethic was Léon Gambetta. He was very active during the formation of the Third Republic. Actually, as the Minister of the Interior, he proclaimed the Republic on September 4, 1870.<sup>537</sup> However, it was a *de facto* republic. The peace with Prussia was made in the name of the Republic, the armies obeyed and conformed to the Republic. But the republicans were only one third of the Assembly. Even, this *de facto* Republic had not a constitution yet. The first few years of the Republic were devoted to the task of constitution building. Due to the fact that the number of Monarchists and Royalists in the Assembly was more than Republicans and Revolutionaries until 1876, Royalist opinion had dominated in the National Assembly during this constitution building process.<sup>538</sup> The Republicans could take control in 1877, when they put an end to the domination of Monarchists

---

<sup>537</sup> For the telegraph he proclaimed the Republic to the Prefects, Sub-Prefects, General Councilors and the Governor-General of Algeria see Leslie Derfler, *The Third French Republic 1870-1940*, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 102

<sup>538</sup> There were roughly 400 Monarchists, 200 Republicans and 30 Revolutionaries in the National Assembly. See, Roger Soltau, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 266

with a *coup d'état*<sup>539</sup>. Actually, one of the primary aims of Gambetta was to reduce the social division and to establish a unity between classes. Actually, he even denied using the term class: "Remember, gentlemen, I said *couches*, not *classes*: that is a distasteful word I never use."<sup>540</sup> His social policy was, mainly, based on "the promotion of the socially integrative concept of *solidarité*".<sup>541</sup> Having aimed at regenerating the nation, he wanted every strata of the nation to assemble around the principles of the Republic. In the election campaign of 1871, he said that "only the Republic can effect the harmonious reconciliation between the legitimate demands of workers and the respect for the sacred rights of property."<sup>542</sup> For him, unless this reconciliation is established, order cannot be attainable.

Gambetta was, at the same time, one of the chief spokesmen of anticlericalism. His famous motto: *La cléricisme – voilà l'ennemi!* (clericalism – there's the enemy) was an outcome of his strong antagonism towards religion. There had been a marked correspondence between anti-clericalism and the secular education in Gambetta's polity. For him, *ecole laïque* was necessary in order for Frenchmen to be confident of their nation's superiority in law, civilization and republican institutions. Education should be in line with dominant social values, and, in this sense, eliminate social, political as well as economic conflicts and promote unity of the classes.

---

<sup>539</sup> Francois Goguel and Marianna Carlson, "The Historical Background of Contemporary French Politics", *Yale French Studies*, No. 15, Social and Political France (1955), 30-37, p. 32

<sup>540</sup> Cited in Sanford Elwitt, *The Making of the Third Republic, Class and Politics in France, 1868-1884*, (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), p. 55

<sup>541</sup> Sanford Elwitt, *The Making of the Third Republic*, p. 54

Moreover, “a new moral unity from a unified education that would teach civic morality based on the principles of natural reason” had to be forged.<sup>543</sup>

The process of secularization in education and the exclusion of religious teaching were not very effective until the so-called Ferry Laws. Before these Laws, the adventure of the secular education was actually in fluctuation. That is, there had never been coherent and consistent policies of the governments on this issue. It depended on the initiatives of the leaders. With Jules Ferry<sup>544</sup>, the Minister of Public Instruction between 1879-1885 and the architect of the modern secular education of France, schooling had become compulsory from the age of six to thirteen and fees were abolished for the primary education. While the religious and ecclesiastical instruction was also abolished from State schools, the teaching of *morale et civic* was enacted.<sup>545</sup> It can be argued that the Ferry Laws was not merely a political issue. That is, “this legislative program was not merely an effort to contain, and even to neutralize the power of anti-republican interests in the French educational system, but an attempt to alter French culture itself.”<sup>546</sup> These Laws can be evaluated as the expression of a republican spirit, which aimed to “substitute for the Catholic soul of

---

<sup>542</sup> Cited in *ibid*, p. 58

<sup>543</sup> Joseph N. Moody, *French Education Since Napoleon*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 89

<sup>544</sup> For the wider account on Jules Ferry and his policies see Alfred Rambaud, *Jules Ferry*, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 1903) and Thomas F. Power, *Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism*, (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1944)

<sup>545</sup> H. C. Barnard, *Education and the French Revolution*, p. 228

the old institutions a spirit which was free of all confessional attachments, and even of all religious and metaphysical ties.”<sup>547</sup> Jules Ferry, emphasized two essential objectives of the law of March 28, 1882 on education that are interrelated with each other: “On the one hand it [the law] excludes the teaching of any particular dogma; on the other it gives first place among required subjects to moral and civic teaching.”<sup>548</sup> Moreover, “the 1882 program for the teaching of *morale* made many demands and stipulated obedience to authority”<sup>549</sup>. For instance, certain moral values as respect for duty, patience and devotion were highlighted: “Obedience, respect, help and concern for others, hard work courage, cleanliness, truthfulness, and modesty were desirable for all children and were woven into most texts on *morale* by authors wishing to conform to the official program so that their books would qualify for adoption by the cantonal meetings of teachers to select books.”<sup>550</sup>

Moral education independent of any religiosity was one of the foremost goals of Ferry. He held that the religious instruction was about the realm of the family, but the moral education belonged to the realm of public schooling. Furthermore, he

---

<sup>546</sup> Philip A. Bertocci, “Positivism, French Republicanism, and the Politics of Religion, 1848-1883,” *Third Republic/Troisième République*, Fall 1976, No. 2, pp. 182-227, p. 182

<sup>547</sup> Ibid.

<sup>548</sup> Jules Ferry, “Letter to the Primary Teachers of France, November 17, 1883” in *French Educational Ideals of Today, An Anthology of the Molders of French Educational Thought of the Present*, Ferdinand Buisson and Frederic Ernest Farrington (ed.) (New York: World Book Company, 1919), p. 6

<sup>549</sup> Ibid.

proclaimed in the Chamber of Deputies in June 1889 that “It is to the State and not to the Church that the control of the school belongs. That is why we hold so firmly the idea of *l’école laïque*.”<sup>551</sup> Ferry asked the teachers to be relieved from religious teaching while never relieving from the teaching of moral education. The primary duty and mission of the teachers, to Ferry, had to instruct children in ethics and citizenship in order to make them honest citizens. In this context, “each teacher is a natural aid to moral and social progress.”<sup>552</sup>

The teachers should instruct better habits, respectful manners, more uprightness, more obedience, greater submission to duty to the children and they should prepare a generation of good citizens of the Republic in order to win the cause of the secular school and to contribute to the rebuilding and the greatness of the nation.<sup>553</sup>

Teachers as possessor of knowledge, now gradually came to be seen as wielding a small portion of power of the State. Along with the extension of the content of elementary education, Jules Ferry’s aim was the secularization and

---

<sup>550</sup> Linda Clark, “The Molding of the *Citoyenne*: The Image of the Female in French Educational Literature, 1880-1914”, *TR/TR*, (Spring-Fall 1977), No. 3, pp. 74-104, p. 88

<sup>551</sup> cited in Y. de la Briere, *Le Lutttes presentes de l’Eglise*, (Paris: G. Beauchesne 1913), p. 317

<sup>552</sup> Jules Ferry, “Letter to the Primary Teachers of France, November 17, 1883”, p. 10

<sup>553</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17



republicanization of the school.<sup>554</sup> In conjunction with solidarism, Positivism was the chief inspiration source that influenced most of his political behavior.<sup>555</sup>

Thanks to the efforts of Auguste Comte and other positivist thinkers, Ferry's generation lived in an era when "science" became a prefiguration that "represented the 'positive' age of humanity which must replace both the clergy's preaching of the theological spirit and the revolutionary utopias of the metaphysical age."<sup>556</sup> However, the problem was to reconcile the Rights of Man and liberty with a historicist, positivist vision of the march of reason. For, in this positivist vision, there was no room for the sovereignty of individuals. The solution was found in shifting from the idea of the natural rights of individuals to "the value of educating citizens, whereby each member of the social contract would, in the long run, find his universality: pedagogy of reason."<sup>557</sup> This signified the birth of new republican creed with which a syncretic philosophy of will and reason could be possible. This counterbalance of religion with science enabled the "enlightened" elites to formulate a realistic answer to the Rousseauian question of how it would be possible to transform the modern man into a citizen. This was only achievable by means of the schools of the

---

<sup>554</sup> Francois Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 148

<sup>555</sup> Thomas F. Power, *Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism*, (New York: King's Crown Press, 1944), p. 4

<sup>556</sup> François Furet, *Revolutionary France 1770-1880*, tr. by Antonia Nevill, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 475

<sup>557</sup> Ibid., p. 476

Republic.<sup>558</sup> That is, the dilemma, for Rousseau, that how could corrupted men generate virtuous society or how could the effect become the cause could be resolved by means of civic education, which appeared to offer the way out.<sup>559</sup> Accordingly, it might be feasible to teach men an entirely new conception of social and political life. The advocates of solidarism whose purpose was to eradicate the traditional religious ideas from society often assimilated the positivist doctrine for their ideological aims. This understanding is important, because it shows that French intellectuals had a dilemma between secularism and democracy, and tried to solve it through radical projects of converting the whole population to the religion of science.

Jules Ferry was the first man who carried positivism into his political struggle. For instance, in his electoral committee, all the “general staff of positivism” can be seen. Emile Littré, J. F. E. Robinet and the like.<sup>560</sup> Having mainly been inspired by the naturalist and positivist thinkers of his time namely Littré, Wyruboff, Robinet and Laffitte<sup>561</sup>, Jules Ferry wanted to base moral action on positive philosophy that would transform ideas and customs of the society. Ferry declared, “for Positivism, morality is an essentially human fact, distinct from every belief concerning the beginning and end of things. Morality is a social fact, which bears within itself its

---

<sup>558</sup> Ibid.

<sup>559</sup> Geraint Parry, “Constructive and Reconstructive Political Education”, *Oxford Review of Education*, (Mar-Jun99), Vol. 25, Issue 1/2, pp. 23-39

<sup>560</sup> Philip Nord, *The Republican Moment, Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 133

<sup>561</sup> Claude Nicolet, *L’Idée Républicaine en France (1789-1924), Essai D’Histoire Critique*, (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1982), p. 37

beginning and end.”<sup>562</sup> By means of a scientific instruction of the masses, he hoped to form a new positivist and secular morality that would make disestablishment of the Church inevitable. He argued that the Republic has only one dreadful enemy: the clergy. This “decomposing body will never triumph over a living society, whose entire progress is absolutely laic.”<sup>563</sup> For him, the school must be purged of all religious prejudices. It must teach a morality that is wholly human. It must be made an institution that will mold a society without any religious prejudices.

The positivist line of republican argumentation on education and morality took a somewhat different shape towards the end of the nineteenth century, especially shortly after the famous Dreyfus Affair. Although the Dreyfus Affair bespoke of a high-flown anti-Semite reaction of nationalist and religiously oriented groups of France, this Affair was then utilized by the radical republican French elite as a catalyst to assimilate the different ethical and ethnic postures among the society to create a uniform secular French identity. Actually, this assimilationist character of French Republican politics in the wake of the *fin de siècle* was a reconstruction of the Jacobin political style. The “neo-Jacobin” political philosophy of the Third Republic revealed itself particularly in the efforts to construct a “secular morality” (*morale laïque*) as a substitute of a religious or traditional moral idea.

Having had this Republican legacy of *laïcité*, the solidarist thinkers of the late nineteenth century like Léon Bourgeois and Émile Durkheim founded their

---

<sup>562</sup> Cited in Evelyn M. Acomb, *The French Laic Laws 1879-1889*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 45

<sup>563</sup> Thomas F. Power, *Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism*, p. 37

assumptions of *solidarité* basically on a peculiar conception of *morale laïque*. Their initial concern was to reach a moral unity among society that would assure a safe atmosphere for a democracy to nourish in an increasingly modernizing French society. It might be argued that the idea of *solidarité* signified a secular reconsideration of morality within a disenchanted boundary of modernity. This reconsideration at the same time provided a safety belt for the regime to persuade people about the dangers of conflict and struggle that was mostly manifested in economic terms. Certainly, for the solidarist thinkers as well, the role of national education in disseminating the new moral precepts of the Republic was of utmost importance. Considering the efforts of the famous solidarist pedagogue of the time, Ferdinand Buisson, in the realm of teaching Republican morality, secular education occupied a central place among the representators of the solidarist ideology in the wake of the *fin de siècle*:

The public primary schools were emancipated beyond a doubt by the laws of 1882. It was decided that not only the elements of knowledge should be taught, but also the elements of ordinary morality with the omission of confessional questions which might divide the children. But for a long time the adherents of religious beliefs denied that a school neutralized in this fashion could have an effective influence on the conscience. Neutrality, they said, is nullity. And the partisans of the lay school, headed by Ferdinand Buisson, strove to find in moral education some kind of substitute for morality on a religious basis.<sup>564</sup>

So, the rationalist-materialist philosophy that sprang from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, reinforced by the philosophical efforts of the nineteenth-

---

<sup>564</sup> Célestin Bouglé, *The French Conception of "Culture Générale" and Its Influences upon Instruction*, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, 1938), pp. 25-26

century positivism by utilizing “science”, had produced among the educated elite of France at the turn of the century an attitude of profound skepticism and doubt with regard to traditional religious doctrines: “Whatever the masses may have felt, the dominant social and political groups were infected with this spirit of skepticism, and their outlook was distinctly secular.”<sup>565</sup>

The rapid growth of socialism and the labor movements, however, further increased a sense of disorder and chaos. Solidarists saw moral anomie as the main reason of this chaos. However, due to the profound influence of the rationalist and positivist ideas over this generation, the religious option never had a chance to be of remedy. Even moral matters were explicitly undertaken outside the domain of religion and tradition. The sort of apprehension of the issue of morality greatly gained support with the Dreyfus affair. At this juncture, as Robert Bellah contends, “There was a conscious effort by liberal and left republicans, politicians and intellectuals, to replace the conservative moral teachings of Catholicism with a secular ethic of a modern democracy.” In that sense, for Bellah, Durkheim’s sociology based on secular and solidarist moral assumptions became the most conscious and important body of thought which could play this role. With its element of rational autonomy, secular morality does not only “change the conception of the rules which are the essence of moral discipline, it also changes the meaning of attachment to social groups.”<sup>566</sup>

---

<sup>565</sup> Malcolm O. Partin, *Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, and the Church: The politics of anti-clericalism, 1899-1905*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 268

<sup>566</sup> Robert Bellah, *Durkheim and Morality*, pp. xxxviii-xli

Teaching of morals was the predominant issue among all of his writings on education. In fact, Durkheim's studies coincided with the anti-clerical aims of the Third Republic. Moreover, he was a strong supporter of the Third Republic.<sup>567</sup> His writings on social solidarity and secular morality became substantial sources of inspiration for the leaders of the Third Republic of his time. Durkheim held that the modern cult of individual actually began to appear in a new form of secular religion. Furthermore, "Durkheim's principle preoccupation was to construct a morality which would be absolutely independent of all theological or metaphysical conceptions."<sup>568</sup> A society equipped with the system of secular morality "had to curb a person's natural instincts and give to everyone a sense of responsibility and duty, and a set of common values."<sup>569</sup> In that sense, it called for obedience, self-discipline and sacrifice. One of the problematical issues in moral teaching, for Durkheim, was that of "authority". Religions could overcome this problem of authority by influencing the pupils through making references to God and divine revelations. However, this cannot be possible in a laique, humanistic system of morality. Durkheim saw society itself as the source of this moral authority. Society would provide the moral codes for the individuals within secular and rational integument. This, then becomes not only the ultimate source of religious experience, but also "a superior force on which

---

<sup>567</sup> Goffrey Walford and W.S.F. Pickering (ed.), *Durkheim and Moral Education*, p. 3

<sup>568</sup> Robert Marjolin, "French Sociology-Comte and Durkheim," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, Is. 5 (Mar., 1937), 693-704, p. 697

<sup>569</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7

everyone depends.”<sup>570</sup> What is more important was the task of rationalizing morality by means of emancipating moral realities from the monopoly of religious conceptions:

Consequently, if, in rationalising morality in moral education, one confines himself to withdraw from moral discipline everything that is religious without replacing it, one must inevitably runs the danger of withdrawing at the same time all elements that are properly moral. Under the name of rational morality, we would be left only with an impoverished and colourless morality... We must seek, in the very heart of religious conceptions, those moral realities that are, as it were, lost and dissimulated in it. We must disengage them, find out what they consist of, determine their proper nature, and express them in rational language. In a word, we must discover the rational substitutes for those religious notions that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most essential moral ideas.<sup>571</sup>

This effort of discovering the moral forces that human beings “have conceived of only under the form of religious allegories,”<sup>572</sup> coincided with the attempt of disengaging those moral precepts from their religious symbols, and “present them in their rational nakedness.”<sup>573</sup> By tracing the philosophical lines of Durkheim and the other solidarist thinkers, the radical revolutionaries of Turkey in the 1930s conform to the central value of this understanding of morality that had been underscored by the solidarist and rationalist foundation of ethics.

---

<sup>570</sup> Irvine Zeitline, *Ideology and the Development of...* pp. 250-251

<sup>571</sup> Emile Durkheim, *Moral Education, A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*, trans. by Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 9

<sup>572</sup> Cited in Robert Bellah, *op.cit*, p. xli

<sup>573</sup> *Ibid.*

For Durkheim, this was the “first order of business” in which moral education would become rational and “at the same time produce all the results that should be expected from it.”<sup>574</sup> Through this novel reconsideration of the issue of morality, Durkheim attempted to form “a new republican ideology that was both scientifically grounded and pedagogically effective; what he produced amounted to a distinctive form of liberal and reformist socialism framed in solidarist terms.”<sup>575</sup> In short, at the center of the Durkheimian solidarist epistemology, there was a necessity to set up an alternative moral foundation to the existing Catholic (religious) one. With its element of rational autonomy, this secular morality does not only “change the conception of the rules which are the essence of moral discipline, it also changes the meaning of attachment to social groups.”<sup>576</sup>

This neo-Jacobin political style of the Third Republic created a long lasting legacy not only for the later generations of France but also for the revolutionary elites of several countries in the way of their nation-building processes. Doubtlessly speaking, Turkey was one of the prominent models, which showed evident relevance to the neo-Jacobin reconstruction of politics. It can be maintained that this sort of attempt to construct a secular morality in France was also apparent among the Turkish Republican elite, especially after 1930. This whole French legacy had been appropriated and internalized by the Turkish Revolutionary elite in times of a crisis.

---

<sup>574</sup> Emile Durkheim, *Moral Education*, p. 11

<sup>575</sup> Steve Lukes, *Émile Durkheim*, p. 356

<sup>576</sup> Robert Bellah, ed., *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. xli



## 5.2. The Turkish Revolution and the Problem of *Laiklik*

When Turkish revolutionaries headed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk assumed the leadership of Turkey in the early 1920s, they immediately inaugurated a broad program of reform which attempted to diminish the influence of traditional and religious institutions, almost in all spheres of social and political life, including religion, education, dress, calendar, voting, etc. These laic reforms were considered as measures of the revolutionary system against tradition, which seemed to be identified with the anti-republican forces. As in the French Republican case, these reform attempts not only had political purposes. That is, the Turkish revolutionary leaders did not merely aim at neutralizing and even devastating the power of anti-republican groups in politics, but more importantly altering Turkish culture and morality itself:

They were concerned primarily with the highest problems of moral transformation. They were moralists who had noted the failure of the traditional values, religious and ethical, to exercise effective control over the behavior of the Faithful under the new social, economic, and political conditions. For them, new and secular conceptions of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful would be the guides to action; the only valid criterion of those would be individual Reason.<sup>577</sup>

Given that the Turkish Republic developed a new value system different from the value universe of the periphery<sup>578</sup>, Mardin held that the Turkish Revolutionary

---

<sup>577</sup> Fay Kirby Berkes, *Village Institutes*, unpublished PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1964, pp. 41-2

<sup>578</sup> See for example, Şerif Mardin, "Just and the Unjust," *Daedalus*, 120 (1990): 113-129

leaders took “the symbolic system of society; culture... as a target than the social structure itself”<sup>579</sup> He explained the origins of the Turkish Revolution by stressing the importance of values:

The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented *bourgeoisie*, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal privileges, but it *did* take as a target the values of the Ottoman *ancien régime*.<sup>580</sup>

Within culture, religion seems to have been singled out as the core of the system.<sup>581</sup> A new culture in its Kemalist sense was manufactured as the domain of social engineering via state agencies.<sup>582</sup> Thus, the ideal culture became the outcome of a constant process of state production<sup>583</sup> and projected a vision of a well-ordered and harmonious social life promoted by the doctrines of the elite.<sup>584</sup> Cultural

---

<sup>579</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.2, 1971: 197-211, p. 202

<sup>580</sup> Ibid.

<sup>581</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution”, p. 202.

<sup>582</sup> For the relationship between modern state and culture, see Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), especially chapters 1, 5 and 6. See also, Eugen Weber, “What Rough Beast?”, *Critical Review*, 2 (1996), pp. 285-98)

<sup>583</sup> Quoted from Richard G. Fox, “Introduction”, in Richard G. Fox (ed.), *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Culture* (USA: American Eth. Soc. Mon. Series, No. 2, 1990), p. 2.

<sup>584</sup> In this sense, Atatürk treated culture as a mentality that every ‘civilized’ Turkish citizen, a cultural/cultured man, should have in describing and determining his own way. See Afetinan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıra ve Belgeler* (Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1959), p. 272.

production gave rise to a populist idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious community, free from internal dissent and struggle. Therefore, the modernizing rulers saw the mores of traditional power centers as the fossilized traces of social and cultural archaism. Not only their worldview was seen as wrong, but also their intention was described as evil and harmful.<sup>585</sup> Thus, the basic aspect of the rulers' civilizing mission was to free people from tight traditional ties, and then to symbolically pattern the people into a 'collective' union made up of civilized individuals. They, in turn, began to be educated and trained "into becoming patriotic citizens of a secular republic rather than pious members of a Muslim community."<sup>586</sup> In short, attempts were made to assimilate the 'heterogeneous' elements (or differences), be it religious, ethnic or ideological, within the public realm and to enumerate those differences under a uniform culture, which was particularly identified in secular terms.

The Turkish Revolution was intended to be a political, social, and economic revolution, as well as a cultural one. The leaders of the Revolution, known as Kemalists, intended to make a clean break with the past and to adopt Western institutions and values in place of traditional Ottoman-Islamic ones. In a few short decades, the country was transformed from an autocratic-religious state to a republican regime, and from strong militarism to vigorous nationalism and westernization. Secularism was accepted as one of the fundamental principles of the new regime. Accordingly, there were attempts to eliminate certain religious, social,

---

<sup>585</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları*, p. 169.

cultural, and legal institutions of Islam; the official language of Turkey was changed, history rewritten, and social customs, such as dress, reformed. The purpose of all these reforms was nothing less than a wide-ranging transformation of Turkish values and ideals. Kemalist leaders conceived of education as a powerful force to be employed to achieve these purposes. Under the new government, the educational system was reconstructed and used as a vehicle to transform Turkish society. First, the entire system of education was unified and brought under the control of the Ministry of Education. Religious schools were closed, and religious instruction was dropped from the curriculum. Moreover, the study of Arabic and Persian, which was associated with the Islamic tradition, was discontinued. In addition, concerted efforts were made to reshape the values and attitudes of the Turkish school youth in terms of rationalist and secular principles.

During this secularization period of the early Republic, the dominant role of religion was diminished within the political domain with a high consensus among the elite. While the political role of religion was undermined in agreement, the moral role of it became a source of never-ending dispute, which has an effect even on the current debates related to the role of religion in Turkish society.

However, before the 1930s, the ruling cadre did not opt for a disposal of religion totally from moral matters. What they aimed was at eradicating the public visibility of Islam through certain acts and reforms. Previously, there had been several attempts to utilize religion in favor of the modernization of the country. The

---

<sup>586</sup> Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?", *Middle East Journal*, 51/1 (1997), p. 34.

Gökalpian way of modernization that assumed religion as a relatively important factor in the nation-building process was not totally discarded by the Kemalist ruling elite until 1930. It is true that “the highest value and central symbol” for the ruling cadre “became not Islam but Turkism, or nationalism, or Kemalism, or, simply, ‘the Revolution’”<sup>587</sup> On the one hand, the Revolutionary rulers aimed at breaking up the existence of Islam in politics via several anti-clerical reforms. On the other hand, they aspired to control and further restructure religion in conformity with the general objectives of the Revolution. Islam was accorded a relatively influential role only insofar as it endorsed the principles of the new regime. It can be argued that the pre-1930 Revolutionary politics of “official religion” signifies an ambiguous character, a pendulum swinging between control and disestablishment attitudes towards religion:

The most important function of “official religion” was that it provided a legitimating framework for the religion of the lower classes. By replacing the official religion with the principle of *laïcisme*, Atatürk erased the possibilities of legitimation offered by the framework. The little man’s religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation: tolerated but not secure. It was this tension which Atatürk hoped would work in favor of secularization in the long run.<sup>588</sup>

However, after 1930, there began a tendency towards constructing a secular, revolutionary morality that would not require resort to religion at all. The 1930s marked a significant shift in the mentality of the ruling leaders towards the essential issues of social and political life. The 1930 municipal elections were in a sense the trial through which the ruling cadre could measure the internal contractual

---

<sup>587</sup> Robert Bellah, “Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan”, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, Is. 1, (Jul., 1958), pp. 1-5, p. 3

commitment of the populace. When the result made the elite understand that the people's alignment with tradition had not been supplanted by the revolutionary affiliation yet, a new idea of reform mostly in the realm of education came to the fore.

It was just after the dissolution of the Free Party that the control of religion was accompanied by more intensive concentration on developing an alternative moral ground quite apart from any religious and traditional morality. Elites made education a primary field of interest, because they believed that only the medicine of enlightenment could cure the spiritual malady the Turkish nation inherited from the traditional Ottoman way of life. The creation of a national system of adult education alongside the other schooling methods was said to constitute a means for creating not merely an enlightened and civilized electorate, but also an electorate imbued with republican faith, which would guarantee the perpetuation of the Republic at least in the sense of procedural democracy. The people had to be persuaded about the intrinsic merits of the revolutionary ideology.

The radical laicist and positivist thoughts of the previous Young Turk intellectuals were gradually able to gain ground during those years. Although the deliberate effort to forget and erase tradition was never fully realized, conscious rejection of traditional symbols and values became pervasive among the most influential figures of the Turkish ruling strata after 1930. Throughout the 1930s, the Turkish ruling elite opted for more authoritarian alternatives to make social and political conditions ripe for the future "democratic" days.

---

<sup>588</sup> Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in Turkish Revolution," 1971, pp. 208-9

### 5.3. The *Ülkü* Elite and the Construction of Secular Morality

Radical Kemalism of the 1930s, particularly the Kemalism of *Ülkü*, proposed essentially a secular project to transmute society into “deracinated replicas”<sup>589</sup> of the revolutionary elite: “We are destined to remake people and to get them to speak, dress and live like us.”<sup>590</sup> It was a process of deracination because the existing belief index of the populace was aimed to be uprooted and further supplanted with the secularly sacrosanct index of the revolutionary ethics. This secular morality was to take the place of and serve as a substitute for the religious one especially by reason of “superior excellence” and power of the new revolutionary faith: “The most prominent feature of the Turkish Revolution is that it is not based on a prophet that was born by hidden mystic diseases. Rather, it grounds on a perfect human intelligence and a real genius.”<sup>591</sup>

The *Ülkü* elite was also the prominent architect of the idea of the People’s Houses that were designed as sites of converting people into the values of the Turkish revolution so as to redress them with revolutionary morality. As İsmet İnönü noted, “The People’s Houses are the places where the notions of morality, science and intelligence are being explained, applied, developed, enrooted and established in the Turkish fatherland.” Moreover, he emphasized “the great role the Houses are

---

<sup>589</sup> This phrase is borrowed from Gauri Viswanathan, *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 5

<sup>590</sup> Aptullah Ziya, “Köy Mimarisi” (The Village Architecture) in *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): 37-41, p. 40

<sup>591</sup> “İnkılap Ülkülerini Yayma Yolunda,” (In the Way of Disseminating the Revolutionary Ideals) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933), p. 25

playing in the realms of morality and personality.”<sup>592</sup> This process meant a conversion of previous morality into secular identification with a new type of morality, “laic morality” (*laik ahlak*)<sup>593</sup>.

One of the main questions in the journal was if “religion should be given a place in the inculcation of moral principles or ideals, or will all morality and ideals be based on secular foundations?”<sup>594</sup> The *Ülkü* authors responded to this question by defining morality completely outside religious and traditional realms. This signified a turning point with respect to the secularist policies of the revolution, since “the old principles conformed neither to the contemporary time nor to our [new] morality consideration.”<sup>595</sup> Therefore, they “could not apply those fossilized principles boiling and springing (*fışkıran*) life.”<sup>596</sup> In order to uproot the previous moral considerations “the rescuer hand of the revolution seized the social body. It collected the old decayed and dead principles together and threw them into the endless depth of the past.”<sup>597</sup> The *Ülkü* elite considered “the emancipation of morality from religion” as the chief factor for the laicization of state and society.

---

<sup>592</sup> İsmet İnönü, “Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, p. 2

<sup>593</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Peasantism Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (September 1933), 118-125, 119.

<sup>594</sup> Nusret Kemal, ‘Köycülük Programına Giriş’, *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 26 (1935), p.139.

<sup>595</sup> Necip Ali, ‘İnkılap ve Türk Kanunu Medenisi’, *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 9 (1933), p.185

<sup>596</sup> Ibid.

<sup>597</sup> Ibid.



It is noted that the Western states had been secularized by means of ideas as well as institutions. That is, it was the secularization of intellectual life, science and institutions that brought about the secularization of their states. However, for Necmettin Sadık, “in countries like Turkey in which the influence of old, archaic and religious teachings still persist, the laic state became necessary for the laicization of other institutions and intellectual life.”<sup>598</sup> In this sense, the laic state became “the propagator, the apostle and guardian of social progress and evolution.”<sup>599</sup> The old morality incongruent with the modern conditions was to be discarded by the laic state, and replaced with modern culture:

Previously religion was the only morality... Now, because modern society has other source for unity and solidarity, its conceptions of morality also originate from the social consciousness.... Morality is not decided by the unchangeable judgments of this or that religion, but by the changing society. That morality has now no relation to religion, is a matter not even worth discussing... That means that the basis of morality is not religion anymore, but culture.<sup>600</sup>

Mehmet Saffet, one of the prominent figures of *Ülkü*, stated that divinity should be handed down from God to the society through teachings of laic sources: ‘True religion is to believe that divinity is expressed in society.’<sup>601</sup> The authors of *Ülkü* saw inseparable links between their politico-social revolution and the religious transformation of Turkish society. However, they faced the difficult task of

---

<sup>598</sup> Necmeddin Sadık, ‘Layik Ne Demek’, *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 11 (1933): 370-378, p.374

<sup>599</sup> Ibid.

<sup>600</sup> Ibid., p.373

expressing their imagined community to the masses who had hitherto only identified themselves according to faith or place of origin. So, they aimed at creating a secular Turkish identity and eclipsing the influence and presence of Islam in the public sphere: “The boundary of religious consideration in Turkey should not exceed the skin of body of a citizen (*Türkiye’de din telakkisinin hududu yurttaş vücudunun cildini aşamaz.*) In this sense, religion should have no place in society, administration, and politics.”<sup>602</sup>

In doing so, the leaders of the Revolution attempted to constitute a new morality which they also called *inkılap ahlakiyatı* (revolutionary morality)<sup>603</sup> with certain appropriate apparatus and institutions of rituals to educate the people about modern civilization, the new Turkish culture, principles of the state, love of the country and unity of national sensitivity. The very establishment of the People Houses in 1932 should notably be considered as the reflection of such efforts.

So why did the necessity of replacement arise? The answer to this question has to do with the basic ideological suppositions of the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism, a primary reference to the efforts paid by the elites to secure a legitimate ground for their reforms and nation-building strategies. Due to the secularist and rationalist character of these strategies, the source of their legitimacy should also be derived from anti-religious origins. Religious mentality was regarded as the primary

---

<sup>601</sup> Mehmet Saffet, ‘Milliyetçiliğin Felsefi Esasları’, *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 12 (1934).

<sup>602</sup> Recep Peker, “Uluslaşma-Devletleşme” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 40, (June, 1936): I-VII, p. III

impediment on the road to civilization and emancipation of people. Kemalism was said to promise to provide complete liberation of personality and to contribute to the creation of preconditions for its development on a much larger scale. The population was to be liberated from “damaging” reactionary teachings and credos and to be indoctrinated continuously with the scientific view of the world:

Furthermore, the revolutionary elite had an uneasy relationship from the beginning with Islam seen as indistinguishable from the old, archaic one. Islam was considered to be the reason for the socio-economic, political and cultural backwardness of the Ottoman society. According to them, the way to become integral part of civilized world (West) could only be possible through a total break off from the world-views of the past (Ottoman-Islamic civilization) and from those manners contradicting progress and science, particularly positivism<sup>604</sup>. The radical revolutionary elite of the 1930s, in general, avoided utilizing religion, even pragmatically and selectively, to justify new practices, and new allegiances. The traditional cultural baggage was often the first item to be discarded along the path of modernization. Moreover, the revolutionary way of modernization attributed hostile images towards the very beliefs and rituals crucial to the definition of Anatolian

---

<sup>603</sup> Ali Sami, “Güzel Sanatları İnkılabına Nasıl Maledebiliriz,” (How Can We Ascribe Arts to the Service of Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July 1934), 361.

<sup>604</sup> Such concepts and doctrines as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean positivism and solidarism have nourished Kemalism. In this sense, it “owes a lot to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century scienticism.” Ali Kazancıgil “The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism”, in Ali Kazancıgil & Ergun Özbudun (eds.) *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1981), p. 37.

Muslim identities.<sup>605</sup> Instead, they attempted to describe new principles for the state and society, which in large part were inspired from the French model. This was the basis of Kemalist *laicism* that prearranged a process of secularization covering all spheres of life: science and reason instead of religious thought would provide the legitimate ground for power: “The scholastic mentality such as fatalism and *tevekkül* is dominant among our society.”<sup>606</sup> For that reason, “this should be demolished and be replaced by the scientific mentality.”<sup>607</sup> In this sense, the emphasis was on secular, national rather than religious affiliation as a legitimizing force.

Another motive for constructing an alternative morality lay in the authoritarian aspirations of the leadership that sought to subject all segments of society to the control of the Party and to attempt to transform them into devotees of the regime. That was the hardest part of the job, because religion in itself was obviously anti-revolutionary oriented, and the results of the attempts to integrate it into an institutionalized party framework remained unsuccessful. The system could not, nor did it wish to, tolerate authority outside itself. From the all above-cited motives originated three basic objectives of the party and state policies toward religion: restricting the influence of religion in society, controlling the activities of religious communities, and putting pressure on any religious initiative in the public realm. Between party and state objectives there were no real differences. There existed a

---

<sup>605</sup> Gavin D. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, p.45

<sup>606</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Köycülük Nedir”, *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6, (July, 1933): 422-430, p. 424

sympiosis of state and party apparatus in all spheres of social life. However, this sympiosis was not public. In theory, the state was striving for individual believers to be treated as full-fledged citizens, but in practice there were many deviations, especially at the local level.<sup>608</sup> In order to overcome this problem, the revolutionary elite considered the People's Houses as centers of cultural conversion, which would provide a sympiosis between ideals of state and society.

Like the revolutionary leaders of the French Revolution who had utilized public rituals as singing, marching, and rallying in the public address to the people in order to construct a strong ritual consensus between them and the crowds<sup>609</sup>, the Turkish radical revolutionary elite employed the People Houses as centers of public rituals where the new regime's rites and symbols were produced. Hence, these centers were not only the institutions of adult education, but also places where the secular codes of collective identity were disseminated. It might be argued that the imagination of the Turkish nation was institutionalized through these public centers. Moreover, by the help of these centers, they aimed at amassing the population into a homogenous whole. In this sense, the *Ülkü* journal as the prominent publication of

---

<sup>607</sup> Ibid.

<sup>608</sup> For a detailed account of religious communities and their reactions to the state policies during the single party period see, Gavin D. Brockett, "Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2000

<sup>609</sup> Bernhard Giesen, "Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins and Romantics" in *Deadalus*, Summer 1998, p. 238

the People Houses played a greater role in transmitting the “root paradigms”<sup>610</sup> of the rituals exercised in the Houses. Furthermore, the *Ülkü* authors believed that a strong nation needed a foundation in a common secular-religious practice based on shared political symbols, rituals, and language. Several ideological views, examples and models – French solidarism, positivism, and étatism– were sometimes cited, and interpolated with domestic views. Furthermore, fascism and communism were also added to the roster of international models suitable for citation and emulation in the anti-liberal climate of opinion of the 1930s.<sup>611</sup> All the efforts were spent to enlighten and secularly purify the people in that critical historical episode. This could be achieved in so far as people was acquainted with the “supreme ideals” of the revolution: “The unique way is to let the new generations know and to make them approve... supreme ideals.” Moreover,

...We have to advance the new generations by means of the real principles of social morality. Furthermore, we should enlighten the individuals with the most scientific as well as practical proofs and examples that insofar as they come close to those supreme ideals based on reality they will be assumed as beneficial and honorable citizens retaining social and national qualities.<sup>612</sup>

---

<sup>610</sup> Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, (Chicago: Aldine, 1969)

<sup>611</sup> See especially, Selim Sırrı, “İtalya’da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), pp. 241-3, R. Ş, “Garp Memleketlerinde Halk Terbiyesi”, Vol.1, No. 4, (May, 1933), pp. 295-306, A. B., “Hitler ve Fırkası,” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933), pp. 160-165

<sup>612</sup> Ahmed Nesimi, “Kip ve Devrim (Enmuzeç ve İnkılap)”, *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, Is. 29, (July, 1935), pp. 330-333

The great irony of their thought is that, while they strictly opposed the quest for spiritual and religious life, they absolutized the ideology of the revolution and insisted upon a razor sharp opposition between the revolutionary spirit – which they affirmed enthusiastically – and all other spirits. For them, “democracy” was not primarily a form of governing and being governed, but a comprehensive perspective on the human condition, an idea whose realization must affect all modes of human life. In accordance with this, all-encompassing idea of the good, they claimed that the cure for the ailments of existent conditions is to be found in “the ideological and spiritual institutionalization” (*fikri ve ruhi teşkilatlanma*)<sup>613</sup> of society grounded on the principles of the revolution in order to make people “genuine democratic citizen” (*hakiki demokrasi vatandaşı*).<sup>614</sup>

Secular conversion was to go hand in hand with a justification that the Republic would bring civilization and prosperity to those who had hitherto lagged behind by the “scholastic mentalities” of dark ages. The fundamental contradictions became visible at the time when the Free Party was able to gain the popular support of the nation during municipal elections in 1930. This was the first significant mark bespeaking the confrontation of the civilizing mission of the Republic with the will and aspirations of the people. Instead of taking into consideration the people’s own aspirations, the radical revolutionaries thought that restrictive mechanisms of the state had to be enlarged to realize contemporary civilization and hence

---

<sup>613</sup> “Köycüler Bölümü İki Yaşına Girerken,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 19, (Sept., 1934), p. 75

<sup>614</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Köycülük Çalışmaları,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936): 386-388, p. 387

“democratization” of the society in a relatively short period of time: “our people should be taught the modern meanings of spiritual sanctions (*manevi müeyyideler*), moral inclinations, and relief and participation that would occupy the place of old religious dominion.”<sup>615</sup>

The radical revolutionary elite of the 1930s discovered that the influence of tradition in society required that a transition to democracy could only be done by imposed from above. In order to emancipate people from the bondage of tradition and religion, they felt responsible to enlighten the people via certain non-democratic means. In that sense, for instance, Necip Ali held that the revolutionary formulas should be injected into the people even “by force” to emancipate and create order (*nizam vermek*) in society: “Revolution is a set of efforts that bring about new formulas to order society, and, if it is necessary, to get society to accept these formulas by force, at a time when the current life is unable to satisfy the material and spiritual vitality (*hayatiyet*) of society.”<sup>616</sup> This authoritarian way of transforming society was justified by the following terms: “So many defects are natural and necessary in the formative stage of a revolution that tore down and remade the whole

---

<sup>615</sup> Hilmi, “Halk Neşriyatının Ehemmiyeti,” (The Significance of the People Publication) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): 70-79, p. 70

<sup>616</sup> Necip Ali, “İnkılap ve Türk Kanunu Medenisi,” (Revolution and the Turkish Civil Law) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 9, (Oct., 1933): 178-185, p. 178 The parallel arguments about Revolution, which highlights the radical reforms and sanctions see, Peker’s arguments under the title of “İnkılablarda Zor Kullanmak” (Use of Force in Revolution), *İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984) and also see Aptullah Ziya, “Köy Mimarisi” (The Village Architecture) in *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1933, p. 38



country, and that got the clock, which had been late for six centuries, accustomed to work correctly.”<sup>617</sup>

Unless the “tyranny” of tradition and customs are swept away, emancipation and hence democratization of society appeared to the *Ülkü* authors to be difficult: “Among people (*halk*), there is tyranny of tradition, customs and rooted ideas. It is not less than a tyranny of governments.”<sup>618</sup> Therefore, in opposition to this tyranny, people’s education should constitute one of the fundamental principles of the revolution. Because, “the rule of freedom means the predominance of an educated reason.”<sup>619</sup> In order to smother the “spiritual domination” (*ruhi tahakküm*)<sup>620</sup> of tradition, the authors of *Ülkü*, in general, sought to instigate a kind of crusading zeal among “enlightened” members of the society. They portrayed themselves as the “apostles” (*havariler*) and “missionaries” in their “saintly and sacred ideal” (*aziz ve kutsi ülkümüz*)<sup>621</sup> to spiritually illuminate (*nurlandırmak*) the Turkish population. They called all the intellectuals missionary guides of the society, to disseminate the sacred ideals of the Revolution: “... The success is dependent only upon increasing

---

<sup>617</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Köy Seferberliğine Doğru,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1933: pp. 355-361, p. 356

<sup>618</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): pp. 105-114, p. 107

<sup>619</sup> Ibid.

<sup>620</sup> Nusret Kemal, “İnkılap İdeolojisinde Halkçılık,” p. 42

<sup>621</sup> Necip Ali (Küçük), “Halkevleri Yıldönümü Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), pp. 5-15, p. 5

the number of the man of mission (*dava*). If the intellectuals carry out their duties of revealing the truth (*hakikat*) to people, the essential task would be achieved.”<sup>622</sup>

The radical revolutionary elite aimed at conversion of the society in line with revolutionary religion. For this aim, they even appropriated religious terminology to embark on a revolutionary mission to “democratize” society. This is indicative of how the *Ülkü* elite utilized symbolic discourse by appropriating pre-revolutionary symbolic resources. It used religious terms and notions interchangeably with the Revolutionary symbols. The People’s Houses were identified as “the Temples of Ideal” (*Ülkü Mabetleri*)<sup>623</sup>; the “apostles” (*havari*)<sup>624</sup> of revolution were called to be recruited for a “village mission” (*köy misyonerliği*)<sup>625</sup>; the “spiritual revolution” (*manevi inkılap*)<sup>626</sup> was said to be disseminated by the zealous efforts of the “resplendent” (*nurlu*)<sup>627</sup> devotees of Kemalism in the way to reach to “the Heaven of

---

<sup>622</sup> Şakir Hazım Gökmen, “Kanadlarımızın Büyük Utkusu,” (The Great Utku of Our Wings), *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935), p. 122

<sup>623</sup> Necip Ali, “Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey’in Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933), p. 104

<sup>624</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” (The Means of People Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9, p. 152

<sup>625</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Köy Misyonerliği,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (September, 1933), p. 150

<sup>626</sup> Mehmet Saffet (1933) “Kültür İnkılabımız,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, p. 351

<sup>627</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halkçılık” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1933: pp. 185-190, p. 190

Atatürk” (*Atatürk Cenneti*)<sup>628</sup>. The following quotation is particularly striking to show the extent of secular conversion:

One of the most significant tasks we should perform is undoubtedly a ‘peasantism mission’ (*köycülük misyonerliği*). We should infuse this sacred work and believe in it with the cognizance and faith of a Jesuit priest... With the perseverance, and penetrating style of a Protestant missionary, we should inculcate (*sindirmek*) this most auspicious principle of populism in all souls.<sup>629</sup>

There was a great effort to envisage the leader of the Republic as a sacred and holy being. For instance, Mustafa Kemal was envisaged as a genius superior the “prophets,”<sup>630</sup> a secular preacher, “a Great savior” (*Büyük kurtarıcı*), “a Genius Commander-in Chief” (*Dahi Başbuğ*)<sup>631</sup> “a highly exalted being” (*pek yüce varlık*)<sup>632</sup>, and a “sacred altar” (*kutsal mihrab*)<sup>633</sup> of this secular religion. Moreover, he should be the fundamental source of the feelings of people. He was also considered as a genius who made a synthesis of science and prophecy:

---

<sup>628</sup> Kamuran Bozkır, “Halkevleri,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), pp. 74-5, p. 75

<sup>629</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Köycülük Programına Giriş,” (Introduction to the Program of Peasantism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 26, (Apr., 1935): 132-141, p. 141

<sup>630</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizm İnkılabının Hususiyetleri,” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 418

<sup>631</sup> Saffet Arıkan, “Yeni Fakültemizin Açılışı,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 36, (Feb., 1936), pp. 404-5

<sup>632</sup> Kazım Nami Duru, “Kutsal Bir Dilek,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 36, (Feb., 1936), p. 466

<sup>633</sup> Ferid C. Güven, “Ona El Kalkar mı?,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935), p. 162

In social matters, the first genius is Kemal Atatürk who could be able to bring together the spirit of guidance with scientific mind in his personality (*nefsinde*). Kemal Atatürk is the first great guide who saw the defects of the existent social order, who mobilized a social mass against those defects, but at the same time who did not seek solutions to these social problems in the charms (*muska*) or one-sided programs of the sacred books. Atatürk has the great power of perception and belief (*seziş ve inan kudreti*) more than any other genius. Moreover, apart from the prophets, he has a quick and unfailing (*yanılmaz*) objective viewpoint, a sound positive scientific mind and a non-deceivable (*aldanmaz*) critical intelligence. The spirit of guidance, intuition, and faith is common among all men of revolution; however, the outstanding peculiarity of Kamal Atatürk and Kemalism should be sought in their objective observationism (*müşahedecilik*) and positive scienticism (*ilimcilik*).<sup>634</sup>

The *Ülkü* authors considered *Nutuk* as the new “holy book (*mukaddes kitap*) of the Turks.”<sup>635</sup> They looked at revolutionary ideology as the true, secular faith. The education for the ideals of the Revolution they prescribed was a sacred task. By adopting a religious idiom to reinforce their secular undertaking and achievement, the *Ülkü* elite’s devotion to the principles of the state was a kind of religious enthusiasm or “a missionary self-sacrifice” (*bir misyoner özverisi*)<sup>636</sup>.

The commemoration activities of the *Menemen* incident at its peak, the killing of an army officer, Kubilay, easily turned out to be a memorial to “a revolutionary martyr.” For instance, the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Kubilay afforded

---

<sup>634</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizmin Hususiyetleri” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 416

<sup>635</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Canlı Söz,” (Lively Speech) *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 38, (April, 1936), pp. 85-87

<sup>636</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Köycülük Çalışmaları,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936): 386-388, p. 388

ample scope for anticlerical rhetoric.<sup>637</sup> Beside Kubilay, the other revolutionary heroes were also commemorated, especially those who were Martyrs to Reaction. “Martyr Kubilay” became the sign of anti-clericalism of the Republic, which was recurrently employed to suppress and denounce *irtica* (reactionism), “the ideology of immoral (*ahlaksız*) and imprudent (*akılsız*) people.”<sup>638</sup> Because, these people were “trying to make the nation swerve from the true path, and make them fall into the old dark slumber again.”<sup>639</sup> For that reason, against this “black disaster” (*kara felaket*) that seeks to destroy the sacrality (*kudsiyet*) of the revolution, every member of the nation should resist in a mood of a Conqueror (*Fatih*).<sup>640</sup> Furthermore, “the debris of the religious orders” (*tarikât döküntüleri*)<sup>641</sup> and the sheikhs as the carriers of reactionism should be exterminated as soon as possible. It is argued that “the religious robes and dervish coats of the sheikhs were opened like the owl wings (*baykuş kanatları*) against the great enlightenment” of the revolution.<sup>642</sup> Hence, the luminosity of the revolutionary ideal would shed light on that “murky hearts” (*kararmış gönüller*). Against reactionism, which was considered as “the most formidable enemy” of the state, “the salvation” was explicitly sought in “the new Turkish culture.” As “the guardians and guides” of the Turkish culture, the *Ülkü*

---

<sup>637</sup> “Kubilay Abidesinde Recep Peker’in Söylevi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 23 (Jan., 1935), pp.374-376

<sup>638</sup> F. Celal Güven, “Kubilay Günü,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936), p. 366-367

<sup>639</sup> Ibid.

<sup>640</sup> Ibid.

<sup>641</sup> Abdülkadir, “Köy ve Köylüler,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936): 375-385, p. 384

authors also invited “the enlightened youths” (*ışıklanan gençlikler*) to preserve it from the reactionists abusing (*simsarlık*) religion everywhere.<sup>643</sup> Ironically, the existent religious orders and communities were considered as harmful to the morality of people:

Certain religious orders (*tarikât*) assumed a spoiling character for the spirit and moral purity of our peasants. The scholastic mentality such as fatalism and resignation (*tevekkül*) is dominant among our people. This mentality should be destroyed through supplanting it with the scientific mentality (*ilmi zihniyet*). The scientific mentality ensures freedom of thought, correct mode of thinking, and the way to have recourse to the causes and solutions of every matter. Furthermore, it rescues people from being captive of superstitions (*hurafeler*).

Though the author grounds his alternative on so-called scientific mentality, his final resolution seems that this idea of science, however, has strong metaphysical connotations, substituting the religious *tarikât* with the secular-religious order: “These thirsty souls hope for *true* spiritual guides (*mürşit*), *true* instructors (*mürebbi*) and *true* means of illumination (*tenvir vasıtaları*).”<sup>644</sup> The true guidance potential of the revolution was said to eradicate all the reactionary “microbes” from the social organism. For Recep Peker, the social body was like a physiological organism. Even, in the healthiest bodies, it is normal that there are various microbes. However, for him, a healthier body had the positive elements of struggle to prevent the emergent dangerous microbes. So, a minority group of men with black thoughts and wrong ideas could not destroy the forces of majority with a clean and progressive life style.

---

<sup>642</sup> Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Kubilay,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 23, (Jan., 1935), p. 377

<sup>643</sup> Ibid.

For Peker, the social body of the Turks had enough power to eliminate those reactionary microbes contrary to the new revolutionary way of life.<sup>645</sup>

Though less fanatical and sectarian than Abdullah Cevdet and the *İctihad* circle, the *Ülkü* elite wished to establish a totally secular institutionalization of the state, so that the nation could be indoctrinated in the virtues of Republic. They had recourse to an anticlerical onslaught as a maneuver both to tame religion and its political adherents and to divert the people's attention from the relative crisis of the Republican politics to the "artificial" enemies of society. That is, they used anticlerical discourse as a device to consolidate their hold upon power. In fact, it is quite hard to discern clerical power and an institutional Church in Turkey, particularly in the inter-war period. Turkish "clericalism" was a fabricated idea, with which the radical revolutionary elite could generate a suitable motive for their imagined anticlericalism. In that sense, Turkish revolutionary anticlericalism had nothing to do with a direct political response to clericalism as in France, but rather was used as an instrument to constitute a faith, a system of thought, in its own right. It can be argued that the *Ülkü* elite considered any moral threat to the ideals, values and social order consecrated by the Revolution as anticlerical as well as reactionary. This was above all the myth of anticlericalism postulating a polarity between the anticlerical and clerical; progressive and reactionary; modern and traditional; civilized and ignorant etc. that essentially sided with the revolutionary worldview always on the formers' part. This sort of revolutionary political demonizing created

---

<sup>644</sup> Mehmet Saffet, "Köycülük Nedir," *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6: pp. 422-430, p. 425

dualistic politics, irremediably divided between those for and those against its principles. Their anticlerical thinking was particularly at the highest degree hostile to *tarikats*, which they considered unwilling to subordinate itself to the principles of the state. The remedy was to get rid of all religious *tarikats* and their morality, and not only to make the revolutionary morality supreme, but also to set up a revolutionary religion, a sanctifying authority that would fill the existent ethical vacuum. They were trying to place morality on a wholly different basis from that of the present religion.

Actually, the *Ülkü* elite was the new radical generation, which was searching for a new religion in the face of what they perceived as the moral and religious vacuum of their time. They thought Kemalism was able to offer a firm belief system and to devise a new morality that they had failed to find elsewhere. With a proselytizing mission, they aimed at converting people from their traditional religious ties to the new revolutionary faith. They even considered themselves as the apostles of the new faith, to rehabilitate people.

In fact, to make up a religion out of the revolution was not an easy task, especially for the radical revolutionaries such as *Ülkü* who undertook to banish all religious activities and to discredit traditional religion once and for all. Even, the mention religion and Islam was considered harmful to the new secularizing policy of the regime: “To not mention religion at all is to present the best education of

---

<sup>645</sup> Recep Peker, “Kubilay Abidesinin Açılması,” *Ülkü*, No. 23, (Jan., 1935): 374-376, p. 375



secularism (*laiklik*).”<sup>646</sup> Nevertheless, despite their explicit warning against “clericalism” because of what they thought it shared with “reactionary” and “scholastic mentality,” the radical anti-clericalism of *Ülkü* group turned out to be a new reactionary stance against all forms of ethical postures.

With the beginning of the 1930s, radical changes came about in the official ruling ideology. The Revolutionary ideology, by denying traditional and religious establishments, began to function as a surrogate for religion. It determined a new marker of identity for the Turks grounded mostly on non-religious connotations. This new secular creed was supposed to substitute for religion in satisfying the psychological and spiritual needs of the people to free themselves from any kind of religious and traditional ethical creeds. The revolutionary elite tried to offer answers to spiritual longings of the people and to give purpose to their life. This was a sort of divinization and sacralization of current politics, and demonization of the previous ones. Furthermore, this sacralization of politics became components or accompanying features of the political life and activities. The new regime set itself primarily in the idea of the realization of a just order on earth and in the salvation of the “savage and ignorant people.” The revolutionary sacralization implies a messianic pretension postulating that the only correct standpoint leading to salvation is exactly the one promoted by the Revolution, and that all other beliefs are wrong leading to false conclusions. Moreover, all those who profess other beliefs should be liberated from their misconceptions, of which they are not aware. This Salvationist

---

<sup>646</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” (Revolutionary Education) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): pp. 105-114, p. 114

motive was one of the main reasons for the attempts at Turkish secularism in the 1930s.

**CHAPTER VI**

**THE SECOND PILLAR OF SOLIDARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF A CLASSLESS HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY AND ITS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY**

This chapter mainly argues that the second premise of solidarism appropriated by the *Ülkü* group was a classless and undifferentiated society. The authors of *Ülkü* generally emphasized social order and uniformity rather than individual freedom and pluriformity. Moreover, the RPP and the People's Houses were perceived as a semi-sacred institution aimed at removal of all outer signs of conflict and the suppression of alternative value systems to preserve harmony and uniformity in society. The 1930s marked an era in Turkey when all the countervailing forces had been eliminated for the sake of social order. The ruling cadre maintained that the RPP represented all the interests among society. Since, the party included within it the whole nation, and not just a section, there was no need to carry out separate interests outside the party. By purging any intermediary bodies between the party and "people", they wanted to reach "direct democracy" in which people and their representation were to coincide. Any attempt to mediate this relation was considered to be harmful to the unity of the nation. As for the *Ülkü* elite, the existing structure of society was not conducive to reforms, so the state should teach the people how to cope with the new life style.

The cultural and political de-legitimization of liberal democracy in the minds of the revolutionary elite paved the way for a search of new alternatives. The radical revolutionaries' alternative was mainly grounded on the solidarist and populist assumptions of democracy, "populist democracy" (*halkçı demokrasi*), which they saw as the "most appropriate form of democracy for Turkey."<sup>647</sup> This understanding of democracy generally highlighted the unanimity and harmony of society centered on the concepts of duty and obligation rather than that on individual rights and responsibilities.

Actually, the European Enlightenment tradition implanted in the Turkish Revolutionary elite a profound commitment to the concept of democracy – the ideas of freedom, equality, representation, and above all, the rule of "the people". Most of them had retained those commitments, but their philosophical and practical expression of the concepts had taken considerably different forms. They, consciously or unconsciously, often misconstrued ideas concerning democracy and representation. Nonetheless, they had the tendency to retain their commitment to the broad and theoretical values of democracy – as a utopian and irresistible ideal – while freeing themselves from the traditional democratic forms and practices. "Ideal democracy" was based upon tutelage of the masses by the *Ülkü* elite who felt themselves obliged to cultivate "the people." Theoretically, people continued to be the source of supreme authority (*hakimiyet kayıtsız şartsız milletindir*). In practice, however, they became the subjects of intensive indoctrination, and had to have total commitment to the purposes of state as defined by their "vanguards". It can be maintained that the

---

<sup>647</sup> Nusret Kemal, "Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi," (A Village Project Experience),

radical revolutionaries of the 1930s were not interested in the representation of the existing structure of society, but in the representation of an imaginary people, which they intended to construct in the future.

This kind of understanding of democracy led the *Ülkü* elite to consider politics in a messianic fashion. This “political Messianism” based on secular, social morality postulated an enlightened, civilized and prosperous tomorrow, “to which humanity are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive.”<sup>648</sup> This postponed representation of society, or to put it another way, this sense of understanding of “belated democracy” constituted a great problematic for later generations. As a consequence, based on a kind of Jacobin utopianism, the Turkish radical Revolutionary elite, generally, felt themselves responsible for “maturing and ascending the spiritual quality”<sup>649</sup> of people that would elevate them to a position at which they can be represented.

In a sense, the newly established cultural institutions such as the People’s Houses became centers of political messianism to prepare the people for the belated democracy. As a matter of fact, they were sites of “apostolic (*havarilik*) craft”<sup>650</sup> to disseminate the Truth, which would be captured only through the realization of

---

*Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123

<sup>648</sup> Jacob L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1952), 4

<sup>649</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bizim Planımız,” (Our Plan) *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), pp. 16-19, p. 17

<sup>650</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” (The Means of People’s Education) *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9, p. 154

revolutionary ideals. In other words, their goals of consolidation of power and social restructuring were intertwined with a peculiar conception of democracy: every country has its own peculiar way to democracy<sup>651</sup>; the way to attain it should rely on forming “collective habits” (*birleşik alışkanlıklar*)<sup>652</sup>, and “amalgamated” (*kütleleşmiş*) social structure<sup>653</sup>. Of course, this understanding refracted the elites’ “march” to democracy in such a way that it turned out to be serious obstacle to democracy; it was redressed with their view that in a society without laic revolutionary culture, democracy is not possible.

The most essential element introduced by the Revolution to the political culture of society in the Turkish Republic was the modernization and laicization of political life which was generally argued to be equivalent to democratization of political life at the same time. The Revolution was said to bring about the active inclusion of the Turkish nation in the creation of institutions and political organizations. Political culture was indeed becoming more inclusive and participatory as the Turkish Revolution became established, and mass politics did come to the fore during those years. But these developments were accompanied by a transformation in political rhetoric toward the ordering and disciplining of the people. More importantly, new forms of discipline and new ways of organizing the masses were arising from within the very forces that were working to “democratize” the country. As Foucault argues,

---

<sup>651</sup> “Partinin Yeni Programı İçin Kurultayda R. Peker’in Söylevi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 28, (June, 1935): pp. 247-259, 258

<sup>652</sup> Cevdet Nasuhi, “Halkevinin Çatısı Altında” (Under the Canopy of the People’s Houses), *Ülkü*, 1/3, (1933), 4

the “democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.”<sup>654</sup>

It is worth mentioning that Kemalism of *Ülkü* often appropriated religious terminology to embark on a revolutionary mission to “democratize” society. It generally borrowed from religious forms and built on traditional rituals. It would probably not be wrong to contend that, in their attempts at secular proselytization, the radical Revolutionary elite of the 1930s utilized the People’s Houses as surrogate mosques of the Republic: “The Kemalists thought of these institutions as replacements for the local mosque as a place for social gathering and forums to propagate their view of the Turkish national project.”<sup>655</sup> Anıl Çeçen also argued that the Houses were established as substitutes for the local mosques on the way of democracy:

During the times of the Empire, the mosque functioned as the center of society. Mustafa Kemal, in a sense, founded a new center substituting for the mosque. The People’s Houses, in the young state of the Republic, emerged as the center of society on the way of democracy. Those masses that were accustomed to meeting in mosques, eventually would gather as a nation instead of *ummah* (religious community). As secularism became the

---

<sup>653</sup> Recep (Peker), “Ülkü Niçin Çıkıyor,” (Why Ülkü is Being Issued) *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933): 1-2

<sup>654</sup> Michael Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Nicholas B. Dirks, *et. al.*, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), p. 219

<sup>655</sup> Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 146.

basic principle of the Republic and state, the new centers were needed for bringing together the masses outside the mosque.<sup>656</sup>

Hence, revolutionary acculturation of society entailed a barrage of secular rituals, some practiced through the Houses. Actually, the People's Houses became a mechanism for overt social engineering (*cemiyet mühendisliği*)<sup>657</sup> and secular indoctrination than a means to impart skills that were increasingly necessary in an urbanizing and industrializing Turkey: "In this specific time of revolution, every Turkish intellectual, the "people's guide" (*halk rehberi*), should undertake the duty of building revolution (*inkılap yapıcısı*)."<sup>658</sup> The underlying myths of the activities of the Houses were unanimity and unity, the idea that all the people would be united and harmonious if there were not traitors among them. Accordingly, division and conflict were deemed unnatural as well as dangerous. There was the view of prosperous tomorrow, which is strongly expressed by the authors of *Ülkü* in many of the articles. Turkey is in the state of difficult passage now: the passage of hard and intricate times. But tomorrow, after this passage has been passed through, there will finally be time for getting at the state of blissful happiness namely "the Heaven of Atatürk" (*Atatürk Cenneti*)<sup>659</sup>. In other words, when this goal is reached, the final beatitude will be accomplished, which transcends the previous state of suffering the

---

<sup>656</sup> Anıl Çeçen, *Halkevleri* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1990), p. 380

<sup>657</sup> Nusret Köymen, "Kemalizm ve Politika Bilgisi," (Kemalism and the Political Science), Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936), p. 324

<sup>658</sup> "Ülkü İki Yaşına Kırerken Okuyanlar ve Yazarlarla Konuşma," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 74-75, p. 75

<sup>659</sup> Kamuran Bozkır, "Halkevleri," *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), pp. 74-5, p. 75



Turkish society had to endure. It would be the case that this line of argumentation hints a revolutionary vision of Nirvana. The obstacles that debar this visionary of Kemalist Nirvana should be removed from an entanglement of traditional and religious mentality.

### **6.1. The Tension Between Democracy and Secularism**

The Turkish version of solidarism revealed a tension between democracy and secularism. Members of the *Ülkü* group believed that democracy could only flourish in a laic and republican system, coupled with the enlightenment of society. For them, democracy was an idea that can be traded for the enlightenment of society. In fact, they were mainly torn between the competing goals of enlightening and emancipating the people: the first seemed to require strict control and inculcation; the second implied trust. The term inculcation is used to denote the elites' will to penetrate down into subjects' hearts deeply enough to conquer their innermost affective and emotional drives so that they can produce subjects who accept without question the will of the ruling elite in whatever form they are:

We aimed at inculcating (*sindirmek*) our revolutions to the people's soul. However, we did not allow people to believe all the reforms as passive recipients. Throwing a spark of each reform's blaze to the heart of people and creating the fever of the revolution for every Turk is a necessary task.

<sup>660</sup>

---

<sup>660</sup> *Halkevi 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, ed. by Behçet Kemal (Çağlar), (Ankara, 1935), p. 3

The justification of this inculcation that aimed at conversion of society into a “granite mass” (*granit kütle*)<sup>661</sup> is sought in verbal addresses to democracy. That is, the *Ülkü* authors frequently pronounced democracy as if it is the ultimate goal, while they paradoxically longed for the submission of people to the artifacts of revolution. Actually, they were well aware of the fact that the principles of revolution were in sharp contrast with liberal democratic way of life. However, they used some excuses that under the influence of the inter-war, totalitarian aura, these liberal democratic principles were in a practical “bankruptcy.”<sup>662</sup> The source of bankruptcy was deciphered as chaos, which would emerge if the emancipatory drives were freed. They overtly yearned for the “disciplined freedom” (*disiplinli hürriyet*)<sup>663</sup>. These excuses were used to justify the attempt to postpone democracy to the moment when the conditions are ripe for the shunning of the presumed chaos. Subjects, or citizens, were considered as not mature enough to experience democracy at that time. They thought that absolute obedience to elites, who were named “prophets and apostles” of revolution, was necessary. “Democracy”, for them, “is not the product, but the goal of the revolution.”<sup>664</sup> Revolution is to be made to clear away those barriers blocking the democratic goal, and certainly to elevate the collective consciousness to a level at which this goal is understandable to all. They required “an absolute obedience from

---

<sup>661</sup> “N. Kansu’nun Halkevleri Hakkında Söylevi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936): 6-8, p. 6

<sup>662</sup> Aydoslu Sait, “Milliyetçi ve Taazzuvcu İktisat” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 4, (May, 1933), p. 282

<sup>663</sup> Recep Peker, “Disiplinli Hürriyet,” (Disciplined Freedom), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), pp. 177-180

their followers.”<sup>665</sup> Revolutionaries were said to engineer appropriate proclivities and capabilities for the people: “Every ‘normal’ human has some natural proclivities and capabilities realized in principal emotions and ideas. These proclivities can only be actualized under certain principles: “Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Étatism, and Laicism.”<sup>666</sup> As “the main principles of the Turkish Revolution are so obvious truths just as the truth two plus two equals four.” So, “a plausible mind cannot find any contradiction in them.”<sup>667</sup> Only after the people are mature enough by digesting these principles, democracy would dawn.

The authors of *Ülkü* were generally engaged in a kind of democratic rhetoric, but to sustain their revolutionary ideals they had felt themselves obliged to make the people fit into a narrative of unity. They tended to see all diversity and dissent as a threat to “national unity.” The only way to talk about democracy in this sense was to presume, and eventually demand, that the people identify with their nation and subordinate their particularistic demands to the common good. In the first issue of *Ülkü*, Recep Peker declared that the leading principle and general idea of the journal is the subordination of any particular interest to the interest of the whole and further

---

<sup>664</sup> Nusret Kemal (Köymen), “Halkçılık,” (Populism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), pp. 185-190

<sup>665</sup> Ibid

<sup>666</sup> Ibid, p. 187

<sup>667</sup> N. K., “Halkevleri Neşriyatı,” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), pp. 465-6, p. 465

amalgamation (*kütleleştirmek*) of the nation.<sup>668</sup> Moreover, the articles in the *Ülkü* journal in common criticized individualism and the liberal economic systems:

Individualism is basically an erroneous ideology... It could not implement and apply its principles anywhere in the world... A social life with anarchy cannot be approved... Liberalism as the reflection of individualism in the economic realm goes backward everyday. This is not only a regression, but also a general bankruptcy.<sup>669</sup>

## 6.2. *Ülkü* Elite's Conception of Anti-Liberal Democracy

The *Ülkü* elite produced an extensive critique of liberalism in general and of liberal economy in particular in conjunction with their solidarist presumptions, which reflected an understanding of a classless homogenous society. While introducing the “Labor Law” (*iş kanunu*) in the Assembly, Recep Peker particularly underlined the significance of the necessity of discarding the liberal option and further undertaking a “regulatory soul” (*tanzimci ruh*) in order to establish national order and harmony (*ahenk*) in the field of economy: “Friends, we are injecting the application of the idea of unity and collectivity of national Étatism (*ulusal Devletçilik*) to our life as replacement of the liberal state type of which our generation witnessed its fragmenting, conflicting and destroying spirit dissolving the national unity.”<sup>670</sup> As Donald Webster aptly notes, “Recep Peker dwelt not only on the necessity for

---

<sup>668</sup> Recep (Peker), “Halkevleri Açılma Nutku,” (The Inauguration Speech of the People’s Houses), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933), p. 8

<sup>669</sup> Aydoslu Sait “Milliyetçi ve Taazzuvcu İktisat” in *Ülkü*, (May, 1933), Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 282

youthfully energetic and concerted action but also for avoiding the wastes of laissez-faire individualism, the class struggle, and the “agony of liberalism” associated therewith.”<sup>671</sup>

Furthermore, it is generally emphasized that democracy has different facets in different countries. One dominant argument was that democracy is only a form of organization of the state that can have different social contents and can be used by all political currents to achieve their own ends. This conclusion was formulated perhaps most cogently by Recep Peker and Necip Ali Küçük. They demonstrated that a populist society is the highest form of democracy that can be attained in the Turkish context. As for democracy itself, it is nothing but one form of state organization that can vary in its social content depending on the conditions:

Democracy is not a dogma (*nas*) and a verse. It is a soul, a spirit (*espiri*) and an essence. If any matter is applied after it is filtered through reason and adjusted to the existent context cleverly, then it will take root and give benefit... Every country has its own way of democracy. Turkey has certain idiosyncratic characteristics by which we should apply a different democracy.<sup>672</sup>

In principle this thesis is invariably one of the weapons used by all anti-liberal arguments. They actually utilized this discourse to ground their conception of an authoritarian state. It is worthwhile to stress that even if they argued that democracy

---

<sup>670</sup> Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in İş Kanununu İzahı,” (Recep Peker’s Explanation of the Legislation on Employment), Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936), p. 325

<sup>671</sup> Donald E. Webster, “State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey”, in *American Sociological Review*, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Apr., 1939), 247-256, p. 247

is only a form in which power is organized, they nonetheless did not ground their ideas on Fascist and Communist forms. They generally favored direct democracy that was formulated by the preceding Western political thinkers from Montesquieu and Rousseau. According to this formulation, "the people" cannot be broken down sociologically into different social, economic, and ethnic groups or represented as an aggregate of differentiated individuals with differing capabilities and noncoinciding political rights, duties, and thus interests in society. Democracy, from this point of view, is a metaphysical abstraction that in fact leads to the domination of a group or of one ruler in the name of the people and consequently to the establishment of a regime of absolute authority. In this regard, Rousseau's metaphysical theory of the general will justified the systematic delegation of the powers of the majority to a ruling minority and in practice was transformed into a political formula legitimizing the power of extremist revolutionary elites from the Jacobins to the Bolsheviks: "each of us puts... all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole"<sup>673</sup>.

The authors of *Ülkü* generally favored the current totalitarian regimes of the world. The models of these regimes in organizing and structuring the society have been welcomed. It is commonly argued that these models should be adapted to the Turkish conditions. Although, they were committed to the democratic ideals, at least discursively, the authors admired the totalitarian type of state organizations:

---

<sup>672</sup> "Partinin Yeni Programı İçin Kurultayda R. Peker'in Söylevi," *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 28, (June, 1935): 247-259, pp. 258-9

<sup>673</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, Roger Masters, ed., Judith Masters, trans. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53

... The tasks the fascists [in Italy] accomplished and the works they created deserve admiration. The source of the perfection of that great monument should be sought in patriotism and unity of national sentiments.<sup>674</sup>

Particularly, the methods of education and training by the totalitarian regimes were the most attractive issues for the authors. They were in search for new techniques of mass socialization that would transform the society in conformity with the principles of the state. What would be the efficient formula of the people's education (*halk terbiyesi*) was their primary concern. Though the USSR was criticized for its communist direction, its technique of the political education methods were appreciated: "Although its regime does not appeal to us, the power of the Russian socialization methods are admired by all intellectuals who are anti-capitalist."<sup>675</sup> Furthermore, the belief in the necessity of the anti-democratic means to prepare people toward democratic ends can be observed in the entire journal. For instance, in his article "*Kışla ve Köy Terbiyesi*" (Army and Village Education), Hilmi A. Halik argues that the military institutions would be important places of educating and civilizing people from the villages: "The military can do great and positive services in creating the Turkish village world. Our youths, who come to the army as raw materials, would return to their homes and villages as very important and valuable persons."<sup>676</sup>

---

<sup>674</sup> Selim Sırrı (1933) "İtalya'da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı," *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), p. 241

<sup>675</sup> Kazım Nami (1933) "Roman" in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933), p. 176

<sup>676</sup> Hilmi A. Halik (1933) "Kışla ve Köy Terbiyesi" in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), p. 239

When the Kemalist ruling cadre had come to the idea after the Free Party experiment that the principles of the new regime had not been fully disseminated to the wider parts of the society, they began to seek a model with which they would accomplish this ideal. Atatürk sent Selim Sırrı and Vildan Aşır to visit several European countries for the search of models on people's education. Selim Sırrı was sent to Italy, and Vildan Aşır to Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Both returned to Turkey with certain reports on these countries. Selim Sırrı asserted that there were several institutions of people's education in Italy including "Dopo-lavoro" (leisure time organisations), "Ballila" (a military education for the six-year-old boys)<sup>677</sup> and "Piccole" (education centres for the girls after 5 years old), which played important roles in disseminating Fascist values.<sup>678</sup> Selim Sırrı generally favoured the military techniques, while Vildan Aşır talked about *Sokol* organisations in Czechoslovakia. *Sokol* served the construction of the idea of nation-state and national identity through adult education centers. Furthermore, amalgamation at the societal level was achieved through these institutions. Aşır stressed the significance of the Rumanian youth organization, *Strasa Tail*, which prepared teachers cadres for the adult education system.<sup>679</sup> Along with these reports, several other countries including Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Denmark, Austria, Belgium and most notably USSR,

---

<sup>677</sup> "The perfect product of a Fascist education was a six-year-old *Balilla* who swears loyalty to the Duce." Emilio Gentile, *Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy* (tr. by. Keith Botsford) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 65

<sup>678</sup> Selim Sırrı (1933) "İtalya'da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı," *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 241-3

<sup>679</sup> Neşe G. Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 71-72



were also compared<sup>680</sup>. Hence, the People's Houses were modelled in line with the parallel institutions of countries cited above:

Russia, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been among the nations where parties or ruling regimes – totalitarian as a rule – established networks of cultural clubs designed to educate the people and to carry their ideology to them. Turkey's Republican Party, the instrument of the Kemalist regime, studied those foreign experiments, found them successful, and decided to emulate them.<sup>681</sup>

#### **6.2.1. One-Party Rule as the Expression of a Classless Homogeneous Society**

The *Ülkü* elite, generally, considered the existing one-party rule as an essential mechanism to sustain solidarity among society. They thought that this idea was the expression of Turkish democracy underpinned by the “science” of Kemalism. In fact, it is very problematic to label Turkish one-party rule in general and the People's Houses experience in particular as totalitarian at least at the conceptual level. Furthermore, the description of Kemalism of 1930s as “totalitarian” would present considerable problems at the methodological level. The typical totalitarian ideologies of this century – Stalinism, Fascism and Nazism – have been worked out by educated minds for largely educated people. The limited intellectual development in Turkey

---

<sup>680</sup> R. Ş. (1933) “Garp Memleketlerinde Halk Terbiyesi”, *Ülkü*, Vol.1, No. 4, pp. 295-306. The author especially gives much place to the Soviet case: “Sovyetler Cumhuriyeti İttihadında siyasi terbiye adını alan halk terbiyesi faaliyetleri, içtimai hayatın her sahasında yeni bir rejim tatbikatına savaşıyor bu memlekette, yeni fikir ve akidelerle halkın kültür seviyesini yükseltmeğe çalışmaktadır.”, p. 295

<sup>681</sup> Ehud Houminer (1965) “The People's Houses in Turkey”, *Asian and African Studies*, Annual of the Israel Oriental Society, Vol. 1, Jerusalem, p. 81

did not permit the evolution of highly developed ideologies with strong international consistency and integration. Rather, the Turkish revolutionary ideology was an amalgam of certain ideas that would pragmatically be a response to the existing social and political problems: “Turkey and its powerful national party incorporated its ideological dogmas (*nas*) to its program, and, as far as possible, it aimed to apply these ideological dogmas to the real phases of social life.”<sup>682</sup> For this reason, it is best to avoid referring to Turkish Revolutionary ideology as “totalitarian”. It is true that some components of Kemalism had certain affinities with Italian fascism or Stalinism. What matters to the Revolutionary elite above everything else was the function that Kemalism serves:

The willful hand, immense perspectives, and accurate inventions of Atatürk, a great genius of politics, leads the Turkish nation to the most modern and progressive political order of the world, who had remained behind and lost their ways in their political development due to the Ottoman state. This event is the outcome of the willful (*iradeci*) guidance of a genius that corresponds well to the spirit of the Turks. In the wake of these political developments, the Turkish intellectuals should undertake a very significant duty: They should grasp Kemalism as the most beautiful, powerful (*kudretli*) socio-political expression of the Turkish spirit, with all its profundity, sophistication and peculiarities that distinguishes it from other types of regimes. Furthermore, they should understand the role of Kemalism in the global political development, and preserve, nourish, and implement it with a profound knowledge of politics and with a high degree of intelligence.”<sup>683</sup>

---

<sup>682</sup> Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in İş Kanununu İzahı,” p. 326

<sup>683</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizm ve Politika Bilgisi,” (Kemalism and the Science of Politics), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936), p. 321

Furthermore, “Kemalism set the fundamentals of both the most appropriate form of politics and the enlightened as well as pure vision of society.”<sup>684</sup> For the *Ülkü* elite, the most outstanding task of the Turkish intellectuals was to build “the science of Kemalism,” in line with scientific methods. It seems plausible to argue that the Turkish one-party system and its policies especially in the 1930s were the outcome of ideological politics in the Kedourien sense. While differentiating ideological politics from constitutional politics at the theoretical level, Elie Kedourie argues that the representatives of ideological politics “look upon state and society as a canvas which has to be wiped clean, so that... [their] vision of justice, virtue and happiness can be painted on this *tabula rasa*”<sup>685</sup> He goes on to say that ideological politics is essentially a European phenomenon and an outcome of the French Revolution. For Kedourie, the very attempt to wipe the canvas clean entailed arbitrariness, lawlessness and violence on a stupendous scale and could not bring about happiness or spiritual fulfillment. Furthermore, having delayed the visions of a democratic and just society, the representatives of ideological politics create a considerable tension between the means and ends of their projects. That is, they justify the present undemocratic and authoritarian techniques and means in terms of their forecasted ideological vision. Kedourie maintains that nationalism as the prominent type of ideological politics.

Although Kedourie’s account appears to be directed against nationalism, his analysis gives some fresh insights to the understanding of Turkish nationalism and

---

<sup>684</sup> Ibid, p. 323

the nation-building process. Likewise, the *Ülkü* elite sought to create a new modern Turkish nation, by discarding the previous cultural and political elements in the state and society so that their vision of a perfect system could be portrayed on this *tabula rasa*. The ends of Turkish nationalist project was to catch up with the Western civilization and democratic vision. Yet, the means was a systematic shaping of society to prepare the ground for the nationalist purpose through mass education. There is a mismatch in the sense that democratic ideal was always thrown back into an unattainable point. The following quote reflects the abovementioned arguments very well:

Democracy is not an outcome of a revolution, but its purpose. Revolution is attained in order to destroy the barriers in front of this goal... and to form a consciousness of the society through carrying them to this goal. In this sense, the revolutionaries of democracy are the prophets and apostles of this task. With these adjectives, the revolutionaries of democracy are likened to be prophets of even the most liberalist religions, who should necessarily be dictator at the beginning. They expect an absolute obedience from their followers.<sup>686</sup>

One of the outstanding arguments in the statements of Köymen is the ideal of the state to prepare the people for democracy. Accordingly, the existing structure of society was considered as unavailable to construe the reforms and the intentions behind these reforms. As Heper aptly notes, the state did not have the role of expressing “the unconsidered thoughts of the crowd, rather to add to them more

---

<sup>685</sup> Elie Kedourie *Nationalism*, fourth, expanded edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. xiii-xiv

<sup>686</sup> Nusret Kemal (Köymen), “Halkçılık,” (Populism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), pp. 185-190

mature thoughts”<sup>687</sup>. For instance, the fourth article of the first part of the 1931 Republican People’s Party Program stated that the people were not ready to evaluate candidates; until the conditions and qualities of the people became mature enough; then, only known and trusted people should be elected.<sup>688</sup> As Clement Dodd argued,

Ataturk wanted radical change first, and democracy only after Turks had come to realize, through his party’s leadership and education, their true role as patriotic citizens. Ataturk’s idea of democracy was essentially idealist, and required acceptance of the need for revolution first. Political opposition would then be properly principled and one could then expect leaders of opposing parties to debate in a civilized way.<sup>689</sup>

In that sense, for the *Ülkü* elite, elections were far from representing the free will of the people. The single party was considered as the best solution for the existing conditions of the country and for constructing an undifferentiated homogenous society. Furthermore, *Ülkü* authors justified the Kemalist one party system as it was based on scientific tenets:

Kemalism is not a unique one party in the world; however, the basis of Kemalism’s understanding of one party differs from the other regimes’ one party. That is, Kemalism does not consider politics as a struggle for application, at whatever cost, of a subjective program based on egoism. Rather, it assumes politics as the discipline of social laws, in other words, as a “science” (*fen*). Before developing into science, medicine had not been a discipline on which the doctors compromised. But, after it became science,

---

<sup>687</sup> Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (University of Hull: The Eothen Press, 1985), p. 50

<sup>688</sup> İsmail Beşikçi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkasının Programı (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1991), p. 14

<sup>689</sup> C. H. Dodd, “The Development of Turkish Democracy,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, Is. 1 (1992), 16-30, p. 18

the matters of disagreement and difference had disappeared. Just like the body doctors (*vücut doktorları*) who work in cooperation to find a medicine, the politicians as the doctors of society (*sosyete doktorları*) should also be in agreement so that politics would be a science of neutrality, and it would be emancipated from the one-sided ideas and private interests. It is “state” as the political organization of nation, which would apply the outcomes of political science, or it would ensure and regulate that application. In this sense, Kemalism distinguishes itself from other regimes also by means of its apprehension of “state”.<sup>690</sup>

Central to this agenda was a conception of the nation as a collectivity marked by social solidarity and cohesion. *Ülkü*’s solidarism aimed to close the cultural and conceptual gap that existed between the “enlightened” segment of society and the seemingly “savage” universe of the peasantry. This could only be achieved by means of converting peasants:

We have fourteen or seventeen million citizens of whom %90 are alien to civilization. In a territory stretching over almost eight hundred km square (*murabbai*) there are forty thousand villages dispersed; and in order to enlighten (*nurlandırmak*) them, the devout citizens that would bestow their resplendence (*nur*) over the people do not perhaps amount to much than forty thousand. Being hopefully the best prediction, it means, per one citizen who is supposed to guide people there is one village; twenty km area; and four hundred citizens.<sup>691</sup>

According to the *Ülkü* elite, the existent Turkish population was an ignorant and reactionary block, a product of “Ottoman Empire’s politics of monstrosity” (*politika ucubesi*). They had to be civilized by means of a new idea of progress

---

<sup>690</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizmin Hususiyetleri” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), p. 417

<sup>691</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halkçılık” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1933: pp. 185-190, p. 190

mostly grounded on positivist, solidarist, and scientific assumptions.<sup>692</sup> These revolutionary leaders were prominently influenced by the French Revolution and the French Republican tradition. They believed in the power of reason as a guide for human conduct, and in the Enlightenment ideas, which linked material progress to science and rationality. At the same time, they were also inspired by the rising totalitarian regimes' attitudes towards state-society relations based on anti-liberal tenets. It might be maintained that the Turkish radical revolutionaries of the 1930s began to interpret the French Republican ideas in line with the rising anti-liberal and authoritarian assumptions particularly in Europe. In effect, since the radical revolutionaries conceived society as an integrated, organic and undifferentiated block, they saw themselves as representing the whole of the nation. As such, they rejected the class-based analysis of socialists which they considered hazardous to the integrity of the nation. In their view, both the liberal and the socialist trends contributed to the disintegration and further fragmentation of Turkey.<sup>693</sup> In other words, similar to the Radicals of the French Third Republic, the radical revolutionaries of Turkey advocated a new moral stance based on solidarity of the nation opposing liberal individualism, Marxist communalism and religious conservatism.

It can be argued that as opposed to the individualistic, laissez-faire freedom of the Anglo-American tradition, the French tradition has tended to stress collective

---

<sup>692</sup> Nusret Köymen, "Kemalizm ve Politika Bilgisi," (Kemalism and the Science of Politics), Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936), p. 321

<sup>693</sup> Necip Ali (Küçüka), "19 Şubat" in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933), pp. 4-5

involvement in pursuit of the “general will” that would liberate everyone.<sup>694</sup> The prominent figure that formed this tradition is Rousseau. This tradition was utilized by the radical revolutionaries as an integrating force and instrument for mobilizing the masses under conditions of rapid social transformations. In this sense, common people were regarded as unable to appreciate the intentions of the elite immediately and follow them. Consequently, the creation of a myth or a special civil religion was necessary. This myth was necessary for religious sanctification or the legitimating of the power of the regime and to create for it a special semi-divine status in society so that people obey and submissively bear the burden of social happiness. In a society of this type, politics and religion had one purpose. It was to realize the designs of the supreme legislator. Hence religion and politics served as each other's instruments. When Robespierre created the cult of the Supreme Being, he was consequently only acting as the true pupil and follower of Rousseau and at the same time as a predecessor of those many ideological and political cults with which the twentieth century has proved so replete.<sup>695</sup>

As it is mentioned before, cultural and political delegitimization of liberal democracy all over the world in the 1930s paved the way for a search of new alternatives among the Turkish revolutionary elite. The radical revolutionaries' alternative was mainly grounded on the solidarist and populist assumptions of democracy, “populist democracy” (*halkçı demokrasi*), which they saw it as the “most

---

<sup>694</sup> Paul M. Cohen, *Freedom's Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Liberty from Rousseau to Foucault*, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997)

<sup>695</sup> François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 77



appropriate form of democracy for Turkey,”<sup>696</sup> and which generally highlighted the unanimity and harmony of society centered on the concepts of duty and obligation rather than that of individual rights and responsibilities:

Democracy aimed at growing superior and sovereign selves. In every state, democracy pursued to establish a national unity and brotherhood based on the ideas of duty and responsibility against selfish emotions. Further, it seeks to construct a just and self-sacrificing (*feragatli*) morality.<sup>697</sup>

Democracy was perceived more in ethical terms rather than political ones: “It can be seen that in a democratic state, the more urgent principle is a moral matter than that of the political control (*murakebe*) or legislative and administrative mechanism.” Namely, “the utmost important thing is the moral roles and peculiarities of institutions.”<sup>698</sup> For the alleged “democratization” of society, the People’s Houses, as moral education centers, were designed to remove all outer signs of conflict to preserve the harmony and uniformity of the society. In this sense, the ruling cadre decided to abolish all the existing ‘civil’ organisations including the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), the Turkish Women’s Association (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*) and the Masonry lodges. In fact, the Turkish Women’s Association decided to dissolve itself in 1935 by declaring that there was no need to represent women outside the domain of the party. İffet H. Oruz, the general secretary of the Association explains the main

---

<sup>696</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Village Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123

<sup>697</sup> Ahmed Nesimi, “Kip ve Devrim (Enmuzeç ve İnkılap)”, *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, Is. 29, (July, 1935), pp. 330-333

<sup>698</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Devlet ve Vatandaş” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1934: pp. 181-184, p. 184

reason of this dissolution was the establishment of the People's Houses: "Here (in the Houses), we as men and women together were undertaking the social and cultural issues and again we men and women hand in hand were walking together in our Ata's way."<sup>699</sup> Instead of all these organizations, they decreed the establishment of the People's Houses as an organ of the party with which the entire interests of the Turkish society were said to be represented. By purging intermediary bodies between the party and "people", they wanted to reach "direct democracy". Since, the party, for Atatürk, "includes within it the whole nation, and not just a section."<sup>700</sup> Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Minister of Justice of the time, summarizes the role of the party very well:

No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as completely and as sincerely as the Republican People's Party. Other parties defend the interests of various social classes and strata. For our part, we do not recognize the existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united. There are no gentlemen, no masters, no slaves. There is but one whole set and this set is the Turkish nation.<sup>701</sup>

Any attempt to mediate this relation was considered as harmful to the undifferentiated and classless structure of the nation. For the *Ülkü* authors' idea of solidarism, the People's Houses would function to unite and homogenize society so as to destroy the barriers in front of democratization of the country. There was an

---

<sup>699</sup> İffet H. Oruz, *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'de Kadın Devrimi* (İstanbul: Gül Matbaası, 1986), p. 36

<sup>700</sup> Cited in Feroz Ahmad "The Political Economy of Kemalism" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, p. 157

obvious affirmation of democracy in the journal texts: “Today, Turkey is one of the distinct countries that is sincere in the idea and spirit of democracy, and it will, no doubt, always walk in the way to democracy.”<sup>702</sup> However, the radical revolutionaries’ perceptions of democracy are but totally different than contemporary visions.

The *Ülkü* authors’ peculiar conceptualization of democracy and secularism, emphasizing social solidarity, homogeneity and secular morality, in fact aimed to incorporate different ethnic and moral postures among the society into a unified and secular block. That is, having mainly adopted the French notion of citizenship, highlighting the incorporation of different ethnic and cultural entities into a uniform Turkish identity, the radical revolutionaries. Further, they came to the point that the incorporation of the ethical domain of society was also essential into a classless, undifferentiated harmony and solidarity of the nation:

The Kemalist regime aims at establishing a classless society. However, it does not want to set up an artificial alignment among the classes or to establish a domination of a class over others. Rather, the purpose is to prevent the defective development (*sakat inkişaf*) of society and to hinder the conditions that lead to class formation by means of assuring a healthy

---

<sup>701</sup> Quoted by Paul Dumont “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology” in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (ed. by. Jacob Landau) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 33

<sup>702</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Köy Seferberliğine Doğru,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1933: pp. 355-361, p. 356

development of society within a willful (*iradeci*) order, which finds its way through the light of social sciences.<sup>703</sup>

Unless the society will be risen to a desired ethical stance, unity and solidarity is impossible. As Peker argued, “a revolutionary mentality demands conformity (*ayak uyduruş*) with each step on the way to progress.”<sup>704</sup> Unanimity on a desired moral portrait was deemed necessary to establish “real solidarity” among society:

Real solidarity and social harmony could only be attained by means of cooperation of certain natural factors such as blood unity, the unanimity of moral quality and history, unity of language and life-style, and finally a unity of ideal and interest... Moral ties of any society are composed of those factors.<sup>705</sup>

For Nusret Kemal, during times of crisis, there are two patterns of social change. The first one is that an enlightened society adopts changing and developing conditions in a considerably short period of time with a high degree of consciousness. On the other hand, the latter pattern is that a guide or a vanguard group (*rehber zümre*) tries to better backward people from ignorance by getting them to meet the new requirements by revolutionary efforts. For Koymen, Turkey fit the second pattern of development:

It should be noted that people would cooperate with the state on their own will only in so far as they come to a desired moral and cultural level; in

---

<sup>703</sup> Nusret Köymen, “Kemalizmin Hususiyetleri” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 416

<sup>704</sup> Recep Peker, “Recep Peker’in İş Kanununu İzahı,” p. 326

<sup>705</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” (The Revolutionary Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): pp. 105-114, p. 108

countries where this level is absent, it is the most sacred duty of state to try to bring the people up to this level at the soonest time possible with its own intervention and directive.<sup>706</sup>

The mass socialization centers were aimed specifically to bring people to the “desired ethical and cultural level” and the revolutionary elite, as the vanguard group, would like to authorize: “The aim of the People’s Houses is to establish a conscious national unity. The Houses afford the new principles of life produced by the Turkish Revolution as moral precepts to the citizens. (*Türk İnkılabının yarattığı yeni yaşayış kaidelerini bir ahlak halinde vatandaşlara verir.*)”<sup>707</sup> Moreover, the Houses were designed as the civilizing medium through which the traditional masses would have the necessary qualifications to be carried to the prosperous future.

#### **6.2.2. Schools as Instruments for *Ülkü*’s Ideal of Democracy**

The moral education of the people in line with the revolutionary ethics was particularly deemed essential. This point also shows the Turkish radical revolutionaries’ concern about a solidarist understanding of ethics that was said to replace the traditional and religious moral precepts among society. The specificity of the 1930s was also regarded as critical to instigate an entire moral training of society: “the issue of moral and patriotic education proves its worth apparently in times especially when rapid economic and social conditions occur.”<sup>708</sup> In these times, for

---

<sup>706</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Danimarka Köylüsü Nasıl Uyandı,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), pp. 467-473, p. 467

<sup>707</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, (29 October 1933), p. 5

<sup>708</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” p. 108

Mehmet Saffet, it is hard to adapt to the new conditions, since, there have never been such great social and economic transformations in Turkish history before. In this sense, it is likely to be extremely critical of the moral issue. During this critical phase, “we are witnessing the impact of materialist philosophy among our youth.”<sup>709</sup> Such a philosophy, for Saffet, is destructive and separatist. For the materialist philosophy inculcates unbridled egoism instead of consciousness of duty (*vazife şuur*) and responsibility. Furthermore, it prefers immediate interests and pleasures to national interests. For that reason, as against the materialist philosophy, the idealist philosophy of revolution should be constructed. However, it is worth mentioning that this kind of consideration of idealism does not correspond to the Western idealist philosophical legacy. It denotes, rather, a solidarist implication that was justified in so far as it served the requirements of the Revolutionary elite in line with the efforts of the construction of *laik* morality. The relationship between the idea of solidarity and social/non-religious morality was explicitly deduced. In order to live in an ambiance of solidarity (*tesanüt havası*), he has to obey the norms of “social morality” (*içtimai ahlak*).<sup>710</sup>

Actually, as in the case of the French solidarist philosophers, they attempted to find a middle way between materialism and idealism in favor of the revolutionary idealist. For instance, on the one hand, the German romanticist and idealist philosophy was appreciated due to its endorsement of national idealism as a substitute to religious idealism: “The collective conscience of the Turkish nation is...

---

<sup>709</sup> Ibid.

a divinity.”<sup>711</sup> Therefore, the social conscience should also be subject to this divinity. The philosophical basis of “the symbol of excellence (*ekmeliyet remzi*) and a divinity (*ülûhiyet*)”<sup>712</sup> of the Turkish nation will be taught in congruence with “the national idealism represented by Kant, Fichte and Hegel in the nineteenth century”<sup>713</sup> On the other hand, the German idealist philosophy was condemned for backing new dogmas that would risk the very foundations of the Revolution: “...Most of us are inclined to a kind of strange spiritualism by the impact of German romantic philosophy.”<sup>714</sup> This would lead to the “intemperance (*ifrat*) of conservatism and traditionalism.”<sup>715</sup> It is argued that revolution means the collapse of most dogmas. In this sense, “new religions and sects (*mezhep*) replacing the previous ones”<sup>716</sup> should be not allowed. Hence, for the *Ülkü* authors, the primary duty of schooling is to instill morality and sense of citizenship to the people in conjunction with secular moral values. That is why “ensuring a better revolutionary education and bringing up (*yetiştirmek*) good

---

<sup>710</sup> See for instance Ahmet Nesimi, “Fertçilik ve Cemiyetçilik,” (Individualism and Communalism) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933), pp. 1-7

<sup>711</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Köycülük Nedir”, (What is Peasantism) *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6, (July, 1933): 422-430, p. 430.

<sup>712</sup> Ibid.

<sup>713</sup> Ibid. For the endorsement of idealism and the spiritual character of the Turkish nation, see also Aydoslu Sait, “Ölü ve Diri Tarih,” (Death and Alive History), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933): 18-19

<sup>714</sup> Niyazi Hüsnü, “İlim ve İnkılap,” (Science and Revolution) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 115-7, p. 117

<sup>715</sup> Ibid.

<sup>716</sup> Ibid.

citizens of republic” is of utmost importance.<sup>717</sup> For this aim the citizens have to be taught courses possessing social and moral values. Consequently, Turkish solidarism emphasized the individual as part of a moral collectivity. It was the individual’s duty to find his appropriate place within this collectivity.

In fact, rationalization of every means of social relations was respected as part and parcel of the moral education of the people based on solidarist assumptions of ethics. It is argued that the Turkish Revolution aims at rationalizing every kind of mechanism of the national body. Furthermore, the Revolution requires “citizens who feel and think in conformity with the structure and character of the Revolution.”<sup>718</sup> In order to save the people from “being captive to ignorance” and to make them to harmonize with “the soul and nature of revolution” economic activities and social relations should be rationalized.<sup>719</sup>

Therefore, to make people accustomed to the fruits of the revolution people’s education should be “the inculcation and orderly inculcation (*nizamlı işlemek*) of the minds of people who have reached normal level of enlightenment in the sense of their psycho-physiological qualities.”<sup>720</sup> This inculcation will be the work of national organization and management in terms of manifestation of our national values. It means, “melting (*yoğurma*) of the separated parts (*zümre*) in regard to their accent,

---

<sup>717</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” (The Revolutionary Education) p. 108

<sup>718</sup> Hilmi, “Halk Neşriyatının Ehemmiyeti,” (The Significance of the People’s Publication) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): 70-79, p. 70

<sup>719</sup> Ibid.

<sup>720</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halk Terbiyesi,” (People’s Education) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): pp. 16-20



sect (*mezhep*) and civilization into a social body as well as a nation.”<sup>721</sup> Furthermore, it denotes “bringing up the spirit, thought, hearing and will of all individuals through inculcation in conformity with the whole ideal of the nation.”<sup>722</sup>

Nusret Kemal made an analogy between a nation and an electricity network. For him, history is the dynamo, the individuals are the accumulators and language is the wire. Since the network has not yet been designed perfectly, Nusret Kemal argues, electricity could not pass all the hearts to the same degree. There are still unfaithful persons. He tried to prove a link between liberalism (individualism) and materialism. He denoted individualism in an extremely pejorative connotation. For him, Turks are communitarian (*cemiyetçi*), zealous and idealist by nature. Mass education through the People’s Houses was aimed to transmute society into this anticipated nature. In their attempt to convert the whole Turkish people the People’s Houses utilized secular myths, symbols and rituals created for the new regime. Thus, the People’s Houses became the new sites for the institutionalization of secular revolutionary politics:

History is heart, language is vein, and the People’s Houses are the thin vein centers where the dirty blood is replaced with the clean blood. The primary aim is to organize and dominate the ‘people force’ (*halk kuvveti*) in the whole country. We want neither individual and group, nor class dictatorship. But we want cooperation, unity of feelings, ideas, and ways... The

---

<sup>721</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” (The Means of People Education) Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9, p. 152

<sup>722</sup> Ibid

fundamental role of the Houses is to institutionalize the people force and further disseminate the revolutionary ideals (*Ülkü*) to the whole country.<sup>723</sup>

As it is seen, the radical agenda of the *Ülkü* elite manifests itself also in their consideration of solidarity. One of the *Ülkü* authors argued that the Turkish Revolution became a pioneer for many nations aiming to adapt these kinds of radical principles: “Before Italian fascism and German national socialism... the Turkish Revolution had established a secular and revolutionary republican foundation on the basis of populism, nationalism and revolutionism.”<sup>724</sup> For they were “concerned about the welfare and freedom of individuals by populism” and wanted to “combine the interests of individual and society through the principles of nationalism and étatism.”<sup>725</sup>

Revolutionary education of the people in the Houses made a great effort to discontinue the traditional system of beliefs and substitute it with a set of views that the regime regarded as suitable for the new age. Still, the most powerful weapon was the school system. Religion was separated from the school, and curricula were revised. New holidays were substituted for religious ones, accompanied by manifestations, meetings, speeches, slogans, posters, exhibitions, and photographs of the revolutionary leaders. Party congresses and conferences, as well as similar manifestations of mass organizations were accompanied by identical iconography – busts, flags, slogans, photographs, choirs, and the like. Through these techniques, the

---

<sup>723</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Halk Kuvveti,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1933), p. 54

<sup>724</sup> Şevket Mehmedali, “Hukuk Bakımından Buhran,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 20-26, p. 26

<sup>725</sup> Ibid.

Party embarked on creating a new political culture and the "new person," whose character, behavior, and understanding had to match the requirements of modern civilization. The transformation and hence elimination of the traditional mentality called for application of a broad spectrum of propaganda techniques. The press, radio, theater, educational courses, film, literature and museums had the task of unmasking the old way of life. In the new cultural life there was no room for the traditional activities. The obstacles that debar the visionary of modern civilization had to be removed from an entanglement of traditional and religious mentality.

### **6.3. Cultural Conversion of the Peasants**

There are a number of mechanisms and targets through which the *Ülkü* elite tried to convert peasants culturally. They were village schools, families, an emphasis on public sphere and war against superstition. These were all aimed to incorporate peasants, the majority of the Turkish population at that time, into a unified mass and provide social solidarity among society. Cultural production gave rise to a populist idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious community, free from internal dissent and struggle. Therefore, the modernizing rulers saw the mores of traditional power centers as fossilized traces of social and cultural archaism. Not only because their worldview was wrong, but also their intention was evil and harmful.<sup>726</sup> Thus, the basic aspect of the rulers' civilizing mission was to free people from tight traditional ties by ending the autonomous status of local power centers, and then to symbolically pattern the people into a 'collective' union made up of

---

<sup>726</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları*, p. 169.

“civilized” individuals. Given that the Turkish villages were considered more traditional than the cities, this mission was carried out especially for the peasants. Numerous articles were published to discuss how to transform the villages in conformity with the principles of the new regime. The Branch for Aid to the Village (*Köycülük Kolu*) of the People’s Houses worked not only to advance the condition of the peasants, but also to elevate them to a civilized position.

The primary issue that bothered the elites was the ignorance and backwardness of the peasants that were said to be under the influence of superstitious and scholastic mentalities. How to inject the knowledge of modern principles to the villages was of utmost importance for the radical Kemalist elite. In Turkey, as in revolutionary France, the revolutionaries sought to create a new man and a new woman. Most important of all, they had to create a new child. They saw the future of nation at the very heart of managing to make children of revolution. In this sense, the task of teachers were said to mold and model the youthful material, purifying it by way of eliminating the dangers and blemishes that affect it:

The primary duty of school is to instill morality and citizenship to the people. Ensuring a better revolutionary education and bringing up (*yetiştirmek*) good citizens of the republic is of utmost importance. The children have to be taught courses possessing social and moral values.<sup>727</sup>

The first focus was on children via their families: “For the children of the villages, there should be a school and a teacher that would inject them the Turkish

---

<sup>727</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “İnkılap Terbiyesi,” (The Revolutionary Education) p. 108

culture, the Turkish Existence and the Turkish language.”<sup>728</sup> In one of the articles, it is argued that the children should escape from the influence of their parents. Hitherto, home had been the preserve of archaic notions and practices characteristics of peasant society and of clerical domination. The child was generally in touch with his or her parent outside the school life. For that reason, in order to be successful in educating the children, especially their mothers should also be trained by especially female teachers: “To advance our culture in a secure and sound way, before anything else, we should struggle with these mothers.”<sup>729</sup> For, the women were conceived as ignorant and “more inclined to believe superstitions.”<sup>730</sup> Fathers are praised for their roles in the public arena. That is, it is maintained that the males of the villages were more enlightened than the females. Because, they were trained in the army, they always went to the bazaar, performed government tasks, and talked to the teachers. In this sense, they were more vigilant and civilized.<sup>731</sup> Existing society and politics were perceived as corrupt, and to be transformed by means of re-educating the children. Accordingly, a prime objective was to distance the children as far as possible from the various forms of education that were remnants of the traditional authorities. Since parents were part of the corrupt generation and were sequentially the first teachers, it was also to be necessary to remove the child from their influence. Revolutionary leaders aimed to create a new form of family that would perpetuate

---

<sup>728</sup> Aptullah Ziya “Köy Mimarisi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (August 1933), p. 38

<sup>729</sup> Sabri Gültekin “Melez Terbiye,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (August 1933), p. 61

<sup>730</sup> Osman Nuri, “Haymana’nın Ahırlıkuyu Köyü,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), pp. 394-400

<sup>731</sup> Sabri Gültekin “Melez Terbiye” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (August 1933), p. 61

the norms of new regime: “By admitting the civil law, we set out to have a new type of society and family i.e., a European family. We are now far away from the countries of *binbir gece masallari* (thousand and one night tales).”<sup>732</sup> By disciplining, educating, and moralizing particularly the rural family, the revolutionaries wanted to overcome major impediments to modern civilization. Like their French counterparts, the Turkish revolutionaries tried to fill a tabula rasa:

The village teachers not only instruct the village kids, but also enlightens the whole village dwellers. Their quality of guidance is not less important than their task of teaching. The idealist (*ülküci*) character of the village teachers gives the power of overcoming most of the problems they encounter in the villages. The primary feature of this *ülküci* teacher, before everything else, is being a good ‘Turk.’ Such a teacher should make the people hear and live the national consciousness. He will learn his Turkness not from books, but by the help of his spirit.<sup>733</sup>

Secondly, it can be argued that the Republican elite wanted everyone to be acquainted with the public realm. The Public realm was their locus of the state. On the other hand, the private sphere represented the traditional, archaic and the superstitious. In order to mobilize the masses in conformity with the values of the Republic, the public sphere was the unique arena. The People’s Houses were the primary gates for the masses to enter the public realm. In short, attempts were made to assimilate the ‘heterogeneous’ elements (or differences), be it religious, ethnic or ideological, within the public realm and to melt those differences under a focal point of culture.

---

<sup>732</sup> Necip Ali, “İnkılap ve Türk Kanunu Medenisi,” (Revolution and the Turkish Civil Law) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 9, (Oct., 1933): 178-185, p. 183

The authors of *Ülkü* saw education as the primary means of secular conversion of the masses with a revolutionary nationalistic spirit and as an active agent for the formation of a modern nation. The *Ülkü* elite, in that sense, endeavored to infect the new teachers with their apostolic zeal. They made a conscious effort to lead the traditional peoples from their religious ties and worldview to revolutionary culture as taught in the schools. Thus, education was seen as a means of forming a homogenous secular and national culture out of the many diverse traditional and ethnic groups. Moreover, this was a project of transformation of Ottoman traditional personality into a new secular one:

The Ottoman personality is just about to die, and the new Turkish personality is rising. In this sense, the duty of the People's Houses is to kill the old residues inherited from cells of the old sick man (the Ottoman mentality, morality, pleasure and the like), which still remains in the spirit of this new personality. In order to rescue the Turkish youth from the Ottoman mentality, we have to show them the models of democratic and honest (*namuslu*) man. For this aim, the members of the Houses should bear idealistic, virtuous and artistic soul...<sup>734</sup>

The dichotomization between the old/traditional/religious and new/modern/national morality was deliberately pursued by means of relegating the former always to the backward and corrupt realm and praising the latter. This dichotomy implied for the authors substitution of the old moral stance by the new one. The following quotation gives enough obvious evidence about this replacement:

---

<sup>733</sup> Hıfzırrahman Raşit Öymen, "Köy Mektebi ve Köy Muallimi," (The Village School and the Village Teacher) *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935): 414-7, p. 414

<sup>734</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, (25 February 1933), p. 3

Among the *Baraks* (a Turkmen clan) morality and personality is very strong. They are tied to the Turkish creeds rather than their religion Islam. The religious currents were not successful in entering their lives. Like the other *Türkmen*s, Baraks also were committed to Turkishness instead of religion... It is impossible to find any mosque and minaret in their village. However, one can see a school building. They are more interested in schools.

The Barak clan's relationship with the Arabs is very weak. It is hard to find a person speaking Arabic, though there are many Arab villages surrounding them. From the beginning, it is truth that they never had even sexual intercourse with the Arabs. They do not hesitate to say that they are suspicious about the morality of Arabs.<sup>735</sup>

The postulation of Turkishness as a new creed as opposed to the Islamic one is quite striking. The author also attributes pejorative meanings to Islamic morality by equating it with Arabness. This can be considered as an Orientalist outlook that attempts to occidentalize Turkishness by creating its own realm of "orient." Perception of school as a substitute for the mosque is obvious.

Another instrument for the *Ulku* authors which constituted the heart of the revolutionary program of education was the rural school. The basic premise of these schools genuinely was to educate and convert the rural masses. The efforts of the village "guides" aimed at constituting a significant impact on society. The main problem was that there was a scarcity of professional teachers endowed with certain qualifications necessary to conduct revolutionary schools the authors of *Ülkü* desired. Therefore, it was proposed sending the candidates to the teacher training centers to be equipped with the necessary qualifications. For instance, Nusret Kemal determined the program of the courses that the village "guides" would be taught:

---

<sup>735</sup> A. Rıza "Akça Köy" in *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1933, p. 65



Theoretical issues: The First Group: Physical sciences, Health and the selection of generation (*neslin istifası*), The Philosophy of Civilization; The Second Group: General Geography, Turkish Geography; The Third Group: The History of General Civilization, Turkish History (a detailed account of the Turkish civilizations and an inquiry of the Revolution), The People's History in Turkey, The People's Literature, The Lives of the Great Men (the men of ideals); The Fourth Group: The Theory of Agriculture, The Village Economy and the Village Shops (*dükkan*), Accounting; The Fifth Group: Psychology and Education (the psychology of individual and society in the respect of education), The History of Moral and Religious Philosophy, Secular Morality (*Laik Ahlak*), Sociology, The Philosophy of State (Turkish populist democracy is the most appropriate form of democracy for Turkey. By explaining the foundations of the Turkish Revolution in detail, the comparison of the Turkish populist democracy with fascism, sovietism, racism, democracy with kingdom, federal democracy and the like will be instructed; the issues of nationalism and humanism, and the necessity of nationalism will be taught.); The Sixth Group: The Philosophy of the Village Education, The Activities of Village Education in other Countries, The Village Law and other Information.”<sup>736</sup>

It is indicative that the majority of the course schedule was set to fit the ideological inculcation of the pupils. It was proposed that “Secular Morality” (*Laik Ahlak*) should be included in the curricula as a separate course. This is also striking since it shows how the revolutionary elites were to a considerable extent engaged to the problem of morality independent of religious considerations. Nusret Kemal referred to the village teachers as modern missionaries and conceived of their task as comparable to that of Christian missionary activities in the savage African tribes.<sup>737</sup> For him, it was a great necessity to launch “village mobilization.” Since, “the cracked lips of those arid villages require much the water of sacred light (*nurun*

---

<sup>736</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi,” (A Village Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123

<sup>737</sup> Nusret Kemal, “Köy Misyonerliği,” (Village Missionary), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Sept., 1933), p. 150

*suyu*)." In this sense, "the People's Houses are the headquarters gathering vanguard forces (*hazırlık kıtası*) for the village mobilization to launch a war against primitiveness." All the volunteers were called to "prepare their hearts and minds for this great war."<sup>738</sup>

Finally, this was a war against superstitions and bigotry. Due to the fact that "*üfürükçülük* (bigotry) is the most dangerous issue in the villages," it was the primary duty of the village teachers "to bury this problem in the cemetery."<sup>739</sup> The efforts of the village teachers to fight the "*üfürük* and superstitions" were even compared with the martyrs of Gallipoli war. This is a deliberate effort to transfer sacrality of the people:

In order to suffocate the superstitious creeds, ignorance, and fanaticism (*taassup*) and to lift our villages up cultural, social and economic domains, thousands of enlightened minds (*nurlu kafa*) should toil, become worn out, and even they should be buried (in the villages they are charged) just as we buried our martyrs in Galipoli, just as we shed much blood in Sakarya, just as there are many Turkish bones in Dumlupınar.<sup>740</sup>

Thus, it can be contended that the *Ülkü* elite had great eagerness to spend most of their energy to uproot the vestiges of traditional authority which was considered as inhibiting Turkish society's adaptation to the requirements of the modern, civilized way of life. This preoccupation had generally led to an overestimation of a number of

---

<sup>738</sup> Nusret Köymen, "Köy Seferberliğine Doğru," *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, (June,1933): 355-361, p. 361

<sup>739</sup> Osman Nuri, "Haymana'nın Ahırlıkuyu Köyü," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), pp. 394-400

<sup>740</sup> Ibid., p. 480

domestic problems of the country. These economic and political problems were either ignored or relegated to a subsidiary position in the Republic's policies of priorities. In this sense, the extreme anticlerical views of the *Ülkü* elite represented the Jacobin republican tradition of France, which regarded teaching of the substantive issues of the Republic as the highest priority. Even, this sort of Jacobin politics tended to justify the infringement of the democratic principle of freedom of conscience as a necessary precondition to eradicate the reactionary forces, which were perceived as inimical to the security of the "democratic" Republic. For the *Ülkü* authors, all forms of "primitiveness" represented mostly by superstition and bigotry implied the primary menace to "democratic" rule in Turkey.

#### **6.4. Utilization of Arts and Rituals for the Cultural Regeneration of People**

This war against primitiveness involved almost all spheres of social and cultural life. The conversion of fine arts, in particular, was deemed necessary in order to provide a total lifting of society up to the level of modern civilization. Necip Ali mainly argues that the old religious considerations caused the fine arts to remain backward. In order to escape the negative effects of old considerations of art, he tried to find a solution outside the religious and traditional domain:

... we want to express the feeling of our national personality and our national songs within the ambit of international musical technique. We would like to put an end to the oriental music such as *saz* and *fasıl* produced by the mixture of Byzantium, Iranian and Arabic songs as if they are national. So, in this modern age while we are claiming to walk shoulder to

shoulder with the most advanced nations, the music performing (*terennüm*) the spirit of the past life has nothing to do with our modern life.<sup>741</sup>

The idea above found some particular expressions in playing instruments and singing music to “make people accustomed to self-sacrifice and discipline.”<sup>742</sup> In this sense, art was one of the primary instruments of subjugating individuals to the sacred ideals of the state. For instance, the function of the choruses was considered to be preparing people to the requirements of their preconceived idea of community predominantly based on non-democratic tenets: “Being subject to the will of a guide without exhibiting himself or herself, and merely rendering service to the target puts a profound idea of discipline and renunciation (*feragat*) as a requisite.” For that reason, “in collective performance of music, the individual melts as well as disappears completely within a totality...”<sup>743</sup> It can be argued that this sort of instrumentalization of the art was for the aims of the revolution. For the *Ülkü* authors, even art was to be shaped in line with the content of revolution. Only by this way, art would have meaning in relation to the *Ülkü* elite’s perception of the revolutionary morality: “The revolutionary ideal can solely be created within a milieu of art that digests (*hazmetmek*) the revolutionary morality and the revolutionary ideal.”<sup>744</sup> Hence, the ideal is above all placed at the center:

---

<sup>741</sup> Necip Ali “Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey’in Nutku,” (A Speech Delivered by Necip Ali Bey in an Annual of the People Houses), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 104-114, p. 110

<sup>742</sup> Hamit Zübeyr, “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” p. 157

<sup>743</sup> Ibid.

<sup>744</sup> Ali Sami, “Güzel Sanatları İnkılabına Nasıl Maledebiliriz,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), p. 361

What is the reality of our revolution? In my opinion, revolutionary ideal is a whole (*kül*), a universe (*alem*). Just as any universe, it also lives with certain satellites (*peyk*) surrounding it. The fine arts is also one of the prominent satellites of the revolutionary universe. The progress of our revolution will be secured in so far as these satellites experience their own revolution separately. In accordance with the great order we had, the time has come. Our chief commands us: The army of art, take the lead (*Sanat Ordusu İş Başına*).<sup>745</sup>

Just like music, theatre was considered by the Revolutionary elite as the “incomparable power of conviction” (*eşsiz telkin kudreti*).<sup>746</sup> Moreover, it was utilized to “conquer the hearts of people”<sup>747</sup> It was seen as aiming to struggle against the “old”, “primitive,” and the “outmoded”. Intrinsically, revolutionary theatre was considered as one of the major passages of ritual that would instill revolutionary morality. It was argued that the essential role of the drama performed in the People’s Houses was to make the deepest impact on the convictions of people. Even this purpose was mathematized: “if we guess that a theoretical play with a single quintessential thesis is staged in 136 People’s Houses and each play is attended by 1000 persons, then more than 136000 citizens are acquainted and convicted with one idea in a few days.”<sup>748</sup>

In general, the content of the plays were to be designed by certain characteristics that would be in conformity with the general purposes of the regime. The essential characteristics of theater were categorized under five conditions:

---

<sup>745</sup> Ibid., p. 359

<sup>746</sup> *Halkevleri 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, ed. by Behçet Kemal (Çağlar), (Ankara, 1935), p. 50

<sup>747</sup> Ibid, p. 15

1. It has to complement the modern life of the new Turkish society
2. It has to nourish the national sentiments.
3. It has to deal with the national problems along the lines of the revolutionary principles.
4. It has to touch upon the themes about the changes and progress in social life corresponding to the revolutionary worldview.
5. And finally the plays should be cultivating ones that would address to all segments of society.<sup>749</sup>

The traditional performance arts were transmuted into modern Revolutionary performances. One of the prominent traditional Ottoman shadowplay characters, *Hacivat and Karagoz* was modified in line with the Revolutionary goal. In its traditional form, Hacivat has wisdom, open-minded character and he teaches Karagoz who is ignorant and coarse. But, in the new form, Hacivat signified a modern, progressive and Kemalist character, while Karagoz was labeled traditional, archaic, reactionary and primitive one. For instance, in one of the Hacivat and Karagoz play staged in the People's Houses, such binary oppositions were inscribed:

Hacivat says:

Oh my dear Karagoz, everything is changing from the dark old to the enlightened present

From serfdom to master life

From oil-lamp to electric light

From theological schools to Modern Schools

From workshop to factory

From ox-cart to automobile

---

<sup>748</sup> Ibid.

<sup>749</sup> Nurhan Karadağ, *Halkevleri Tiyatro Çalışmaları: 1932-1951*, (Ankara: T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1998), p. 125

From rowing boat to motorboat  
From plough to tractor  
And to the plane...  
Karagoz replies: stop it, I feel dizzy.  
An invisible third person's voice ushers with sobriety: It's because of the speed. Be accustomed to it. There is no right to live if you are not accustomed.  
Hacivat continues: the revolution has lessened the years to months, months to weeks, and weeks to days, and days to hours.  
Go ahead in knowledge, in mind, in technique, in arts...<sup>750</sup>

This theatrical drama play is part of larger system of structure of stage plays which consisted of the following rituals: 1- Turkish National Anthem, 2- speech about the fruits of the Revolution delivered by the general director of the particular House, 3- staging the play.

Of course there were also non-verbal symbolic organization of objects that strengthened the ritual messages in collaboration with verbal symbols. According to the official publication of the People's Houses, which documented activities in the Houses<sup>751</sup>, the theatre hall is pictured as follows: within the hall where the theatrical plays are staged, there is a raised platform built in framed-stage architectural style. The frame signifies the importance of what is staged and engages audience in the message given through the play. Atop the frame again there are the Turkish and the party flag with six arrows. In between these two, there is an Ataturk picture. There is a system of lining up the organization of the seats in the auditorium. As part of the general system of the ritual, architectural organization of the Houses contains some physical objects that are used as ritual symbols:

---

<sup>750</sup> Cited in Ibid, p. 139.

<sup>751</sup> *Halkevleri 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, pp. 50-64

1. A maxim posted above the main door. Usually, the maxim “so happy is one who says I am Turk,” or “Turk, take pride in yourself, be diligent, and trust,” and other Atatürk’s maxims used decisively according the logic of situation.
2. A tower signifying the new temples of the Revolution, which is analogous to mosques with its physical appearance. Some of these towers are built taller than minaret of a mosque.
3. Placard, put on walls emphasizing the “old” to disfavor and disfigure it, and the “new” praising the fruits of the reforms.
4. A balcony to deliver speeches to the people gathered in the courtyard of the main building.
5. Two flags, one of the Turkish Republic and the other the Party (RPP) flag, which symbolize the principles of the Revolution, Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Laicism, Étatism and Revolutionism. These flags are posited side by side.
6. Atatürk bust or statue.<sup>752</sup>

Ritual became a significant means to structure and maintain power relations, because the revolutionary elite deliberately used new state rituals to increase social solidarity and thus further the construction of a secular society. The ruling elite regarded traditional rituals and customs as the primary components of superstition and scholastic way of life. Actually, they considered its cultural inheritance as problematic, in general. Inherited ritual was to be ruled out in terms of replacement of existing rites by new, secularized substitutes. The new ritual engineers hoped that

---

<sup>752</sup> For a detailed account of symbols and architectural styles of the People’s Houses see especially Neşe G. Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).



the new Revolutionary liturgy would stamp out not only religious superstitions and rites but also generally rid people's consciousness of all spoiled residues of the *ancien regime*.

Just like music and theatre, in the *Ülkü* journal, the revolutionary elites wanted to highlight the significance of the ceremonies in inculcating the revolutionary values to the people. For instance, it was stated that the Language Day Ceremony was to be celebrated with a significant ritual. It was argued that the People's Houses valued the Language Day as it has almost equal significance with the Victory Day, which celebrated the termination of the war of independence on 30 August 1922. In one of the Language Day Ceremonies, after the National Anthem, the head of the Ankara People's House, Ferid Celal Guven opened the ceremony with an enthusiastic speech. Especially, his expressions signifying "the trust in the revolutionary values made a very good impact on the audience."<sup>753</sup> Then, the head of the Turkish Language Institution, Besim Atalay, made a speech. He stressed the importance of Turks in world history, and particularly made a distinction between the old and new approaches. Afterwards, many poems written and read in "Atatürk's Turkish" by Ishak Rafet Işıkmen were "listened to with pleasure." During all these speeches and poems "the instances revitalizing the cause were much applauded."<sup>754</sup>

According to the journal, in Istanbul Eminönü People's House, the Language Day was also celebrated with enthusiasm. A crowd belonging to "an enlightened strata" (*münevver zümre*)" come together at six o'clock, listened to the conference

---

<sup>753</sup> "Ankarada Dil Bayramı," *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935), p. 87

<sup>754</sup> Ibid.

speeches broadcasted from Ankara radio, and then the ceremony was opened with the National Independence Anthem. Following the anthem, the Assembly Anthem was chanted. Afterwards, a prominent member of the House, Sabri Esat Ander delivered a speech denoting the importance of the Day:

This is a ceremony of a nation who had been forced to forget its existence, and to be deluded by the ceremonies of the Palace and Medrese (Ottoman educational institutions). However, this national ceremony announces the unification of the nation with its own personality and vitality. Recent history is the history of Turkish miracle. Turks who have been seeking their way in the darkness attained the celebrated days by way of the emergence of their ATA as the rising sun from an Anatolian district on May 19. And finally 26 September; the surrounding of this sun all over the universe as a national faith.

In times past, our whole knowledge was nothing but medrese bigotry. Our literature was a mere imitation. Since, we did not know ourselves; and we doubted our language... There was an unconscious, hidden, unexpressed consideration that we are a great nation. Today, by the help of the language and history research, we see that this consideration has come true. We are now not only an amalgamation clenching to each other instinctively, but also a nation who melts into each other with faith, love and knowledge. The consciousness of our personality is enlightened by the sun of the ceremonies such as 19 May, 30 August and 29 December. The ceremony that we celebrate together today is the ceremony of our enlightened consciousness and the manifestation of our everlasting gratitude to our Sacred Sun (Atatürk).<sup>755</sup>

After the speeches, a classical music concert started and the orchestra of the People's House was much applauded. The concert was followed by various stage plays signifying the fruits of the Revolution. All these activities were aimed to strengthen and fortify the revolutionary transformation of society. In this respect, one

---

<sup>755</sup> "Kültür Haberleri: Yurdda Dil Bayramı," *Ülkü*, Vol. VIII, No. 44, pp. 160-166

*Ülkü* author argued, “in order to fortify our revolution and reinforce the national consciousness, we have to spend maximum energy to employ every instrument such as speech, text, cinema, poster and theatre... This task could only be entrusted to idealist and faithful (*imanlı*) persons.”<sup>756</sup>

For the *Ülkü* elite, fine arts should reflect the spirit of communality and homogeneity of the nation. For them, there was no such thing as individual art as art was a social phenomenon and for the society and for the common good of the nation: “We have to develop a revolutionary literature in order to reflect the essence of Revolutionary Turks. Our revolution is volcano, sun, fire, and earthquake. It destroyed, overthrow and demolished. But at the same time, it remade, recreated, and restored. Our literature should also be like our revolution. We are disgusted with centuries long love stories, personal passions and lifeless joy. We want revolutionary poetry that would teach us ourselves, and direct us to our ideal.”<sup>757</sup> The aim was to nullify everything produced before the Revolution.

In sum, it can be argued that culture, for the *Ülkü* elite, was manufactured as the domain of social engineering via state agencies.<sup>758</sup> Thus, *Ülkü*’s conception of

---

<sup>756</sup> Mehmet Saffet, “Köycülük Nedir,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6: pp. 422-430, p. 425

<sup>757</sup> Kazım Nami, “İnkılap Edebiyatı,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 46-53

<sup>758</sup> On the relationship between modern state and culture, see Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), especially chapters 1, 5 and 6. See also, Eugen Weber, “What Rough Beast?,” *Critical Review*, 2 (1996), pp. 285-98

culture became the “outcome of a constant process of cultural production”<sup>759</sup> and projected a vision of an ideal, well-ordered and harmonious socio-cultural life promoted by the cultural doctrine of the elite.<sup>760</sup> Cultural production gave rise to a populist idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious community, free from internal dissent and struggle. Utilization of culture for the common good of the nation was of utmost importance to establish a harmonious order and social solidarity among society.

---

<sup>759</sup> Richard G. Fox, “Introduction”, in Richard G. Fox (ed.), *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Culture* (USA: American Eth. Soc. Mon. Series, No. 2, 1990), p. 2.

<sup>760</sup> In this sense, Atatürk treated culture as a mentality that every ‘civilized’ Turkish citizen, being a cultural/cultured person, should possess to describe and determine his own way. See Afetinan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıra ve Belgeler* (Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1959), p. 272.

## CONCLUSION

In Turkey, the 1930s marked an era when the state elite attempted to alter state power in line with new ideas, institutions and techniques that were significantly different from the ones before 1930. This specific historical episode bespeaks certain characteristics that shaped the very direction of the Turkish politics. Three major characteristics came to the fore. First, the idea of a “secular morality” was seriously considered as a substitute for the religious one. With this idea, the problem of *laiklik* was reduced to a search for constituting a laic morality. Second, the vision of a Jacobin-like democracy was internalized, which presumed an equivalence between representation and the people. Any intermediary body that would disrupt this equality was eradicated as the enemy of the general/national will. Third, the idea of solidarism and social solidarity were employed to highlight a classless, amalgamated and amassed society free from internal dissent. Actually, this idea of solidarity embraced both secular morality and Jacobin democracy. This dissertation claims that the *Ülkü* elite’s representation of Kemalism was generally undertaken through employing these three characteristics. This version of Kemalism became particularly dominant between 1933-36. When Atatürk dismissed Recep Peker from the post of the Secretary-General of the party on June 1936, the *Ülkü* group was also dismissed from *Çankaya*, and their ideas ceased to be the official formulation of Turkish revolutionary ideology.

The dissertation draws a number of conclusions from the analysis of the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism which also describes a stage in the Turkish Revolution, namely Kemalism of the 1930s. First of all, the dissertation reveals that chronologically there was no single revolutionary style. Furthermore, even during the 1930s, there were competing projects and programs and multiple interpretations of Kemalism on how to secularize and modernize Turkish society and how to form the ideology of revolution. The *Ülkü* variant of Kemalism represents one of the most powerful attempts to provide substance to the Turkish revolutionary ideology carried out by a pioneering elite group within the RPP in the 1930s. *Ülkü* met the historical-temporal needs of Kemalism in a particular historical situation that had arisen especially after the World Economic Depression and the Free Party experiment.

Although the radical projects of the *Ülkü* group were implemented during the mid-1930s, this was only possible due to a coincidence of an international and domestic crisis. Yet, once it was implemented for a short period of time, this specific version of Kemalism remained as a model for later generations even after the transition to multi-party politics. If Kemalism carries certain permanent politico-cultural meanings that still provide inputs to shape Turkish politics, it partly owes it to the historical heritage descending from the intricate encounters between differing versions of Kemalism of the 1930s, including that of *Ülkü*. Since Kemalism might be re-interpreted in different political contexts to meet different contingencies, the semiotic struggle over the definition of it is a continuous process. In short, the analysis of *Ülkü* demonstrates that Kemalism is an amalgam composed of lots of variations in it. All the competing meta-narratives subsumed under Kemalism generated the politico-jural order of contemporary Turkish politics, and its internal

contradictions. A scientific exploration of these differing attempts is highly valuable to understand not only the specificities of Kemalism but also its general stance in terms of its transformative character, and also its permanence throughout time. In this sense, the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism represents a specific hue in the spectrum of the Turkish Revolutionary ideology, which is meaningful in understanding not only the political dynamics of Turkey in the 1930s, but also the current dynamics, structures, problems and challenges in Turkish politics.

Secondly, the dissertation shows that the ideas conveyed in the texts of *Ülkü* also provided guiding codes for the People's Houses. The authors of *Ülkü* were able to find a suitable place in People's Houses to disseminate and further test their thoughts. In this sense, the analysis of the People's Houses and *Ülkü* unravels the solidarist tenets of Kemalism of the 1930s, which considered secular morality and Jacobin democracy as the ultimate ways of modernizing the country. The relevance of this analysis extends beyond the 1930s Turkey in terms of providing insights for understanding the contemporary problems of Turkish politics. The features of Turkish politics originally formulated in the 1930s should be seriously taken into account while assessing today's problems of Turkish democracy. In this sense, the study of the *Ülkü* group of Kemalism provides a key that would be instructive to understand major predilections of Turkish politics today while focusing on the peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary ideology in the 1930s.

Prompted by their profound belief in the superiority of revolutionary secular culture and the possibility of progress through the displacement of "scholastic mentality" by the "scientific" one, the re-constructivist revolutionaries of the 1930s

set out to improve the material and moral conditions of the “ignorant,” “illiterate” traditional masses. Their rule of conduct of the Turkish Republican “enlightenment” project rested on a set of coercive practices that violated their own democratic ideals.

The establishment of the People’s Houses can be evaluated as part and parcel of the institutionalization of the radical Kemalist meta-paradigm as a secular morality aspiring to convert the whole Turkish people by means of the myths, symbols and rituals of the new regime. Thus, they became the new sites for “the sacralization of secular politics.” The Houses defined as “National Temples” (*Milli Tapınaklar*)<sup>761</sup> were the cultic sites that the radical Kemalists expropriated in their first step toward constructing a complex politico-cultural liturgy connecting the supposedly “uneducable masses” to the Kemalist principles. The rites, symbols, and myths of the Kemalist revolutionary project were designed to mold the population into an amalgamated block. Radical Kemalism found so much of traditional Turkish culture and religion to be convertible and adaptable to its own purposes.

The third major argument that this dissertation makes is about the historical ideological seeds of the tension between *Ülkü*’s project of democracy and secular/modern transformation. New forms of discipline or to put it another way, new ways of organizing the masses arose from within the very forces that were working to “democratize” the people. Actually, the rhetoric of democracy affords the

---

<sup>761</sup> Necip Ali, “İsmet Paşa ve Halkevleri,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934): 402-404, p. 404



possibility for the “colonization” of “the people”<sup>762</sup> by the revolutionary elite. The revolutionary *Ülkü* elite aimed at creating narratives of the national past, present, and future, which were at the same time constructed to give shape to the existing social structure. Their initial concern with terms like “freedom” and “revolution” were paired with words like “obedience” and “discipline.” Even the content of freedom and revolution was filled by obedience and discipline.<sup>763</sup>

Revolutionary quest for enlightening and secularly purifying the people was to go hand in hand with promises that the Republic would bring civilization and prosperity to those who had lagged behind due to the “scholastic mentalities” of “dark” ages. The authoritarian nature of social control and the emancipatory, democratic ideals of official ideology were not contradictory in the minds of the revolutionary *Ülkü* elite, for authoritarian measures were deemed essential to make the traditional and “backward” segments of the population capable of participating in the Republican way of life.<sup>764</sup> The fundamental contradictions became visible in time when the Free Party was able to appeal to the nation during the municipal elections in 1930. This was the first significant mark bespeaking the confrontation between the civilizing mission of the Republic with the wills and aspirations of the people. Instead of taking into consideration people’s own aspirations, the radical

---

<sup>762</sup> Katherine Verdery, “The Production and Defense of ‘the Romanian Nation,’” in *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*, ed. Richard G. Fox, (Washington, D. C., 1990), p. 96

<sup>763</sup> See, for instance, Recep Peker, “Disiplinli Hürriyet,” (Disciplined Freedom), *Ülkü*, (1933)

<sup>764</sup> See for instance Hilmi A. Halik, “Kışla ve Köy Terbiyesi” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933)

*Ülkü* group thought that the restrictive mechanisms of state had to be enlarged to realize the revolution's goal of civilizing and hence democratizing society in a relatively short period of time. In his famous *İnkılap Dersleri* (Revolutionary Courses), Recep Peker, under the subtitle "Using Force in Revolution" (*İnkılapta Zor Kullanmak*), argued that among all the revolutions of the world, the Turkish Revolution is the one that had to use more force and violence against especially *irtica* (reactionism)<sup>765</sup> so as to pave the way for the progress and prosperity of the country.

The radical revolutionary ideology of the *Ülkü* elite implied that democracy could only flourish in a laic and republican system underpinned by an enlightened society. In fact, they were torn between the competing goals of enlightening (secularism) and emancipating (democracy) the people. The tension between secularism and democracy refracted the elites' 'march' to democracy in such a way that in the end this turned out to be a serious obstacle to democracy; it was redressed with their view that without a society which is not converted to secular or revolutionary morality, democracy is not possible. Thus, the elitist passion for the mass conversion of Turkish society to modernity and secularism used 'the will to democracy' as a justifiable end of the overall project. In this sense, "conversion" implies an ultimate means of negotiation of the tension between secularism and democracy in Turkey in the 1930s.

The final focus of analysis of the dissertation is on the relatively distinctive philosophy which the *Ülkü* circle nurtured. It was solidarism, which was anticlerical,

---

<sup>765</sup> Recep Peker, *İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları*, (Ankara, Ulus Basımevi, 1936), p.8

anti-liberal, patriotic, and nationalist. It maintained a positivistic faith in objective science and contempt for the religious value system. The solidarist perception of the radical revolutionaries was that the maintenance of discipline and social unity in Turkey would make the country better equipped than any in the world to transform society suddenly and in accord with rational revolutionary morality.

*Ülkü's* peculiar conceptualization of solidarism, emphasizing national uniformity and secular morality, in fact assimilated both politics and ethics of various kinds on condition that they were committed to secular revolutionary ideals. Having mainly adopted the French notion of citizenship highlighting the assimilation of different ethnic and cultural entities under a uniform Turkish identity, the *Ülkü* elite, further, came to the conclusion that different ethical postures would have to be unified to provide a classless, undifferentiated harmony and solidarity of the nation. In their mind, unless the society was raised to a desired ethical stance, democracy was impossible. Unanimity on desired moral standards was deemed necessary to establish "real solidarity" among society. The People's Houses were established specifically to bring people to the "desired ethical and cultural level" as envisaged by the revolutionary elite, as the vanguard group. Moreover, the Houses were designed as the civilizing vehicles through which the traditional masses would have the necessary qualifications to be carried to the prosperous future.

In sum, the dissertation elaborates a specific version of the Turkish revolutionary ideology in the 1930s when dramatic developments in institutions and beliefs of a new value system in Turkey began to crystallize, with implications for the course of development of the Turkish democratic experience. The analysis of the

*Ülkü* group provides some scholarly insights to interpret the Turkish Revolution in more realistic terms.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

“İnkılap Ülkülerini Yayma Yolunda,” (In the Way of Disseminating the Revolutionary Ideals), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933)

“Köycüler Bölümü İki Yaşına Girerken,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 19, (Sept., 1934), 75

“Kültür Haberleri: Yurdda Dil Bayramı,” *Ülkü*, Vol. VIII, No. 44, (Oct., 1936), 160-166

“N. Kansu’nun Halkevleri Hakkında Söylevi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), 6-8

“Partinin Yeni Programı İçin Kurultayda R. Peker’in Söylevi,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 28, (June, 1935): 247-259

“Recep Peker’in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), 1-5

“Şehit Kubilay Anıtının Açılışı Münasebetiyle Recep Bey’in Nutku,” *Ülkü*, 1934

“Ülkü İki Yaşına Kırerken Okuyanlar ve Yazanlarla Konuşma,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), 74-75

“*Ülkü*’nün Yazı Bölümleri,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), 76-79

A. B., “Hitler ve Fırkası,” (Hitler and his Party), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933), 160-165

Abadan, Yavuz. *İnkılap ve İnkılapçılık*, (İstanbul: Eminönü Halkevi, 1940)

Abdülkadir, “Köy ve Köylüler,” (Village and Peasants), *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936): 375-385

Abrams, Philips. *Historical Sociology*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1994)

- Acomb, Evelyn M. *The French Laic Laws 1879-1889*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941)
- Adams, Mildred. "Women under the Dictatorships," *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, Guy Stanton Ford (ed.), (London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1939), Second Edition, 272-291
- Adamson, Walter L. *Avant-Garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)
- Adivar, Abdulhak Adnan. "Interaction of Western and Islamic Thought in Turkey," in *Near Eastern Culture and Society: A Symposium on the Meeting on East and West*, ed. by T. Cuyler Young, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951)
- Adivar, Halide Edip. *Turkey Faces West; A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930)
- Afetinan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıra ve Belgeler* (Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yay., 1959)
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. "Vicdan Azabı Duymayanlara," *Son Posta*, A Daily Newspaper, January 12, 1931
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Devlet ve Fert* [State and Individual], (İstanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933)
- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969)
- Ahmad, Feroz. "The Political Economy of Kemalism." in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993).
- Aksın, Feridun (ed.), *Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı 1923-1953*, , Vol. 1, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999)

Alpert, Harry. "Emile Durkheim and the Theory of Social Integration" in Peter Hamilton (ed.) *Emile Durkheim; Critical Assessments*, Vol.2, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990)

*Anadolu*, September 4 and September 5, 1930

Andrzej Welicki, "Russia," in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969)

Apter, David. "Political Religion in the New Nations," *Old Societies and New States*, Clifford Geertz (ed.), (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 57-104

Aquarone, Stanislas. *The Life and Works of Emile Littre 1801-1881*, (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1958)

Arıkan, Saffet. "Yeni Fakültemizin Açılışı," *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 36, (Feb., 1936), 404-5

Armstrong, H. C. *Grey Wolf – Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator*, (London: Methuen, 1932)

*Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü Semineri* [Seminnar on the Economic and Social Aspect of Atatürkism], (İstanbul: İstanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi, 1973)

Atay, Falih Rıfkı. "Kubilay," *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 23, (Jan., 1935), 377

Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, trans. Harriet Martineau, (London, 1893), II

Avcıoğlu, Doğan. *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1968)

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1968)

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *Tek Adam*, Vol. 3, (İstanbul, 1965)

- Aydın, Ertan. "The Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The *Ülkü* Version of Kemalism," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (July, 2005, *forthcoming*)
- Aykut, Şeref. *Kamalizm: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programının İzahı*, (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1936)
- Baker, Keith M. "Enlightenment and Revolution in France: Old Problems, Renewed Approaches," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, 1981
- Baker, Keith M. "Memory and Practice: Politics and Representation of the Past in Eighteenth-Century France" *Representations*, Is. 11, (Summer, 1985), 134-135
- Baltacıoğlu, İsmayıl Hakkı. *Mürebblere*, (Semih Lütü: İstanbul, 1932)
- Baltacıoğlu, İsmayıl Hakkı. *Türke Doğru*, (Ankara, 1972)
- Barnard, H. C. *Education and the French Revolution*
- Barnes, Harry E. "Durkheim's Contribution to the Reconstruction of Political Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, 35: 2, (Jun., 1920): 236-254
- Başar, Ahmet Hamdi. *Atatürk'le Üç Ay*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945)
- Başar, Ahmet Hamdi. *İktisadi Devletçilik*, Vol. 2, (İstanbul, 1933)
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Yasa Koyucular ile Yorumcular*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996)
- Bayraktutan, Yusuf. *Türk Fikir Tarihinde Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türk Ocakları* [Modernization, Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths in the History of Turkish Thought], (Ankara: Kültür Bak. Yay., 1996)
- Belge, Murat. *Türkiye, Sosyalizm ve Gelecek*, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1989)
- Bellah, Robert "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Turkey and Japan", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, Is. 1, (Jul., 1958), 1-5



- Bellah, Robert ed., *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973)
- Bendix, Reinhard. *Force, Fate, and Freedom: On Historical Sociology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 114-116
- Berkes, Fay Kirby. *Village Institutes*, unpublished PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1964, 41-2
- Berkes, Niyazi. "Sociology in Turkey" in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 (September 1936, 238-246.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964)
- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill Univ. Press, 1964)
- Berkes, Niyazi. *Unutulan Yıllar*, (The Forgotten Years), ed., Ruşen Sezer, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997)
- Bertocci, Philip A. "Positivism, French Republicanism, and the Politics of Religion, 1848-1883," *Third Republic/Troisième République*, Fall 1976, No. 2, 182-227
- Bianchi, Robert. *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984)
- Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985*, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınları, 1989)
- Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiyede Devletçilik*, (Ankara, 1982)
- Bouglé, Célestin. *The French Conception of "Culture Générale" and Its Influences upon Instruction*, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, 1938), 25-26

- Bourgeois, Léon and Alfred Croiset (ed.), *Essai D'une Philosophie de La Solidarité, Conférences et Discussions*, (Paris: Félix Alcan, Éditeur, 1907)
- Bourgeois, Léon. *Solidarité*, (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1902), Third Edition
- Boutroux, Emile. *Education and Ethics*, (tr. by Fred Rothwell) (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1913)
- Bozkır, Kamuran. "Halkevleri," (People's Houses), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936), 74-5
- Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat. *Ataturk ihtilali, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Derslerinden*, (Istanbul: Burhaneddin Matbaası, 1940)
- Brown, Kendall W. "The French Revolution and Modernity," Stephen J. Tonsor (ed.), *Reflections on the French Revolution*, (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1990)
- Çavdar, Tevfik. *İttihat Terakki*, İstanbul: İletişim, 1991
- Çeçen, Anıl. *Halkevleri*, (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1990),
- Censer, Jack R "Commencing the Third Century of Debate," *The American Historical Review*, Volume 94, Issue 5 (Dec., 1989), 1309-1325
- Censer, Jack. "The French Revolution after two hundred years," *The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution*, ed. Joseph Klaitz & Michael H. Haltzel, (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994): 7-25
- Cevdet Nasuhi, "Halkevinin Çatısı Altında" (Under the Canopy of the People's Houses), *Ülkü*, Vol.1, No. 3, (Apr., 1933)
- Chadwick, Kay and Timothy Unwin (ed.) *New Perspectives on the Fin de Siècle in nineteenth and twentieth- Century France*, (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000)

- Charlton, D. G. "New Creeds for Old in Nineteenth-Century France", *Canadian Journal of Theology*, Vol. VIII (1962), No. 4, 258-269
- Charlton, D. G. *Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962)
- Charmont, Joseph. "Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy", in *Modern French Legal Philosophy* (Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. VII, Boston, 1916): 65-149
- Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)
- Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993)
- Clark, Linda L. "Social Darwinism in France," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 58, Is. 1, (Mar., 1981), p D1025-D1044 (On Demand Supplement)
- Clark, Linda. "The Molding of the *Citoyenne*: The Image of the Female in French Educational Literature, 1880-1914", *TR/TR*, (Spring-Fall 1977), No. 3, 74-104
- Cobban, Alfred. *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964)
- Cohen, Paul M. *Freedom's Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Liberty from Rousseau to Foucault*, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997)
- Coker, F. W. *Organismic Theories of the State: Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the State as Organism or as Person*, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1910)
- Colin Lucas, "Introduction," Colin Lucas (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), i-xii

- Cox, Harvey. *The Secular City*, (New York: Macmillan, 1965)
- Cranston, Maurice. "The Sovereignty of the Nation," Colin Lucas (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988)
- Creel, Frank W. "Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism", *Int. Journal of Turkish Studies*, 4(1980), 9-26.
- D. G. Charlton, *Positivistic Thought in France*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959)
- Dansette, Adrien. *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.; Paris, 1965)
- Davison, Andrew. *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
- Davison, Andrew. *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1997)
- De Hovre-Jordan, *Philosophy and Education* (A Translation of *Essai de Philosophie Pedagogique*), Vol. 1, (New York, 1931)
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Foucault*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)
- Derfler, Leslie. *The Third French Republic 1870-1940*, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966).
- Dodd, C. H. "The Development of Turkish Democracy," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, Is. 1 (1992), 16-30
- Doyle, William. "Presentation," Colin Lucas (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988)
- Droz, Jaques. *Histoire des Doctrines Politiques en France*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948)

- Dumont, Paul. "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology" in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (ed. by. Jacob Landau) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984)
- Durkheim, Emile. "The Principles of 1789 and Sociology," in Robert Bellah, ed., *Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973)
- Durkheim, Emile. *Moral Education, A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*, trans. by Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer, (New York: The Free Press, 1973)
- Durkheim, Emile. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. by Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Macmillan, 1915)
- Duru, Kazım Nami (trans. and ed.), *Sosyolojinin Unsurları: Seçilmiş ve Sıralanmış Metinler*, Lise Felsefe Dersleri Yardımcı Kitapları No. 11, (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936)
- Duru, Kazım Nami. "Humanisma", *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), 336
- Duru, Kazım Nami. "Kutsal Bir Dilek," (A Sacred Wish), *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 36, (Feb., 1936), 466
- Duru, Kazım Nami. "Roman" in *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933)
- Ebeling, Richard M. "Inflation and Controls in Revolutionary France: The Political Economy of the French Revolution," Stephen J. Tonsor (ed.), *Reflections on the French Revolution*, (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1990)
- Eisenstadt, S. N. "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective," Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981): 127-142
- Ellison, Grace. *Turkey To-Day* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1929)
- Elwitt, Sanford. *The Making of the Third Republic, Class and Politics in France, 1868-1884*, (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1975).

- Elwitt, Sanford. *The Third Republic Defended, Bourgeois Reform in France, 1880-1914*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986)
- Engin, Saffet. *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938)
- Erişirgil, Mehmet Emin. *Bir Fikir Adamının Romanı: Ziya Gökalp*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1984)
- Ertan, Temuçin Faik. *Kadrocular ve Kadro Hareketi*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1994), 65-73
- Ferry, Jules. "Letter to the Primary Teachers of France, November 17, 1883" in *French Educational Ideals of Today, An Anthology of the Molders of French Educational Thought of the Present*, Ferdinand Buisson and Frederic Ernest Farrington (ed.) (New York: World Book Company, 1919)
- Fidler, Geoffrey C. "On Jean-Marie Guyau, Immoraliste", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 55, Is. 1 (Jan., 1994), 75-97
- Fındıkoğlu, Z. Fahri. "Ziya Gökalp ve Sosyalizm," *1964-1965 Ders Yılı Sosyoloji Konferansları*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Neşriyatı, 1965), p 42-70, 59
- Ford, Thomas K. "Kamalist Turkey," *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, Guy Stanton Ford (ed.), (London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1939), Second Edition, 126-153
- Foucault, Michael. "Two Lectures," in *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Nicholas B. Dirks, et. al., (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994)
- Foucault, Michel. "What Calls for Punishment," *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)

- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1979)
- Fouillée, Alfred. "Hegemony of Science and Philosophy," *International Journal of Ethics*, 6:2 (Jan., 1896): 137-164
- Fouillée, Alfred. "Some Important Points of View in Contemporary French Legal Philosophy," in *Modern French Legal Philosophy* (Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. VII, Boston, 1916): 149-237
- Fox, Richard G. "Introduction", in Richard G. Fox (ed.), *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Culture* (USA: American Eth. Soc. Mon. Series, No. 2, 1990)
- Frey, Fredrick W. *The Turkish Political Elite*, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965)
- Furet, Francois and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
- Furet, François *Revolutionary France 1770-1880*, tr. by Antonia Nevill, (Oxford: Balckwell, 1988), p. 475
- Furet, François. "The French Revolution is Over," Jack R. Censer (ed.), *The French Revolution and Intellectual History*, (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989)
- Furet, François. "The French Revolution, or Pure Democracy," Colin Lucas (ed.), *Rewriting the French Revolution*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 33-45
- Furet, François. *Interpreting the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
- Furet, François. *Interpreting the French Revolution*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
- Furet, François. *Revolutionary France 1770-1880*, tr. by Antonia Nevill, (Oxford: Balckwell, 1988)

- Gellner, Ernest. "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective", p. 242
- Gellner, Ernest. *Muslim Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981)
- Gentile, Emilio. *Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy* (tr. by. Keith Botsford) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996)
- Giesen, Bernhard. "Cosmopolitans, Patriots, Jacobins and Romantics" in *Deadalus*, (Summer, 1998).
- Goffrey Walford and W.S.F. Pickering (ed.), *Durkheim and Moral Education*, 3
- Goguel, Francois and Marianna Carlson, "The Historical Background of Contemporary French Politics", *Yale French Studies*, No. 15, (1955): 30-37.
- Gökalp, Ziya. *Makaleler VII*, edited by M. Abdülhalik Çay, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1982)
- Gökalp, Ziya. *The Principles of Turkism*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968)
- Gökalp, Ziya. *Türk Ahlakı*, (İstanbul, 1975)
- Gökalp, Ziya. *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, trans. and ed. by Niyazi Berkes, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1959)
- Gökmen, Hazım. "Kanadlarımızın Büyük Utkusu," (The Great Utku of Our Wings), *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935): 122
- Göle, Nilüfer "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey", in Richard Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995)
- Gooch, G. P. *French Profiles; Prophets and Pioneers*, (London: Longmans, 1961).
- Grew, Joseph C. *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co. Ltd., 1953)



- Gruder, Vivian R. "Wither Revisionism? Political Perspectives on the Ancien Regime," *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 20, Is. 2, (Spring, 1997): 245-295
- Gültekin, Sabri. "Melez Terbiye" (Hybrid Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933)
- Güven, Ferid Celal. "Kubilay Günü," *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936), 366-367
- Güven, Ferid Celal. "Ona El Kalkar mı?," *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935), 162
- Guyau, Augustin. *La Philosophie et la Sociologie D'Alfred Fouillée*, (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1913)
- Hale, William. "Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945", *Bulletin (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies)*, Vol. 7, Is. 2 (1980), 100-117
- Halkevi 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yıllarda Nasıl Çalıştı*, ed. by Behçet Kemal (Çağlar), (Ankara, 1935)
- Hamburger, Maurice. *Léon Bourgeois*, (Paris : Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1932)
- Hampson, Norman. *Saint-Just*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991)
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. "Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic", in *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 86, 1997/2, 133-149
- Hann, Chris. "The nation-state, religion, and uncivil society: Two perspectives from the periphery" *Daedalus*, Vol. 26, Is. 2 (Spring, 1997), 27-45
- Hardman, John (ed), *The French Revolution; Sourcebook*, (London: Arnold, 1999)
- Hardman, John (ed). *The French Revolution; Sourcebook*, (London: Arnold, 1999): 225-226.

- Hayward, J. E. S. "The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Léon Bourgeois and Solidarism" *International Review of Social History*, Vol. VI (1961): 19-48
- Hayward, Jack E. S. "Solidarist Syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit", in Peter Hamilton (ed.) *Emile Durkheim; Critical Assessments*, Vol.2, (London: Routledge, 1990)
- Hayward, Jack E. S. "Solidarity and the Reformist Sociology of Alfred Fouillée, I" *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 22 (1963): 205-222
- Hayward, Jack E. S. "Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in Nineteenth Century France," *International Review of Social History*, IV (1959): 261-284
- Heper, Metin. "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?", *Middle East Journal*, 51/1 (1997)
- Heper, Metin. "Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey" *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (1992), 169-194
- Heper, Metin. "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, Is. 1, (Fall 2000)
- Heper, Metin. "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective", *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1991
- Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985), 14-16
- Heyd, Uriel. *The Foundations of the Turkish Nationalism*, 1950
- Higonnet, Patrice. *Goodness beyond Virtue; Jacobins during the French Revolution*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998)
- Hilmi A. Halik, "Kışla ve Köy Terbiyesi," (Army and the Education of Peasants), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), 237-240

- Hilmi, "Halk Neşriyatının Ehemmiyeti," (The Significance of the People Publication) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933), 70-79
- Hobsbawn, Eric. *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990)
- Hotham, David. *The Turks*, (London: John Murray, 1972)
- Houminer, Ehud. "The People's Houses in Turkey", *Asian and African Studies*, Annual of the Israel Oriental Society, Vol. 1, Jerusalem, 1965
- Hunt, Lynn. "Foreword," *Re-creating Authority in Revolutionary France*, Bryant T. Ragan, Jr., and Elizabeth A. Williams (eds.), (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992)
- Hunt, Lynn. "The Sacred and the French Revolution", in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 25-43
- Hunt, Lynn. *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)
- Hüsnü, Niyazi. "İlim ve İnkılap," (Science and Revolution) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933), 115-7
- İnalcık, Halil. "The Nature of Traditional Society," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, 42-63, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964)
- İnönü, İsmet "Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı," *Kadro*, (October, 1933)
- İnönü, İsmet. "Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1933): 1-4
- İrem, Nazım. "Kemalist Modernizm ve Türk Gelenekçi-Muhafazakarlığının Kökenleri," [Kemalist Modernism and the Roots of Turkish Nationalist Conservatism], *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 74, (Güz, 1997), 52-101

- İrem, Nazım. "Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal," *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* Vol. 34, No. 1, (2002), 87-112
- Jean Jacque Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, Roger Masters, ed., Judith Masters, trans. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978)
- Jones, Colin. "Bourgeois Revolution Revivified, 1789 and Social Change," Gary Kates (ed.), *The French Revolution; Recent Debates and New Controversies*, (London: Routledge, 1998), 157-191
- Jones, Peter. "Introduction," Peter Jones (ed.), *The French Revolution in Social and Political Perspective*, (London: Arnold, 1996)
- Kadro*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (II. Kanun, 1932)
- Kandemir, Feridun. *Serbest Fırka Nasıl Kuruldu Nasıl Kapatıldı*, (İstanbul: Ekicigil Yayınları, 1955)
- Kaplan, Mehmet and et al. (eds.), *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1992)
- Karadağ, Nurhan. *Halkevleri Tiyatro Çalışmaları: 1932-1951*, (Ankara: T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1998)
- Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri, *Zoraki Diplomat* [Uneasy Diplomat], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998)
- Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Politikada 45 Yıl* [45 Years in Political Life], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984)
- Karaömerlioğlu, M. Asım. "The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 34/4 (1998), 67-91
- Karpat, Kemal H. "The People's Houses in Turkey, Establishment and Growth," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 17, 1963
- Karpat, Kemal. *Turkey's Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959)

- Kates, Gary. "Introduction," Gary Kates (ed.), *The French Revolution, Recent Debates and New Controversies*, (London: Routledge, 1998)
- Kazancıgil, Ali. "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Turkey*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 213-238
- Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*, fourth, expanded edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)
- Kemal Karpat, "The People's Houses," 55
- Keyder, Çağlar. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London: Verso, 1987);
- Keylor, William R. *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), p 166-168
- Kılıç Ali, *Atatürk'ün Hususiyetleri*, (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955)
- Kindleberger, Charles P. *The World in Depression*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)
- Kinross, Lord. *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation*, (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brothers, 1964)
- Knight, Alan. "Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared to England and France," *Past & Present*, No. 134, (Feb., 1992): 159-199
- Kohn, Hans. "Ten Years of the Turkish Republic," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Oct., 1933): 141-155
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. "Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi," (A Village Project Experience), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, 123
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. "Bizim Planımız," (Our Plan) *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), 16-19

- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Danimarka Köylüsü Nasıl Uyandı,” in *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), 467-473
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Halk Kuvveti,” (Force of People), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933)
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Halk Terbiyesi,” (People’s Education) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): 16-20
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Halkçılık” (Populism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (Apr., 1933): 185-190
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “İnkılap İdeolojisinde Halkçılık,” (Populism in the Ideology of Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 41-5
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Köycülük Programına Giriş,” (Introduction to the Program of Peasantism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, No. 26, (Apr., 1935): 132-141
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Terbiye Meselesi,” (The Problem of Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6, (July, 1933): 436-439
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Canlı Söz,” (Lively Speech) *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 38, (April, 1936): 85-87
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Kemalizm İnkılabının Hususiyetleri,” (The Peculiarities of Kemalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 42, (Aug., 1936): 416-8
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Kemalizm ve Politika Bilgisi,” (Kemalism and the Political Science), Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936)
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Köy Misyonerliği,” (Village Missionary), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Sept., 1933), 150
- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. “Köy Seferberliğine Doğru,” (Towards Village Mobilization), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 5, (June, 1933): 355-361

- (Köymen), Nusret Kemal. "Köycülük Çalışmaları," (Peasantism Studies), *Ülkü*, Vol. 6, No. 35, (Jan., 1936): 386-388
- Küçük, Yalçın. *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler-5, 1830-1980*, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1988)
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "İsmet Paşa ve Halkevleri," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), 402-404
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "19 Şubat," *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933): 4-5
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "Halkevleri Yıldönümü Nutku," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), 5-15
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey'in Nutku," (A Speech Delivered by Necip Ali Bey in an Annual of the People Houses), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933), 104-114
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "Başvekilin Dersi," *Varlık*, No. 19, (15 April 1934), 289
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "Halkevleri Yıldönümünde Necip Ali Bey'in Nutku", Vol. 1, No. 2, (March 1933): 104-114
- (Küçüka), Necip Ali. "İnkılap ve Türk Kanunu Medenisi," [Revolution and the Turkish Civil Law] *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 9, (October 1933): 178-185
- Lefebvre, George. *The French Revolution*, Two Volumes, Vol. 1: *From Its Origins to 1793*, trans. Elizabeth Moss Evanson, Vol. II: *From 1793 to 1799*, trans. John H. Stewart and James Friguglietti (New York, 1962-64).
- Lerner, Daniel. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, (New York: The Free Press, 1958)
- Lewis, Bernard. "Loyalty to Community, Nation and State," In *Middle East Perspectives: The New Twenty Years*, ed. by George Issawi, (princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1981)

- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968)
- Lucas, Colin. “Nobles, Bourgeois, and the Origins of the French Revolution” *The French Revolution and Intellectual History*, Jack R. Censer (ed.), (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989)
- Lukes, Steven. *Émile Durkheim: His Life and His Work*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)
- Mardin “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey,” in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James P. Piscatori, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 138-159
- Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey,” *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 29, (1977): 279-297,
- Mardin, Şerif. “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution.” In *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.2, 1971: 197-211
- Mardin, Şerif. “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11, (1969): 258-281
- Mardin, Şerif. “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey,” in James P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 138-159
- Mardin, Şerif. “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997): 191-219
- Mardin, Şerif. “The Just and the Unjust”, *Daedalus* 120, (1991): 113-129
- Mardin, Şerif. *İdeoloji*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1982), p 117-118
- Mardin, Şerif. *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992)



- Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962)
- Mardin, Şerif. “Siyasi Fikir Tarihi Çalışmalarında Muhteva Analizi,” [Content Analysis in the Studies of History of Political Ideas], *Siyasal ve Sosyal Bilimler*, Mümtaz’er Türköne and Tuncay Önder (ed.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 9-24
- Marjolin, Robert. “French Sociology - Comte and Durkheim”, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, Is. 5, (March, 1937), 693-704
- Martin, David. *A General Theory of Secularization*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1978)
- Mehmet Saffet, “Milliyetçiliğin Felsefi Esasları,” (The Philosophical Foundations of Nationalism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 12 (Jan., 1934)
- Milliyet* (Nationality), November 3, 1963
- Minnich, Lawrence A. *Social Problems and Political Alignments in France, 1893-1898; Leon Bourgeois and Solidarity*, (unpublished PhD Dissertation), The Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University, (September, 1948)
- Moody, Joseph N. *French Education Since Napoleon*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1978)
- Mosse, George L. “Political Style and Political Theory – Totalitarian Democracy Revisited,” *Totalitarian Democracy and After, International Colloquium in Memory of Jacob L. Talmon, Jerusalem, 21-24 June 1982*, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1984)
- Mosse, George. *The Crisis of German Ideology; Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964)

- Mosse, George. *The Nationalization of the Masses*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975)
- N. K, "Halkevleri Neşriyatı," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), 465-6
- Nafi Atuf, "Lozan ve Milli Kültür," [Lozan and the National Culture], *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934), 405-408
- Hüseyin Namık, "Türk Edebiyatına Toplu Bir Bakış," [A General Outlook to the Turkish Literature], *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), 71-73
- Nami, Kazım. "İnkılap Edebiyatı," [The Revolutionary Literature], *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934), 46-53
- Nesimi, Ahmet. "İnanç ve Us," [Belief and Reason], *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), pp. 403-407
- Nesimi, Ahmed. "Kip ve Devrim (Enmuzeç ve İnkılap)," *Ülkü*, Vol. 5, Is. 29, (July, 1935), 330-333
- Nesimi, Ahmet. "Fertçilik ve Cemiyetçilik," [Individualism and Communalism] *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933), pp. 1-7
- Nesimi, Ahmet. "İslahatçı İktimaiyat Bakımından Sosyalizm," [Socialism from the Perspective of Reformist Sociology], *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 16, (June, 1934), 241-252
- Neumann, Sigmund. "The Political Lieutenants in Modern Dictatorship," *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, Guy Stanton Ford (ed.), (London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1939), Second Edition, 292-309;
- Nicolet, Claude. *L'Idée Républicaine en France (1789-1924), Essai D'Histoire Critique*, (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1982)
- Niyazi Hüsni, "İlim ve İnkılap," (Science and Revolution) *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 115-7, 117

- Nord, Philip. *The Republican Moment, Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995)
- Nuri, Osman. "Haymana'nın Ahırlıkuyu Köyü," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), 394-400
- Offen, Karen. "Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle France," in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3, (Jun., 1984), pp. 648-676
- Okyar, Ali Fethi. *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Fesh Edildi*, (İstanbul, 1987)
- Okyar, Fethi *Fethi Okyar'ın Anıları: Atatürk, Okyar ve Çok Partili Türkiye*, ed. Osman Okyar and Mehmet Seyitdanlioğlu, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999)
- Okyar, Fethi. *Üç Devirde Bir Adam*, ed. by Cemal Kutay, (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980)
- Oruz, İffet H. *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'de Kadın Devrimi* (İstanbul: Gül Matbaası, 1986)
- Öymen, Hıfzırrahman Raşit. "Köy Mektebi ve Köy Muallimi," (The Village School and the Village Teacher) *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), 414-7
- Özbudun, Ergun. "Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey," S. P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party States*, (New York: Basic Books, 1970): 380-405
- Özbudun, Ergun. "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," Eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997): 79-102

- Ozouf, Mona. “*La Révolution française et l’idée de l’homme nouveau*,” Colin Lucas (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 213-232
- Ozouf, Mona. *Festivals and the French Revolution*, tr. by Alan Sheridan, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988)
- Parla, Taha. *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985)
- Parry, Geraint. “Constructive and Reconstructive Political Education”, *Oxford Review of Education*, (Mar-Jun99), Vol. 25, Issue 1/2, 23-39
- Parry, Geraint. “Constructive and Reconstructive Political Education,” *Oxford Review of Education*, (Mar-Jun99), Vol. 25 Issue 1/2, 23-39
- Partin, Malcolm O. *Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, and the Church: The politics of anti-clericalism, 1899-1905*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969)
- Paulhan, Fr. “Contemporary Philosophy in France”, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 9, Is. 1 (Jan., 1900), 42-69
- Peker, Recep. “Disiplinli Hürriyet,” (Disciplined Freedom), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (Apr., 1933), 177-180
- Peker, Recep. “Kubilay Abidesinin Açılması,” *Ülkü*, No. 23, (Jan., 1935), 374-376
- Peker, Recep. “Recep Peker’in İş Kanununu İzahı,” (Recep Peker’s Explanation of the Legislation on Employment), Vol. 7, No. 41, (July, 1936): 324-328
- Peker, Recep. “Recep Peker’in Partililerle Bir Konuşması,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 39, (May, 1936): 161-162
- Peker, Recep. “Recep Peker’in Yeni Halkevlerini Açma Nutku,” *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March, 1936): 1-5

- Peker, Recep. "Halkevleri Açılma Nutku," (The Inauguration Speech of the People's Houses), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933)
- Peker, Recep. "Ülkü Niçin Çıkıyor," (Why *Ülkü* is Published) *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933): 1-2
- Peker, Recep. "Uluslaşma-Devletleşme," (Nationalization-Etatization), *Ülkü*, Vol. 7, No. 40, (June, 1936): I-VII
- Peterson, David J. *Revoking the Moral Order*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999)
- Power, Thomas F. *Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism*, (New York: King's Crown Press, 1944)
- Quinet, Edgar. "A Lay School For a Lay Society" in *French Educational Ideals of Today, An Anthology of the Molders of French Educational Thought of the Present*, Ferdinand Buisson and Frederic Ernest Farrington (ed.) (New York: World Book Company, 1919), 1-4
- R. Ş, "Garp Memleketlerinde Halk Terbiyesi," (Adult Education in the Western Countries), *Ülkü*, Vol.1, No. 4, (May, 1933), 295-306
- Rabinow, Paul. *French Modern*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989)
- Rambaud, Alfred. *Jules Ferry*, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 1903)
- Reardon, Bernard M. G. *Religion in the Age of Romanticism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
- Reed-Danahay, Deborah. *Education and Identity in Rural France, the Politics of Schooling*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
- Renan, Ernest. "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" in A.D Smith. and J. Hutchinson (ed) *Nationalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- Rıza, A. "Akça Köy," *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933), 65

- Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984)
- Rothermund, Dietmar. *The Global Impact of the Great Depression*, (London: Routledge, 1996)
- Sa'adah, Anne. *The Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990)
- Sadık, Necmeddin. *Layik Ne Demek* (What Does Laique Mean), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 11, (Dec., 1933), 270-278
- Safa, Peyami. *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution* (Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar), tr. by Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, (Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 1999)
- Saffet, Mehmet. "Devlet ve Vatandaş" (State and Citizen), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (Apr., 1934), 181-184
- Saffet, Mehmet. "İnkılap Terbiyesi," (The Revolutionary Education), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933), 105-114
- Saffet, Mehmet. "Köycülük Nedir," (What is Peasantism), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 6, (Jul., 1933), 422-430
- Saffet, Mehmet. "Kültür İnkılabımız," (Our Cultural Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol.1, No. 5, (June, 1933): 351-54
- Sait, Aydoslu. "Milliyetçi ve Taazzuvcu İktisat," *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 4, (May, 1933)
- Sait, Aydoslu. "Ölü ve Diri Tarih," (Death and Alive History), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Feb., 1933): 18-19
- Sami, Ali. "Güzel Sanatları İnkılabına Nasıl Maledebiliriz," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), 359-361

- Sarmay, Yusuf. *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* [The Historical Development of Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931], (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1994)
- Schama, Simon. *Citizens; A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989)
- Scott, John A. *Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951)
- Sellars, Roy Wood. "Positivism in Contemporary Philosophic Thought", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 4, Is. I (Feb., 1939), 26-42
- Şevket Mehmedali, "Hukuk Bakımından Buhran," *Ülkü*, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): 20-26
- Sewell, William H. "A rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution," Gary Kates (ed.), *The French Revolution; Recent Debates and New Controversies*, (London: Routledge, 1998), 143-156
- Sewell, William H. "Le citoyen/la citoyenne: Activity, Passivity, and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship," Colin Lucas (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988)
- Sheradin, Kristin A. *Reforming the Republic: Solidarism and the Making of the French Welfare System, 1871-1914*, (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester, 2000), Unpublished PhD Dissertation
- Simon, W. M. "The 'Two Cultures' in Nineteenth-Century France: Victor Cousin and Auguste Comte", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 26, Is. 1, (Jan.-Mar., 1965), 45-58
- Singer, Brian C. J. *Society, Theory and the French Revolution; Studies in the Revolutionary Imaginary*, (London: Macmillan, 1986)

- Sırrı, Selim. "İtalya'da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı," (The People and Youth Organization in Italy), *Ülkü*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 1933), 241-3
- Smith, Anthony D. "Gastronomy and Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations," *ASEN*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995
- Soltau, Roger. *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931)
- Sonenscher, Michael. "Artisans, *Sans-Culottes* and the French Revolution," Alan Forest and Peter Jones (eds.), *Reshaping France; Town, Country and Region During the French Revolution*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 105-121
- Soyak, Hasan Rıza. *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar*, (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 1973)
- Spearman, Diana. *Modern Dictatorship*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939)
- Stern, Fritz. *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974)
- Stock-Morton, Phyllis. *Moral Education for a Secular Society; The Development of Morale Laïque in Nineteenth Century France*, (New York: SUNY Press, 1988)
- Szyliowicz, Joseph S. *A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case* (London: Sage Publications, 1972)
- T.B.M.M. *Zabıt Ceridesi*, Dördüncü İn'ikat 2-X-1930 Perşembe, Devre: 3, Cilt: 21, İçtima: 9, Birinci Celse
- Talmon, Jacob L. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960)
- Tanrıöver, Hamdullah Suphi. *Seçmeler* [Selections], ed. M. N. Sepetçioğlu (İstanbul: MEB Yay., 1971), 72-73.



- Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin, “Türkiye’de Bir Aydın Hareketi: Kadro,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, 24, (Winter, 1984), 35-67
- Tekin Alp (Mois Cohen), “Ziya Gökalp’te Tescanütçülük” in Jacob Landau (ed.) *Tekinalp: Bir Türk Yurtseveri*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), 411-412
- Tekinalp, Munis. *Kemalizm*, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Gazete ve Matbaası, 1936)
- Thompson, Dennis. *The Democratic Citizen* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), 43-52
- Tocqueville, Alexis. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, tr. by Stuart Gilbert, (New York: Anchor Books, 1955)
- Toprak, Zafer. “Aydın, Ulus-Devlet ve Populizm,” in *Türk Aydını ve Kimlik Sorunu*, Sabahattin Şen, ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995)
- Toprak, Zafer. “Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Oluşumu” in *Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarihiyle İlgili Sorunlar Sempozyumu*, (İstanbul, 1977),13-31
- Toprak, Zafer. “II. Meşrutiyet’te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, (Spring, 1977): 92-123
- Tör, Vedat Nedim. *Yıllar Böyle Geçti*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976)
- Toynbe, Arnold and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey*, (New York: Chales Scribner’s Sons, 1927)
- Tüfekçi, Gürbüz (ed.). *Atatürk, Seyahat Notları (1930-1931)*, (Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998)
- Tunaya, Tarık Z. *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952*, (Doğan Kardeş: İstanbul, 1952)
- Türk Parlamento Tarihi, TBMM-II. Dönem 1923-1927*, Vol. II (Ankara: TBMM Vakfı Yayınları, 1996)

- Turner, Victor. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, (Chicago: Aldine, 1969)
- Uran, Hilmi. *Hatıralarım*, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959)
- Üstel, Füsün. *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931* [Turkish Nationalism from the Empire to the Nation-State: The Turkish Hearths, 1912-1931] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997)
- Venturi, Franco. *Roots of Revolution: A History of Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia* (New York: MacMillan, 1969)
- Venturino, Diego. "La naissance de l'Ancien Régime," Colin Lucas (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. II, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 11-40
- Viswanathan, Gauri. *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998)
- Walford, Goffrey and W.S.F. Pickering (ed.), *Durkheim and Moral Education* (London: Routledge, 1998)
- Weber, Eugen. "What Rough Beast?" *Critical Review*, 2 (1996), 285-98
- Webster, Donald E. "State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey", in *American Sociological Review*, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Apr., 1939), 247-256
- Webster, Donald E. "State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey," *American Sociological Review*, Volume 4, Is. 2, (Apr., 1939): 247-256
- Webster, Donald E. *The Turkey of Atatürk*, (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939)
- Webster, Donald. *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939)

- Weiker, Walter. *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984)
- Wilson, Bryan. "Secularization" in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, editor in chief Mircea Eliade, (New York: Macmillan, 1987)
- Wilson, Mabel V. "Auguste Comte's Conception of Humanity", 99
- Wortham, H. E. *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1931)
- Y. de la Briere, *Le Lutttes presentes de l'Eglise*, (Paris: G. Beauchesne 1913)
- Yalman, Nur. "Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey," *Daedalus*, 102 (1973), pp. 139-67.
- Yarın* [Tomorrow], a daily newspaper
- Yeşilkaya, Neşe G. *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999)
- Yetkin, Çetin. *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı*, (İstanbul: Karacan Yayınları, 1982), pp. 93-97
- Yücel, Hasan Ali. "Dil İnkılabımız," (Our Language Revolution), *Ülkü*, Vol. 4, No. 22, (Dec., 1934): 255-7
- Zeitline, Irving M. *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory*, (New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987)
- Zeldin, Theodore. *France 1848-1945: Politics & Anger*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)
- Ziya, Aptullah. "Köy Mimarisi" (The Village Architecture), *Ülkü*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Aug., 1933): 37-41

Zübeyr, Hamit. “Halk Terbiyesi Vasıtaları,” (The Means of People Education) Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9

Zürcher, Eric J. *Turkey, A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997)